Ce mémoire s’intéresse aux conditions historiques qui ont mené à l’édification judiciaire de la doctrine de la provocation policière d’abord aux États-Unis, puis au Canada. Dans un système de droit criminel aux visées préventives, il identifie le risque de la création étatique du crime comme le problème au cœur de cette doctrine. À la lumière de ce constat, l’auteur met ensuite le droit canadien en examen. En s’intéressant plus particulièrement à deux facettes du cadre d’analyse développé par la Cour suprême du Canada, il remarque la relative indifférence du droit à l’égard du « problème », et ce, en dépit d’un discours judiciaire rassurant, mais trompeur et teinté par un désir prépondérant de contrôle du crime. Cette découverte le conduit à mettre en doute la capacité exclusive des tribunaux à répondre aux enjeux sociaux complexes émanant de la doctrine de la provocation policière. / This master’s thesis examines the historical conditions that led to the judicial construction of the doctrine of police entrapment, first in the United States and then in Canada. Within a criminal justice system with preventive aims, it identifies the risk of state creation of crime as the central issue of this doctrine. In light of this observation, the author subsequently scrutinizes Canadian law. By focusing on two specific aspects of the analytical framework developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, the author observes the law's relative indifference to the "issue", despite a reassuring yet deceptive judicial discourse, coloured by a predominant desire for crime control. This discovery leads to a questioning of the exclusive capacity of the courts to address the complex social issues arising from the doctrine of police entrapment.

« Doctorat en droit de l'Université Laval offert en extension à l'Université de Sherbrooke; Docteur en droit (LL. D.); Université de Sherbrooke, Sherbrooke, Canada; Faculté de droit, Université Laval, Québec, Canada. » / Comment les tribunaux conçoivent-ils les droits fondamentaux enchâssés dans nos chartes des droits et libertés au moment de les interpréter et de leur donner application dans le domaine du droit privé au Québec? Au-delà du texte écrit de la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne (ou de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés), que veulent dire concrètement des concepts aussi larges que « liberté », « égalité » ou « discrimination » par exemple? À l'heure où les droits fondamentaux n'ont de cesse de croître en importance, la question du cade intellectuel par lequel on les mobilise devient cruciale - tout particulièrement dans un État pluraliste comme le Québec où coexistent historiquement deux traditions juridiques distinctes (droit civil et common law) chacune avec leur cadre distinct, et où l'enjeu du respect de la tradition civiliste par les tribunaux canadiens lorsqu'il y est question de son propre droit privé et de sa propre Charte québécoise se lie à celui de l'autonomie juridique du Québec au sein de la fédération canadienne. Les tribunaux respectent-ils véritablement les tenants et aboutissants distincts de la tradition civiliste au moment d'adjuger d'affaires privatistes de droits fondamentaux au Québec, ou ont-ils plutôt tendance à y imposer une lecture de common law dont la fidélité première est d'abord et avant tout envers la jurisprudence dans son interprétation de la Charte canadienne et des instruments anglo-canadiens de droits fondamentaux plutôt qu'envers le Code civil du Québec, les principes généraux de droit qui le traversent et le génie original de la Charte québécoise ? Pour aborder un tel questionnement, cette thèse de doctorat en droit propose d'abord, dans son premier chapitre, de se pencher sur une tentative de définition des concepts de tradition juridique et de droit commun pour en éclairer l'importance fondamentale à la pensée juridique dans un rapport consubstantiel avec l'histoire et les valeurs d'une société dans l'évolution de sa conception même du droit en tant que science. Par la suite, au chapitre 2, nous entreprenons une analyse détaillée des distinctions épistémologiques fondamentales entre les traditions juridiques de droit civil et de common law selon la théorie des structures (organisation superstructurelle du droit et rapport des normes entre elles), des sources (autorités énonciatrices du droit et pouvoirs de création normative) et des méthodes (techniques de raisonnement de la pensée juridique) qui les caractérisent l'une et l'autre le long d'un échiquier théorique comparatif. Cela établi, nous portons ensuite notre attention au chapitre 3 sur l'étude