The presented thesis examines the process of adoption of new constitutional rule - debt brake - into german Grundgesetz. Germany attempts to establish the debt brake not only on European level, but also recommends other EU states to accept it. The goal of this thesis is to descripe and evaluate the process which has led up to acceptance of the debt brake as one of potential solutions to stop the excessively growing indebtedness and which has been by far influenced by the work of II. commision for federalism reform. The thessis strives to answer the questions if there was political, expert and social agreement on the issue, how does it influence budget sovereignty of the federal lands and if it really can be an effective instrument in the effort for stopping of indebtness increase, alternatively if it brings any effect even before it came into force, for example in the form of preparing of the budgets for 2016 and 2020 respectivelly. One part of the thesis is dedicated to Swiss debt brake, which served as a model for the german one, especially in terms of it's functionality. Even though it is complicated to evaluate the debt brake before it came into force, the results of the thesis showed for example the problematic nature of the relation between debt brake in the Grundgesetz and individual...

This dissertation is a collection of three essays dealing with selected problems of the Euro Area during its most recent crisis. It applies empirical, theoretical, and institutional analyses to gain new insights into many of its financial aspects. The first essay offers an alternative explanation for the surge in government bond spreads. Many researchers attribute this phenomenon to market sentiment and multiple equilibria alone. We show that an often neglected fundamental variable may drive spreads: a decrease in the expected recovery value of private market participants. With an ever-increasing share of crisis countries’ debt held by official creditors, private investors may feel pushed into the position of subordinated creditors. The other two essays both explain the sharp increase in central bank credit from different perspectives. First, from the national perspective, central banks may be confronted with a classical tragedy-of-the-commons problem, which gives rise to an expansionary bias. Second, from the perspective of the ECB, we argue that the empirical patterns surrounding the liquidity provision in December 2011 are reminiscent of a speculative attack on a fixed exchange rate system.

Yes / As of April 2020, the IMF categorised seven African countries as being in debt distress, whilst identifying twelve more that were at high risk of becoming distress. It is no longer a secret that considered immutable and eternally binding, debt by the global south (i.e., poor developing African countries) has become a tool for imperial powers in the post-colonial world to enforce and perpetuate their dominance over the global south. This is despite serious global crises that emerge from, and/or were caused by the rich countries of the global north; specifically, the negative effects of the global financial crisis of 2008, devastating impact of Covid-19 pandemic, and impact of Russia-Ukraine war on the African economies and contribution to these debt vulnerabilities. Yet, the rich countries of the global north have insisted on these poor countries to continue financing their debts. The paper considers how African countries could legally cancel the repayment of the debts by relying on the principles of international law (such as pacta sunt servanda, limit to legal obligation to pay, force majeure, State of Necessity or rebus sic stantibus) and States’ declarations to commitment to sustainable development agenda (such as the European Union’s response to the adoption of the 2030 Agenda featured in its Commission’s 2016 Communication) could be used as justifying grounds for cancellation of Africa debts. The paper draws on international law and development in the light of dependency and postcolonial theories and employs the human rights-based approach, interdisciplinary and critical-analytical perspective and using qualitative empirical evidence from rich countries and institutions of the global north and poor developing countries of the global south for analysis.

This thesis analyses whether the concept of monetary sovereignty evolves under the impact of globalization and financial integration, and provides a framework for assessing what this implies. Thereby, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of both the contemporary exercise of sovereign powers in monetary and financial matters and of the driving forces behind the evolution of international law in this field. As elaborated in chapter 1, the contemporary concept of monetary sovereignty proposed by this thesis is not static but dynamic in nature. Due to the dual nature of sovereignty as a concept having not only positive but also important normative components, monetary sovereignty cannot become eroded under the impact of legal and economic constraints. Chapter 2 examines the ongoing hybridization of international monetary law arising from changes in the sources of this complex body of law, from the unsuitability of the categories of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law for characterizing all normative evolutions in this field, and from the rise of private and transnational monetary law. Chapter 3 scrutinizes the phenomenon of exchange rate misalignment under monetary and trade law. Intrinsically related, it assesses which aspects of the IMF’s legal framework should be reformed in order to tackle contemporary challenges to the stability of the international monetary system, such as global current account imbalances. Chapter 4 analyses the increasing regionalization of monetary sovereignty. It argues that, to the extent that transferring sovereign powers to a monetary union is what provides a state’s population with maximum monetary and financial stability, the underlying transfers are not a surrender of monetary sovereignty, but its effective exercise under the form of cooperative sovereignty. Finally, chapter 5 assesses the implications of the contemporary concept of monetary sovereignty proposed herein for the reorganization of the international financial architecture in the wake of the Great Recession.

