A presente dissertação dedica-se ao estudo da relação entre a teoria e a prática do Supremo Tribunal Federal no que diz respeito aos limites da interpretação conforme a Constituição. A partir do confronto entre as principais lições doutrinárias sobre o tema e os acórdãos proferidos pela Corte nos processos do controle abstrato de constitucionalidade, verifica-se que os limites reconhecidos pela doutrina e pelo Tribunal não são obedecidos em muitos dos precedentes, casos nos quais tem-se a utilização da interpretação conforme como mecanismo de correção e integração judicial do direito. Nesse cenário, busca-se averiguar a legitimidade de tal conduta pelo aplicador do direito. Chega-se, assim, a conclusão de que, nos casos em que o Supremo Tribunal Federal se vê diante de hipóteses em que há lacuna ou antinomia que não podem ser resolvidas pela interpretação conforme em sua função de decisão, o princípio da inafastabilidade da jurisdição impõe a aplicação da integração conforme a Constituição, desde que ela não esteja vedada tácita ou expressamente pelo ordenamento e que a decisão que a determine esteja fundamentada. / This study tries to understand the relationship between theory and practice regarding the limits of the interpretation according to the Constitution. Confronting the most common jurisprudence that relates to the topic and the decisions that the Supreme Court emitted in the cases of abstract judicial review, it becomes clear that the before mentioned limits of the interpretation according to the Constitution aren\'t respected by the decisions of the Court and that the technique is used as a mechanism of correction and integrity of the law. In this scenario, this study tries to reveal the legitimacy of the decisions the Supreme Court took on this basis. The conclusion one has arrived at states that in the cases in which the Supreme Court confronts itself with antinomy or law blanks that can\'t be resolved by regular interpretation, the non liquet principle forces the Court to correct or to integrate the law, as long as: 1) it isn\'t expressly or implicitly forbidden by the constitutional text; and 2) the decision is thoroughly motivated.

Função política do Estado é a atividade que órgãos instituídos pela Constituição exercem no âmbito de sua competência, tendo por objetivo preservar a sociedade política e promover o bem comum, e que consiste em determinar, mediante a livre interpretação de normas constitucionais, o que é o interesse público e quais são os meios necessários à sua implementação. A função política é desempenhada por diversos órgãos e poderes, inclusive pelos tribunais constitucionais. Os tribunais constitucionais exercem função política, basicamente, em relação a quatro grandes temas: separação de poderes, federalismo, direitos fundamentais e funcionamento das instituições democráticas. O exercício da função política pelos tribunais constitucionais possui características específicas. Os tribunais constitucionais têm legitimidade para exercer função política, apesar de seus integrantes normalmente não serem escolhidos pelo voto popular. No desempenho de função política, os tribunais constitucionais devem observar limites. No Brasil, o órgão que exerce o papel de tribunal constitucional é o Supremo Tribunal Federal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal, ao longo de sua história, desde sua instalação, em 1891, até os dias atuais, contribuiu para a definição do que é o interesse público, bem como para a definição dos meios necessários para sua implementação. Portanto, exerceu função política. Foram identificadas sete fases na história do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Em algumas delas, o Supremo Tribunal Federal exerceu função política mais ativamente. Em outras fases, limitou-se a confirmar decisões adotadas por outros órgãos de soberania. O Supremo Tribunal Federal tem legitimidade para exercer função política. Sua jurisprudência demonstra também que, no exercício da função política, o Supremo Tribunal Federal observou limites. / Political function of the State is the work performed by constitutional bodies, within the scope of their respective competencies, to preserve political society and promote public welfare. It consists in determining, through free interpretation of constitutional rules, what may be considered of public welfare and what are the necessary mechanisms for its implementation. Political function is performed by various powers and bodies including the constitutional courts. Basically, constitutional courts exercise political function in relation to four major subjects: segregation of power, federalism, basic rights and the functioning of democratic institutions. Constitutional courts bear specific characteristics when it comes to exercising their political function. A constitutional court has the legitimacy to exercise political functions even though its constituents are not elected through popular suffrage. In the exercise of their political function, constitutional courts must beware of some limits. In Brazil, the body that plays the role of constitutional court is the Federal Supreme Court. Throughout its history, that is, since its establishment in 1891 until the present, the Federal Supreme Court has contributed to define what public welfare is, as well as to its implemen-tation. Therefore, it has exercised its political function. Considering its jurisprudence, it is possible to identify seven stages in the Federal Supreme Court history. In some of these stages the Supreme Court exercises its political function actively. In other stages, simply confirmed decisions taken by other bodies. The Federal Supreme Court has legitimacy to exercise its political function. Its jurisprudence also shows that, in the exercise of its political function, the Federal Supreme Court has known some limits.