historique de l'évolution de la tradition civiliste comme socle fondamental du droit québécois depuis la Nouvelle-France, au-delà de la Conquête, puis au travers des lois constitutionnelles, des codifications et de la haute lutte séculaire pour sa reconnaissance devant l'appareil judiciaire canadien, établissant sa légitimité comme seule tradition juridique fondamentale du Québec en droit privé. Ensuite, tous ces éléments posés, nous passerons en revue, au chapitre 4, l'entièreté de la jurisprudence rendue par la Cour suprême du Canada depuis 1982 soulevant des questions de droits fondamentaux en matière privée au Québec (plus de 250 décisions répertoriées, près de 50 analysées en détail) pour en caractériser l'approche intellectuelle de tels enjeux à la lumière de la théorie des structures, des sources et des méthodes de l'une et l'autre des traditions juridiques. Après analyse, notre étude de la jurisprudence révèle un portrait divisé entre deux grands courants judiciaires largement incompatibles, d'ampleur proportionnelle comparable dans la jurisprudence (55%-45%), presque monolithiques chacun dans leurs domaines et qui, largement, s'ignorent mutuellement : un premier courant, dominant le domaine de la responsabilité civile extracontractuelle, où la Cour suprême semble se faire un point d'honneur de respecter et maintenir les distinctions civilistes du Québec (que nous avons désigné « courant de résistance »), et un second courant, aux antipodes du premier, où la Cour suprême semble au contraire ne faire que peu ou pas de cas de la tradition civiliste pour plutôt y imposer sans distinction les solutions jurisprudentielles anglo-canadiennes dans le domaine contractuel (que nous désignons « courant de subjugation »). Ceci nous amènera, en conclusion de cette thèse, à défendre que cette situation de respect partiel et non-intégral de la tradition civiliste par la Cour suprême en matière de droits fondamentaux dans le domaine privé au Québec est selon nous impropre - non seulement au regard de l'histoire constitutionnelle de la fédération, mais aussi à la lumière de la genèse civiliste de la Charte québécoise elle-même ainsi que devant les distinctions de valeurs sociales et juridiques qui différencient socialement le Québec dans sa conception distincte des valeurs structurantes en fonction desquels doivent opérer les droits fondamentaux. / How do courts conceive Charter rights and freedoms when comes the time to interpret their meaning and to apply them in concrete situations of private law matters in Quebec ? Beyond the written text of Quebec's Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), what exactly do grand concepts such as "freedom" "equality" or "discrimination" for example actually mean ? In an era where fundamental rights claims are constantly growing, the matter of the intellectual framework through which they are mobilized becomes a crucial one - all the more so in a pluralist State like Quebec, historically featuring two distinct legal traditions (civil law and common law) each with their own specific framework and where the recognition of its civilist tradition by Canadian tribunals when it comes to its own private law and its own Charter of rights is inextricably linked with that of Quebec's legal autonomy within the Canadian federation. Are courts truly respecting the distinctive ins and outs of the civil law tradition when adjudicating on private law matters of fundamental rights in Quebec, or do they rather have a tendency to read them trough common law lenses first and foremost subservient towards case law rendered in the name of the Canadian Charter and Anglo-Canadian provincial Human Rights Acts rather than towards Quebec's Civil Code, its civilist legal principles and the originality of its own Quebec Charter ? To address such a questioning, this doctorate thesis of law begins, in its first chapter, by attempting to clarify and define the concepts of legal tradition and "droit commun" (ius commune) in order to apprehend their fundamental importance within a legal worldview, placed as they are in an extricable relationship with a society's history and legal values shaping the evolution of its very conception of law as a scientific discipline. Afterwards, in chapter 2, we will proceed to a detailed analysis of the fundamental epistemic distinctions between the civil law and common law legal traditions with regards to their theory of structures (macrostructural organization of law and inter-normative relationships), of sources (the relationship and power dynamics between legal authorities when it comes to lawmaking) and of methods (reasoning