The aim of this paper is to investigate if it is compatible with the free movement of capital (Article 63 TFEU) to levy a withholding tax on Swedish-sourced dividends paid to non-EU investment funds with legal personality (in the paper referred to as investment companies). This question is of relevance since several Swedish intermediaries do not pay any income tax on dividends, either due to a formal tax exemption or to de facto practice. As such, it is clear from CJEU case law that non-EU investment companies should also be exempt from withholding tax on dividends, provided that they are in an objectively comparable situation with any of these Swedish entities and that no justification ground is applicable.   The conclusion of the thesis is that there are indications of that the current Swedish lower court practice, which is to deny comparability between non-EU investment companies and Swedish tax-exempt investment funds with reference to that the foreign entities have a different legal form, is contrary to EU law. Alternatively, it is possible to find discriminatory treatment when comparing the dividend tax treatment of a non-EU investment company with the dividend tax treatment of a Swedish fiscal investment enterprise (investmentföretag). For this reason, it is welcome that leave to appeal was recently granted by the Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden in one of the lower court cases dealing with this issue.

Never before in history has the amount of international trade been higher or more efficient than it is today. The fastest growing type of trade is the speculative currency trading, searching for instant profit based only on the anticipation of the variations in currency exchange rates. When currency speculation becomes an influential part of the capital flows it becomes harmful and creates instability of currency systems. Exchange rates starts to fluctuate due to the will and anticipation of speculators rather than the economic health of the country associated with the currency. This has led to recurring currency crises all over the world and an increased interest in regulatory mechanisms. One of the most discussed mechanisms proposed to handle this harmful evolution of the foreign exchange markets is the Currency Transaction Tax (CTT). The CTT stipulates a low tax (0.1 per cent) on all currency transaction to curb the incitement of short-term speculation based on a large amount of smaller transactions. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether an implementation of a CTT is compatible with the EU treaties. This purpose consists of two research questions; whether the CTT is in conformity with the substantive law of the EU, more precisely the free movements of capital, and if the CTT is in conformity with the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the exclusive power of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) over monetary policy. Since this thesis aims to identify if the CTT is in conformity with existing legislation, the traditional doctrinal method is used for identifying and analysing potential difficulties with the CTT and to interpret these provisions in the light of ECJ case law and literature. The thesis concludes that the CTT is in conformity with the EU treaties. It does however require the full cooperation of the ESCB and ECB to achieve the objectives; to create a more stable currency market. The CTT is ready to implement.

Les entrepreneurs n’ont pas manqué de soulever l’importance et la nécessité d’une structure européenne flexible pour répondre aux besoins des PME. En effet l'introduction d'une société à conception contractuelle dans le droit européen revêt de multiples intérêts. D'une part, elle intègre les PME dans la continuité du processus de construction du marché intérieur. D’autre part, elle offre une liberté d’action appréciée par les entrepreneurs qui évoluent dans un marché fortement concurrentiel. Enfin, le caractère contractuel permet au législateur européen de revenir sur la définition des libertés d'établissement et de circulation des capitaux.Aussi encourageant que soit ce projet, il n'en demeure pas moins source d'interrogations et d'inquiétudes. La liberté contractuelle comporte des risques si elle n'évolue pas dans un cadre juridique adapté et protecteur. Cette thèse a pour objectif d’analyser les effets de la transposition de la liberté contractuelle dans le droit européen des sociétés. Pour comprendre la portée de l’adoption du texte relatif à la SPE, cette thèse tentera de définir la liberté contractuelle au sens communautaire, de souligner ses avantages et d’analyser ses inconvénients. / Entrepreneurs consider flexible structures are important to meet European SMES needs. Indeed, the transposition of a contractual company in the European law are very valuable. On the one hand, it includes SMES in the process of construction of internal market. On the other hand, it offers to entrepreneurs a freedom to manage their companies in order to be more competitive. Finally the contractual aspect of the company allows the European parliament to reconsider the definition of freedom of establishment and free movement of capital. As encouraging as this project is, it remains a source of questions and concerns. Contractual freedom could involve risks if it doesn’t evolve in a suitable protective legal framework. This thesis aims to analyze the effects of the transposition of contractual freedom in the European company law. To understand the scope of the adoption of the text relating to the SPE, this thesis will try to define the contractual freedom in EU terms, to emphasize its advantages and disadvantages analyzed