La banque centrale européenne (bce) n'est pas une institution au sens des traités communautaires. pourtant elle dispose, à l'image des institutions, de pouvoirs législatifs et exécutifs. au sens du droit communautaire, la bce est un <<organe>>, elle jouit donc de la personnalité juridique. dans le paysage institutionnel de l'union, la bce est la seule à disposer à la fois de pouvoirs législatifs et exécutifs et de la personnalité morale. il convient de ce fait de se poser la question de la place de la bce dans ce paysage institutionnel. de plus, les pouvoirs de la bce et leur exercice sont extrêmement flous. tout d'abord, la bce partage certains pouvoirs avec le conseil ecofin, qui lui mêne en partage avec l'eurogroupe. ensuite, les pouvoirs de la bce sont exercés soit par le conseil des gouverneurs, soit par le directoire. les décisions prises par ces organes, sont ensuite mises en oeuvre par la bce elle même ou par les banques centrales nationales. il se pose donc la question des réels pouvoirs de la bce, du fait de son intégration au sein du système européen de banques centrales. beaucoup d'auteurs ont apporté des réponses à ces questions, la bce : banque centrale de la communauté, la bce autorité administrative indépedante, le bce communauté internationale à part. malgré, l'intérêt de ces travaux aucun n'a pris en compte la bce dans sa globalité et dans sa complexité. notre travail de tèse se propose de reprendre l'ensemble des questions relatives à la place de la bce dans les institutions et organes de l'union, afin de mieux définir et comprendre cet organe à part. / The Eurosystem is a unique structure of European Union law which includes the central banks of States that have adopted the euro and the European Central Bank. A theoretical study of the evolution of the exercise of power within the Union demonstrates the emergence of a new methode of integration called "vertical integration." In a dialectical process between theory and reality of the Eurosystem, the main features of the the vertical integration method can be tested and its main qualities and defects disclosed.The method of vertical integration led to the construction of sub-systems composed of national bodies and body of the Union. The method operates in four directions. The sub- system thereby producted relates formally and functionally to the EU and operates in a specific sector which imposes the specificities of its action. It can be said "organized" (its components are interconnected by complex interrelationships guaranteeing the unity and effectiveness of the system). It is independent from the states as it is from the political institutions of the Union.The study of the Eurosystem through this perspective allows to elucidate the nature of this unusual construction whose action in crises - the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis - was crucial. Such research can also highlight, under a new perspective, the recent developments in the institutional system of the EU as a whole.

