Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T16:45:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniela Wariss Monteiro.pdf: 2225041 bytes, checksum: 8895c4a5f8d078eae0cbc8cfc5856db0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-02-18 / The goal of this work is to analyze by means of a case study the IT governance processes in a mobile phone company. First, it intends to verify if the controls required by these processes incur in bureaucratic dysfunctions and then to suggest ways for a gradually effective implementation. In order to comprehend how a certain implementation was made, it was carryed out a comparative between the situation before and after of the implementation. Also, interviews were done to verify if the individuals who work on the organization were satisfied with the result. The choice of the mobile phone sector is due to the large investments in technological and procedural innovations and to the strategic role played by IT within this sector, which aggregates value to the company. Since technological processes have been decisive in IT and in the whole company, IT area is not more only that one that provides technological services but plays a fundamental role in the general structure of the company. Dealing with the present case, some questions arise: Is IT governance effective or it has become a merely bureaucratic process? Are there advantages in its implantation? Do the individuals need to be prepared for the change? Does the market require these modifications? Are the certifications important to the phone companies? Has the quality of deliveries improved? Are the controls more effective without the utilization of frameworks? If they are, how do these controls burden the company? What kind of improvements could be done to make IT governance processes better? In order to answer such questions, a theoretical study on IT governance and bureaucracy has been done aiming to investigate their similarities and find out that some bureaucratic dysfunctions are present also in governance, even tough this kind of problems tends to be not considered or even neglected , preventing critical attitudes necessary to find practices solutions / O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar, mediante estudo de caso, os processos de governança de TI em uma organização de telefonia móvel. Pretende-se, em primeiro lugar, verificar se os controles exigidos por esses processos incorrem em disfunções burocráticas e, depois, sugerir caminhos para uma implementação gradualmente eficaz. Buscando compreender como uma determinada implementação foi efetuada, realizou-se um comparativo entre a situação antes e depois de tal implementação, além de aplicação de entrevistas a fim de verificar se os indivíduos que trabalham na organização ficaram satisfeitos com o resultado. Escolheu-se o setor de telefonia móvel porque é um segmento que possui grandes investimentos em inovações tecnológicas e processuais, dentro do qual a área de TI possui um papel estratégico agregando valor para a organização. Na verdade, como os processos tecnológicos tornam-se determinantes para o funcionamento da área de TI e, conseqüentemente, para a própria organização, a área de tecnologia passa a desempenhar um papel fundamental na estrutura geral da organização, deixando de ser apenas aquela que provê serviços técnicos. Diante do caso em questão surgem questionamentos como: a governança de TI é eficaz ou se tornou apenas um processo burocrático? Existem vantagens na sua implantação? Os indivíduos precisam estar preparados para a mudança? O mercado exige essas modificações? As certificações são importantes às empresas de telefonia? A qualidade dos entregáveis melhorou? Os controles são mais efetivos sem a utilização dos frameworks? Se sim, em que onera a organização efetivar estes controles? Quais melhorias podem ser feitas para aperfeiçoar os processos de governança de TI? Para responder a tais perguntas foi efetuado um estudo teórico tanto de governança de TI, como de burocracia, no intuito de investigar suas similaridades e de perceber que algumas disfunções burocráticas também existem na governança, embora problemas do tipo tendam a ser desconsiderados ou mesmo negligenciados , dificultando a tomada de postura crítica necessária para se buscar soluções práticas

