Lorsque les fonctionnaires adoptent des comportements fautifs, qui entravent le bon déroulement des missions publiques, l’Administration est en droit d’exercer une action disciplinaire à leur encontre. Par ce biais, l’Administration contrôle, compense ou neutralise les déviances risquant de nuire à l’action publique et à son image. En toute logique, les modalités d’exercice des pouvoirs disciplinaires varient selon les États, conformément aux dispositions propres à chaque fonction publique. Il est rare de trouver une conformité absolue entre les divers régimes disciplinaires. L’objet de la présente thèse est de comparer et d’identifier les caractéristiques propres à l’action disciplinaire applicable dans la fonction publique en France et au Liban, en faisant un rapprochement entre cette dernière action et l’action pénale. Il s’agit ainsi d’observer dans quelle mesure les principes généraux régissant l’action pénale peuvent fournir des éléments de perfectionnement du régime disciplinaire, que ce soit français ou libanais, en le rendant plus équitable. / When public civil servants engage in misconduct, which hinders the proper conduct of public duties, the Administration is entitled to exercise disciplinary action against them. In this way, the Administration controls, compensates or neutralizes the deviations likely to harm the public action and its image. Logically, the procedures for the exercise of disciplinary powers vary according to the state, in accordance with the provisions of each civil service. It is rare to find absolute conformity between the various disciplinary systems. The purpose of this thesis is to compare and identify the characteristics of the disciplinary action applicable in the civil service in France and Lebanon, bringing the latter action closer to criminal action. It is thus necessary to observe to what extent the general principles governing criminal prosecution can provide elements for the improvement of the disciplinary system, whether French or Lebanese, by making it more equitable.

L'indication Géographique, signe distinctif particulièrement spécifique, a connu au XIXème et XXème siècle, par, notamment des législations nationales éparses, des accords bilatéraux ou des conventions multilatérales, voire même l'utilisation contentieuse des moyens juridiques de lutte contre la concurrence déloyale, différents types de protection utiles mais limités. Ces derniers, appuyés par l'intervention de la Communauté Européenne, ont, néanmoins, eu le grand avantage de rendre possible l'émergence internationale, dans l'Accord ADPIC, d'une section spécifique dédiée. Ce texte issu des Accords de Marrakech instituant, en 1994, l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) reconnaît, en effet, l'Indication Géographique comme l'objet d'un droit autonome de Propriété Intellectuelle. Il lui permet de disposer d'une définition et d'un régime juridique, et surtout oblige les différents Membres de l'OMC, à le reconnaître et à le protéger. En posant un principe de liberté dans la mise en œuvre de ce dispositif nouveau qui, contrairement aux autres Droits de Propriété Intellectuelle, et en particulier aux marques, ne s'applique pas à un système préexistant, cet Accord a eu pour conséquence non pas une uniformisation, mais une certaine hétérogénéité des situations nationales. Celles-ci ont pu conduire, dans certains cas, à un métissage ou à une substitution des concepts, notamment à cause de l'intégration des Indications Géographiques dans des systèmes préexistants de Propriété Intellectuelle, comme celui des marques de certification / Geographical Indication, a particularly specific distinguishing sign, experienced throughout the XIXth and XXth centuries, under specially scattered national legislations, joint conventions or bilateral agreements, even under the contentious use of legal means to combat unfair competition, different types of useful but limited protection. These latter, supported by the intervention of the European Community, had however the advantage of contributing to make a specific dedicated section emergence possible in the Trip's agreement. This text coming from the Marrakech Agreements which established in 1994 the World Trade Organization (WTO), recognizes in fact the Geographical Indications as an independent law of Intellectual Property. It allows them to rely on a definition and a legal system, and bind the different members of the WTO to their recognition and protection. In asserting a principle of liberty in the implementation of this new system which, contrary to the other rights of Intellectual Property, and particularly of marks, does not apply to a preexisting system, this Agreement has not resulted in a uniform effect but heterogeneity of national situations. In special cases, these situations may have led to a knowledgeable mix or substitution of concepts, particularly because of the Geographical Indications integration into preexisting systems of Intellectual Property such as certification marks. Beyond the recognition of the Geographical Indication definition in these texts, the existence of two types of protection, simple and additional, has also practical consequences on these different integrations

