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Estudo de eventos e análise da rentabilidade ex post como metodologia de análise de fusões: o caso brasileiroRabello, Gabriel Gouvêa 30 August 2013 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2013-08-30 / O objetivo desta dissertação é estimar os potenciais efeitos competitivos sobre o mercado relevante das principais fusões ocorridas no Brasil após o Plano Real, avaliando a eficácia da metodologia de estimação ex ante de efeitos efetivamente observados na rentabilidade das firmas fusionadas e rivais ex post. Segundo a análise de modelo teórico proposto por Motta (2004),é possível utilizar o resultado das firmas rivais no mercado em que ocorreu a fusão como indicador da presença de ganhos em eficiência ou de poder de mercado no mercado relevante das firmas fusionadas, em que retornos positivos para as firmas rivais indicam a presença de poder de mercado e, consequentemente, uma diminuição do excedente do consumidor e do bem-estar na economia. Analogamente, retornos negativos para as firmas rivais indicariam a presença de ganhos em eficiência e aumento do bem-estar. Para estimar os efeitos das fusões sobre as firmas rivais e fusionadas, utiliza-se neste trabalho a metodologia de estudo de eventos em que são calculados os retornos anormais das ações das firmas rivais, bem como das firmas fusionadas, decorrentes do anúncio da fusão. Além disso, para verificar se a metodologia de estudo de eventos é capaz de capturar os efeitos competitivos das fusões de maneira adequada, comparam-se os resultados obtidos via metodologia de estudo de eventos com uma medida de desempenho das firmas ex post.Tal comparação foi feita por meio de uma análise de correlação e regressão. Nesse estudo, foi utilizada uma amostra de 42 grandes fusões horizontais entre firmas de capital aberto com ações cotadas na BM&FBOVESPA e suas respectivas rivais no setor, além de um detalhamento para um setor específico, o de Telecomunicações. Os resultados empíricos obtidos na metodologia de estudo de eventos apontam para uma maior presença de efeitos anticompetitivos nas fusões em geral (ganho de poder de mercado) e de ganhos de eficiência para o setor de Telecomunicações. Além disso, foi encontrada, tanto para as firmas rivais como para as firmas fusionadas,correlação positiva e significativa entre os retornos anormais e o efeito na lucratividade ex post, evidenciando a capacidade do mercado em antecipar os efeitos negativos das fusões sobre o bem-estar. Esses resultados também são corroborados pela análise de regressão, cabendo ressaltar a presença do efeito de reversão à média, evidenciando, assim, a utilidade da metodologia de estudo de eventos em capturar os efeitos potenciais das fusões ex ante. / The objective of this dissertation is to estimate the potential competitive effects on the relevant market of major mergers occurred in Brazil after the Real Plan, evaluating the effectiveness of methods used to estimate ex ante effects actually observed in the profitability of merged firms and rivals ex post. According to the analysis of the theoretical model proposed by Motta(2004), it is possible to use the result of rival firms in the market in which the merger occurred as an indicator of the presence of gains in efficiency or market power in the relevant market of the merged firms, where positive returns for rival firms indicate the presence of market power and, consequently, a decrease in consumer surplus and welfare in the economy. Similarly, negative returns for rival firms indicate the presence of efficiency gains and increased well-being. To estimate the effects of mergers on rivals and firms merged, is used in this work to study methodology in which events are calculated abnormal stock returns of rival firms as well as firms merged, resulting from the merger announcement. This comparison was made by means of a correlation analysis and regression. In this study, a sample of 42large horizontal mergers between firms with publicly traded shares listed on the BM&FBOVESPA and their respective rivals in the sector was used, and a breakdown for a specific sector, the Telecommunications. The empirical results obtained in the methodology of event studies show a higher presence of anticompetitive mergers in general (gain market power) and efficiency gains in the sector of Telecommunications effects. Furthermore, it was found for both the rival firms as for firms merged, positive and significant correlation between abnormal returns and the effect on ex post profitability, demonstrating the market's ability to anticipate the negative effects of mergers on the welfare. These results are also corroborated by regression analysis, fitting to emphasize the presence of the effect of mean reversion, thus demonstrating the usefulness of the event study methodology to capture the potential effects of ex ante mergers.
