This research explores the role of public interest litigants in the circulation of arguments among courts regarding the interpretation of fundamental rights. Such circulation is often labeled ‘judicial dialogue’. ‘Public interest litigants’ are here defined as entities (individuals or groups) with no direct interest in the case, who use procedural avenues to participate in the litigation. Despite extensive scholarly attention for judicial dialogue, the necessity for more empirical research devoted to the exchanges among jurisdictions had been stressed. Three jurisdictions with different postures towards cross-citations were chosen for the analysis: the U.S. Supreme Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the South African Constitutional Court. Among their vast case law, landmark cases were selected dealing firstly with death penalty or related questions and secondly with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Briefs submitted by public interest litigants to courts were collected and analyzed, mainly to inquire about the identity of the actors involved in the cases, to see whether their briefs contain comparative material and, if they do, to record what sort of references are made and whether they are accompanied by justifications supporting their relevance.The analysis reveals that the briefs contain comparative material. Many public interest litigants can be considered as messengers of this information. They push for the detachment of judicial interpretation from the text at hand and propose a variant of the interpretative exercise in which the mobilized material is not exclusively jurisdiction-bound. The cross-analysis also reveals that, contrary to the picture painted by the literature on the phenomenon, there are actually many comparisons in the broad sense (referring for example to a ‘universal practice’) that are used in a norm-centric way, that is, where the simple mention of a comparative element in the form of a broad reference or the outcome of a foreign case should have weight in the adjudication and not in a reason-centric way, that is, by exposing the reasoning of a foreign judge. The research also hypothesized that the comparative material brought by public interest litigants influences the judges. Analyzing the cases using the process-tracing method allowed to substantiate that briefs are read and established that several comparative references brought by public interest litigants were debated during the oral arguments and found an echo in the judgments (in majority and dissenting opinions). Along with the use of other methods such as interviews of judges, the hypothesis was thus confirmed.Exploring the roles of external actors also enables to supply the literature on judicial dialogue with factual insights regarding the identities of the actors behind the circulation of legal arguments. It was found that, in the United States, the traditional domestic ‘repeat players’ (that is, actors often involved in the litigation) do not clearly embrace a comparative approach while most public interest litigants in Europe and South Africa do. Similarly, the pregnant role of transnational actors is underlined. The analysis suggests an explanation drawn from an aspect of the legal culture in which the public interest litigants evolve and which influences their argumentative strategies: the horizon of the ambient rights discourse: a civil rights discourse, more territorially bounded (and more often found in the U.S. context), is distinguished from a human rights or fundamental rights discourse which entails a more cosmopolitan dimension.The final part of the research explores and discusses the justifications provided by public interest litigants to support the relevance of a comparative approach in the interpretation of rights. The compilation of these justifications allows to confront those provided first hand to the judges with those constructed post facto by the scholarly literature. It reveals the uncertain implications of some of these justifications, in particular the one pointing to the universal nature of the discussed rights and the one invoking the need for consistency among the approaches of jurisdictions.The research thus allows to confirm the hypothesis that public interest litigants play a key role in judicial dialogue. Moreover, it points at further promising researches, and this thesis hopes to draw the attention to often neglected elements, such as the identity and status of the actors bringing comparative information, the forms of citations and the roles assigned to them, the aspects of legal culture that are seldom mentioned in the literature and the implications of the justifications explicitly or implicitly provided for the relevance of comparative material. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The thesis evaluates how effective the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the EU have been in promoting the human rights of vulnerable migrants. It thereby pursues two objectives. Firstly, it questions legal scholarship that has identified certain rulings of the two courts as vital for migrant rights but which have not analysed their impact empirically. Secondly, it makes a methodological contribution to the evaluation of the effectiveness of international courts by proposing (and applying) an 'issue-based' methodology which assesses judicial bodies for their ability to resolve specific social and political problem. For these purposes, eight carefully selected 'key cases' are analysed in terms of three effectiveness types, namely law development, case-specific, and strategic effectiveness. The empirical materials used include interviews with 28 persons who were directly or indirectly involved in the selected key cases. Legal and empirical analyses show varying and complex results for the different cases, with some general trends emerging. Firstly, the case law of the courts is characterised by a significant inconsistency, resulting in a 'dilemmatic adjudication' that diminishes the impact of even rights-affirming judgments. Secondly, the 'case-specific' impact on the persons or the countries concerned remains contingent as governments and domestic courts manage to contain the ruling. Lastly, lawyers and NGOs increasingly use the courts in a strategic way, which can elevate impact on policy. Yet, this will depend on the resources invested, raising the question whether such strategies are the most efficient way to promote migrant rights. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Dans le contexte actuel de crise financière, le recours des Etats membres aux golden shares est révélateur d’un mouvement de protection des entreprises nationales à l’encontre des investisseurs étrangers. Or, ce mécanisme tombe sous le coup des normes de l’Union. De l’application de ces règles émerge un cadre juridique autonome qui soumet ce régime de propriété particulier des Etats membres au respect de la libre circulation des capitaux et de la liberté d’établissement. Si les golden shares ne sont pas interdites per se, le contrôle strict, effectué tant par la Commission que la Cour de justice, souligne la faible marge de manœuvre qui est octroyée aux Etats membres dans l’utilisation du dispositif. Ce contrôle a une double incidence. Il permet, tout d’abord, de souligner certaines incohérences éventuelles qu’une telle analyse pourrait engendrée dans le droit de l’Union. En ce sens, une remise en question des éléments du cadre juridique peut s’avérer fortuite. Il révèle, ensuite, les limites à la constitution d’un véritable marché intérieur. Les Etats membres sont enclins à se réapproprier le dispositif des golden shares par des moyens détournés. Leurs tentatives révèlent un malaise plus profond, celui de la crainte des investissements étrangers dans les entreprises nationales opérant dans des secteurs stratégiques. Se pose alors la question de l’opportunité d’un mécanisme commun de contrôle des investissements étrangers. La réponse à la crise se veut ainsi à l’échelle de l’Union, et plus seulement à celle des Etats membres. / In the currrent context of financial crisis, the recourse of Member States to golden shares reveals the ongoing movement to protect domestic firms against foreign investors. This mechanism however falls within the scope of EU norms. From the application of these rules emerges an autonomous legal framework which submit this particular ownership regime of Member States to comply with the free movement of capital and freedom of establishment. If golden shares are not prohibited per se, the strict control undertaken by both the Commission and the Court of Justice only leaves a limited marge de manoeuvre to Member States in the use of such device.This control has a dual incidence. Firstly, it allows to point out some inconsistencies that such analysis could generated in EU law. To that extent, calling into question the elements of the legal framework may be relevant. Secondly, it reveals the limits of the constitution of a truly internal market. Member States are likely to restore the golden shares mechanism by devious means. Their attempts reveal a deeper malaise, the fear of foreign investment in domestic companies operating in strategic sectors. This questions the opportunity of a common instrument to control foreign investment. Response to the crisis must be taken at the level of the European Union, and not anymore at Member States’.