Le droit pénal ne contient, certes, aucune infraction de prosélytisme intellectuel nommée comme telle, mais il connaît, depuis longtemps, la conversion idéologique et s’y intéresse par le moyen de plusieurs types d’incriminations. En effet, s’il demeure, au nom du respect des libertés fondamentales, complètement indifférent à l’appropriation d’une idéologie par le prosélyte, il intervient à chaque fois que l’expression de celle-ci porte atteinte aux valeurs sociales qu’il protège. C’est notamment le cas lorsqu’une idéologie agressive est diffusée : elle échappe à tout contrôle possible par le prosélyte, si bien que sa propagation est source de trouble pour l’ordre public et justifie ainsi sa répression par une infraction d’idéologie. En outre, le droit pénal s’intéresse au comportement du prosélyte : lorsque l’acte qu’il réalise en vue de convertir autrui à une idéologie heurte les valeurs protégées par le législateur pénal, des infractions par idéologie existent pour limiter le prosélytisme intellectuel. Elles ont vocation à réprimer non pas la conversion idéologique en tant que telle, mais les moyens utilisés par le prosélyte au cours du processus de conversion et qui constituent, eux, une menace pour l’ordre et la sécurité publics. Par conséquent, que ce soit à travers des infractions d’idéologie ou par idéologie, le droit pénal contient déjà la réponse pour combattre le prosélytisme intellectuel qui risque de menacer la tranquillité sociale. Dès lors, en dépit de la tendance actuelle qui privilégie le recours à l’arme répressive pour combattre le terrorisme, les sectes dites dangereuses et l’homme criminel – dangereux, à son tour –, aucune intervention législative qui irait dans le sens de la création d’une nouvelle incrimination de prosélytisme intellectuel n’est la bienvenue. En revanche, l’étude du prosélytisme intellectuel a permis de mettre en évidence une particularité propre au délinquant prosélyte qui devrait être prise en compte aussi bien par le législateur que par le juge pénal : animé par une idéologie, le prosélyte devrait être toujours traité comme un délinquant politique et les infractions de prosélytisme intellectuel innommées devraient alors, elles aussi, recevoir cette qualification. / Criminal law does not explicitly incorporate criminal offenses directly related to intellectual proselytism per se. Nevertheless, references to ideological conversion have long been cited in several types of criminal offenses. Criminal law holds that each person has the fundamental human right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and does not interfere in the act of a proselyte adopting an ideology. However, the law is implicated whenever an ideology is conveyed in such a manner that threatens the social values the law is bound to protect. For instance, an aggressive ideology is a real danger to the public order, and can spread and spin out of control. In such cases, it is justified and necessary to consider ideological conversion as a crime named ideological offense.Furthermore, the behavior of the proselyte is of concern, whenever an action to convert a person to an ideology is in conflict with the values that criminal legislators are protecting. Specific offenses induced by an ideology are in place to impede intellectual proselytism. These types of offenses aim to penalize the methods used by the proselyte during conversion, rather than prohibit the ideological conversion itself, as the methods themselves constitute a danger to the public order and safety.Consequently, criminal law already encompasses offenses based on ideological ground or induced by ideology, and which constrain intellectual proselytism that is at risk of disturbing the social order. Any new draft law and intervention to propose additional incrimination related to intellectual proselytism are questionable, in spite of the recent tendency to eradicate terrorism, dangerous sects, or criminals by means of repressive weapons.Interestingly, the study completed on intellectual proselytism has shown that there exist particularities of an intellectual proselyte which are analogous to a political delinquent. And this fact must be taken into account by both prosecutors and criminal judges. A proselyte who is supporting a strong ideology is similar to a political delinquent and thereby, offenses related to intellectual proselytism should be treated in the same manner as infractions of a political delinquent.

Cette étude se propose d’analyser la réception médiévale du personnage de Caton d’Utique, philosophe stoïcien et citoyen romain engagé dans la défense des institutions républicaines durant la période de la seconde guerre civile, qui se suicida après la victoire de Jules César (46 av. J.-C.). Concentrant, dans un premier temps, notre intérêt sur le Catone dantesco, et en particulier sur le portier du Purgatorio de la Commedia, il a semblé pertinent de remonter le cours du temps afin d’étudier les potentielles sources de la figure catonienne élaborée par Dante (1265-1321). Ce projet a conduit à réévaluer l’image du Romain dessinée par les auteurs antiques (Ier s. av. J.-C.-VIIe s. ap. J.-C.), puis à découvrir les contours de celle tracée par les auteurs médiévaux (VIIIe s. ap. J.-C.-1320). Cet imposant parcours s’est organisé autour d’une quadruple interrogation concernant la pensée médiévale : quel rôle y joue l’exemplarité ? quelle place revient à Rome et aux Romains ? comment sont traitées les questions de la liberté et du suicide ? comment répond-on au problème du salut des païens antiques ? / The study examines the medieval reception of the character of Cato of Utica, a Stoic philosopher and Roman citizen engaged in defending the institutions of the Roman Republic during the second civil war, who committed suicide after the Julius Caesar's victory (46 B.C.E.). The thesis starts by focusing on the Catone dantesco, and in particular on Cato as the warden of the Purgatorio of the Commedia, and then works backwards in analyzing the potential sources of Dante’s (1265-1321) portrayal. This undertaking leads to a reevaluation of the image of Cato in antique authors (1st century B.C.E.-7th century C.E.), and then to uncovering the outlines of the portrayals of medieval authors (8th century C.E. - 1320). This massive undertaking is organized around four questions concerning medieval thought : what role does the notion of exemplarity play in the discussion? What place is given to Rome and to the Romans? How are the questions of liberty and suicide treated? How do the authors discuss the problem of salvation for pagans of Antiquity?