Submitted by Maria Aparecida (cidazen@gmail.com) on 2017-04-24T12:35:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Edson barbosa de Miranda Netto.pdf: 611509 bytes, checksum: e132671e1a04b1e096b318a9c549904b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-24T12:35:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Edson barbosa de Miranda Netto.pdf: 611509 bytes, checksum: e132671e1a04b1e096b318a9c549904b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-01-31 / CAPES, FAPEMA / The present research aimed to carry out a content analysis in legal and political speeches given in Brazil by the Presidents of the Republic, the Ministers of Health and the Federal Suprem Court of Justice from January 1, 2011 to October 15, 2016, in order to identify the frequency in which terms and expressions related to predetermined thematic categories appeared in the content of such discourses. Thus, it was sought to identify and analyze the actors, interests and rationalities of the Unified Health System. As the methodological procedure, the Lawrence Bardin’s content analysis was chosen in order to enable an understandment about the explicit or non apparent meanings in the juridical and political speeches content analyzed in this research. It was verified that the different frequencies express the rationalities and the concerns of each authority or organ analyzed, so that even important categories – such as the Health Judicialization and its serious reflexes in health services and the Reorganization of the public health competence distribution between the Federation members – had little or none appearance in the content of certain groups of speeches. The reason found to this was a predominant circumstantial feature in the content of the political speeches of the Executive authorities and the institutional limits of the Federal Suprem Court of Justice when confronted with political issues. / A presente pesquisa objetivou realizar uma análise de conteúdo em discursos jurídicos e políticos proferidos no Brasil pelos Presidentes da República, pelos Ministros da Saúde e pelo STF no período de 01 de janeiro de 2011 a 15 de outubro de 2016, de modo a ser possível identificar a frequência com que termos e expressões relacionados a categorias temáticas predeterminadas apareceram no conteúdo de tais discursos. Com isso, buscou-se identificar e analisar os atores, interesses e racionalidades do Sistema Único de Saúde. Como procedimento metodológico, utilizou-se a análise de conteúdo de Lawrence Bardin, de modo a ser possível compreender as significações explícitas ou não aparentes contidas no conteúdo dos discursos de natureza jurídica e política alvos da pesquisa. Constatou-se que as diferentes frequências expressam as racionalidades e os interesses inerentes a cada autoridade ou órgão analisado, de modo que mesmo importantes categorias – como a Judicialização da Saúde e seus graves reflexos nas ações e serviços de saúde e a Reorganização da distribuição de competências dos entes federados em matéria de saúde pública – pouco ou sequer apareceram no conteúdo de determinados grupos de discursos. Concluiu-se que, com relação aos membros do Poder Executivo, isso ocorreu em razão do caráter circunstancial predominante no conteúdo de seus discursos e, com relação ao STF, em função dos limites institucionais de sua atuação em questões de natureza política.

[pt] O estudo se preocupa em examinar o caráter da abstração dos efeitos conferidos aos julgados do Supremo Tribunal Federal em âmbito de controle concreto de constitucionalidade, ao qual vem sendo atribuídas características típicas do controle abstrato e concentrado, ora sob a denominação de abstrativização, ora com a expressão objetivização do controle de constitucionalidade. A partir de uma contextualização da jurisdição constitucional brasileira sob a influência de suas principais matrizes históricas, em especial a norte-americana e austríaca, verifica-se que tal fenômeno vem se ampliando na jurisprudência da Corte de modo a desvirtuar o desenho institucional delimitado pelo constituinte. Busca-se delinear, ademais, outros institutos e fatos pontuais representativos da referida tendência de objetivização, realçando as modificações constitucionais e legislativas que demonstrem tal ocorrência, o que denota maior amplitude do fenômeno, não apenas no que tange ao controle difuso, mas em relação à própria jurisdição constitucional como um todo, reflexo de uma postura jurisdicional ativista. Em sua segunda parte, o trabalho faz análise crítica do objeto empírico sob a luz de perspectivas democráticas e minimalistas, tendo por pano de fundo o processo judicial que questionou a demarcação da Terra Indígena Raposa Serra do Sol, bem como casos concretos paradigmáticos da jurisdição constitucional estrangeira e brasileira. / [en] This study is concerned with examining the abstraction’s character of the noted effects of the Brazilian Supreme Court’s trials regarding the concrete control of constitutionality, which have been given typical characteristics of the abstract and concentrated control, sometimes under the denomination abstrativization, sometimes with the expression objectivization of the control of constitutionality. From a contextualization of the Brazilian’s constitutional jurisdiction under the influence of its main historic matrices, specially the North American and Austrian, is verified that such phenomenon is increasing in the Court’s jurisprudence in order to misrepresent the institutional layout limited by the constituent. Still is desired to outline, other institutes and single facts meaningful of the noted tendency of objectivization, highlighting constitutional and legislative modifications which show such occurrence that shows the phenomenon’s larger magnitude, not only concerning the diffuse control, but related to the constitutional jurisdiction as a whole which reflects an activist jurisdictional position. In it’s second part, the work does a critical analysis of the empiric object, based on the democratic and the minimalistic’s perspectives, having as background the lawsuit which questioned the delimitation of the indian reserve Raposa Serra do Sol, as well as other brazilian and foreign concrete paradigmatic cases of the constitutional jurisdiction.