Pas de résumé / No abstract

De fameux arrêts rendus le 10 juillet 2002, par la Chambre sociale de la Cour de cassation, on retient surtout le revirement de jurisprudence concernant les clauses de non-concurrence insérées dans un contrat de travail : pour être valides, ces stipulations doivent désormais remplir différentes conditions cumulatives, dont le versement, au salarié, d’une contrepartie financière. Mais le visa - inédit - du « principe fondamental de libre exercice d’une activité professionnelle » a moins retenu l’attention. Certains ont vu dans cette norme un simple substitut de principes plus classiques (tels les principes de la liberté du travail, de la liberté du commerce et de l’industrie ou de la liberté d’entreprendre), tandis que d’autres ont cru trouver le véritable fondement de ces arrêts novateurs dans l’article 1131 du Code civil requérant que toute obligation ait une cause. La consécration et la sollicitation de ce principe de libre exercice d’une activité professionnelle constituent pourtant un apport majeur de ces décisions et d’une série significative d’arrêts postérieurs. Par référence à cette norme – et sans précision de son assise textuelle – la Cour de cassation a construit le régime des clauses de non-concurrence en droit du travail et conduit une véritable politique jurisprudentielle en la matière. Cette norme a en outre fondé la mise en question de la validité d’autres clauses et d’autres pratiques. Sa promotion en fait un élément singulier du droit positif, capable d’enrichir divers débats et de régir nombre de situations juridiques, au-delà des rapports de travail salarié. Son avènement et ses conquêtes participent aussi de phénomènes plus amples affectant l’ordre juridique français, notamment sa constitutionnalisation. Son actualité comme ses potentialités commandaient de consacrer enfin une étude à cet authentique « principe », de l’identifier précisément et de prendre la mesure de sa portée. / From the well-known court rulings pronounced by the Social Chamber of the Court of cassation on July 10th 2002, the most notorious is the reversal of jurisprudence about non-competition clauses inserted into an employment contract: to be valid, these stipulations now have to satisfy several cumulative conditions, among others the payment, to the employee, of a financial compensation. But the visa – never seen before – of the “fundamental principle of free exercise of a professional activity” didn’t get as much attention. For some people, this norm was just a substitute of more classical principles (as the principles of freedom of work, of freedom of trade and industry, or of freedom of enterprise), while others found the real foundation of these rulings in article 1131 of the Civil Code, that requires that any obligation has a cause. However, this principle of free exercise of a professional activity recognized in these decisions and used in a series of subsequent court rulings is a major contribution.Through this norm – without detailing its textual foundation – the Court of cassation built the non-competition clauses’ rules in labour law and drove a real case law policy. Furthermore, thanks to this norm, the validity of other clauses and other practices was questioned. The promotion of this norm makes it a singular element of positive law, able to improve many discussions and to govern many legal cases, beyond salaried work relationships. Also, its advent and conquests pertain to largest phenomena which affect the French legal order, for example its constitutionalization. Its topicality as well as its potentialities required to devote a study to this authentic “principle”, in order to identify it accurately and to evaluate its impact.