A pesquisa apresenta reflexões e experiências a partir dos fenômenos socioculturais e políticos, no campo da saúde mental pública brasileira, através das articulações entre o sujeito e a cultura. Estuda a temática da burocracia, pensada como política da indiferença a partir da metáfora da máquina e do anonimato como referentes do laço social neste discurso. Enfatiza as formas burocráticas contemporâneas, típicas dos Estados capitalistas atuais, os traços de uma burocracia à brasileira, estabelecida pelo hibridismo entre a autoritária maneira de lidar com a norma e seus matizes flexíveis, além das raízes da burocracia missioneira. Discute as transformações do modelo de saúde mental, com seus avanços e retrocessos, problematizando as dificuldades de rupturas com o modelo manicomial. Discorre acerca da configuração da política sanitária brasileira, com destaque para a saúde mental, em especial os CAPS. Através de fragmentos de experiências em um CAPSi propõe o lugar destas instituições como lugares utópicos, de passagens, “lugar Entre”. Aponta para a necessidade de profanar a burocracia, atentando aos restos não burocratizáveis, a partir de dois eixos: o brincar como dispositivo fundamental do trabalho em um CAPSi e a produção/utilização do arquivo como testemunha na instituição de saúde mental pública, reconhecendo a importância de um trabalho singularizado, artesanal, que não suspenda a capacidade de pensar e fortaleça o espaço público. / This research presents reflections and experiences on sociocultural and political phenomenon in the Brazilian public mental health field, articulating the subject and the culture. It studies the bureaucracy considered as an indifference policy through the machine metaphor and the anonymity as referential of the social bond in this speech. It also emphasizes the contemporary bureaucratic characteristics, typical from modern capitalist States, the features of a Brazilian bureaucracy, stablished by the hybridism between the authoritarian way of dealing with the norm and its flexible nuances, besides the roots of a missioneira bureaucracy. It argues the mental health model transformations, focusing its advances and retrocessions, as well as it analyzes the difficulties of rupture with the asylum model. It debates about the Brazilian sanitary policy, emphasizing the mental health, especially the CAPS. Thus, through experiences at a CAPSi, it proposes the place of these institutions as utopic places, of passage, “in-between place”. It points out the necessity to desecrate the bureaucracy, giving attention to the non-bureaucratic parts through two axis: to play as a fundamental device of work at a CAPSi and the production/use of a file as a witness in a public mental health institution, recognizing the importance of a singularized word, handmade, which does not suspend the ability to think and fortifies the public space.

Dieser Beitrag präsentiert die Befunde der Elitestudie Politisch-Administrative Elite 2013 (PAE 2013) über Zusammensetzung und Politisierung der bundesdeutschen Verwaltungseliten. Diese vierte nationale Replikation der Comparative Elite Studies zum Ende der 17. Legislaturperiode bringt überraschende Entwicklungen ans Licht: Hinsichtlich der Zusammensetzung des Personals schreitet zwar die Feminisierung auch auf den Leitungsebenen fort und eine Berufsvererbung kann nicht mehr festgestellt werden, allerdings erlebt die Juristendominanz mit erstmals seit Jahrzehnten steigenden Werten ein Wiedererstarken. Der Grad an formaler Politisierung überrascht: Trotz des Verbleibs der CDU/CSU an der Macht findet ein umfassender Personalaustausch statt. Diese teils im Widerspruch zu etablierten Trends und Theorien stehenden Entwicklungen zeigen, dass das Feld der administrativen Elitenforschung auch zukünftig besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient.