Depuis quelques décennies, les États européens font face à des revendications religieuses qui visent l’adaptation de règles générales applicables dans différents domaines de la vie en société, et cela dans un contexte qui s’est progressivement sécularisé. Qu’il s’agisse du port du turban sikh par les motocyclistes britanniques, de l’organisation de l’horaire de travail lors du ramadan dans les transports publics belges ou des objections à la célébration de mariages entre personnes de même sexe par les officiers d’état civil français de confession chrétienne, nombreux sont les exemples qui ont défrayé la chronique sur le Vieux Continent. Ces requêtes d’aménagement religieux ne sont pas sans mettre au défi juges et législateurs. Elles interrogent le rôle de l’État dans la résolution de ces nouveaux enjeux et poussent plus largement la réflexion sur la place de la religion dans les sociétés occidentales contemporaines. Afin de répondre spécifiquement à ces demandes, les États-Unis et le Canada ont fait découler de la liberté de religion et de l’interdiction des discriminations en matière religieuse, un droit spécifique à obtenir l’ajustement des mesures générales, qui entrent en contradiction avec les croyances ou pratiques religieuses de leur population :l’«accommodement raisonnable». Face aux sollicitations d’ordre religieux qui touchent actuellement les pays européens, il y a, depuis quelques années, une mobilisation de ce concept juridique nord-américain – déjà intégré en Europe en matière de handicap – dans les sphères médiatique, politique et également scientifique. La thèse vise à éclairer le débat européen qui pose la question de l’intégration d’un tel droit sur la base des croyances religieuses ou philosophiques. En analysant la manière dont plusieurs États européens appréhendent certaines demandes d’aménagement religieux, sur la base des outils juridiques dont ils disposent (liberté de religion, interdiction des discriminations en matière religieuse), l’étude s’est efforcée d’évaluer le degré de circulation du concept d’«accommodement raisonnable» en matière religieuse dans l’espace normatif européen et, cela, en vue de porter un regard plus critique sur l’éventuelle reconnaissance de ce principe en Europe. Pour ce faire, il a été décidé de se pencher sur les ordres juridiques de trois pays (étude de cas) qui couvrent l’échelle des divers modèles européens de prise en compte des identités religieuses (Angleterre, France et Belgique) et de se centrer sur les requêtes qui se présentent le plus fréquemment et suscitent le plus grand nombre de questions (codes vestimentaires, agencement des horaires et des jours de congé, et objection à la réalisation de devoirs déterminés). Après avoir fait le constat, dans les trois États européens analysés, de degrés très différents d’appropriation de la logique au cœur de l’«accommodement raisonnable», la thèse a finalement pu révéler les difficultés de mise en œuvre et d’articulation des sources juridiques actuellement applicables et les soucis de cohérence que cela peut engendrer dans les sociétés européennes. Sans prôner l’adoption d’un concept juridique supplémentaire visant à répondre spécifiquement aux requêtes d’aménagement religieux, à l’image du concept nord-américain d’«accommodement raisonnable» – qui paraît peu probable, peu réaliste et même parfois inutile au vu de l’analyse effectuée dans chaque État et à l’échelon européen – la thèse privilégie une meilleure connaissance et une meilleure application des droits existants et de leurs implications (examen concret de la proportionnalité des atteintes à la liberté de religion, mobilisation du concept de discrimination indirecte), permettant de se conformer aux engagements européens et internationaux en matière de droits fondamentaux et de lutte contre les discriminations. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette thèse de pensée politique propose une relecture des oeuvres de Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon et de Charles Fourier, deux penseurs du « socialisme utopique » français du 19e siècle, allant dans le sens de leur association avec les pensées actuelles du « contre l’État », de la division originaire du social et de la dialectique de l’émancipation. À l’aide de l’interprétation de l’utopie développée par Miguel Abensour, qui est mobilisée tout en conservant à son égard une distance critique, il est montré en quoi Saint-Simon et Fourier participent à la découverte de la société comme objet de connaissance scientifique et comment cette découverte ouvre des possibilités inédites pour penser la transformation sociale. L’apport particulier de la thèse est alors l’étude des effets de la rencontre de l’utopie et du socialisme afin de saisir l’idéal coopératif à titre de mode alternatif d’institution de la société. Il est avancé qu’il se trouve, dans les oeuvres de ces deux auteurs, un cadre pour penser la liberté politique en ce que, tant Saint-Simon que Fourier, s’appuient sur une théorisation de l’utopie qui non seulement repère dans le présent les éléments d’un ordre nouveau à opposer à l’ordre établi, mais qui s’articule à même une conception ouverte de l’histoire basée sur la vérification de la satisfaction des besoins du grand nombre. Il est également avancé qu’en raison du procédé d’écart propre à l’utopie, se pose la possibilité, au sein même du socialisme, de cultiver une conscience du politique sensible au risque d’inversion des visées d’émancipation.