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Les accords de report d'entrée : contribution à l'étude de la relation du droit de la concurrence et du droit des brevets / Pay-for-delay agreements : contribution to the study of the interaction between competition law and patent lawChaiehloudj, Walid 07 December 2017 (has links)
Les accords de report d’entrée sont des accords conclus dans le secteur pharmaceutique. Conçus par les laboratoires princeps, ils ont pour objet ou pour effet de retarder l’entrée de concurrents génériques sur le marché. Nés aux États-Unis à la fin des années 1990, ces accords continuent jusqu’à ce jour de générer de nombreux problèmes juridiques. Malgré plus de deux décennies de contentieux, les accords « pay- for-delay » produisent toujours un grand scepticisme outre-Atlantique et ne bénéficient pas d’un régime juridique clair. La difficulté tient à ce que ces accords cristallisent à la fois des problèmes de droit de la concurrence et de droit des brevets. De son côté, l’Union européenne a été récemment touchée par cette pratique. La Commission européenne s’est jusqu’alors saisie de trois cas. À chaque reprise, cette dernière a conclu que les accords restreignaient la concurrence en raison de leur objet. L’institution bruxelloise a ainsi fait preuve d’une grande intransigeance et d’une étonnante sévérité eu égard à sa faible expérience sur le sujet. Ce travail de recherche se propose de répondre aux problèmes posés par les accords de report d’entrée en mobilisant une approche comparatiste. Par ce biais, l’objectif de cette étude est double. D’une part, il s’agira de mieux comprendre le mécanisme qui se cache derrière ces accords. D’autre part, il s’agira de formuler des recommandations afin d’améliorer le contrôle actuel des « pay-for-delay » dans l’Union européenne / Pay-for-delay agreements are agreements concluded in the pharmaceutical sector. Designed by brand laboratories, they have for object or for effect to delay generic entry on the market. Born in the United States in the late 1990s, these agreements continue to generate many legal problems. Despite more than two decades of litigation, the pay-for-delay agreements still produce great skepticism across the Atlantic and do not have a clear legal regime. The difficulty is that these agreements crystallize both competition law and patent law issues. The European Union has recently been affected by this practice. The European Commission has prononced three decisions. In each of them, the commission concluded that the agreements restricted competition by their object. Thus, the commission showed a great intransigence and an astonishing severity in view of its weak experience on the subject. This research aims to address the problems posed by pay-for-delay agreements by mobilizing a comparative approach. In this way, the objective of this study is twofold. On the one hand, the purpose is to better understand the mechanism behind these agreements. On the other hand, the goal is to formulate recommendations to improve the current pay-for-delay control in the European Union
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A critical review of the treatment of dominant firms in competition law : a comparative studyMunyai, Phumudzo S. 10 1900 (has links)
In South Africa compliance with competition law has become a major concern for firms that achieve and maintain certain levels of success and growth in the market, as their actions are often a source of complaints and litigation by rivals and competition authorities. With substantial financial penalties often levied against them for a variety of conduct deemed to constitute an abuse of their market position, dominant firms must constantly be aware of the likely impact of their business strategies and actions on both rivals and consumers. What were once thought to be normal and economically sound business practices and decisions, such as cutting prices to attract customers, have now acquired new meanings, with devastating consequences for dominant firms. So, are dominant firms under attack from competition law? In this study I aim to determine this.
I track the historical development of competition law in three jurisdictions: South Africa, America, and the EU, with the aim of identifying traces, if any, of hostility towards dominant firms in the origins of competition law. I further investigate whether the formulation and enforcement of certain aspects of existing abuse of dominance provisions manifest as hostility towards dominant firms. While acknowledging the important role that competition law enforcement plays in promoting competition and enhancing consumer welfare, I conclude that significant unjustified economic and legal prejudice is suffered by dominant firms as a result of the way in which certain abuse of dominance provisions have been formulated and applied. I also offer appropriate recommendations. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.