Le thème de la sécurité invite généralement à aborder les pratiques de travail dans les industries à risques à partir des règles. Cette thèse décale le questionnement vers l’analyse d’une activité non explicitée dans une organisation formelle : l’entretien des installations. Un collectif diffus se forme sur cette base ; il unit plusieurs collectifs situés, définis à partir de l’organisation sans s’y restreindre. L’entretien consiste à rattraper un fonctionnement productif qui échappe continuellement à toute emprise, en raison de la dégradation matérielle des installations et des contraintes de flux tendu. Dans une ambiance d’urgence, les travailleurs essayent d’éviter les accidents et l’arrêt de la production, intriqués et toujours latents. Ils régulent leurs coopérations en essayant d’avoir prise à la fois sur les machines, sur leurs trajectoires professionnelles et, par là, sur la composition des collectifs. Parallèlement, les procédures de sécurité relèvent d’un dispositif bureaucratique plus large, à la fois insaisissable et omniprésent. Au nom de la « sécurité », ce dernier est censé concilier une production en flux tendu avec la prévention des accidents par un contrôle de la main-d’œuvre. Il intervient en pratique comme repère mais surtout en tant que menace : incapables de mesurer les écarts entre la réalité et la prescription, les travailleurs redoutent d’être mis en cause en cas d’accident. Les démarches de participation censées améliorer ce dispositif ne permettent pas de faire valoir le caractère incontrôlable des machines. Les membres du collectif diffus évitent alors de participer pour minimiser l’emprise hiérarchique sur l’ordre social construit en interne. / The theme of security generally invites to consider work practices in hazard industries from the point of view of rules. This thesis shifts the questioning towards the analysis of a non-explicit activity in a formal organization: the maintenance of facilities. A diffuse collective is formed on this basis; it units several sited collectives, defined from the organization without being restricted to it. The maintenance consist in catching up an efficient operation that constantly escapes beyond any control, due to material deterioration of facilities and to just-in-time constraints. In an urgency atmosphere, the workers try to avoid accidents and production arrests, intricately linked and always latent. They regulate their cooperation by trying to gain control on machines and on their own career paths, and thus on the composition of collectives. In parallel, security procedures relate to a larger bureaucratic apparatus, which is both elusive and omnipresent. On behalf of « security », this latest is supposed to conciliate just-in-time production with accident prevention through a control of workforces. It intervenes in practice as a benchmark but mainly as a threat: workers, unable to measure the deviations from reality to requirements, fear to be charged in case of accident. Participative actions supposed to improve this apparatus do not allow emphasizing the uncontrollable nature of machines. The members of the diffuse collective thus avoid participating in order to minimize the hierarchical hold on the in-house-built social order.

近年來政府大力推動行政革新、政府再造等工作,然綜觀其所採行之相關措施仍以工具理性為導向，忽略了實質理性的重要性,主客分離互易的結果,產生"異化"問題，對於國家整體生產力將造成負面影響，因此，研究官僚組織的異化問題,實為政府推動種種革新措施的首要之務。 異化論具有宗教的涵義，其後之黑格爾、費爾巴哈、馬克思、盧卡奇、馬庫色等人對此概念均有所論述，近代學者更進一步將此概念應用於官僚組織的經驗研究，以期能對官僚組織的異化問題有更深入的了解與認識，本文乃對異化論及其應用於官僚組織的相關研究予以探析及介紹，並藉此研究、探討官僚組織的異化問題。 目次 第一章 緒論 第一節 研究動機與目的 第二節 研究問題與重要名詞釋義 第三節 研究方法與流程 第四節 研究範圍與限制 第二章 相關理論及文獻探討 第一節 異化論探析 第二節 官僚組織理論探析 第三節 異化論、官僚組織理論的相關研究 壹 異化論的相關研究 貳 官僚組織理論的相關研究 第四節 官僚組織異化問題的相關研究 第三章 研究設計與實施 第一節 研究架構與假設 第二節 研究工具與前測 第三節 研究對象、樣本選取與研究實施過程 第四節 資料處理與統計分析方法 第四章 研究調查結果分析與討論 第一節 樣本結構分析 第二節 公務人員不同個人特質異化情形的差異性分析 第三節 行政官僚組織各面向與公務人員異化各面向間的相關分析 第四節 行政官僚組織整體面向對公務人員異化的綜合影響 第五章 研究發現與建議 第一節 研究發現 第二節 研究建議 參考書目 附錄一 附錄二 / Our government has been wholly absorbed in reinventing task recently. But trying to make a through inquiry, it's not difficult for us to find that it was mainly emphasizing on instrumental rationality, losing sight of substantive rationality. And owing to overlooking substantive rationality , it may result in alienation which will do more harm than good to the productivity of our government. Therefore, the research of alienation in the bureaucracy should be the most important job we ought to do. Alienation has religious implication. Hegel、Feuerbach、Marx、Luck'acs、Marcuse used to discuss it , and modern scholars further apply it to the research of bureaucracy. This research will illustrate the alienation theory and it's application to bureaucracy to understand the alienation problem of Taiper City Government bureaucracy.