Cette recherche s’inscrit dans le domaine du sentencing. Sa question de départ porte sur la persistance, dans les jugements correctionnels, du modèle rétributif et des peines privatives de liberté, sur le manque d’essor des peines alternatives à l’emprisonnement et sur l’allongement des peines. <p>La littérature portant sur le sentencing souligne l’importance, dans la décision de la peine, du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge, qui fait partie intégrante du processus d’interprétation de la loi pénale. La décision est un processus humain (Hogarth), une pratique sociale complexe dans un environnement structuré et structurant (Beyens), le produit de collaborations et de contraintes institutionnelles (Gibson).<p>Adoptant la perspective de la construction de la peine comme processus humain et interactionnel en contexte, la question empirique est :« Comment le juge pénal décide-t-il de la peine dans son contexte d’action ?».<p>Son cadre conceptuel est l’ethnométhodologie. Dans ce courant, la sociologie cognitive examine la chaîne processuelle du traitement de l’information, c’est-à-dire comment les membres d’un groupe social donnent une signification à une situation en sélectionnant et interprétant les informations, puis la catégorisent et décident, par induction, de la norme à appliquer et de la conduite à tenir. <p>Pour répondre à la question empirique, le dispositif méthodologique comprend des observations durant huit mois en tant que stagiaire dans deux tribunaux ;des échanges informels avec les différents acteurs judiciaires et para-judiciaires ;et des entretiens formalisés avec les juges.<p>Quatre procédures principales se dégagent du matériau empirique :évaluer le dossier répressif ;évaluer la personne du prévenu ;évaluer la réprobation adéquate ;évaluer une peine acceptable. Ces procédures permettent de mettre en lumière les savoirs, raisons, motivations, valeurs et mécanismes qui entrent dans le processus décisionnel de la peine. <p>Cette analyse permet de construire progressivement un modèle de la prise de décision en contexte et, partant, de répondre aux questionnements de départ.<p><p><p> / Doctorat en criminologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

General Introduction<p><p>The process of the institutionalisation of law that started at the end of the 18th century was followed by a general wave of codification throughout Europe. The French codification of 1804 was exemplary for all the others. The “law in books” was complete, certain, clear, and undisputable. From then on, the law in books had priority over the “law in action”. Law in books was a critique of law in action that preceded the French Revolution. Judicial activism was proscribed, and judges were called to apply the rules issued by the legislator.<p><p>This ideal of the French Revolution is still framing our pattern of legal thinking. It is dominant throughout the 19th century with the école de l’exégèse in France, Begriffjurisprudenz in Germany, and analytical jurisprudence in Anglo-American legal systems. Legal formalism or the deductive application of rules is the only form of judicial reasoning that is allowed. The science of law, as a consequence, was confined to a theoretical support and elaboration of this judge-centred approach to law.<p><p>This view on law and legal science persisted throughout the last century. It started being criticized in the late 1960s, a critique that paved the path for a more active role of the judge. New theories of interpretation were proposed so as to supplement the law in books with theoretically justified methodologies to determine its meaning.<p><p>The findings of legal theory are still, to a large extent, premised on the central role of the judge in the legal system. Although this evolution may be applauded for having contributed to a more dynamic attitude towards the law, the role of the legislator remains largely underexposed. Legal theory takes the law as “just there”, and limits its theoretical undertakings to law as it is. Law, so it is said, is the result of political decision-making. Once it comes into being however, it is separated from politics. Politics, that is, is thought of as impure, at least when compared to the methods of legal reasoning and decision-making. <p><p>This brings us to the theme of this book. Some of the questions I propose to explore are: Where does the law come from? What are the premises of a theory that considers law separated from politics? What does it mean for a legislator to be bound to the rules of a constitution throughout the process of legislation? Does the constitution consist of rules to be followed by the legislator or is its role merely confined to be a political programme?<p><p>These and other questions frame the main problem this book proposes to deal with. They are triggered by the fact of the exponential growth of today’s legal systems. Complaints about both the increasing volume of legislation and its decreasing quality in most European countries have raised the question as to whether collaboration between legislators and legal theory can help to articulate and to solve that problem.<p><p>As a matter of fact, although the complaints are made with an ever-stronger voice, solutions are by no means obvious. Legislation as a matter of politics is not rational. Politics is a power game, resulting in compromises that are framed into a legislative or statutory structure. This power game seems to have its own logic, the results of which most of the time outweigh any other form of logic.<p><p> Legal theory for its part is considered, from the perspective of politics at least, to be a “theoretical” approach to legal problems. It contributes to the description and systematisation of existing valid law. It shows up, like Minerva’s owl, after the sunset of legislative activity. From that perspective, there is not much hope that legal theory can usefully intervene in the process of legislation or regulation, i.e. before or during the creation of rules. Legal theory then is confined to “legal science” or “legal dogmatics”.