Face à la crise financière de 2008, l’Union européenne a intensifié la contrainte pesant sur les États dont la gestion des finances publiques est désormais strictement encadrée. Des objectifs à moyen terme leurs sont assignés dont l’irrespect peut être sanctionné par des amendes (sanctions pécuniaires) ou la perte du droit de vote (sanctions politiques). Des codes de bonne conduite, des guides et des chartes (soft law), fondés sur la mise en commun d’expériences de terrain, proposent des mesures censées favoriser leur intégration. Cette méthode uniforme et centrée sur la gestion et les instruments de maîtrise des finances publiques, devient contraignante lorsqu’elle est transposée en droit national et son assise juridique peut varier selon le degré de protection qui lui est accordée. Le droit public financier, principal vecteur de modernisation de l’État, est profondément remanié à l’aune de ces nouveaux préceptes. Dans ce contexte et au-delà, de fortes tensions pèsent sur la responsabilité financière des institutions et des décideurs publics, et particulièrement dans le secteur local, objet de la recherche. Classiquement, la responsabilité financière est une responsabilité juridique fondée sur le bon emploi des deniers publics, c’est-à-dire leur emploi régulier. Elle sanctionne exclusivement et juridictionnellement le non-respect des règles et des principes du droit public financier local établis dans l’intérêt général. Ce cadre est aujourd’hui mis en question par la gestion publique : aux préoccupations de régularité, s’ajoutent (se substituent parfois) les impératifs d’efficacité et d’efficience, principaux indicateurs de la performance publique. L’efficacité apprécie le degré de réalisation des objectifs de l'action et l’efficience étudie la relation entre les coûts et les résultats de l’action. Dès lors, la question se pose de savoir si le droit a la capacité de sanctionner selon ces critères et si cela serait pertinent. Si l’adaptation des régimes juridiques de responsabilité à ces enjeux n’a pas abouti, de vrais changements s’opèrent aujourd’hui, souvent en marge du droit. En effet, un nouveau modèle de responsabilité se met en place à tous les niveaux du secteur public. Fondé sur les notions de performance et d’autonomie asymétrique, il impose à l’ensemble des acteurs publics locaux de s’engager à atteindre un certain nombre d’objectifs préalablement fixés dont les résultats sont évalués en termes d’efficience et d’efficacité, et parfois sanctionnés. Donc plutôt que de réformer la responsabilité juridique, le choix semble fait d’adopter une vision extensive de la responsabilité financière : la responsabilité managériale, à côté de la responsabilité juridique. Cette juxtaposition de deux logiques d’essence différente, voire contradictoires, interroge sur les conditions de leur coexistence, dans un État de droit. / Faced with the financial crisis of 2008, the European Union has intensified the constraint on states whose public finance management is now strictly regulated. Medium-term objectives are assigned to them, which may result in fines (financial penalties) or loss of the right to vote (political sanctions). Codes of conduct, guides and charters (soft law), based on the sharing of experiences on the ground, propose measures to promote their integration. This uniform method, centered on management and public finance control instruments, becomes binding when it is transposed into national law and its legal basis may vary according to the degree of protection granted to it. Public financial law, the main vector of modernization of the public sector, is profoundly altered in the light of these new precepts. In this context and beyond, strong tensions weigh on the financial responsibility of public institutions and managers, including in the local sector, which is the subject of research. Classically, financial responsibility is a legal responsibility based on the good use of public funds, that is, their regular employment. It sanctions exclusively and jurisdictionally the failure to respect the rules and principles of local public financial law defined in the general interest. This framework is now called into question by the new public management (NGP): to the concerns of regularity, are added (sometimes replaced) the imperatives of effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness assesses the degree of achievement of the objectives of the action and efficiency studies the relationship between the costs of the action and the benefits it provides. Therefore, the question arises whether the right has the capacity to sanction according to these criteria and whether it would be relevant. If the adaptation of legal regimes of responsibility to these issues has not succeeded, real changes are taking place today, often on the margins of the law. Indeed, a new model of accountability is being put in place at all levels of the public sector. Based on the notions of performance and asymmetric autonomy, it requires all local public actors to commit themselves to achieving a number of previously defined objectives whose results are evaluated in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, And sometimes punished. So rather than reforming the legal responsibility, the choice seems to be made of adopting an extensive view of financial responsibility: managerial responsibility, alongside legal responsibility.

The dissertation is composed of three empirical research papers analyzing the development on credit derivatives markets in recent years characterized by the global financial crisis in 2007- 2009 and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. The basic motivation of the thesis is to contribute to the clarification of the turbulent development on credit derivatives markets. The first paper addresses main flaws of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market during the global financial crisis. The second paper examines the impact of the Greek debt crisis on sovereign credit default swap (CDS) reliability. The third paper analyzes whether a resulting change in CDS terms restored confidence in CDS contracts. An introductory chapter presents a common framework for the three papers. In the first paper, we examine valuation of a Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) in 2007- 2009. One Factor Gaussian Copula Model is presented and five hypotheses regarding CDO sensitivity to entry parameters are analyzed. Four main deficiencies of the CDO market are then articulated: i) an insufficient analysis of underlying assets by both investors and rating agencies; ii) investment decisions arising from the valuation model based on expected cash-flows and neglecting other factors such as mark-to-market losses; iii)...