La notion de « concurrence » est traditionnellement associée au droit de la concurrence, entendu, dans sa vocation restrictive et européenne, comme le corpus gouvernant ententes et abus de position dominante. Si le droit de la concurrence a vocation à saisir les marchés financiers en vertu du droit commun, force est toutefois d’observer que, animé par une spécificité concurrentielle, le droit financier s’est investi lui-même de la mission consistant à assurer ses propres intérêts concurrentiels : sur les marchés financiers, modèles archétypique de concurrence « pure et parfaite », la concurrence s’est développée non pas dans le cadre des règles communes de la concurrence, mais en dehors de ces dernières. C’est de cette « spécificité concurrentielle » du droit financier que la présente recherche, enrichie des apports notables du droit américain, se propose de rendre compte : bouleversant les monopoles traditionnels et favorisant une dynamique de compétition normative le droit financier organise la concurrence sur les marchés financiers d’abord. Sur le modèle du droit commun de la concurrence, le droit financier assure la protection de la compétition, ensuite, la transparence jouant à cet égard un rôle de premier plan. La confrontation du droit financier au principe de concurrence atteste d’une véritable « spécificité concurrentielle » en matière financière. De façon plus globale, l’analyse conduit à remettre en cause les ordres établis, suggérant une clé de compréhension renouvelée autour d’une nouvelle cohérence : le droit financier ne serait in fine pas réductible à une branche du droit de la régulation tourné par l’ouverture à la concurrence via la mise en œuvre de politiques dites de « libéralisation ». Corrélativement, le droit de la concurrence pourrait ne pas être que le droit de la protection de l’ordre concurrentiel sur le marché des biens et services, les « Grandes libertés » étant appelées à compléter un édifice commun voué non seulement à protéger la concurrence, mais également à l’organiser. Au final, et cela ne serait pas le moindre des paradoxes de souligner la spécificité du droit financier tout en relativisant la notion de « droit de la régulation », avec en point de mire un « droit de la régulation économique ». / The concept of « Competition » traditionally refers to Antitrust Law, heard in its restrictive and European meaning as governing both Trusts and abuse of dominant position. If Antitrust Law is intended to capture financial markets under common rules, however, it is observed that, animated by a competitive specificity, Financial Law has invested himself the task of ensuring its own competitive interest: financial market, competition archetypal models of « pure and perfect » competition, has not developed in the framework of common rules of competition, but outside them. It is precisely this kind of Financial Law’s « competitive specificity » that this research, enriched by notable contributions of US Law, proposes to report here : contesting classic monopolistic positions that have long characterized the financial infrastructures while sustaining a Law competition dynamic, Financial Law organizes competition in financial markets. More, not only does Financial Law organizes competition, it also protects competition, in the context of the influence of common Antitrust principles and market transparency.Financial Law and the competition principle comparison is rich teaching : it allows to demonstrate Financial Law’s competitive specificity. More broadly, the research led to challenge the « established order », suggesting a renewed key to understanding based on a new consistency: Financial Law would ultimately not be reduced to a branch of « Regulation Law », regulating the entire shot the opening to competition through the implementation of « Liberalization » policies. Correlatively, Antitrust Law may not be only confined in the protection of the competitive order on the goods and services market, « European freedoms of Mouvement » being then asked to complete a common building dedicated not only to protect the competition, but also to organize it. In the end, it would not be the least of paradoxes emphasizing the specificity of Financial Law while relativizing the notion of « Regulation Law », in focus with an « Economic Regulation Law ».