<p><p>I propose to consider the problem of legislation from another angle. The premises of the problem are that, although legislation and regulation is the result of a political process, they can be the object of a theoretical study. Using an approach analogous to e.g. Hans Kelsen in legal theory ,the main idea is not to primarily focus on the content of rules and concepts, but rather on the structure and function of legal systems. <p><p>In the approach of this book, the focal point is on problems that are common to most legal systems and not on the characteristics, viz. the content of concepts that are specific for one or more legal systems. The creation of law, so is my claim, has become a problem. <p><p>Kelsen’s approach leaves legislation and regulation – apart from their formal validity aspects – outside the scope of study. The creation of rules relies on value judgments that are according to him not fit for theoretical study. In short, the creation of legal rules is a matter of politics and politics is not fit for scientific study.<p><p>This position is an understandable one, though it is only partially acceptable. Rule creation is a matter of choice. The legitimation of this choice is found in the democratic character of the regulating process and not in some science of values. In other words, would one try to mould legislation into the frame of a science, we would face something like “scientific politics”, as Marxism propagated, and which is, for several reasons, unacceptable.<p><p>A different standpoint is to study legislative problems from the angle of legal theory. This approach I propose to call legisprudence. The object of study of legisprudence is the rational creation of legislation and regulation. As to its method, it makes use of the theoretical insights and tools of current legal theory. Whereas the latter has been dealing most of the time dealing with problems of the application of law by the judge, legisprudence explores the possibilities of the enlargement of the field of study as to include the creation of law by the legislator.<p><p>Within this new approach, a variety of new question and problems – e.g. the validity of norms, their meaning, the structure of the legal system, etc. - are raised. They are traditionally dealt with from the perspective of the judge or are taken for granted by classical legal theory. However, when shifting our attention from the judge to the legislator, the same questions arise: In what sense does the legislator have to take the systematicity of the legal order into account? What counts as a valid norm? What meanings can be created and how? to mention but a few.<p><p>Traditional legal science or legal dogmatics covers many of these questions with the cloak of sovereignty. Legislators are sovereign, they decide what will count as a valid norm, and its meaning. Whether and how a rule and its meaning fit with the legal system, is then a matter of interpretation – and this is the task of the judge and the legal scientist.<p><p>On this view, the process of legislation seems to be inappropriate for theoretical inquiry. After long decades of legalism in legal reasoning, it can be said that the dominant views in legal theory resulting from that, have precisely barred the way for inquiring into the position of the legislator. Everything happens behind the veil of sovereignty as far as legislation properly so called is concerned, and behind the veil of legality when it comes to the execution of legislative acts. These veils conceal a great part of ignorance related to the possibilities of an alternative theoretical reflection on rule making. Sovereignty itself, so one can say, creates silence about this alternative, so that it becomes “sovereignty in silence” .<p><p>Sovereignty of the ruler prevents his rules from being questioned in any other than binary terms. Validity is a good example of that. The only question that is worthwhile putting is: Is this propositional content a valid rule yes or no? As a consequence, questions on its efficacy, effectivity, efficiency, or acceptability are not in order.<p><p>The claim of legisprudence is that these questions, like others, are important ones, and that they can be analysed with the help of legal theory.<p><p>The book is divided into three parts.<p><p>In the first part, I propose to explore the three basic tenets of the Modern philosophical project as Descartes inaugurated it. These three tenets are: rationality, the individuality of the subject, and freedom. A brief sketch of what is meant by them is offered in the first chapter.<p>Rationality as it is dealt with in the Modern philosophical project means that what is rational is self-evident. Self-evidence is certainty and certainty is the mark of truth. The question for whom something is certain is however left out of view. The subject, that is, has himself immediate access to reason and truth upon the use of his rational capacities. The latter are presumed to be identical in and for all. The subject’s reflection on himself leads to the true insight that he is a res cogitans.<p><p>The subject thinks of himself as an ”I”, that is, as an individual. Others are not thought of as others, but rather as representations or ideas. The subject as an individual is a product of thought, that is, upon the Modern approach of rationality, a theoretical idea. <p><p>As a result of rationality as self-evidence and the subject as an individual, practical reason is confined to free will. Freedom as the third basic tenet of the Modern philosophical project is limited to following the commands of God and the rules of the country. These commands and rules are found “out there”, without questioning either their origin or their purpose.<p><p>The main critique of the Modern philosophical project as it is briefly set out in the first chapter is that it is based on the so-called "scholastic fallacy”. This fallacy involves that rationality is presupposed identical in everyone’s head. On the supposition that all subjects are ontologically rational as Descartes suggests, their use of their rational capacities would result in an identical outcome that is truth. The universality of reason is, however, a hidden premise of the Modern philosophical project. It unfolds from a “view from nowhere”. This view of rationality is challenged as an unreflected one, and the methodological device of this book is to avoid this type of fallacies.