La dernière crise financière et les crises des dettes souveraines successives ont mis en lumière l'enjeu majeur de l’encadrement du marché de la distribution du crédit bancaire. Le principal questionnement aura porté sur la nécessité, sinon l’opportunité, de sacrifier « un peu de liberté » pour un « peu de sécurité » dans le processus de distribution du crédit. À ce titre, deux voies ont fondamentalement cohabité dans la mise en place de limites à la une liberté totale. D’une part, les législateurs et organes réglementaires ont entrepris, du niveau interne au niveau international, en passant par l’incontournable niveau communautaire, d’encadrer les caractéristiques intrinsèques des acteurs du marché du crédit et leur environnement juridique. Cet encadrement a été impulsé par des instances internationales, plus promptes à réagir en cas de crise, mais a été progressivement adapté et intégré dans le droit positif. Cette intégration a justement eu pour effet premier de lui conférer un caractère normatif. Ainsi les dispositions normatives, légales ou réglementaires sont devenues un instrument majeur afin de cantonner les risques individuels et de prévenir le risque systémique. À ce titre, la norme, au sens extensif, est intervenue chaque fois qu’un risque était avéré, ou qu’il était soupçonné. L’écueil presque naturel a été une inflation quasi-exponentielle des normes et une juxtaposition des niveaux de normativité. La prise de conscience de cette situation a mené à faire cohabiter le « droit dur », contraignant et rigide, avec un droit plus souple et plus pragmatique. Dès lors, le droit positif a vu apparaître des obligations dites « professionnelles » qui viennent régir non pas la personne des dispensateurs de crédit, mais bien leur comportement lorsqu’ils établissement une relation contractuelle de crédit. Les obligations professionnelles ne visent pas à répondre à la même finalité que la norme au sens propre, elles ont une vocation d’indication, d’information afin d’établir des standards modulables, pragmatiques et flexible pour les contrats de crédit. Le contrat de crédit se complexifie, ce qui impose l’intervention d’un droit flexible, facilement adaptable, et dont la motivation première n’est pas la contrainte ou la sanction, mais l’accompagnement dans la vie du contrat. L’obligation professionnelle est à envisager comme une « norme de comportement ». Ainsi cette étude tente-t-elle de démontrer comment la dualité d’intervention entre norme prudentielle et obligation professionnelle permet sans aucun doute de préserver l’intégrité du marché de la distribution de crédit mais qu’elle risque également dans certaines situations de remettre en cause ses principes de fonctionnement. / The latest financial crisis and successive sovereign debt crises have highlighted the major challenge of framing the market for the distribution of bank credit. The main question was whether or not it would be appropriate to give up on a bit of freedom for more security in the credit distribution process. In this respect, two paths have basically cohabited in the establishment of limits to total freedom. On the one hand, legislators and regulatory bodies have undertaken, from the internal level to the international level, and also the Community level, to frame the intrinsic characteristics of the players in the credit market and their legal environment. This framework has been driven by international bodies, which are quicker to react in the event of a crisis, but has gradually been adapted and integrated into positive law. This integration has had the primary effect of giving it a normative character. Thus, normative, legal or regulatory provisions have become a major instrument to limit individual risks and prevent systemic risk. As such, the standard, in the broad sense of the term, has been applied whenever a risk has been proven or suspected. The almost natural pitfall has been a near-exponential inflation of standards and a juxtaposition of levels of normativity. Awareness of this situation has led to the coexistence of "hard law", which is both binding and rigid, with a more flexible and pragmatic law. As a result, positive law has seen the emergence of so-called "professional" obligations which govern not the person of the credit grantors, but their behaviour when they establish a contractual credit relationship. The almost natural pitfall has been a near-exponential inflation of norms and a juxtaposition of levels of normativity. The awareness of this situation has led to the coexistence of hard law, binding and rigid, with a more flexible and pragmatic law. Therefore, the positive law has seen the appearance of so-called "professional" obligations, which govern not the person of the credit providers, but their behavior when establishing a contractual credit relationship. Professional obligations are not intended to fulfill the same purpose as the norm in the literal sense, they are intended to provide guidance and information in order to establish flexible, pragmatic and flexible standards for credit agreements. The credit agreement is becoming more complex, requiring the intervention of a flexible and easily adaptable right, the primary motivation of which is not coercion or punishment, but support in the life of the contract. The professional obligation is to be seen as a "standard of behaviour".Thus, this study attempts to demonstrate how the duality of intervention between prudential standard and professional obligation undoubtedly preserves the integrity of the credit distribution market, but that this duality also risks, in certain situations, to call into question its operating principles.