techniques within legal science) that characterize them both on a comparative chessboard. This established, we will turn our attention in chapter 3 towards a historical study of the evolution of the civil law legal tradition as a fundamental pillar of Quebec law since New-France, that survived the Conquest and further endured though constitutional acts, both of Quebec's codifications and the century-spanning struggle for its recognition by Canadian tribunals, establishing its legitimacy as the sole fundamental legal tradition of Quebec in private law matters. These elements established, we will conduct, in chapter 4, an exhaustive review of all Supreme Court case law rendered since 1982 involving human rights claims in private matters in Quebec (over 250 reported decisions, nearly 50 analyzed in-depth) as to characterize its intellectual approach to such issues under the comparative light of structure, sources and methods theories of each legal tradition. Following this review, our findings reveal two largely incompatible judicial streams, of comparable proportions within the case law (55%-45%), almost monolithic each in their domains and who, largely, ignore one another: a first line of jurisprudence dominating matters of extracontracual responsibility ("torts"), in which the Supreme Court prides itself in respecting and maintaining Quebec's civilist distinctiveness (the "resisting" approach), and a second line of jurisprudence where, in complete contrast, the Supreme Court seems to care little if at all about the civilist tradition to rather, indistinctively, import and superimpose upon it the common law reasoning of Anglo-Canadian precedents when it comes to contractual matters (the "subjugating" approach). Such will bring us, to conclude this thesis, to suggest that this situation of a partial and incomplete respect of the civil law tradition by the Supreme Court when it comes to private law matters in Quebec is, in our opinion, improper - not only when considering the Federation's constitutional history, but also under the light of Quebec's own Charter of rights, itself of civilist genesis, and that of the distinctions of social and legal values that differentiate Quebec in its own conception of the structuring values guiding the idea and inner workings of human rights as legal concepts.

Traditionnellement, les biens immatériels sont qualifiés, tantôt de biens incorporels, tantôt de propriétés incorporelles ou intellectuelles, tantôt encore de biens d'exploitation, la plupart de ces qualifications étant insatisfaisantes. En réalité, cette catégorie de biens souffre d'une absence de définition. Pourtant, d'aucuns affirment qu'ils représentent une richesse économique, une source de crédit fantastique pour les débiteurs, et un gage de sécurité pour les créanciers. Or, la législation française semble avoir superbement ignoré les biens immatériels.En témoigne le droit des biens tout d'abord. En effet, à la lecture de l'article 516 du Code civil, selon lequel « tous les biens sont meubles ou immeubles », force est de constater que les biens immatériels ne peuvent être valablement rattachés à la catégorie des meubles ou à celle des immeubles. Les biens immatériels s'opposent aux biens matériels (biens de la nature, matières premières, biens intellectuels tombés dans le domaine public ou dénués de protection au titre du droit de la propriété intellectuelle). Ils désignent les biens qui disposent d'une chose incorporelle et d'un corpus. Nous avons recensé deux natures de biens immatériels : les biens immatériels financiers regroupant les monnaies, les parts et actions sociales, les instruments financiers, les créances et les biens immatériels industriels regroupant les fonds de commerce et les propriétés intellectuelles.En témoigne le droit des sûretés réelles conventionnelles ensuite. Le projet de réforme du droit des sûretés qui a été confié à la Commission Grimaldi fondait de nombreux espoirs. Ayant fait l'objet de très rares modifications depuis l'origine du Code civil, l'édifice s'ébranlait et nécessitait une rénovation. Il s'ébranlait principalement pour trois raisons : la lisibilité notamment parce que le droit des sûretés réelles conventionnelles sur biens immatériels s'est développé en marge du Code civil, l'efficacité et la capacité des régimes envisagés quant à la préservation des intérêts du débiteur et du créancier. Depuis longtemps la pratique et la doctrine dénonçaient une telle complexification et appelaient de leurs vœux aux changements. Malheureusement, l'ordonnance n° 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006 portant réforme du droit des sûretés