There is a consistent thread throughout Russian history of governmental management of culture. Tsars and Communist bureaucrats alike have sought to variously promote, censor, or exploit writers, filmmakers, and musicians to control and define the country's cultural content. Often, these measures were intended not necessarily to cultivate Russia's aesthetic spirit, but to accomplish specific policy goals. The promotion of a State ideology and other efforts to stave of social unrest were chief among them. With the fall of Soviet power and the loss of an official ideology promoted by the state, the concept of cultural politics fell to the wayside. It has remained largely ignored ever since. Despite numerous high-profile incidents of persecution of the creative class, analysts have not linked them together as part of an overarching cultural policy. However, the Russian government under Vladimir Putin has faced consistent policy challenges since the beginning of the 2000s that could be mitigated through the implementation of such a policy. In some ways, the breadth and character of State involvement in the cultural sphere follows the pattern of the country’s autocratic past. In others, it demonstrates that it has adapted these policies to function in the hybrid regime that Putin has created, as opposed to the totalitarian ones that preceded it. A recent case that exemplifies this new breed of cultural policy is the persecution of the radical feminist punk band Pussy Riot. While largely unknown to many Russian citizens, the group’s overt opposition to the patriarchal model of rule established by Putin with the help of the Russian Orthodox Church was met by the most comprehensive crackdown within the cultural sphere since perestroika. Examining this case in detail can reveal the extent to which the Russian government is concerned about its ability to maintain popular legitimacy. The fact that it has continued to try to manage the cultural sphere may indicate the level of democracy that has or has not been established in Russia so far today. / text

One of the most significant acts of protest against the rule of Vladimir Putin was staged by the punk group Pussy Riot in Christ the Saviour’s Cathedral in Moscow in February 2012. The protest was one of several actions during the last decade where Russian artists had questioned the role of the Russian Orthodox Church, but this time the role of the Church in relation to the State rule was directly highlighted. This caused strong reactions internationally and in Russia, and there is a need to look into the arguments used in the debate in detail, using discourse analysis. This thesis, therefore, investigates what discourses the most prominent stakeholders – the Church, the State and Pussy Riot – rely on in the public debate around the Pussy Riot performance and the trial. Interconnections between different discourses are also investigated in order to gain a better insight into how religion, politics and popular culture interact in Russia today. The most important conclusion in this thesis is that religion and religious discourse affect legal and political practices in Russia today in ways that are not normally expected in a modern and secular state.

This thesis seeks to shed light on a remarkable figure in Russian history, Father Alexander Men’. How and why did Men’ identify Vladimir Solovyov, Nikolai Berdyaev, and other pre-revolutionary cultural figures as representatives of authentic Russian religious culture? Why would a popular Russian Orthodox priest present the writings of mystics, anarchists, and the Silver Age counterculture as the antidote for seventy years of Soviet materialism? What role did Judaism and the Russo-Jewish intellectual tradition have on Men’s identifications as an Orthodox priest? I use a semiotic theory of culture following Yuri Lotman and the Tartu–Moscow Semiotic School as a framework to analyze the historical development of Orthodox personalism. Through this we find a coherent justification for Men’s cultural project. This thesis traces this line of thought from theories of cultural unity by Pyotr Chaadayev, through Christian universalism in Vladimir Solovyov, the existential personalism of Nikolai Berdyaev, and finally through Men’s personal relationship with Nadezhda Mandelstam.

Master of Music / School of Music, Theater, and Dance / Virginia Houser / Alexander Tikhonovich Gretchaninoff (1864-1956) was a prolific composer from Russia’s Romantic age who explored the art of musical writing within an extensive number of genres and forms and showed an unusually strong interest in the creation of solo piano pieces for and about children. It is important that musicians in general and pianists in particular investigate his compositions and gain an understanding of their nature and potential usefulness as teaching pieces and as works worthy of public performance. My research consisted of an examination of Gretchaninoff’s autobiography, the study of numerous secondary accounts of his life and personal analysis of piano scores written by the master. My investigation uncovered the almost hidden existence of a large number of attractive musical works which Gretchaninoff wrote for solo piano as well as insightful details concerning the circumstances and motives that inspired the master to compose within the parameters of this genre. The following pieces are performed as part of this presentation: (from Children’s Album, Op. 98) A Tale, In the Camp of the Lead Soldiers, Lead Soldiers on the March, Hobby-Horse, Nurse Is Sick, Lullaby, Little Dance, Dreadful Event, After the Ball, On a Travel Tour, The Little Would-be Hero; (from 12 Little Sketches for Children, Op. 182) Sunrise, With the Fishing Rod, On the Swing, A Country Lad; (from A Child’s Day, Op. 109) Morning Prayer, The Broken Toy, The Happy Return Home; (from The Grandfather’s Book, Op. 119) My Dear Mommy, Swallow Dance, Pussy Is Ill, On the Swing; (from Glass Beads, Op. 123) Morning Promenade, On a Bicycle, Difficult Work; (from Andrusha’s Album, Op. 133) The Dance of the Gold Fishes, My Little Dog Joujou; (from Album Leaves, Op. 139) After Walking; (from Nina’s Album, Op. 141) After Mass, Dreaming, At the Wheel; (from Arabesques, opus number in dispute) Russian Folksong, A Sad Little Story; Sonatina in F major, Op. 110, #2 – 1. Allegro giocoso, 2. Menuet (Moderato grazioso) and Trio, 3. Finale – Allegro.