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Interface entre a proteção à propriedade intelectual e o direito de concorrência no Brasil / The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Competition Law in BrazilBrito Junior, Jorge Luiz de 02 March 2015 (has links)
Embora os direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (PI) sejam supostamente instituídos de forma a fomentar a inovação e o bem-estar em longo prazo, seu uso pode ensejar comportamentos oportunistas e abusivos como os Artigos 8.2 e 40 do TRIPS expressamente admitem. Sempre que tal tipo de comportamento afetar a concorrência em determinado mercado excluindo concorrentes, impondo barreiras à entrada, prejudicando consumidores por meio de aumento de preços ou redução da oferta o Direito de Concorrência será chamado a intervir. Considerando tais questões, o objetivo desse trabalho é identificar um quadro de trabalho brasileiro para tratar de questões envolvendo questões de Direito de Concorrência relacionadas à Propriedade Intelectual. O autor buscou delinear os conceitos de uso abusivo de direitos de Propriedade Intelectual, Dominação de Mercado por meio de uso da Propriedade Intelectual e de abuso de posição dominante, considerando o novo quadro regulatório introduzido pela Lei 12.259/2001. / While intellectual property (IP) rights are usually claimed to be designed to foster innovation and welfare in the long run, their use may give rise to opportunistic, abusive behavior - as Articles 8.2 and 40 of TRIPS openly admit. Whenever such sort of behavior affects competition in a given market - whether by dislodging competitors, imposing barriers to entry, harming costumers, raising prices or reducing output - competition law is called to intervene. Considering these issues, the purpose of this paper is to identify a Brazilian legal framework for dealing with IP related competition issues. The author sought to draw the legal concepts of abusive of IP rights, market domination and abuse of dominant position considering the new regulatory framework introduced by Law 12.259/2011.
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Índices de política de concorrência: avaliação do caso brasileiro / Competition policy indexes: assessment of the brazilian caseFalco, Guilherme de Aguiar 26 June 2014 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2014-06-26 / Market regulation brings on the expectation that government's intervention improves the economy. For example, the assumption that competitive environments enable efficient allocation of resources influences the development of antitrust policies and encourages free competition. The promotion of competition through laws and regulatory agencies follows this reading and public antitrust policies are disseminated throughout developed and developing countries. However, despite its wide application, these regulations lack empirical mechanisms that organize their major institutional properties and allow proper assessment of policy operation and its effects over the economy. This master thesis replicates to the Brazilian reality a set of indexes - previously developed for 13 other jurisdictions - that seek to translate institutional and qualitative information into objective, quantitative and comparable cross-country information. The indexes are created upon the compilation and classification of the characteristics of a particular jurisdiction with respect to a benchmark of best practices in deterring anticompetitive conducts. The immediate goal is to review and critique different designs of competition policy agencies and statutes, allowing cross-time and cross country analysis. The results for the Brazilian policy are positive regarding institutional features (rules of the game), both in cross-time and cross-country perspectives; Brazil presents inferior results regarding enforcement (human/financial resources and volume of cases analyzed by the competent agency); the aggregate index presents high levels in a cross-country analysis. / A regulação de dinâmicas de mercado traz a expectativa de que a interferência estatal melhora a economia. A defesa e a promoção da concorrência por meio de leis e agências estatais se encaixam nessa leitura regulatória e constituem política pública disseminada entre a maioria dos países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento. Entretanto, apesar de sua vasta aplicação, essas regulações carecem de mecanismos empíricos que organizem suas principais propriedades institucionais e permitam análises satisfatórias acerca do funcionamento da política e da extensão de seus efeitos sobre a economia, especialmente em perspectiva comparada. Essa dissertação replica para a realidade brasileira um conjunto de Índices de Política de Concorrência, anteriormente construídos para outras 13 jurisdições pelo trabalho de Buccirossi et al (2011), que busca traduzir informações institucionais e qualitativas de uma política antitruste em informações objetivas, quantitativas e comparáveis entre países. Os índices são construídos a partir da compilação e classificação das características de determinada jurisdição com relação a um benchmark de melhores práticas em dissuasão de condutas anticompetitivas. O objetivo imediato é desenvolver instrumento que permita avaliação e comparação de diferentes modelos de política de concorrência, o que engloba tanto análises intertemporais da evolução do modelo aplicado por cada jurisdição quanto análises comparativas entre a evolução de políticas de diferentes jurisdições. O Brasil apresenta resultados positivos do ponto de vista institucional (regras do jogo), seja em avaliação intertemporal seja em caráter comparado; o desempenho nacional é inferior no que se refere à capacidade de enforcement (recursos humanos, financeiros e volume de casos analisados pelas autoridades). De forma agregada, o Brasil possui índices de concorrência elevados em perspectiva internacional.