n'a pas su rassurer. En créant le nantissement comme la sûreté réelle conventionnelle sur biens mobiliers incorporels, sans l'accompagner d'un régime uniforme, elle n'a fait qu'accentuer les inquiétudes et les critiques patentes.Pourtant, nous sommes convaincus de ce que le droit français dispose des remèdes indispensables au sauvetage de la matière. En effet, le nouveau régime du gage, tel que modifié par l'ordonnance n° 2006-346 du 23 mars 2006, comporte désormais un régime adapté aux biens immatériels industriels. Quant à la fiducie-sûreté, consacrée par la loi n° 2007-211 du 19 février 2007, elle a révélé, à travers les expériences observées hors de nos frontières, sa pleine efficacité lorsqu'elle a pour assiette des biens immatériels financiers. / Immaterial assets are traditionally described either as intangible assets or as intangible or intellectual property, or else as operating assets, but most of those terms are not satisfactory. This class of assets actually suffers from a lack of definition. However, some people state that they represent a form of economic wealth, a fantastic source of credit for the debtors, and a guarantee of safety for the creditors. And yet, French legislation seems to have ignored immaterial assets.This is first and foremost demonstrated by property law. Indeed, according to article 516 of the Code civil, which states that « property is either movable or immovable », one has to admit that immaterial assets cannot validly be linked to movable or immovable property. Immaterial assets are opposed to material assets (property of nature, commodities, intellectual property of the public domain or without protection under intellectual property law). They refer to property that has an object and a corpus. Two types of immaterial assets have been identified: financial immaterial assets, bringing together currencies, units and shares in a company, financial instruments, liabilities and industrial immaterial assets, bringing together business and intellectual property.This is also demonstrated by conventional real-property surety law. The surety law reform project which was awarded to the Grimaldi Commission was the source of significant hope. It had only been rarely amended since the inception of the Code civil and the structure was weakening and needed updating. This weakening had three main grounds : readability first, in particular since conventional real-property surety law on immaterial assets had developed outside of the Code civil, efficiency and capability of the contemplated systems regarding the preservation of the interests of the debtor and the creditor. Practice and doctrine had been denouncing such complexity for long and were calling for amendments. Unfortunately, order n°2006-346 of March 23rd 2006 reforming surety law didn't restore confidence. By creating the lien as the conventional real-property surety on immaterial movable assets without creating a consistent system, it has only emphasized the obvious concerns and critics.However, we are convinced that French law has the means that are essential to save this subject. Indeed, the new system of pledge, as amended by order n° 2006-346 of March 23rd 2006, now has a system that is suitable for industrial immaterial assets. As for the “fiducie-sûreté”, established by Act n° 2007-211 of February 19th 2007, it has revealed that, through the experiences observed abroad, it is fully efficient when it deals with financial immaterial assets.

With the increased global infringement of personal rights, it is necessary to be aware of the protection in the different legal systems, especially Anglo-American. Even if the consequences are to be felt in the domestic legal order, the enforceability is recognized under the foreign legal order. The protection is worldwide and through the case law from the European Court of Human Rights the two legal systems - Common law and the Civil Law are penetrating the legislation and the case law in respect of the institute of the protection of personal rights. The doctorate thesis presents the complex introduction to the area of protection of personal rights in the Common law, especially in English law, Commonwealth countries and USA that has not been presented yet for the Czech legal professionals. The thesis explains theoretical concept of the Common law and its background for the purpose of explanation of differences of examined legal orders. The institute is explained on the key historical case law that led to establish the Common law principles. The thesis uses the current and topical legal cases and problems that the orders face in the 21st Century.

