Cette thèse est consacrée aux systèmes d'assurance maladie mixtes où la couverture publique obligatoire peut être améliorée par une complémentaire santé. Les questions abordées portent sur l'effet inflationniste de la complémentaire sur le prix des soins et sur l'impact de la tarification à l'âge sur les solidarités entre malades et bien portants et entre catégories de revenu. Les analyses empiriques sont réalisées sur données françaises. Cette base de données originale regroupe les consommations de soins de 99,878 affiliés à la MGEN sur la période 2010-2012. Le chapitre 1 estime l'effet causal d'une meilleure couverture sur la consommation de dépassements d'honoraires et démontre l'effet inflationniste de la complémentaire sur le prix des soins. Le chapitre 2 considère l’hétérogénéité de l'impact d'une meilleure couverture sur les dépassements et sa corrélation avec la demande d'assurance. De fait, l’effet inflationniste de la complémentaire est accentué par des effets de sélection. Le chapitre 3 montre que la tarification à l'âge permet de maximiser les transferts entre malades et bien portants au détriment de la solidarité entre hauts et bas revenus. / This thesis deals with two questions relative to efficiency and fairness in mixed health insurance systems with partial mandatory coverage and voluntary supplementary health insurance (SHI): (i) the inflationary effect of SHI on medical prices; (ii) the fairness of SHI premiums. We set the analysis in the French context and perform empirical analyses on original individual-level data, collected from the administrative claims of a French insurer (MGEN). The sample is made of 99,878 individuals observed from 2010 to 2012. In Chapter 1, we estimate the causal impact of a generous SHI on patients' decisions to consult physicians who balance bill their patients. We find evidence that better coverage contributes to the rise in medical prices. In Chapter 2, we specify individual heterogeneity in moral hazard and consider its possible correlation with coverage choices. We find evidence of selection on moral hazard: individuals who are more likely to ask for coverage exhibit stronger moral hazard. In Chapter 3, results show that when SHI is voluntary, age-based premiums maximize transfers between low and high healthcare users but do not guarantee vertical equity.

[pt] Esta tese é formada por três artigos, o primeiro em economia organizacional e cultura; os dois últimos em economia política. No primeiro capítulo, nós modelamos a relação entre a disseminação de normas sociais de ética do trabalho e incentivos propostos pelas firmas, que motivamos utilizando evidência de três bases de dados diferentes. No segundo capítulo, examinamos se a renda dos vizinhos afeta o voto de eleitores, utilizando dados de resultados de eleições presidenciais (2004 até 2012) nos Estados Unidos, por zona eleitoral e grupo de bairros. Com isso, buscamos contribuir para o entendimento das razões que levam a diferentes níveis de demanda por redistribuição de renda. Como estratégia de identificação, utilizamos efeitos fixos de ano e dummies de trato e ano; trato sendo a menor unidade geográfica maior que o grupo de blocos (em média, um trato contém 4 grupos de blocos). No terceiro capítulo, estudamos patronagem, investigando o efeito da vitória de um candidato a prefeito de um partido na probabilidade de membros deste partido (ou de partidos da mesma coalizão) ocuparem cargos públicos no governo; ou de sua renda advinda do governo aumentar, caso já sejam empregados públicos. Analisamos também o efeito da vitória de um partido sobre o número de registrados a este partido nos anos futuros, o que indicaria um desejo de sinalizar apoio ao candidato eleito. Estimamos o efeito causal de um partido ocupar a prefeitura, comparando municipalidades em que este partido quase ganhou com cidades em que quase perdeu. / [en] This thesis is composed of three papers, the first in organizational economics and culture; the last two in political economics. In the first chapter, we model the relation between dissemination of social norms of work ethic and incentives proposed by firms, which we motivate using evidence from three different datasets. In the second chapter, we examine whether neighbors income affects voting, using data from election results for the 2004-2012 Presidential Elections in Unites States, by precinct and block group. That way, we try to contribute to understanding the reason why there are different demands for income redistribution. As an identification strategy, we use year fixed-effects and tract year dummies; tract is the smallest geographic unit larger than block group (on average, each tract contains 4 block groups). In the third chapter, we study patronage, investigating the effect of a mayoral candidate s victory on the probability that members of his party (or parties in the same presidential coalition) occupy public jobs in the government, or on their income accrued from government, in case they are already public employees. We also analyze the effect of a party s victory over the number of registered members of that party in future years, which would indicate that voters affiliate to political parties as a way to signal support to the office holder. We estimate plausibly causal effects of a party holding mayoral position by comparing municipalities where that party nearly won with places where it nearly lost.