<p><p>Chapter 2 focuses on the idea of science as it comes up with the Modern philosophical project. The infinite universe is substituted for the Aristotelian closed world. Mathematics becomes the appropriate method of the scientia nova that Descartes and Galileï initiate. As Descartes’ method aims at being a mathesis universalis it is believed to include the aptitude to deal with any problem, theoretical as well as practical. <p><p>The subsequent epistemologization of philosophy tacitly presupposes that mathematics belongs to the very nature of reality. From there, it follows that philosophy is thought of as a theory of reality. On an alternative view, mainly advocated by, e.g. Heidegger, it is claimed that mathematics as a method of science is a matter of choice. If the method is a matter of choice, the scientia nova can be articulated as a liberation from the shackles of ecclesiastical authority, and hence as a matter of freedom. Another consequence is that the scientia nova can articulate true propositions about reality, without having direct access to it. The distinction between a theory of reality and a theory about reality is illustrated with the help of the conflict between Galileï and the Church.<p><p>Chapter 3 concentrates on the subject and rationality. Both the subject and rationality are put in context, that is, a context of participation. With this approach, I propose to challenge the self-evidentiary character of rationality as well as the idea of the isolated and ontologically anchored Cartesian subject. Relying on George Herbert Mead’s theory of the subject, I argue that the subject is first and foremost an “intersubject”. <p><p>The subject, it is argued, is a social subject whose self emerges through interaction with others. The substitution of a subject of meaning for a subject of truth concretises the critique of the Cartesian subject in the first chapter. Both the subject and meaning, so it is argued, emerge from interaction in a context of participation. The subject’s self includes a social as well as an individual pole. These two poles and the interaction between them have been neglected throughout the Modern philosophical project. By articulating them, an attempt is made to take the subject qua subject seriously.<p><p>A similar contextualisation is operated with rationality. Rationality, even in its rationalistic appearance, is not self-revealing. The idealisation of rationality in the Modern philosophical project, that is, its decontextualisation, obscures the fact that it is historically situated. This situatedness refers to its emergence and operation in a specific context. This recontextualisation shows it as one conception of rationality among others. The Modern philosophical project held its conception of rationality to be a reflection of reality, upon its belief in the direct access to the latter.<p><p>The distinction between conceptions on the one hand and a concept on the other is the methodological device that serves to further articulate the concept of freedom. This is the theme of chapter 4. Freedom is related to the emergence of science in the 17th century. While the subject and rationality were connected to a context of participation in the foregoing chapters, attention will be drawn to the characteristics of the concept of freedom in this chapter. <p><p>The basic premise of the theory of freedom proposed in this chapter comes to saying that in the absence of any external limitation, subjects are free to act as they please. If they want to act, however, freedom unlimited as it is called must be determined. This means that from the infinite range of possibilities, a choice has to be made. Without a choice, everything remains possible though no action can occur. To make a choice implies that the concept of freedom is concretised. This concretisation is called a conception. Action is possible, so it is argued further, on two types of conceptions. One is a conception of freedom, the other a conception about freedom. A conception of freedom is a conception of the subject himself; a conception about freedom on the contrary is a conception of someone else.<p><p>On the basic premise of the theory of freedom advocated throughout the book, freedom is unlimited. This includes a priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom. Therefore, his acting on conceptions about freedom must be justified. This requirement of justification is connected to the idea of freedom as principium. A principium has a twofold meaning. The first is a starting point; the second is that a principle is also a leitmotiv. <p><p>Freedom unlimited is the starting point of political philosophy as it is found in Hobbes and Rousseau. They will be our main discussion partners throughout the book. Their theory of the social contract as the basis of the construction of political space is premised by the idea of freedom unlimited. They do neglect though the second aspect of freedom as principium, that is, freedom as the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. This aspect is briefly elaborated in chapter 4 where Hobbes’ theory is diagnosed as a theory about freedom, while it purports to be a theory of freedom.<p><p>Freedom as principium and the priority of the subject acting on conceptions of freedom that it involves is identified as the basic principle of legisprudence. It holds, summarizing, that law can only be legitimate if it is legitimated to operate as an alternative for failing social interaction. The idea of freedom as principium will be elaborated in chapter 8 where I proceed to the identification of the principles of legisprudence.<p><p>The second part of the book is dedicated to the problem of legalism and legitimation.<p><p>Chapter 5 explores the reason for the absence of a theory of legislation until now. The main reason is that law, from the very beginning of the Modern philosophical project, is unfolded as a reflection of reality. The obscuration of the embedment of law in the realm of politics is explained as a strategy of practical reason. This strategy is at the basis of what is identified as strong legalism. Strong legalism is the dominant pattern of thought in legal thinking. It holds that normativity is a matter of rule following, irrespective of where the rules come from. It easily fits the idea of the provisional morality Descartes has sketched, but that never came to a real end.<p><p>The main characteristics of strong legalism are pointed from a reading of Hobbes and Rousseau. The characteristics identified are: representationalism, universality or the neglect of the time dimension, concealed instrumentalism, and etatism. These characteristics of the legalistic thought pattern are supported and corroborated by a type of legal science that finds its roots in the Modern philosophical project.