South Africa has been experiencing a number of violent strikes by trade unions in recent times. The issue is not only to hold unions liable for damage caused during strikes, but also to reduce the number of violent strikes. This study investigates if victims of such violence can hold trade unions liable for the violent acts committed by their members during industrial action. The Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (LRA) makes provision for the dismissal of employees who commit misconduct during an unprotected strike. It also provides the remedy of an interdict and a claim for just and equitable compensation which can be made against the union, during an unprotected strike. It is further possible to hold the union together with its members liable for damages in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 205 of 1993 (RGA). The study argues that a strike or conduct in furtherance of a strike that becomes violent could lose protection and the trade union should consequently be held liable, in terms of the LRA and/ or the RGA, for damages caused by its members. This study investigates the position in Canada, Botswana and Australia to determine if there could be any other basis upon which to hold trade union liable for the conduct of its members. The study recommends that the common law doctrine of vicarious liability should be developed by the courts to allow trade unions to be held liable for damages caused by members during violent industrial action. Policy considerations and changing economic conditions and the nature of strikes in the Republic favours the expansion of the doctrine of vicarious liability to trade union member relationship. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.

Alors que la protection effective des droits et libertés est souvent conçue comme dépendante de leur garantie juridictionnelle, cette dernière implique une transformation de l'équilibre qui s'établit entre le juge, non élu, et le législateur, représentant du peuple souverain. À travers une analyse pratique des effets du travail juridictionnel sur l'activité législative, tels qu'ils se sont déployés aux États-Unis, au Canada et au Royaume-Uni sur les quinze dernières années, il est possible d'évaluer les conséquences de la consécration de certains droits dans un catalogue opposable par le juge au législateur, en matière d'équilibre entre les pouvoirs législatif et juridictionnel. Si ces trois systèmes, aux traditions constitutionnelles éloignées, disposent chacun de mécanismes spécifiques pour assurer le respect des droits consacrés, plusieurs points de convergence peuvent être mis en lumière. Leur étude sera alors l'occasion d'appréhender dans une perspective renouvelée l'équilibre qui s'établit entre les deux institutions. Elle fera progressivement apparaitre l'idée d'une véritable collaboration du législateur et du juge en matière de protection des droits et libertés dans les démocraties contemporaines / Effective human rights protection is often perceived as being dependent upon their judicial enforcement. However, such a mechanism transforms the relationship between unelected judges and electorally accountable legislators. Through an empirical analysis of the effects of judicial review on legislation and legislative decision-making, in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, during the last fifteen years, the actual impact of the entrenchment of human rights in a written bill of rights will be assessed and evaluated. Even though these three countries have different processes to guarantee the respect of entrenched rights, and despite their long-settled and contrasting traditions, their systems are not as conflicting as it is often thought. This study finally leads to a better understanding of the relationship between judges and legislators in contemporary democracies and underlines the idea of a genuine collaboration of powers

In this project the various International Instruments, namely the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child; 1989, the Beijing Rules and the African Charter, relating to the guidelines of the establishment of a minimum age for criminal capacity are furnished. The developments regarding the issue of criminal capacity since 1998 in Australia, the United Kingdom and Hong Kong are highlighted. The historical position and the current position in South African law with regard to the issue of criminal capacity are discussed as well as the implementation thereof by our courts. The statistics on children under 14 years in prison over the past five years are furnished. The introduction of the Child Justice Bill, 2002 by Parliament and the deliberations following the introduction, focusing on the issue of criminal capacity is highlighted. The proposed provisions of the Child Justice Bill, 49 of 2002 codifying the present common law presumptions and the raising of the minimum age for criminal capacity are furnished. The evaluation of criminal capacity and the important factors to be assessed are discussed as provided for in the Child Justice Bill, 49 of 2002. A practical illustration of a case where the criminal capacity of a child offender was considered by the court is, discussed and other important developmental factors that should also be taken into consideration by the court are identified and discussed. Important issues relating to criminal capacity, namely, time and number of assessments, testimonial competency of the child offender, evolving capacities and age determination are discussed and possible problems identified and some solutions offered. The research included an 11-question questionnaire to various professionals working in field of child justice regarding the issue of criminal capacity and the evaluation thereof. / Criminal and Procedural law / D.Litt. et Phil. (Criminology)