Blockchain technology with its distributed ledgers attracts massive attention today and creates interest in many different industries. One of the most promising areas for implementation of blockchain technology is its use to create fully automated and decentralized contract solutions, so-called smart contracts. The blockchain technology is also expected to develop the concept of BIM by facilitating the creation of a common model. The problem addressed in this study is the limited amount of research carried out in the blockchain field and the potential use of smart contracts in procurement of services in the construction industry.  The construction industry differs from many other industries as it is project-based with changing circumstances and conditions. The study shows that the construction industry is an industry focused on discussions and disputes, the majority of which are linked to payments and contractual interpretations. Two of the key concepts of the study are therefore moral hazard and opportunistic behavior. Opportunistic behavior can affect norms, the willingness for cooperation and the degree to which parties trust each other. Designing contracts to reduce the risk of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior is therefore an important aspect. The study has chosen to study both relationships that are hierarchical to nature but also peer-to-peer.  The purpose of the study has been to conceptually reflect on percived opportunities and challenges with blockchains in the construction industry regarding two identified applications, smart contracts and BIM. To investigate this, a qualitative interview study has been conducted. The study points to the need for a more standardized building process that is subject to a certain degree of repetition to achieve successful use of a blockchain network and smart contracts. The study also shows that there is a positive attitude from the respondents regarding a possible development for several of the potential applications of blockchain technology. Blockchain technology and smart contracts have the potential to improve the reliability and credibility of logbooks, self-checks and work performed within a building project. Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of long-term relationships and confidence in reducing opportunistic behavior. Based on previous research and empirical analysis, the study contributes to an increased understanding of which levels in the construction industry smart contracts may be applicable. The study shows that smart contracts are not perceived suitable for complex contracts where the work to be performed can be changed many times during the contract period. The study, on the other hand, indicates that blockchain development with BIM is not demanded at the present time. Finally, the study points out that blockchain technology is perceived to have the potential to make the building process more transparent and open with reduced power conditions at the same time as it gets less centralized which opens up the need for research in that direction. / Blockkedjetekniken med sina distribuerade liggare lockar idag massiv uppmärksamhet och skapar intresse inom många olika branscher. Ett av de mest lovande områdena för implementering av blockkedjetekniken är dess användning för att skapa helt automatiserade och decentraliserade kontraktslösningar, så kallade smarta kontrakt. Blockkedjetekniken spås även kunna utveckla begreppet BIM genom att underlätta skapandet av en gemensam modell. Problemet som adresseras i denna studie är den begränsade mängd forskning som har utförts gällande blockkedjor och smarta kontrakts potentiella användning vid upphandling av tjänster i byggbranschen.  Byggbranschen skiljer sig från många andra branscher då den är projektbaserad med föränderliga förhållanden och förutsättningar. Studien visar på att byggbranschen är en bransch kantad av diskussioner och tvister, vars majoritet är kopplad till betalningar och kontraktstolkningar. Två för studien centrala begrepp är därmed moral hazard och opportunistiskt beteende. Opportunistiskt beteende kan påverka normer, viljan till samarbete och i hur hög grad parter litar på varandra. Att utforma kontrakt så att risken för moral hazard och opportunistiskt beteende minskar är därmed en viktig aspekt. Studien har valt att studera både relationer som är hierarkiska till naturen men också peer-to-peer.  