<p><p>Over against this form of legalism that is labelled “strong legalism” chapter 6 explores the contours of a different brand of legalism that I propose to mark as “weak legalism”. <p><p>Weak legalism or “legalism with a human face” comprises a critique of strong legalism in that the latter neglects the position of the subject qua subject. As it will be discussed in the first part of the book, the Modern philosophical project makes the subject the preponderant actor in reality. He is, however, an actor in a play written in advance by others and not an auctor or an agent.<p><p>To take the subject qua subject seriously, as weak legalism purports, entails placing him in a context with others. This part of chapter 6 joins the insights articulated in the first part of the book, more specifically in chapter 2. Others, and not just “otherness” as a representation of the subject, belong to the subject’s context. If it is in this context that the self and meaning emerge, this process is not necessarily conflict-free. Hobbes and Rousseau conclude from this fact that social interaction leads to war. It provides them with an argument to substitute interaction based on legal rules from social interaction based on conceptions of freedom. The former are issued by the sovereign and can be qualified as conceptions about freedom.<p><p>Hobbes and Rousseau hold that this substitution is ipso facto legitimate. On the theory of freedom that was sketched out in chapter 4, this substitution however needs to be legitimated.<p><p>Chapter 7 deals with the issue of legitimation. I distinguish to begin with between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories of legitimation. On the former, law is legitimated if it corresponds to at least one transcendent true norm. On the latter, no transcendent content is available. This is proper to a democratic theory of legitimation upon which the demos determines the ends of action as well as the means to realise them.<p><p>Apart from this difference between jusnaturalistic and non-jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation process they embrace is the same. This dynamic refers to the direction of the legitimation chain. In jusnaturalistic theories, the dynamics of the legitimation chain runs from a transcendent norm to a rule of the sovereign. In non-jusnaturalistic theories exemplified by Hobbes and Rousseau the dynamics of the chain runs from an initial consent to the social contract to the set of rules issued by the sovereign.<p><p>The dynamic of the chain in both type of theories, so it is argued, is irreversible. The operationalisation of political space ensuing from the social contract is what legislation is about according to the Modern philosophical project. Taken as it stands, the initial consent of the subjects to the social contract or their proxy to the sovereign is an action on a conception of freedom. They do give, though, a proxy to the sovereign to issue subsequent limitations of their freedom that are yet unknown when subscribing the contract .From the “moment” of the contract, the sovereign is legitimated in substituting conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom. The initial proxy contained in the contract covers any of his limitations of freedom. As both Hobbes and Rousseau argue, the rules of the sovereign are always morally correct. As a consequence, they cannot be criticized for whatever reason. Would this be possible then the chain of legitimation initiated by the social contract would be reversed. <p><p>On strong legalism, however the chain is unidirectional. The sovereign transforms any propositional content into a true norm, which allows for the qualification of sovereignty as a black box.<p><p>Chapter 7 ends with the articulation of some possibilities of reversing the chain of legitimation in what is called the proxy model. On this idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain, a more general approach is initiated. This approach leads to the claim that a legislator’s limitations of freedom are to be justified. They are deemed legitimate and legitimated on a general proxy. The latter however affects he reflexive character of freedom of the subject. On the idea of a general proxy, any of his conceptions of freedom can a priori be replaced by conceptions about freedom. The general approach to the idea of a reversal of the legitimation chain comes to say that this substitution must be justified. Sovereigns, that is, should give reasons for their rules.<p><p>This is basically what legisprudence as a theory of rational legislation comes to. Its more concrete articulation is the topic of the third part of the book.<p><p>Chapter 8 starts with the exploration of an alternative for the proxy model of legitimation that was investigated in the previous chapters. The alternative is labelled the trade-off model. On this model, the subjects trade off conceptions of freedom for conceptions about freedom. This comes to saying that the substitution of conceptions about freedom for conceptions of freedom must be justified. No rule can be held legitimate if this justification or legitimation is lacking.<p><p>The trade off model is based on freedom as principium in its twofold meaning. Freedom unlimited as was argued in chapter 4 is both the starting point and the leitmotiv of the organisation of political space. It follows from there that subjects are primarily to act on conceptions of freedom. A substitution of a conception about freedom for conceptions of freedom can only be legitimate if it is legitimated or justified as an alternative for failing social interaction. This is the first principle of legisprudence that is called the “principle of alternativity”. The second principle is the principle of necessity of the normative density. Rules should not automatically contain sanctions. If sanctions are included, this requires a specific justification. Rules with a sanction embrace a double reduction of freedom. First, the pattern of behaviour is imposed and second its realisation is enforced. Before realising a rule with the help of force alternative means of achievement of its goals are to be outweighed.