Trots en rättsutveckling som pågått sedan början av 2000-talet råder fortfarande viss oklarhet rörande möjligheterna att enligt unionsrätten pröva en nationell lagstiftning mot den fria rörligheten för kapital. För tillämpningen av ändamålstestet saknas tydliga riktlinjer både vad gäller definitionen av begreppet definitivt inflytande och betydelsen av lagstiftarens vilja med den ifrågavarande nationella lagstiftningen. Min tolkning, som alltså i huvudsak bygger på rättsfallen Lasertec och Itelcar, är att begreppet definitivt inflytande inte kan knytas till en exakt procent av ägandet i ett annat bolag. Genom en jämförelse av flera avgöranden från EU-domstolen tycks dock slutsatsen kunna dras att ett definitivt utövande typiskt sett följer av en ägarandel om 25 %. Samtidigt ger ordalydelsen i domstolens resonemang i till exempel Itelcar vid handen att ett innehav om ner till 10 % kan ge ett definitivt inflytande i kombination med andra faktorer, men inte i sig. Det är heller inte omöjligt att detsamma gäller ännu mindre innehav. I och med att definitivt inflytande kan utövas vid mindre innehav än 25 % måste det också vara möjligt för nationella lagstiftningar att tillämpas på sådana innehav utan att för den sakens skull kunna angripas med den fria rörligheten för kapital.  Det sagda innebär att en lagstiftning, likt den i Lasertec, som är tillämplig på ägarandelar om 25 %, eller mindre andelar men där ett sådant inflytande som generellt följer av en sådan ägarandel likväl kan utövas, ska anses ha som ändamål att tillämpas på situationer där definitivt inflytande föreligger och ska därför inte prövas mot den fria rörligheten för kapital. Att tillämpningen av lagstiftningen utgår från en ägarandel om 25 % visar att lagstiftaren haft som avsikt att lagstiftningen ska tillämpas i situationer där ett sådant inflytande som motsvarar det som typiskt sett följer av en sådan ägarandel kan utövas. En lagstiftning likt den i Itelcar, som i stället som utgångspunkt för tillämpning förutsätter ett innehav om 10 % kan dock inte sägas ha som ändamål att endast tillämpas på ägarandelar som ger ett definitivt inflytande. Det inflytande som typiskt sett kan utövas vid ägarandelar om 10 % kan nämligen inte anses vara definitivt. De svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna kräver för sin tillämpning att åtminstone ett väsentligt inflytande kan utövas över det räntebetalande företaget. Vad ett väsentligt inflytande närmare innebär är inte helt entydigt, men tycks avse ägarandelar om minst 40 %. Det är dock tydligt att även andra omständigheter än storleken på ägandet kan beaktas. Vid innehav under 40 % måste således ett väsentligt inflytande kunna påvisas på annan grund för att lagstiftningen ska vara tillämplig. Mot bakgrund av det ovan sagda är min slutsats att de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna inte kan prövas mot den fria rörligheten för kapital. Då förarbetsuttalanden antyder att det inflytande som ska kunna utövas ska motsvara en ägarandel om 40 %, måste ändamålet med lagstiftningen anses vara att den endast ska tillämpas i situationer där ett definitivt inflytande föreligger. Att lagstiftningen även kan komma att tillämpas vid mindre innehav ändrar inte denna bedömning, då detta har godkänts av EU-domstolen i Lasertec. Jag har visserligen dragit en annan slutsats än Ohlsson rörande tillämpligheten av den fria rörligheten för kapital på de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna, men jag delar hans uppfattning att en svensk domstol bör inhämta ett förhandsavgörande från EU-domstolen för att få frågan avgjord. Det skulle dessutom ge EU-domstolen en möjlighet att ytterligare förtydliga tillämpningen av ändamålstestet i tredjelandssituationer.