一九四九年國民黨政府遷臺後﹐在臺灣所實行的統治型態是介於民主與極 權之間的威權體制。它的特徵包括有限的政治參與、一黨支配、低度的政 治動員等。臺灣在國民黨的執政下﹐以三民主義為統治的意識型態基礎﹐ 具備政治、軍事強人身份的兩位蔣總統為統治核心﹐而國家建構(na- tion building )的終極目標則是：在國共鬥爭中重新奪回歷史正統的地 位。這樣的統治企圖影響了往後中央政府的組織架構﹐除了國會長期不改 選之外﹐行政體制的發展也遭受不同程度的扭曲：在官僚系統方面﹐黨政 關係的糾葛使行政無法中立；常任文官的考選違背公平公正公開的原則﹐ 另為外省籍人士與軍人開方便之門；政務官無法進入國民黨中央的決策核 心﹐重要政策的決定權仍由老一輩的革命菁英所把持( 唯一例外的是財政 、經濟政策﹐國民黨的威權控制此地便顯得力不從心﹐因此具專業背景的 技術官僚得以獲得較大的自主權 )﹐使得決策品質粗糙且不符社會需求。 在政府組織方面﹐初期國民黨因為並無長久居留的打算﹐所以政府內出現 許多臨時性機構﹐而且以「委員會」型態出現的一級單位特多﹐疊床架屋 的情況非常嚴重﹐尤其組織規範多半是以行政命令取代法律﹐成為不折不 扣未法制化的「黑機關」；其次﹐因為經濟建設是國民黨政府進行國家建 構過程中的發展主軸﹐因此負責設計經濟建設計畫的機關成為政府組織中 最重要、權力最大的部門﹐其職權範圍甚至超過負責經濟行政事務的經濟 部與主管金融政策的財政部。從一九四九年成立的生管會起至目前的經建 會止﹐雖然今天其功能與地位已不如從前﹐但基本上它仍是政府組織之中 相當重要的機構。隨著強人已逝與威權體制的解體﹐轉型期中的中央行政 體系正面臨一個新的發展階段。唯有調整「大有為政府」的牧民心態﹐消 除行政權的篡奪性格﹐「國民政府」的民主行政才有實現的一天。

<p>This dissertation explores delegation and democracy within the European Union (EU). The EU now constitutes one of the cornerstones of the democratic systems of its member states. The most vital instrument of democracy is lawmaking, which increasingly occurs at the European level. Many different actors contribute to the shaping of EU legislation. Among the most important of these are national bureaucrats representing their member states in Council negotiations. This thesis focuses on these bureaucrats. In particular it analyzes the delegation and accountability relationship between member states’ governments and their national bureaucrats stationed at the permanent representations (PRs) in Brussels. It is based on semi-structured elite interviews with 80 French and Swedish senior civil servants in Brussels, Paris and Stockholm.</p><p>Using an explorative and descriptive comparative case study of two EU member states, France and Sweden, the dissertation seeks to describe and analyse how delegation between member states’ capitals and Brussels are affected by: i) the coordination and preparation of EU issues in member states’ government offices, ii) the organisation and functioning of the permanent representations, and, most importantly, iii) existing accountability mechanisms. Applying a principal-agent approach, this study shows that the delegation between governments and their Brussels-based bureaucrats is adequate, despite relatively weak delegation and accountability designs. The study identifies institutional divergence between France and Sweden as regards the design of national systems of EU delegation, particularly monitoring and reporting requirements, where Sweden seems to have a more developed system. Both countries have similar contract design and screening and selection systems for employing national agents stationed at the PRs. The impact of domestic coordination of EU affairs is important in order to understand processes of both preference formation precedent to delegation and of preference transfer through instructions. In this case it is obvious that French coordination is more efficient. The functions of the permanent representation also influence delegation between national and European levels. For example, administrative procedures in the PRs in Brussels have had effects on the drafting of instructions, something that is particularly notable in the Swedish case.