Syftet med studien har varit att konceptuellt reflektera över uppfattade nya möjligheter och utmaningar som finns med blockkedjor i byggbranschen gällande två identifierade användningsområden, smarta kontrakt och BIM. För att undersöka detta har en kvalitativ intervjustudie genomförts. Studien pekar på att det krävs en mer standardiserad byggnadsprocess som omfattas av en viss grad av upprepning för att få en lyckad använding av ett blockkedje-nätverk och smarta kontrakt. Studien visar också på att det finns en positiv grundinställning från respondenternas sida kring en möjlig utveckling för flera av blockkedjeteknikens potentiella applikationer. Blockkedjetekniken och smarta kontrakt har potentialen att förbättra tillförlitligheten och trovärdigheten hos loggböcker, egenkontroller och utförda arbeten inom ett byggnadsprojekt. Vidare belyser studien vikten av långsiktiga relationer och tillit för att minska opportunistiskt beetende. Baserat på tidigare forskning, empiri och analys bidrar studien till en ökad förståelse kring vilka nivåer inom byggbranschen smarta kontrakt kan vara applicerbara. Studien förevisar att smarta kontrakt inte uppfattas lämpa sig för komplicerade kontrakt där arbetet som ska utföras kan ändras många gånger under kontraktsperioden. Studien indikerar däremot att blockkedje utvecklingen med BIM inte efterfrågas i dagsläget. Slutligen pekar studien på att blockkedjetekniken uppfattas ha potential att göra byggprocessen mer transparent och öppen med minskade maktförhållanden samt mindre centraliserade vilket öppnar upp behov av forskning i den riktningen.

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租賃是使用權與所有權分離的一種企業或個人取得資產使權的方式。但是租賃市場中卻隱含二種潛在的訊息不對稱問題--逆向選擇與道德機問題。本文首先導出存在逆向選擇問題時之最適租約，並與充分訊息時之最適租約相比較。隨後我們也導出道德危機與逆向選擇問題並存時之最適租約。 　　有鑑於租賃對企業與個人的重要性，本文希望利用機制設計的方式來設計出存在訊息不對稱問題下的最適租約，以幫助租賃市場更有效地運作。針對逆向選擇問題，我們希望能利用誘因相容的直接控制機制，透過契約的設計，由承租人自己選擇租約，來幫助出租人分辦承租人之類型，並依此決定最適的租賃契約。針對道德危機問題，探究其成因主要是由於租約到期時資產的殘值完全不影響承租人報酬所致，所以我們希望能設計一組能使作維護努力的承租人得到充分獎勵的租約，也就是透過讓承租人作努力決策時將資產殘值納入考量的方式，使承租人的努力決策對出租人也是最適的。

The main goal of this dissertation was to obtain an understanding as to the true economic nature of employee share options and the problems surrounding the accounting thereof. The main conclusion of this study is that employee share options should be expensed in the income statement as and when the employee's services are performed. The reason is that employee share options are valuable financial instruments which the employer has used to compensate the employee for his services. It was also concluded that exercise date accounting and classification of outstanding employee share options as liabilities on the balance sheet is the most appropriate accounting treatment. Such accounting treatment trues up the accounting of employee share options with that of cash-settled share appreciation rights, which are economically equivalent transactions. The measurement of employee share options should be based on their fair value using an option-pricing model adapted for the specific features of employee share options. / Accounting / Thesis (M. Com. (Accounting Science))

隨著經濟發展與國民所得提高，汽車已經成為人們必備之交通運輸工具。近年來，假日休閒旅遊蔚為風氣，除造成自用汽車數量急遽成長外，亦因使用頻率增加而使汽車發生毀損滅失之機率增高。 汽車保險業務具有濃厚之地域性，而且與社會環境及國民習性密切相關，因此，經營汽車保險業務者，必須投入相當規模之資源，方能提供完善之服務。由於汽車保險業務之保費收入佔財產保險業所有業務之一半以上，其損失率高低往往牽動著保險業者之經營成效。 今日汽車保險市場積弊之一，乃保險業者拓展業務時，常以提高業務量為目標，爭相採取超佣、折讓或錯價等違規手段，造成市場之惡性競爭。再者，行銷通路亦與汽車保險業務經營成敗有緊密關連。 以汽車代理商而言，其有規模者之業務項目涵蓋汽車銷售、保險代理、零件價格與汽車修護等，完全掌握汽車保險行銷之競爭優勢。此外，貿易商、貨運行及代檢場，與汽車保險業務亦有密切關連，也是保險業者不可忽視之重要通路。 本研究以汽車車體損失保險為對象，針對上述行銷通路之運作實務作介紹與分析，並分別探討各種通路可能衍生之道德危險。最後，針對各類型之道德危險及理賠實務之缺失，本研究提出建議方案供相關單位參考，以期汽車保險市場能健全發展。 