無論是東方或西方古代社會，宗教信仰與政治信仰二者的關係都是相輔相成的；尤以中國古代殷周時期，宗教與政治的信仰、權力、組織、制度更是合為一體。筆者的興趣與關注，正是周初宗教人文轉向的課題。周室承繼殷權的宗教文化傳統，從祭祀天神、地衹、鬼靈、祖宗等現象出發，透過一套象徵系統的詮釋方式，傳達出一種對宇宙、人事獨特的理解與信念。然而，夏、殷之例不遠，僅以祭祀、占卜等活動尚不足以「祈天永命」來確保國祚久安，故強調「敬德」的主體修養活動以彌補宗教活動的不足；周室遂以此信仰體系為背景，經由「敬」的自我省察工夫，把對超越界的崇敬與追尋，回返到主體對自我的覺知與省察，神秘的宗教性格遂轉化為「敬德」價值理性的生發，「敬德」與「服天命」或「受天命」之間自始產生了聯結，兩者形成了緊密的因果關係：前為因，後為果；這有效地說明天命屬意周室的正當性。此時，「天命有德→敬德保民→祈天永命」三者恰好結成牢固的繩索，「敬德」成了國祚久安的必要條件，開顯出全新的、倫理的、道德的人文面相。 　　周初宗教人文轉向的關鍵處就是，周公等人以人民根植在祭祀、占卜活動中對超越界的情感為基礎，把一貫的宗教情操巧妙地轉移至「德」價值本體上；在周公等人自覺意識的作用下，神人關係的宗教情操順利地轉化為道德情操，周初宗教精神自此一大躍進，展現了新的宗教精神，從而指點出它的道德與倫理向度；宗教理性與人文理性因而結合、消融，人文意義與價值自始受到重視與肯認。職是之故，筆者擬以周初「天命觀」與「敬德」價值理性二者互為辯證的關係為進路，從二者的形成、關連與作用面切入，分別描述周初宗教人文化的歷史進程，並就其統貫之理作一系統性的闡述。 / The relations between the religious and political beliefs are complementary either in the eastern or eastern society which beliefs, authorities, organization, systems were combined into a whole especially during the Ying-Chou period of the ancient China. The writer's interests and concerns are rightly focused on “the humanistic turn of the early Chou religion”. The Chou empire inherited the religious, cultural tradition from Ying authority, starting out from the phenomena of worshiping the heaven deity, earth deity, ghosts, ancestral spirits and expressed an unique understanding, belief for the cosmos and the living world through the interpretative way of a set of symbolic system. Whereas, that the examples of Shia, Ying authorities went just ahead made Chou empire realized that only relying on the worshiping, divining activities was insufficient to “appealing to the heaven for the eternal life of nation”; hence, they proclaimed further the subjective deed― “respecting virtue” ―for supplementing the deficiency of religious activities; given that, the Chou turned its outwardly respecting and searching for the transcendent back to the inwardly subjective awareness and introspection on self, grounded on the inherited belief system, by way of the introspective work “respecting” of self that resulted in the transformation from the mystic, religious characters into the arising of the value-ration of “respecting value”. Thus, there was connection between “respecting virtue” and “obeying the heaven's destiny”, “accepting the heaven's destiny”; the former the cause, the later the effect. The close causation occurred within them that effectively explained the legitimacy of the bestowed destiny from heaven on Chou. At this time, “the heaven bestowing destiny on those who have virtue→respecting virtue for the purpose of protecting people→appealing to the heaven for the eternal nation” these three nodes were rightly strung into a firm rope so that “respecting virtue” became the necessary condition of the eternal nation that discovered the wholly new, moral, ethical and humanistic aspects. 　　The key point of the humanistic turn of the early Chou religion was Chou-Kong and others, based on people's emotions rooted in the worshiping, divining activities for the transcendent, ingeniously turned people's inherited religious sentiments to the “virtue” itself. Under the function of Chou-Kong's self-consciousness, the religious sentiment of relations between gods and men smoothly transformed into the moral sentiment that made the religious spirit in the early Chou pushed a giant leap and opened a fully new religious spirit that directed to its moral and ethical dimensions. The religion-ration and humanity-ration were thus combined and melted; from this on, the humanistic meanings and values were acknowledged and regarded with esteem. On the grounded of that, the writer tries to make a systematic explication for its reason of unity by describing separately the historical process of the humanization of the early Chou religion from the aspects of formations, correlations and functions of both the view of “heaven's destiny” and the value-ration of “respecting virtue” among which the inter-dialectical relations used as an approach in this text.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