<p><p>The third principle of legisprudence is the principle of temporality. The limitation of freedom on a conception about freedom must be justified as “on time”. Any justification is embedded in a context. This means that if it is successful it will only be temporarily so. The principle of temporality then requires a justification over time, and not only on the moment that a rule is issued.<p><p>The principle of coherence is the fourth principle of legisprudence. It requires that rules, both judicial and legislative make sense as a whole. The principle of coherence thus identified is elaborated in a theory that I propose to call the “level theory of coherence”, and that makes part of legisprudence.<p><p>At the end of the chapter, the principles of legisprudence are focused on from the position of the legislator before they are further explored in chapter 9. This chapter concretises the operationalisation of the principles of legisprudence. The principles of legisprudence, so it is argued, are to be read within the context of one another. Upon weighing and balancing their relative weight in the process of legislation, the ruling of the sovereign can be said to be legisprudentially optimal.<p><p>Legisprudential optimality on its turn is further concretised in chapter 10. The sovereign has to discharge of his duties throughout the legislative process while taking the circumstances of legislation into account. These circumstances are the fact that subjects interact with each other on the basis of conceptions of freedom. These circumstances result from the theory of freedom that was set out in chapter 4 and further elaborated in the subsequent chapters. <p><p>The duties of the sovereign throughout the process of legislation amount to a duty of fact finding, problem formulation, weighing and balancing of alternatives, prognosis, retrospection, taking future circumstances into account and finally a duty to correction.<p><p>Finally, a brief sketch is offered of the concept of validity according to legisprudence. Apart from the necessity of formal validity, both efficacy and axiological validity are briefly commented upon. From the diagnosis of some theories of validity that mainly focus on only one of the aspects of validity, the concept of validity according to legisprudence is called “network validity”.<p><p>Projects like this book would never begin, let alone come to an end, without the help of a large number of people. I will not enter into a detailed description of their contribution. Suffice to mention their names with the hope that they will recognize some of their thoughts, reflections, critiques and encouragements somewhere in the book.<p><p>The persons that come to my mind are Aulis Aarnio, Maurice Adams, Manuel Atienza, John Bell, Samantha Besson, Guido Calabresi, Tom Campbell, Carine Caunes, Emilios Christodoulidis, Wochiech and Aga Cyrul, Martine de Clerq, Pieter Dehon, Erwin Depue, Johan Desmet, David Dhooge, Guillaume Drago, Hugues Dumont, Philip Eijlander, Michiel Elst, René Foqué, Benoit Frydman, Tito Gallas, Philippe Gérard, René Gonzalez, Guy Haarscher, Mark Hunyadi, Sheldon Leader, Maria-Isabelle Köpke-Tinturé, Neil MacCormick, Francesco Laporte, Luzius Mader, Frank Michelman, Charles-Albert Morand, Dwight Newman, François Ost, Juliane Ottmann, Richard Parker, Trinie Parker, Aleksander Peczenik, Chaïm Perelman, Vlad Perju, Kauko Pietillä, Juha Pöhöynen, Daniel Priel, Pekka Riekinen, Thomas Roberts, Eric Rossiaux, Geoffrey Samuel, Jerzy Stelmach, Andreas Takis, Benoît Timmermans, Philippe Thion, Hannu Tolonen, Michel Troper, François Tulkens, Stamatios Tzitzis, François Vallançon, Koen Van Aeken, Wibren Van der Burg, Mark Van Hoecke, Michiel Vandekerckhove, Frederik Vandendriesche, Rob van Gestel, Scott Veatch, Roger Vergauwen, Amaryllis Verhoeven, Michel Villey, Jeremy Waldron, Kenneth Winston, Willem Witteveen, Wochiech Zadurski and Marek Zyrk-Zadurski.<p><p>Thomas Roberts helped me with the linguistic corrections of the text.<p><p>I have a special debt to Mark Van Bellingen and Lilly De Vooght for their views on the context of participation, the idea of a hermeneutical point of view and their critique on the “view from nowhere”.<p> <p><p> <p>1\ / Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

L’histoire a très souvent opposé catholicisme et libéralisme. Tout du moins, les a-telle situés dans deux domaines séparés. Pour autant, cette opposition relève d’une confusion au sujet de la doctrine libérale qui s’en trouve figée dans une conception tronquée. À nos yeux le libéralisme est multiple. S’il convient de parler « des » libéralismes, il reste à penser ce qui les rapproche, la spécificité d’« un » esprit, de « son » esprit. Cette thèse a pour objectif de l’élucider et, pour ce faire, elle établit que le libéralisme dépend d’une conception de l’homme qui trouve sa source en terre chrétienne. En plus de rapporter les principales étapes de l’entrelacement des idées théologiques, philosophiques, économiques et de leur rôle dans la constitution « du » libéralisme, il s’agit donc de porter à la lumière la dépendance d’une doctrine philosophique et économique vis-à-vis d’un principe, « l’être-personne-en-relation », appelé à la féconder. / Catholicism and Liberalism have historically been subject to controversial debate. It’s a matter of fact that these two notions are considered as very different, if not opposed, in most people’s mind. However, this kind of antagonism can be explained by the basic confusion made about the liberal doctrine itself, actually opened to various understandings and that hence to an unrealistic scrutiny. In our opinion, liberalism can be understood as different levels of meanings. The main goal of our work is precisely to define a commune feature between these different opinions by adopting a specific “spirit” that fits with all of these interpretations. This thesis aims to get a better approch, in definig liberalism in generalas the result of a conception that came up in christian countries. In a first step, we have to relate the interlacing of theological, philosophic and economic ideas and their role in the constitution of Liberalism/ how they played a role in the constitution of Liberalism. In addition, it’s a question of putting the light on the dependence of Liberalism towards a concept, “être-personne-en-relation” that is fertilizing the philosophic and economic doctrine.