</p><p>The study identifies several central problems as regards delegation between bureaucrats in Brussels and governments in member states’ capitals. The first problem has to do with the ongoing blurring of political and bureaucratic dimensions. This inhibits the ability of principals (in our case member state governments) to hold their agents (Brussels-based bureaucrats) accountable. The second problem identified by this study as regards the working of democracy is the distinction between formal and informal processes. One conclusion is that informal processes should be formalised or made more transparent. Opacity in lawmaking processes has detrimental effects on long-term legitimacy of democratic systems. Holding de facto lawmaking bureaucrats, caught in a cross-pressure between national demands and European ambitions, accountable is essential for democracy. The dissertation includes practical suggestions as to how to improve delegation, and argues that additional research on both the roles and power of bureaucrats as well as issues of cross-pressure is necessary.</p>

Die Studie schließt an die Debatte in der vergleichenden politikwissenschaftlichen Verwaltungsforschung an, die sich mit der Rolle interner Beratungsakteure in Regierungsorganisationen beschäftigt. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, die Mechanismen zu erklären, durch die interne Beratungsakteure die ihnen zugeschriebene Bedeutung im exekutiven Entscheidungsprozess erlangen. Dabei werden jene Organisationseinheiten untersucht, die proaktiv an exekutiven Entscheidungsprozessen mitwirken und mit ihrer Beratung politischer Akteure in Konkurrenz zur Ministerialverwaltung stehen können. Die Einflussmechanismen dieser Akteure in der exekutiven Entscheidungsfindung werden als Formen einer "Institutionenpolitik" aufgefasst, bei der Akteure die institutionellen Bedingungen von Politikformulierungsprozessen bzw. die "Spielregeln exekutiver Entscheidungsfindung" verändern, um ihre eigene Position bzw. die ihres "Klienten" zu stärken. Das theoretische Argument dieser Arbeit folgt der neo-institutionalistischen Wende in der Organisationstheorie und definiert Institutionenpolitik als graduelle Institutionalisierungsprozesse zwischen Institutionen und organisationalen Akteuren, wobei einem weiten Institutionenbegriff folgend die Objekte solcher Veränderungsprozesse durch regulative, normative und kognitive Säulen gekennzeichnet sind. In Anwendung des "power-distributional approach" lassen sich graduelle Institutionalisierungsprozesse durch institutionenbezogene Charakteristika erklären, d.h. die Beschaffenheit der Objekte von Institutionenpolitik, insbesondere die Interpretationsfreiheit ihrer Anwendung, sowie die Restriktionen des institutionellen Kontexts. Zudem lässt sich Institutionenpolitik durch akteursbezogene Charakteristika erklären, d.h. den Ambitionen der Akteure sich als "potentielle institutionelle Agenten" zu engagieren. Diese beiden Erklärungsdimensionen drücken sich in vier idealtypischen Mechanismen von Institutionenpolitik aus: Sedimentation, Ersetzung, Drift, und Konversion, die mit vier Agententypen korrespondieren. Die Studie untersucht die institutionenpolitischen Ambitionen der Akteure explorativ, die Relevanz des institutionellen Kontexts wird mithilfe von Erwartungshypothesen zu den Effekten von vier Merkmalen analysiert, die in der bestehenden Debatte als relevant gelten: (1) die Parteienzusammensetzung der Regierung, (2) die Strukturprinzipien von Kabinettsentscheidungen, (3) die Verwaltungstradition sowie (4) die formale Politisierung der Ministerialverwaltung. Die Studie folgt einem "most similar systems design" und führt qualitative Fallstudien zur Rolle interner Beratungseinheiten im Zentrum deutscher und britischer Regierungsorganisationen, d.h. der Regierungszentrale und dem Finanzministerium, über einen längeren Zeitraum durch (1969/1970-2005). Es werden jeweils drei Zeitperioden pro Untersuchungsland betrachtet, die britischen Fallstudien analysieren die Beratungsakteure im Cabinet Office, Prime Minister's Office und dem Finanzministerium unter den Premierministern Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) und Blair (1997-2005). Die