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Interface entre a proteção à propriedade intelectual e o direito de concorrência no Brasil / The Interface Between Intellectual Property and Competition Law in BrazilJorge Luiz de Brito Junior 02 March 2015 (has links)
Embora os direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (PI) sejam supostamente instituídos de forma a fomentar a inovação e o bem-estar em longo prazo, seu uso pode ensejar comportamentos oportunistas e abusivos como os Artigos 8.2 e 40 do TRIPS expressamente admitem. Sempre que tal tipo de comportamento afetar a concorrência em determinado mercado excluindo concorrentes, impondo barreiras à entrada, prejudicando consumidores por meio de aumento de preços ou redução da oferta o Direito de Concorrência será chamado a intervir. Considerando tais questões, o objetivo desse trabalho é identificar um quadro de trabalho brasileiro para tratar de questões envolvendo questões de Direito de Concorrência relacionadas à Propriedade Intelectual. O autor buscou delinear os conceitos de uso abusivo de direitos de Propriedade Intelectual, Dominação de Mercado por meio de uso da Propriedade Intelectual e de abuso de posição dominante, considerando o novo quadro regulatório introduzido pela Lei 12.259/2001. / While intellectual property (IP) rights are usually claimed to be designed to foster innovation and welfare in the long run, their use may give rise to opportunistic, abusive behavior - as Articles 8.2 and 40 of TRIPS openly admit. Whenever such sort of behavior affects competition in a given market - whether by dislodging competitors, imposing barriers to entry, harming costumers, raising prices or reducing output - competition law is called to intervene. Considering these issues, the purpose of this paper is to identify a Brazilian legal framework for dealing with IP related competition issues. The author sought to draw the legal concepts of abusive of IP rights, market domination and abuse of dominant position considering the new regulatory framework introduced by Law 12.259/2011.
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Contribution à l’étude des droits régionaux de la concurrence en Afrique de l’Ouest : cas de l'union économique et monétaire Ouest-Africaine et de la communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest / Contribution to the studies of Community competition law in west Africa : Case of West African Economic and Monetary Union and Economic Community of West African StatesKoutouan, Atchiman Joséphine Naara 28 March 2018 (has links)
Les États ouest-africains ont fait de l’intégration économique la voie privilégiée pour relever le défi du développement économique dans un contexte international de plus en plus concurrentiel. Ainsi, par le biais d’organisations régionale et sous régionale, la protection du libre jeu de la concurrence est devenue un enjeu communautaire. L’intégration économique régionale ouest-africaine a donc été saisie par le droit de la concurrence. De ce fait, on assiste à l’émergence de droits régionaux de la concurrence au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire ouest africaine (UEMOA) et de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO). Chacune de ces organisations a donc mis en place un droit de la concurrence dans son espace économique. Il en résulte, vu la composition de l’UEMOA et de la CEDEAO, que ces droits communautaires ont vocation à s’appliquer aux États membres de l’Union qui font également partie de la Communauté. Cette particularité de la coexistence de ces règles communautaires de la concurrence en Afrique de l’Ouest méritait qu’on s’y attarde afin d’évaluer leur application, d’analyser l’effectivité et l’efficacité de ces droits. Cette étude comparative s’est attachée à mettre en exergue ce que renferment ces droits, à relever leurs spécificités, tout en mettant en lumière leurs insuffisances. Il apparaît nécessaire de repenser, voire de réformer certains aspects de ces droits afin d’améliorer leurs applications, gage d’une meilleure protection de la libre concurrence en Afrique de l’Ouest. / West African states have made economic integration the preferred way to deal with the challenge of economic development in an increasingly competitive international context. Thus, through regional and subregional organizations, the protection of the free movement of competition has become a community issue.West African regional economic integration has therefore been seized by competition law. From this, we note emerging competition rights in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Each of these organizations has therefore put in place a competition law in its economic area. As a result, given the composition of UEMOA and ECOWAS, these Community rights are intended to be applied to the Member States of the Union which are also part of the Community. The features of the coexistence of these Community competition law in West Africa deserved to be examined in order to evaluate their application, to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of these rights. This comparative study intends to highlight the contain of these rights, reveal their specificities, while showing their lacks. It’s necessary to rethink or even reform some aspects of these rights to improve their applications, basis for a better protection of free competition in West Africa.