När en investerare vill investera utomlands finns många risker som måste beräknas, analyseras och hanteras. Utöver olika ekonomiska risker finns politiska risker. En investerare kan, för att hantera dessa politiska risker, välja att investera i en stat med vilken Sverige har ett bilateralt investeringsskyddsavtal. Dessa avtal reglerar både materiellt investeringsskydd, det vill säga hur en investerare ska behandlas, och processuellt skydd, det vill säga möjligheten för en investerare att väcka talan mot staten investeraren investerar i genom ett internationellt skiljeförfarande. Sverige har idag 66 stycken bilaterala investeringsskyddsavtal i kraft, varav tolv stycken är slutna med länder inom EU. Antalet bilaterala investeringsskyddsavtal slutna mellan EU-länder, intra-EU BIT, ökade avsevärt i och med att unionen utvidgades år 2004 och 2007. Sedan dess har avtalens förenlighet med EU-rätten diskuterats i litteraturen, i skiljedomstolar och nyligen även i EU- domstolen i det så kallade Achmea-målet. I uppsatsen kartläggs och analyseras argumenten i diskussionen om relationen mellan intra-EU BIT och EU-rätten. Vidare analyseras vilken del av investeringsskyddet som intra-EU BIT-förespråkare anser vara mest betydelsefull. Från resonemanget och analysen i uppsatsen dras slutsatsen att det är ISDS-systemet, tvistelösningssystemet där en investerare kan väcka talan mot en stat, som kan anses utgöra den mest betydelsefulla delen av investeringsskyddet i intra-EU BIT:en. Därefter analyseras huruvida ett investeringsskydd innehållande ett ISDS-förfarande kan vara förenligt med principen om ömsesidigt erkännande och förtroende. I uppsatsen konstateras att ISDS-förfarandet inte kan vara förenligt denna princip och att problematiken inte kan lösas genom en juridisk debatt utan måste diskuteras på en politiskt hög nivå. / When investing abroad, an investor is faced with many risks that need to be thoroughly analysed in order to be mitigated. Risks are not only financial, but also political. An investor may, to mitigate these risks, choose to invest in states with which Sweden has a bilateral investment treaty, a so called BIT. BIT do not only regulate treatment of the investor and the investment, which is the material investment protection; but also the jurisdictional possibility of the investor to raise charges against the state of in which the investment has taken place in case of violation of investment rights, procedural investment protection. Today, Sweden has 66 BITs in force, out of which twelve are concluded with EU member states, so called intra-EU BIT. The number of intra-EU BITs grew significantly as a result of the enlargement of the union in the year of 2004 and 2007. Since then, the agreements’ compatibility with the EU legislation has been a subject of discussion within literature, investment arbitrations and recently in the European Court of Justice in the Achmea case. This thesis aims to establish and analyse the context of the discussions flourishing the relationship between the intra-EU BITs and the EU legislation. Additionally, the author intends to identify which argumentation regarding investment protection, that by intra-EU BIT praisers is considered to be the most impactful. As a result, the conclusion of the thesis is that it is the ISDS-system, the investor- state dispute settlement, in which an investor can raise charges towards a state, that is the most valuable part of the investment protection given by the intra-EU BITs. Accordingly, it is analysed weather investment protection containing an ISDS-system can be compatible with the principle of mutual trust and recognition. In the thesis it is concluded that the ISDS-system cannot be considered to be compatible with the principle and that this problem should be debated on a high political level and cannot be solved through a legal debate.

Le patriotisme économique, souvent brandi comme un étendard afin de justifier l'intervention de l’État dans la sphère économique, est en cela une expression d'origine essentiellement politique. Ainsi ressort-il de manière régulière sur la scène médiatique française au gré d'offres publiques d'achat faites sur des fleurons nationaux. La traduction dans la sphère juridique de ce concept passe alors nécessairement par l'identification des instruments juridiques permettant sa mise en œuvre. Cette traduction se voit alors encadrée et dans une certaine mesure orientée par un impératif tenant à la détermination des limites du concept. Celui-ci n'a de sens, de manière autonome, que s'il parvient à se distinguer du protectionnisme. Dans cette optique, l'arsenal juridique du patriotisme économique désigne ainsi plus spécifiquement les moyens permettant à L’État de détenir un contrôle sur les entreprises qu'il juge « stratégiques » ou « essentielles » afin de veiller à garantir les intérêts nationaux vis-à-vis de prises de participation étrangères. De cette façon, le patriotisme économique s'affirme tant par son champ d'application, la protection de secteurs économiques stratégiques, que par son objet, en étant conçu à la lumière d'un élément tenant à l'extranéité, les capitaux étrangers. Dès lors, les instruments juridiques auxquels renvoie ce concept sont loin d'être propres à un État en particulier, bien au contraire. Étant donné qu'ils s'entendent sous le prisme de la souveraineté étatique, il s'agit même de se demander si leur mise en œuvre n'est pas inhérente à l’État. Parallèlement, la conception internationale de la souveraineté de l’État implique que celui-ci est libre de se limiter par la conclusion d'engagements internationaux. La construction européenne, caractérisant le processus dynamique d'édification d'une organisation d'intégration, est le fruit de l'exercice de cette souveraineté internationale. À mesure des transferts de compétences des États membres vers l'Union européenne, un point de jonction entre le patriotisme économique pratiqué par les États membres et la construction européenne s'est créé. Cette étude a donc pour objet d'étudier la dialectique entre le concept de patriotisme économique et la construction européenne, sous la forme d'une exigence de compatibilité. Cette dialectique doit alors s'analyser en miroir de la souveraineté de L’État. Si le patriotisme économique ne fait qu'exprimer la souveraineté territoriale et in fine la souveraineté interne de l’État, il porte en lui une certaine opposition au mouvement de libéralisation des échanges et des investissements, auquel l’État membre de l'Union européenne a lui-même consenti par le biais d'engagements internationaux. En cela des tensions peuvent être perceptibles entre la souveraineté interne et la souveraineté externe de l’État. / On the one hand, economic patriotism is often merely a ploy, flourished to justify State intervention in the economy. That is why it is first of all a political expression. Therefore, the matter routinely appears in the French media through the takeover bids made on national champions. The expression into the legal sphere of this concept requires an identification of legal instruments, which will make possible its implementation. This definition is framed and coloured by the necessity to distinguish economic patriotism from protectionism. As a result, the legal definition of economic patriotism refers to the means for the State to keep some control over the companies that it considers "strategic" or "essential" to ensure national interests are not jeopardized by foreign ownership. Therefore economic patriotism is asserted both through its scope, the protection of strategic economic sectors, and through its purpose, as an answer to an external threat: foreign capital. In this way the legal instruments to which this concept refers are far from being specific to a particular State. Since they are understandable through the State sovereignty, one even wonders if their implementation is not inherent to the State. On the other hand, external sovereignty implies that the State is free to restrict itself by entering into international commitments. European construction characterizes the dynamic process, which aims to build an integration organization and therefore it is the result of the exercise by the State of this international sovereignty. Even as jurisdictions have been transferred from member states to the European Union, economic patriotism practiced by the member states gradually fell into European integration realm. This study aims to explore the dialectic between the concept of economic patriotism and European integration as a compatibility requirement. This dialectic must be analysed from the State sovereignty point of view. Economic patriotism expresses the State territorial sovereignty whereas European integration is the result of its external sovereignty, which notably led to liberalize trade and investments. Therefore, tensions may appear between internal and external State sovereignty.