deutschen Fallstudien untersuchen die Beratungsakteure im Bundeskanzleramt und dem Bundesfinanzministerium unter den Bundeskanzlern Brandt (1969-74), Kohl (1982-1987) und Schröder (1998-2005). Für die empirische Untersuchung wurden die Ergebnisse einer Dokumentenanalyse mit den Erkenntnissen aus 75 semi-strukturierten Experteninterviews trianguliert. Die vergleichende Analyse zeigt unterschiedliche Muster von Institutionenpolitik. Die deutschen Beratungsakteure agieren anfänglich in Ersetzung, später vornehmlich in Sedimentation sowie Drift, d.h. ihre institutionenpolitischen Aktivitäten widmen sich nach anfänglicher Ersetzung bestehender institutioneller Grundlagen zunehmend der Addition neuer Elemente sowie der deliberativen Nicht-Entscheidung zur Anpassung existierender institutioneller Grundlagen an Umweltveränderungen. Die britischen Beratungsakteure sind zumeist in Ersetzung sowie Konversion engagiert, trotz gelegentlicher Sedimentation, d.h. einer direkten Ersetzung bestehender institutioneller Grundlagen durch neue Spielregeln exekutiver Entscheidungsfindung sowie einer bewussten Umwandlung und Neuausrichtung existierender institutionellen Grundlagen, gelegentlich auch eine Addition neuer Elemente zu bestehenden Regeln. Die institutionen- und akteursspezifischen Charakteristika sind für diese Muster von Institutionenpolitik erklärungsrelevant. Erstens weist die Studie nach, dass der institutionelle Kontext die institutionenpolitischen Aktivitäten in Deutschland beschränkt und in Großbritannien begünstigt. Zweitens ist die Interpretationsfreiheit der Anwendung institutionenpolitischer Objekte bedeutsam, wie sich anhand der institutionenpolitischen Ambitionen der Akteure im Zeitverlauf und im Ländervergleich zeigt und somit drittens bestätigt, dass diese Interessen der Akteure an Institutionenwandel die Mechanismen von Institutionenpolitik beeinflussen. Die Arbeit schließt mit der Erkenntnis, dass die Rolle interner Beratungseinheiten in der exekutiven Politikformulierung nicht nur aus ihren inhaltlichen, parteistrategischen oder medial-beratenden Funktionen für politische Akteure in Regierungsämtern folgt, sondern insbesondere aus ihren institutionenpolitischen Aktivitäten, deren Resultate die institutionellen Restriktionen aller Akteure in exekutiven Entscheidungsprozessen beeinflussen – und somit auch ihre eigene Rolle in diesen Prozessen. / This study follows the debate in comparative public administration research on the role of advisory arrangements in central governments. The aim of this study is to explain the mechanisms by which these actors gain their alleged role in government decision-making. Hence, it analyses advisory arrangements that are proactively involved in executive decision-making and may compete with the permanent bureaucracy by offering policy advice to political executives. The study argues that these advisory arrangements influence government policy-making by "institutional politics", i.e. by shaping the institutional underpinnings to govern or rather the "rules of the executive game" in order to strengthen their own position or that of their clients. The theoretical argument of this study follows the neo-institutionalist turn in organization theory and defines institutional politics as gradual institutionalization processes between institutions and organizational actors. It applies a broader definition of institutions as sets of regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. Following the "power-distributional approach" such gradual institutionalization processes are influenced by structure-oriented characteristics, i.e. the nature of the objects of institutional politics, in particular