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Le contentieux privé des pratiques anticoncurrentielles : Étude des contentieux privés autonome et complémentaire devant les juridictions judiciaires / Private litigation of competition law (cartels and abuses of dominance) : Study of stand alone and follow-on litigations in national courtsAmaro, Rafael 05 December 2012 (has links)
L’actualisation des données sur le contentieux privé des pratiques anticoncurrentielles fait naître laconviction que l’état de sous-développement souvent pointé est aujourd’hui dépassé. Les statistiquessont nettes : des dizaines d’affaires sont plaidées chaque année. Toutefois, ce contentieux s’esquissesous des traits qui ne sont pas exactement ceux du contentieux indemnitaire de masse faisant suite àla commission d’ententes internationales. C’est un fait majeur qui doit être noté car l’essentiel desprojets de réforme furent bâtis sur cet idéal type. Trois des caractères les plus saillants de la réalitéjudiciaire témoignent de cette fracture entre droit positif et droit prospectif. D’abord, le contentieuxprivé est majoritairement un contentieux contractuel entre professionnels aux forces déséquilibrées. Ensuite, c’estun contentieux national – voire local – plus qu’un contentieux international. Enfin, c’est plutôt uncontentieux autonome se déployant devant les juridictions judiciaires sans procédure préalable oupostérieure des autorités de concurrence (stand alone). Paradoxalement, les actions complémentaires(follow-on), pourtant réputées d’une mise en oeuvre aisée, sont plus rares. Ces observations invitentalors à réviser l’ordre des priorités de toute réflexion prospective. Ainsi, la lutte contre l’asymétried’informations et de moyens entre litigants, l’essor de sanctions contractuelles efficaces, larecomposition du rôle des autorités juridictionnelles et administratives dans le procès civil ou encorele développement des procédures de référé s’imposent avec urgence. Mais s’il paraît légitime desoutenir ce contentieux autonome déjà existant, il n’en reste pas moins utile de participer à laréflexion déjà amorcée pour développer le contentieux indemnitaire de masse tant attendu et dont onne peut négliger les atouts. De lege ferenda, le contentieux privé de demain présenterait donc uncaractère bicéphale ; il serait à la fois autonome et complémentaire. Il faut alors tenter de concevoir unrégime efficace pour ces deux moutures du contentieux privé en tenant compte de leurs exigencesrespectives. Or l’analyse positive et prospective de leurs fonctions révèlent que contentieuxautonome et contentieux complémentaire s’illustrent autant par les fonctions qu’ils partagent que parcelles qui les distinguent. Il serait donc excessif de vouloir en tous points leur faire application derègles particulières ou, à l’inverse, de règles identiques. C’est donc vers l’élaboration d’un régime commun complété par un régime particulier à chacun d’eux que s’orientera la présente recherche.PREMIÈRE PARTIE. Le régime commun aux contentieux privés autonome et complémentaireSECONDE PARTIE. Le régime particulier à chacun des contentieux privés autonome et complémentaire / Pas de résumé en anglais
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