Assurer un équilibre, entre les différentes parties du contrat du travail, a toujours été l'un des buts de la création de la branche du droit du travail. La mise en place des règles du droit du travail réside, certes, dans une finalité particulière ; elle est constituée par la volonté d'émanciper le travailleur même, dans l'espace de l'entreprise. C'est assurément dans le même dessein que, pour permettre aux libertés individuelles de ne pas rester à la lisière de l'entreprise, des droits d'expression collective ont été attribués aux travailleurs : la liberté syndicale, le droit de grève et le principe de participation. Il convient d'étudier la fondamentalité de ces droits, dans un champ qui doit nécessairement s'affranchir de tout ordre juridique national, en regard du caractère universel dont ils disposent. Mais encore faut-il partir de deux ordres internes pour mener une réflexion non superficielle. Comment ne pas dès lors partir du « pays des droits de l'homme » et du « quartier latin de l'Afrique », pour voir dans quelle mesure les droits fondamentaux de l'homme au travail sont partout respectés. La problématique de « mimétisme juridique » génère t-elle des difficultés sur le plan des garanties des libertés collectives des travailleurs en Afrique et, plus précisément, au Bénin ? Qu'en est-il de la réalité des droits fondamentaux de l'homme au travail dans l'ex Dahomey ? Telles sont les formes de questions auxquelles cette étude comparative des libertés collectives des travailleurs se propose d'apporter une esquisse de réponse. / To ensure a balance, between the different parts of the work contract, has always been the aim of the employment law creation. The implementation of the rules of employment law certainly has got a particular purpose. It is constituted by the wish to get the worker emancipated in the business space. It is certainly in the same purpose that, in order to enable individual liberties not to remain in the edge of the enterprise, those collective expressions rights were given to workers: the liberty of trade unions, the right to strike and the principle of participation. We will have to study the fundamental nature of those rights in a way which would be totally free of any national legal system, in regard of the universal character there have. However, we still have to start from two internal orders to reach a non-superficial reflexion. Then, why shall we not focus on the “human right country” and the “Latin district of Africa” to understand in which extent fundamental human rights regarding employment are respected everywhere. Does the “mimicry legal” issue generate difficulties in Africa workers' collective liberties and freedom field and more specifically in Benin? What about fundamental human rights regarding employment in ex Dahomey? That comparative study on worker's collective liberties will make an attempt to answer.

La situation des individus situés en dehors du travail interroge sur la perception qu’a le droit des inactifs et sur les protections conférées à ces derniers, notamment la protection de leur dignité sociale. La notion de paresse, qui pourrait être définie comme la propension à ne rien faire, est absente des dictionnaires juridiques et revêt un sens péjoratif dans les rares textes qui en font usage. L’étude se propose de dessiner les contours de ce que pourrait être un droit à la paresse, et plus spécifiquement un droit collectif à la paresse, en étudiant dans l’ordre juridique français à l’aune de l’activité de travail et du droit de la protection sociale, la façon dont les comportements paresseux sont perçus par le droit et s’il est des situations empreintes d’oisiveté qui permettent de conférer à la paresse une forme de licéité. La recherche s’est intéressée à la fonction et la valeur sociale du travail, pour mieux déconstruire les rapports de dépendance à l’activité de travail qui s’établissent au préjudice du développement du temps de vie personnelle des travailleurs. / The situation of individuals outside work questions the perception of the law of the inactive and the protections afforded to them, including the protection of their social dignity. The notion of laziness, which could be defined as the propensity to do nothing, is absent from legal dictionaries and has a pejorative meaning in the few texts that make use of it. The study proposes to draw the outline of what could be a right to laziness, and more specifically a collective right to laziness, by studying in the French legal order in the yard of the work activity and the social welfare law, the manner in which lazy behavior is perceived by law, and the idleness of situations that make laziness a form of lawfulness. Research has focused on the function and social value of work, in order to better deconstruct the relationships of dependence on the work activity that are established to the detriment of the development of the personal life time of workers.