the freedom of interpretation in their application, as well as the distinct constraints of the institutional context. In addition, institutional politics are influenced by agency-oriented characteristics, i.e. the ambitions of actors to act as "would-be change agents". These two explanatory dimensions result in four ideal-typical mechanisms of institutional politics: layering, displacement, drift, and conversion, which correspond to four ideal-types of would-be change agents. The study examines the ambitions of advisory arrangements in institutional politics in an exploratory manner, the relevance of the institutional context is analyzed via expectation hypotheses on the effects of four institutional context features that are regarded as relevant in the scholarly debate: (1) the party composition of governments, (2) the structuring principles in cabinet, (3) the administrative tradition, and (4) the formal politicization of the ministerial bureaucracy. The study follows a "most similar systems design" and conducts qualitative case studies on the role of advisory arrangements at the center of German and British governments, i.e. the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance, for a longer period (1969/1970-2005). Three time periods are scrutinized per country; the British case studies examine the role of advisory arrangements at the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Finance under Prime Ministers Heath (1970-74), Thatcher (1979-87) and Blair (1997-2005). The German case studies study the role of advisory arrangements at the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry of Finance during the Brandt government (1969-74), the Kohl government (1982-1987) and the Schröder government (1998-2005). For the empirical analysis, the results of a document analysis and the findings of 75 semi-structured expert interviews have been triangulated. The comparative analysis reveals different patterns of institutional politics. The German advisory arrangements engaged initially in displacement but turned soon towards layering and drift, i.e. after an initial displacement of the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern they laid increasingly new elements onto existing ones and took the non-deliberative decision to neglect the adaption of existing rules of the executive game towards changing environmental demands. The British advisory arrangements were mostly involved in displacement and conversion, despite occasional layering, i.e. they displaced the pre-existing institutional underpinnings to govern with new rules of the executive game and transformed and realigned them, sometimes also layering new elements onto pre-existing ones. The structure- and agency-oriented characteristics explain these patterns of institutional politics. First, the study shows that the institutional context limits the institutional politics in Germany and facilitates the institutional politics in the UK. Second, the freedom of interpreting the application of institutional targets is relevant and could be observed via the different ambitions of advisory arrangements across countries and over time, confirming, third, that the interests of such would-be change agents are likewise important to understand the patterns of institutional politics. The study concludes that the role of advisory arrangements in government policy-making rests not only upon their policy-related, party-political or media-advisory role for political executives, but especially upon their activities in institutional politics, resulting in distinct institutional constraints on all actors in government policy-making – including their own role in these processes.