The Soviet Union population was unified under the shared belief of being a part of a common goal for proletarianism, in disregard of religion. These sentiments were prevalent up until the union’s dissolution. Something which created an identity void, reinvigorating the need for spirituality. The idea of belonging to a Church was encouraged, in which Orthodoxy emerged as a solution for the lack of identity and provided a source of piety for the people. Amalgamating the scattered religious community, essentially providing a catalyst for creating an identity based on a cultural belonging to a historical past. This thesis presents the Russian Orthodox Church’s politicised role in Russia, that in turn has created an identity marker for Russians. From this, an understanding stems for the outcome of Russia’s and the ROCs attempt to exert cultural values through Soft power on Ukraine and Belarus. Fundamentally illustrating that the two states’ preconceived identities differs to the extent that they either welcome or reject these notions.

Nikita Khrouchtchev est surtout connu en Occident comme étant celui qui a permis le relatif soulagement de la déstalinisation. Cette image est d’ailleurs aussi persistante dans les anciens pays de l’URSS. Lorsque Khrouchtchev accède au pouvoir, il aspire en effet à des modifications ambitieuses dans des domaines extrêmement variés. La dénonciation des crimes de Staline lors du XXème Congrès du PCUS ouvre la voie à l’expression d’un certain pluralisme intellectuel et artistique qualifié de « dégel » dont les effets seront irréversibles pour la société soviétique dans son ensemble. Le volontarisme du premier secrétaire conduit à une politique de réformes économiques et politiques aussi impromptues que déstabilisatrices. Cependant la déstalinisation sera pour les peuples soviétiques (tout spécialement pour les ukrainiens) une ère de déceptions autant que d’espoirs. En effet, l’Ukraine, un des plus solides bastions de la vie religieuse en Union soviétique, tiendra une place particulière dans cette campagne. Entre autres, les régions de l’ouest de l’Ukraine avaient échappées à la répression des années trente et constituaient un phénomène singulier avec leur vie religieuse vivace et leur refus de rejoindre l’orthodoxie. Ainsi la campagne antireligieuse de Khrouchtchev est une facette méconnue de la politique du successeur de Staline. Le comportement du nouveau premier secrétaire va ainsi être encore plus dur que celui de Staline l’ancien séminariste à l’égard de la religion. Ce dernier avait fait des concessions aux Eglises après 1943, alors que dès 1958, quelques années après l’accession au pouvoir de Khrouchtchev, la propagande antireligieuse redevient virulente. / Nikita Khrushchev is mainly known in the western countries as the one who has allowed a relative relief of the dictatorship thanks to the destalinization process. This opinion is also persistent in the former countries of the USSR. Indeed when Khrushchev seizes power, he wishes to proceed with many ambitious reforms in various areas. Nevertheless, he remains a convinced communist who tries this way to give a new start to the soviet ideological adventure. The denunciation of the crimes of Stalin during the XXth Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party (SUCP) opens path to some intellectual and artistic pluralism often called « unfreezing ». Furthermore, the wills of the first secretary will lead to a policy of unexpected and unbalancing politic and economic reforms. But in fact the destalinization times will also be times of disappointments, especially for the Ukrainians. Indeed Ukraine will have a special place in the antireligious campaign, as one of the healthiest strongholds of the religious life of the Soviet Union. Since the western regions had not suffered the repression of the thirties, they were a singular phenomenon in the Soviet Union with their vivid religious life and their refusal to become uniformly orthodox. Thus the antireligious campaign of Khrushchev is one of the poorly known sides of the policy of Stalin’s successor. The behaviour of the new first secretary as regards the religions will be indeed even harsher than the one of Stalin (the former were-be priest). Stalin had made concessions to the churches after 1943; but as soon as 1958, few years after Khrushchev’s rise to power, the antireligious propaganda becomes strong and efficient again.