This doctoral thesis is at the intersection of law and technology by focusing on the ethical governance of private companies on the topic of discrimination. It centers on algorithmic and intentional discrimination. It aimed to determine whether the European Union and Federal USA law are equipped to address discrimination in the provision of work, goods, and services online. Through and extensive analyses of sources that included private company practices, private anti-discrimination policies, collective and private litigation, court decisions, public regulation at the EU, Member State levels, and United States, this thesis argued that statutory law and legal precedents in the European Union and United States are only partially equipped to address discrimination against statutorily protected classes. The author of this thesis inferred from the selected sources that the main obstacles to the full implementation of the equality principle rely on businesses' structural challenges, including aesthetic design, matching tools, evaluation systems, and network effect of online platforms that ultimately reinforce old biases against protected classes. Furthermore, rigid and more flexible regimes of liability immunities to online intermediaries results in the lack of incentive for structural changes. Finally, in the light of these structural challenges, this thesis asserts that the fight against discrimination in online platforms might produce the best results when also oriented by a model of regulation that encourages online platforms to implement the principle of transparency and fairness in their interactions with users, coupled with the cooperation of anti-discrimination bodies and private businesses. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

À l’intersection du droit de la preuve, du droit disciplinaire et des droits fondamentaux, le secret professionnel du juriste est à la fois un droit fondamental des justiciables, une obligation déontologique des professionnels de droit et un principe essentiel à l’administration de la justice. Cette dernière composante – touchant à l’équité de la procédure par laquelle les citoyens font valoir leurs droits devant les tribunaux – distingue le secret professionnel du juriste des autres secrets professionnels ou obligations de confidentialité reconnues aux membres d’autres ordres professionnels. Si le secret professionnel du juriste fait place à part tant aux yeux des membres de professions juridiques que des cours de justice, se pose la question de ses modes de coexistence avec d’autres intérêts concurrents, protégés par des droits et libertés tout aussi fondamentaux, au vu de la conception de non-hiérarchie ou d’égalité des droits constitutionnels que préconise la Cour suprême du Canada. La présente thèse s’intéresse à la coexistence concrète du secret professionnel du juriste avec d’autres intérêts concurrents et constate, dans le quotidien de la pratique, une approche de délimitation qui permet de modérer le discours officiel prônant une conception absolutiste du secret professionnel du juriste. Cette approche de délimitation se substitue à l’approche de pondération en procédant, non pas à une balance des inconvénients, mais plutôt en s’attelant à un examen minutieux, au cas par cas, de la portée d’une protection a priori absolue. / At the intersection of the law of evidence, disciplinary law and fundamental rights, solicitor-client privilege is a fundamental right of litigants, an ethical obligation of legal professionals as well as an essential principle for the administration of justice. This last component – affecting the fairness of the procedure through which citizens assert their rightful claims before courts of law – serves as a distinguishing feature of the solicitor-client privilege, apart from general duties of confidentiality incumbent upon other professionals. If solicitor-client privilege attracts so high an esteem in the eyes of both legal professionals and justices, the question arises as to the coexistence thereof with other competing interests, protected by equally fundamental rights and freedoms, in view of the non-hierarchical or equality approach advocated by the Supreme Court of Canada. This thesis turns on the concrete coexistence of solicitor-client privilege with other competing interests and observes, in the daily practice, a delimitation approach which makes it possible to moderate the official discourse advocating an absolutist conception of secrecy. This limitation approach replaces the accommodation approach by carrying out, instead of a balancing of salutary vs deleterious effects, a case-by-case meticulous examination of the adequate scope to be conferred on an a priori absolute privilege.

Les privilèges parlementaires nécessaires au bon fonctionnement des assemblées législatives sont constitutionnalisés, de sorte que les actions que ces assemblées posent conformément à ces privilèges ne peuvent être examinées par une instance juridictionnelle. Le présent mémoire s'intéresse à l'impact de cette constitutionnalisation sur les droits et libertés, consacrés par les chartes, des non-parlementaires qui prennent part ou qui sont visés par les délibérations des assemblées législatives. Il étudie notamment la force normative des privilèges parlementaires en tant que principes constitutionnels implicites et les conséquences de leur constitutionnalisation sur le principe de la non-hiérarchisation des droits et des privilèges consacrés par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés et la Constitution.