Seit 2002 wird das Standardkosten-Modell (SKM) als Ansatz zur Messung von Bürokratiekosten in einer Vielzahl von OECD-Ländern, darunter Deutschland und Großbritannien, angewendet. Im Zentrum dieser Arbeit steht die Frage, warum im Regulierungsreform-Nachzüglerland Deutschland die Ausweitung des Ansatzes auf den Bereich Bürger seit Jahren auf der politischen Agenda steht und bereits erste Schritte zur Umsetzung unternommen wurden, während SKM Bürger im Regulierungsreform-Vorreiterland Großbritannien scheinbar nie auf der Agenda stand. In Anlehnung an einen von Kingdon entwickelten Agenda-Setting-Ansatz werden Unterschiede im Bereich der Problemwahrnehmung, in der Bewertung der Policy SKM sowie im politischen Entstehungsprozess untersucht. Hierbei zeigt sich, dass hinsichtlich der Wahrnehmung des Problems der Bürokratiebelastung signifikante Unterschiede zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien bestehen, die sich vor allem auf die in Deutschland höhere Intensität der Problemwahrnehmung beziehen. Weitere Unterschiede bestehen bezüglich der Bewertung der Policy SKM, die in Deutschland eine höhere Medienaufmerksamkeit erhält und allgemein positiver bewertet wird. Auch der Entstehungsprozess des SKM, der in Deutschland wesentlich stärker politisiert war als in Großbritannien, trägt zur Erklärung der beobachteten Unterschiede im Agenda-Setting bei. / Since 2002 the Standard Cost Model (SCM) has been used for the measurement of administrative burdens in several OECD countries, among them Germany and the UK. The central question explored in this article is why in the regulatory reform “laggard country” Germany the application of the SCM at the citizen level has been on the political agenda for several years, with the first steps already taken towards implementation, while in the regulatory reform “leader country” UK, the use of the SCM for the measurement of citizens’ administrative burdens has apparently never been on the agenda. Using an agenda setting model developed by Kingdon, differences in the areas of problem perception, assessment of the SCM as a policy, and the political introduction process of the policy are investigated. It is shown that regarding the perception of the problem of bureaucracy significant differences between Germany and the UK exist, in particular relating to the higher intensity of problem perception in Germany. Additional differences are identified regarding the assessment of the SCM policy which has received more media coverage in Germany and is also generally more positively received there. Differences identified in the introduction process, which in Germany has been much more politicised than in the UK, constitute additional explanatory factors.

This dissertation explores delegation and democracy within the European Union (EU). The EU now constitutes one of the cornerstones of the democratic systems of its member states. The most vital instrument of democracy is lawmaking, which increasingly occurs at the European level. Many different actors contribute to the shaping of EU legislation. Among the most important of these are national bureaucrats representing their member states in Council negotiations. This thesis focuses on these bureaucrats. In particular it analyzes the delegation and accountability relationship between member states’ governments and their national bureaucrats stationed at the permanent representations (PRs) in Brussels. It is based on semi-structured elite interviews with 80 French and Swedish senior civil servants in Brussels, Paris and Stockholm. Using an explorative and descriptive comparative case study of two EU member states, France and Sweden, the dissertation seeks to describe and analyse how delegation between member states’ capitals and Brussels are affected by: i) the coordination and preparation of EU issues in member states’ government offices, ii) the organisation and functioning of the permanent representations, and, most importantly, iii) existing accountability mechanisms. Applying a principal-agent approach, this study shows that the delegation between governments and their Brussels-based bureaucrats is adequate, despite relatively weak delegation and accountability designs. The study identifies institutional divergence between France and Sweden as regards the design of national systems of EU delegation, particularly monitoring and reporting requirements, where Sweden seems to have a more developed system. Both countries have similar contract design and screening and selection systems for employing national agents stationed at the PRs. The impact of domestic coordination of EU affairs is important in order to understand processes of both preference formation precedent to delegation and of preference transfer through instructions. In this case it is obvious that French coordination is more efficient. The functions of the permanent representation also influence delegation between national and European levels. For example, administrative procedures in the PRs in Brussels have had effects on the drafting of instructions, something that is particularly notable in the Swedish case. The study identifies several central problems as regards delegation between bureaucrats in Brussels and governments in member states’ capitals. The first problem has to do with the ongoing blurring of political and bureaucratic dimensions. This inhibits the ability of principals (in our case member state governments) to hold their agents (Brussels-based bureaucrats) accountable. The second problem identified by this study as regards the working of democracy is the distinction between formal and informal processes. One conclusion is that informal processes should be formalised or made more transparent. Opacity in lawmaking processes has detrimental effects on long-term legitimacy of democratic systems. Holding de facto lawmaking bureaucrats, caught in a cross-pressure between national demands and European ambitions, accountable is essential for democracy. The dissertation includes practical suggestions as to how to improve delegation, and argues that additional research on both the roles and power of bureaucrats as well as issues of cross-pressure is necessary.