本論文主要在探討俄羅斯東正教政教關係之演變。在研究方法上，主要依據”政教關係”的理論以及相關的文獻分析來進行之。本文的架構以教會過去的歷史、俄羅斯官方的意識型態以及政府的宗教政策之演變為主軸，據此來探討一九九一年底之後，俄羅斯政教關係之變化。 本論文共分五章。第一章說明本文之研究方法與架構。第二章則將帝俄時期至一九八五年以前的俄羅斯政教關係的歷史背景作一簡單的敘述。一九一七年以前，東正教一直是俄羅斯的國教。與其他的教派相比，東正教會享有許多特權，例如，它得以免除稅務以及公民應盡之義務。在蘇聯時期，東正教會喪失原來獨享之特權並且遭受到殘酷之宗教迫害；不過這種情況到戈巴契夫上台以後有了轉變。 本文第三章首先題到戈巴契夫在蘇聯境內實行政治與經濟領域之革新，這些政策伴隨官方意識型態之轉變，導致政府宗教政策的大幅修正，政教關係也因此有所突破。此時俄羅斯東正教會再度受到重視，並且可以進行它的復興工作。在蘇聯解體之後，東正教在俄羅斯的政治上依然扮演著重要的角色。在第四章裏我們將探討教會與俄羅斯政府之間如何相互影響。第五章將對本文作一個總結，並討論俄羅斯政教關係可能的發展方向，以及俄羅斯東正教之未來前景。 / This dissertation focuses on the changes in the relationship between the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church. The methodology for this thesis is based on the “Politics-Religion Mutuality”Theory and the analysis of documents pertaining to the two related parties. The framework of this study is based upon three essential topics: the history of the church, the evolution of Russian ideology and the religious policies of Russian government.Analyzing these three topics we may find out how the Russia politics-religion relationship changes after the end of 1991. There are five parts to this thesis. Each part has a chapter devoted specifically to it. In chapter one the methodology and the framework of this dissertation will be expounded. In chapter two the author gives an outline of the history of the relationship between the state and the church. Before 1917 the Russian Orthodox Church was the state church of Russia. Being the official church, the Russian Orthodox Church had many privileges as compared with other denominations, for example, it was exempt from assessments and civic obligations. In the Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox Church lost its monopolistic power and suffered brutal religious persecution. This, however changed when M. Gorbachev headed the government. Chapter three, the turning point, shows the new policies in political and economic domains within the USSR enacted enforced by Gorbachev. These changes to the official ideology also led to large-scale changed in religious policy. At this time the Russian Orthodox Church became highly regarded again in the USSR and could proceed with its own revival. After the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian Orthodox Church was still highly regarded and played an important role in Russia's politics. In chapter four we investigate how the church and the government influenced each other. In chapter five we conclude with a summery, the possible development of mutuality between the Russian Orthodox Church and the prospects of the Russian Orthodox Church.

This research aimed to determine whether the rejection by Russian Orthodox Church leaders of recent translations of the Bible into Russian could be ascribed to a conflict of Russian and Western translation norms. Using Lefevere's (1992) notion of systems, the study compared the norms of Russian Bible translations, Western Bible translation and Russian literary translation, as well as those of a segment of the target audience, to determine the extent of their compatibility with each other and with the translations in question. The results showed that the recent translations did reflect the norms of Western Bible translation, but that these were not atypical of norms for previous Russian and Slavonic translations, nor for the norms of Russian literary translation. However, the results also showed that in practice target audience norms mirrored those of the Russian Orthodox Church, resulting in a similar rejection of the newer translations. / Linguistics / M.A. (Linguistics)

After a barren period between about 1920 and 1970, in which there was little or no mission activity, the Orthodox Church has experienced a revival of interest in mission. This thesis is an examination of how Orthodox theology and worldviews have affected Orthodox mission methods, and account for some of the differences between Orthodox methods and those of Western Christians. A starting point for the study of the Orthodox theology of mission is the ikon of the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, which shows the apostles gathered in the upper room with the world in their midst. Orthodox soteriology, which sees Christ as the conqueror of evil and death, rather than as the punisher of sin, has led Orthodox missionaries to have a more open approach to other cultures. A historical survey of ways in which the Orthodox Church grew in the past includes martyrdom, mission and statecraft, monastic mission, and in the 20th century, the missionary significance of the Orthodox diaspora. Even in the fallow period, however, there was mission in the sense that various groups of people were drawn to Orthodoxy, sometimes through the ministry of irregularly ordained bishops. The collapse of communist regimes in the Second World has created many new opportunities for orthodox mission, but has also brought problems of intra-Christian proselytism, nationalism and viole:1ce, and schism and stagnation in those places. As the Orthodox Church prepares to enter the 21st century, its worldview, which has been less influenced by the modernity of the West, may enable it to minister more effectively to people involved in postmodern reactions against modernity. / Christian Spirituality, Church History and Missiology / D.Th. (Missiology)

The thesis is a contribution to the analysis of media representation through the use of critical discourse analysis of twelve English written articles by Russian and international media sources. The articles were chosen in relation to the unauthorised Pussy Riot protest in the Cathedral in Moscow back in February 2012, and the societal changes that have taken place thereafter. The analysed articles have been written and published between February 2012 and January 2014. The aim with the study is to see how media sources from different geographical backgrounds described the same events and news.