關鍵字：汽車保險、道德危險、行銷通路、汽車代理商、貿易商、貨運行、 代檢場 / 【Abstract】 Along with economy development and increase of national income, automobiles become a necessity for people in transportation and communication. In recent years, due to the trend in taking vacation by car, the amount of automobile has rapidly grew. Consequentially, frequent use has resulted in higher percentage of the damage or loss of the automobiles. As automobile insurance has characteristics in localism and territorialism, it is highly related to social environment and citizen’s behavior. Under such a scenario, all the automobile insurance companies need to invest all kinds of resources to provide full scale services. Meanwhile, since its premium volume accounts for more than half the overall property insurance business premium volume, its underwriting result in loss ratio usually has a significant impact on the overall performance in operation. One of the cumulated cankers in the automobile insurance market is that while extending business, insurance companies often aim at increasing premium volume, so that they take the methods against regulations, such as excessive commission, rebate and wrongful pricing. All of them may have deteriorated the unsoundness and stability of the insurance market. In addition, many marketing channels play a significant role to automobile insurance business. In light of automobile dealers’ operation, the ones in large scale normally carry on an automobile maintenance workshop at the same time. Their services cover wide range, include: car selling, insurance soliciting, components price controlling and repair and maintenance services etc. In this way, they acquire the advantage in the marketing competition. Meanwhile, merchants, forwarding agents and the vehicle-inspection workshops are also related to the automobile insurance, and certainly they are the important channels that shall not be neglected. By taking Automobile Insurance - Body Damaged Coverage as the main object, this research makes a thorough analysis on the operation of the above-mentioned marketing channels, and explores all the possible moral hazard stemmed from different channels. To eliminate the moral hazards and the claim insufficiency, this research submits certain recommendation to the regulatory authority and the insurance industry in order to achieve sound development of the automobile insurance market. Key words: Automobile Insurance、Moral Hazard、Marketing Channel、Automobile Dealer、Merchant、Forwarding Agent、Vehicle-Inspection Workshop

Cette thèse est composée de 3 essais. Le 1er essai traite de la problématique du risque de pertes extrêmes dans le secteur bancaire dans un contexte du problème d'agence entre les actionnaires et les top managers des banques. Pour pouvoir inciter les banques à ne pas prendre le risque de pertes extrêmes, il est proposé d'appliquer la régulation des fonds propres sous forme d'une politique de recapitalisations obligatoires, dont les paramètres sont choisis pour inciter les actionnaires à rémunérer leurs managers de la manière à les détourner des stratégies au risque de pertes extrêmes.Le 2ème essai développe le design de la supervision bancaire qui vise à éliminer le problème d'aléa moral au sein d'une banque, tout en assurant un coût minimum de supervisions. Les banques, dont la situation financière commence à se dégrader, doivent être soumises à des audits aléatoires. Les banques, dont la valeur de l'actif s'est dégradée considérablement, doivent être mises sous tutelle pour un redressement financier. Les auditeurs externes peuvent être impliqués dans le processus de supervision, mais ne doivent pas complètement remplacer les régulateurs. Le 3ème essai étudie comment la capacité d'emprunt de l'entreprise non-financière affecte sa politique d'investissement en présence des coûts d'émission de la dette. Il est montré que les entreprises, dont la capacité d'emprunt est moyenne, ont intérêt à réaliser un investissement plus important par rapport aux entreprises dont la capacité d'emprunt est relativement faible/forte. Cela est entièrement dû à l'effet des coûts fixes d'émission de la dette, qui émerge dans le contexte dynamique d'investissement. / This dissertation consists of 3 self-contained theoretical essays.Essay 1 brings into focus the problem of "manufacturing" tail risk in the banking sector. This work shows that, in order to prevent banks from engaging in tail risk, bank capital regulation should account for the internal agency problem between bank shareholders and bank top managers. It is proposed to design bank capital requirements in the form of incentive-based recapitalization mechanism which would induce bank shareholders to shape executive compensation in such a way as to prevent top managers from engaging in tail-risk.Essay 2 deals with the problem of moral hazard in bank