This dissertation looks at the position of the unmarried father in South Africa with regard to obtaining access to his illegitimate child. The writer has focused on three distinct eras in South African family law: the position of unmarried fathers in terms of: the common law; Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act; and the Children's Act. The writer has further focused on a case study. This is to emphasis the difficulty which unmarried fathers have when attempting to go through the courts to have access to his child. In terms of South African common law, fathers of illegitimate children did not have any form of parental authority over the child. The mothers of illegitimate children have full parental authority over such children. Access in terms of South African common-law is seen as an incident of parental authority. Unmarried fathers nevertheless had the right to approach the high court to obtain access to their children, if the mother of the child refuses to allow the father to have such access. In the late 1980's and early 1990's, there was an overwhelming amount of applications brought by unmarried fathers in the high courts so as to obtain access to their illegitimate children. The case of Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) sparked victory for unmarried fathers when the learned judge held that all unmarried fathers of children have an inherent right of access to their children. This victory was short-lived. Subsequent case law and in particular the case of B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) enforced the common law and held that unmarried fathers do not have an automatic right to their illegitimate children and that such fathers will have to apply to the high court for such access. Due to the increase in litigation in the late 1980's and early 1990's regarding a father's access to his child born out of wedlock the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act commenced on 4 September 1998. The South African legislature adopted the approach taken in the case of B v S 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) and rejected the approach taken in the case of Van Erk v Holmer 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) ie the common law continued to remain the approach taken in South Africa. Legislators recognised that the approach taken in the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act does not conform to the provisions of the African Charter of the Rights and the Welfare of the Child, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and equality and dignity provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. On 19 June 2006, the Children's Act was effected and will commence once promulgated in the Government Gazette. The writer then determines whether the Children's Act has in practice changed the position of the unmarried father. / JURISPRUDENCE / LLM

The current South African legislative framework does not properly address the unequal bargaining position between employers and fixed term employees. Ineffective regulation of fixed term employment in South Africa has had the effect of excluding certain groups of fixed term employees from claiming the remedies provided in terms of the Labour Relations Act and other labour legislation. Furthermore, where remedies are applicable to them they are often ineffectual. Interpretational variation evident from case law pertaining to the enforcement of the rights of fixed term employees, indicate clear lacunae in the unfair dismissal protection afforded to these vulnerable employees. This is mainly a consequence of uncertainties related to the interpretation of the legislative provisions. The infusion of the values entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the development of the common law to reflect these values might augment the scope and availability of rights enjoyed by fixed term employees. But, changing socio-economic and political circumstances necessitates review and amendment of the legislation applicable to fixed term employees to meet the country’s constitutional and international obligations. Proposed amendments to the Labour Relations Act have been tabled. These amendments may be capable of addressing some of the current problems. However, they may also lead to other undesirable consequences. An investigation into problems related to the application of similar provisions as those proposed by the Labour Relations Amendment Bill in other jurisdictions crystallises some possible causes for concern. Some of the proposed changes could create new vulnerabilities, or renew old ones. / Private Law / LLD

If the expectancy that someone was to act according to what we deem to be his or her “duty” was that straightforward, there would be no need to address the issues of liability of the employee for the wrongful acts of the employer. The recent - and some say alarming - trend in South Africa to hold employers (particularly the government) liable for wrongful, culpable acts committed by their employees, gives rise to difficulties and any inquiry into the possible vicarious liability of the employer should necessarily always start by asking whether there was in fact a wrongful, culpable act committed by the employee. If not, there can neither be direct liability of the employee nor vicarious liability by the employer. Where the employee did indeed commit a delict, the relationship between the wrongdoer and his or her employer at the time of the wrongdoing becomes important. It is then often, in determining whether the employee was acting in the scope of his or her employment that normative issues come to the fore. Over the years South African courts have devised tests to determine whether an employee was in fact acting in the scope of his employment. / Jurisprudence / LLM