Over the last couple of decades or so, comparative public law scholars have been reporting a dramatic increase in the power and influence of judicial institutions worldwide. One obvious effect of this “judicialization of politics” is to highlight legitimacy concerns associated with the exercise of judicial power. Indeed, how do courts attain and retain their legitimacy particularly in the context of their increasing political relevance? To answer this question I develop a novel theory of strategic legitimacy cultivation. The theory is developed through an application of the institutionalist branch of the rational choice theory which suggests that institutional structures, rules, and imperatives provide behavioural incentives and disincentives for relevant actors who respond by acting strategically in order to attain favourable outcomes. The theory shows that courts cultivate legitimacy by exhibiting strategic sensitivities to factors operating in the external, political environment. In particular, legitimacy cultivation requires courts to devise decisions that are sensitive to the state of public opinion, that avoid overt clashes and entanglements with key political actors, that do not overextend the outreach of judicial activism, and that employ politically sensitive jurisprudence. The theory is tested in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada through a mixed-method research design that combines a quantitative analysis of a large number of cases, case-study approaches, and cross-policy comparisons. One of the central findings of the dissertation is that understanding judicial institutions and judicial policymaking influence requires taking close accounts of external contexts within which courts operate.

The 1980s witnessed a judicial “rights revolution” in Canada characterized by the Supreme Court of Canada striking down both federal and provincial legislation which violated the rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights. The lack of a similar judicial “rights revolution” in the wake of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights has largely been attributed to the structural difference between the two instruments with the latter – as a “mere” statute of the federal parliament – providing little more than a canon of construction and (unlike the Charter) not empowering the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation. Yet this view contrasts starkly with how the Bill was portrayed by the Diefenbaker government, which argued that it provided for judicial review and would “prevail” over other federal legislation. Many modern scholars have dismissed the idea that the Bill could prevail over other federal statutes as being incompatible with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. That is, a bill of rights could only prevail over legislation if incorporated into the British North America Act. As such, they argue that the Diefenbaker government could not have intended the Bill of Rights to operate as anything more than a canon of construction. However, such a view ignores the turbulence in constitutional thinking on parliamentary sovereignty in the 1930s through 1960s provoked by the Statute of Westminster. This era produced the doctrine of “self-embracing” sovereignty – in contrast to traditional “Dicey” sovereignty – where parliament could limit itself through “ordinary” legislation. The effective author of the Canadian Bill of Rights, Elmer Driedger, was an adherent of this doctrine as well as an advocate of a “purposive” approach to statutory interpretation. Driedger, thus, drafted the Bill based upon the doctrine of self-embracing sovereignty and believed it would enjoy a “purposive” interpretation by the courts, with the Bill designed to be as effective at guaranteeing rights as the Statute of Westminster was at liberating Canada from Imperial legislation.

Between 1921 to 1941, Canada and Japan were close trading partners. The end of World War II provided the two countries with the opportunity to resume their former economic relationship. However, Japan was a defeated country, lacking in resources and credit, and subject to the Occupation led by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. In contrast, Canada was left with a strong economy and political independence. In 1945, Canada was invited to participate in the Far Eastern Advisory Commission that later became the Far Eastern Commission in 1946. In August 1946, Canada established a Liaison Mission at its former Legation in Tokyo. Using archival material, this study explores how trade was conducted between 1945-1951 and explains how Canada and Japan redeveloped their economic relationship during the challenging years of Occupied Japan.