asset management. It proposes the concept of incentive-based bank supervision aimed at preventing moral hazard at a minimum cost to the regulator. It is shown that the intensity of supervision efforts should be gradually adjusted to the bank's financial health: banks in the mild form of distress should be subject to random audits, whereas deeply distressed banks should be placed under temporary regulatory control. To prevent double moral hazard, external auditors involved in supervision should be offered the optimal incentive contract.Essay 3 examines the impact of credit rationing (debt capacity) on corporate investment in the setting with costly debt financing. It is shown that, when credit constraints are binding, the firms with intermediate levels of debt capacity will establish larger investment projects than the firms with relatively low or high debt capacity. This non-monotonicity of investment on debt capacity arises due to the effect of the lump-sum debt issuance costs in the dynamic context of investment.

Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Verhalten auf Produktmärkten, welche durch eine asymmetrisch verteilte Information zwischen Anbietern und Nachfragern über die Qualität gekennzeichnet sind. Die Arbeit untersucht experimentell, ob Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal und Reputation als Anreizmechanismus auf solchen Märkten verstanden werden. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden dazu zwei Experimente durchgeführt, mit deren Hilfe untersucht wird, ob das Problem adverser Selektion mit Hilfe von Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal überwunden werden kann. Die Ergebnisse der beiden Experimente, welche sich durch ein unterschiedliches Design auszeichnen, unterscheiden sich stark. Während bei direkter Interaktion Werbeausgaben nicht als Qualitätssignal verstanden werden, werden bei indirekter Interaktion Werbeausgaben von einem Teil der Probanden als Qualitätssignal verstanden. Die Ergebnisse des zweiten Experiments zeigen darüber hinaus, dass von ein Verhalten, welches von dem theoretisch vorhergesagten abweicht, oftmals mit Hilfe der Erwartungen der Probanden über das Verhalten der anderen Marktseite erklärt werden kann. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird untersucht, ob erkannt wird, dass die Höhe des drohenden Reputationsverlusts einen kritischen Anreiz auf das Verhalten der Anbieter hat, wenn diese unbeobachtet von den Käufern die Qualität wählen können. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments zeigen, dass mit Hilfe von potentiellen Reputationsinvestitionen nicht, wie theoretisch vorhergesagt, das Problem des moralischen Risikos überwunden werden kann. Allgemein wird ein zu hohes Vertrauen der Käufer beobachtet, welches dazu führt, dass die Anbieter keinen Anreiz haben, Reputationsinvestitionen zu tätigen. / The dissertation studies individual behavior in product markets, in which information about product quality is asymmetrically distributed between sellers and buyers. It is studied experimentally, whether individuals understand advertising spending as quality signal and reputation as incentive mechanism. In the first part, two experiments are conducted in order to study whether the problem of adverse selection can be overcome with advertising spending as quality signal. The results of the experiments which differ in the experimental design are very different. While in case of direct interaction between sellers and buyers individuals do not understand advertising spending as quality signal, they do in case of indirect interaction. Furthermore, the results of the second experiment show, that behavior not in line with the theoretical expectations can be explained with individuals' expectations about the other market side's behavior. In the second part it is studied whether individuals recognize that sellers' behavior in situations with endogenous quality depends critically on the amount of reputation loss at risk. The experimental results show that contrary to the theoretical expectations moral hazard problems are not solved by investments into reputation. In general, it is observed that there is too much trust on the buyer side. As a result of this behavior sellers have no incentive to invest into reputation.