布列敦森林機制的成形與運作是基於國際社會對一九三０年代經濟大恐慌所記取的歷史教訓。國際社會要捨棄「以鄰為壑」的歷史錯誤，期以國際協調與合作解決國際經濟秩序不穩定的問題。但是在建立布列敦森林機制的過程中與布列敦森林機制的運作上，顯現出國際政治權力與國家利益才是最重要的考量。美國以其在兩次世界大戰中發展出的國力，主導了布列敦森林機制的設計，將大部分的國家納入此項體系中，並以此體系中的規範、準則來約束所有成員的行為。透過此機制的槓桿運作，美國得以將其在政治上與經濟上的力量發揮到極至，從而維護美國繼續作為霸權國的國家利益。布列敦森林機制成為戰後國際合作的基礎架構，會員國所簽訂的國際貨幣基金協定條款成了體系成員的行為準則。制約條件與監督會員國的經濟政策之權是國際貨幣基金兩項最重要的武器。然而，制約條件所產生的政經效應，卻讓國際貨幣基金倍受批評。影響制約條件成效不彰的原因包含有國際貨幣基金的組織結構因素、國際環境因素與執行制約條件的國家的內部因素。國際社會將所有的責任都歸於國際貨幣基金，實在是隔靴搔癢，同時也無助於解決當今資本全球化所引發的問題。 目　　錄 序言 壹 圖表目錄 參 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 國際貨幣基金之成立 4 第一節 布列敦森林機制的起源 4 第二節 布列敦森林機制前的國際貨幣體系 9 第三節 懷特方案與凱因斯方案 12 第四節 小結 17 第三章 布列敦森林機制的制度分析 21 第一節 國際貨幣基金的制度 21 第二節 國際貨幣基金的組織 26 第三節 美國霸權與布列敦森林機制 34 第四章 國際貨幣基金角色的轉變 50 第一節 國際經濟環境的變遷 50 第二節 國際貨幣基金協定條款的修訂 54 第三節 特別提款權的運作 59 第四節 國際貨幣基金的監督功能 61 第五章 國際貨幣基金的制約條件 67 第一節 什麼是制約條件 67 第二節 制約條件的發展 71 第三節 制約條件與調整政策 76 第四節 制約條件的政經效應 79 第六章 一九八０年代的拉丁美洲債務危機 92 第一節 拉丁美洲債務危機的起源 92 第二節 處理拉丁美洲債務危機的國際行動 96 第三節 處理拉丁美洲債務危機的成效與政經意涵 102 第七章 一九九七年東亞金融危機 111 第一節 東亞金融危機的起源 111 第二節 東亞國家的政治經濟結構 117 第三節 處理東亞金融危機的國際行動 119 第四節 國際貨幣基金穩定方案的檢討 123 第五節 小結 132 第八章 結論 138 參考書目 143 圖表目錄 圖 圖3-1 國際貨幣基金組織結構圖 45 表 表6-1 拉美國家的貿易平衡、經常帳與資本基本轉移 的情況，1977—1987 105 表6-2 接受IMF融資計畫的拉美國家之經濟表現 105 表6-3 接受IMF融資計畫的拉美國家之債務情況 106 表7-1 泰國、印尼與南韓三國外匯存底的變動， （1997年6月—19982月） 112 表7-2 東亞四國的債務情況 114 表7-3 東亞四國的經濟表現，1997—1999 131