There have been three main sets of trends in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the field of the internal market after 2004. The first set of trends concerned the criteria of legal analysis, i.e. the scope of EU rules on free movement, the concept of the restriction of free movement and the justification of such restrictions. The second set of trends in the case law is related to the fact that the Court completes its legal analysis by considerations linked to its value orientation of the Court, i.e. its liberalism, social tendencies, protection of fundamental rights, pragmatism and proactivity. The third trend in the case law of the internal market consisted in changing the focus of case law in the sense that the Court has begun to deal with more and more cases from sectoral fields, i.e. fields covered by secondary law.

The relationship between international investment agreements and EU law has attracted increased attention in past few years. The aim of this thesis is to bring a detailed analysis of various aspects of this complicated relationship. In attainment of this aim it proceeds in the following steps. After a short introduction (Chapter I.), Chapter II. briefly overviews typical content of bilateral investment treaties, following with a more detailed analysis of relevant EU law rules concerning foreign investment and subsequent comparison of both sets of rules. Chapter III. deals with investment agreements to be concluded by the EU, in particular with questions of external competence for foreign investment, responsibility for breaches of investment agreements concluded by the EU and the future shape of EU investment policy. The status of existing bilateral investment treaties concluded between EU member states and third countries is analyzed in Chapter IV. Chapter V. tackles various issues related to investment treaties concluded between member states (so called intra-EU BITs).

Investment Policy of the European Union - protection of foreign direct investment Abstract One of the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty is the explicit inclusion of foreign direct investment and its protection in the common commercial policy of the European Union. This is one of the areas of exclusive competence of the EU. The European Union has subsequently stated negotiating bilateral agreements governing, inter alia, investment issues. However, it has not been spared from controversy and negative publicity that has been accompanying especially the TTIP and the CETA. This work aims to analyse the investment policy of the EU and mutual interaction of its institutions with the Member States and third parties. After general introduction to the topic of international investment law and EU law (chapters II. and III.), it is devoted to the issue of protection of foreign investment in the internal market. Its regime is then compared with the BIT regime (chapter IV.). Attention is then focussed towards the EU's external relations in the field of investment protection. Its competence is subjected to further analysis (chapter V.) and current results of efforts of the Commission and the EU as such are also discussed (chapter VI.). It is so in the light of possible impacts of foreign investment in terms of...