Normas contábeis e normas fiscais desempenham um papel fundamental dentre os determinantes da qualidade da informação contábil. A Lei nº 11.638, de 2007, legitimou o processo de adoção das Normas Internacionais de Contabilidade (IFRS) no Brasil e introduziu um regime contábil desvinculado da finalidade tributária no país. Dentre os objetivos da referida Lei, estão a redução da influência da legislação fiscal nas normas contábeis e a melhora da qualidade do reporte financeiro, uma vez que as IFRS são consideradas normas de qualidade superior. A literatura internacional apresenta evidências de redução no poder informativo dos lucros em ambientes nos quais normas contábeis e tributárias estão fortemente vinculadas. Ademais, a influência da legislação fiscal sobre a contabilidade financeira é apontada como um incentivo ao conservadorismo incondicional, um viés que não apresenta vantagens à eficiência contratual nos mercados financeiros por não atribuir informação nova ao investidor. Nesse sentido, espera-se que a neutralidade tributária, instituída a partir da Lei nº 11.638/07, proporcione ao Brasil um ambiente institucional mais adequado ao reporte financeiro de qualidade, ao desvincular a contabilidade financeira da contabilidade fiscal. Diante do exposto, a presente pesquisa tem por objetivo investigar se o advento da neutralidade tributária influencia o conservadorismo incondicional nas companhias de capital aberto no Brasil. A metodologia utilizada envolve regressões para dados em painel. A amostra é composta por companhias abertas brasileiras com informações divulgadas na base de dados Economática® no período de 2002 a 2014. Os resultados evidenciam diferenças na relação entre tributação e reporte financeiro entre firmas sujeitas a diferentes níveis de pressão no mercado acionário brasileiro. São encontrados indícios de conservadorismo incondicional em empresas sujeitas a maior pressão do mercado acionário, apenas. Nesse mesmo grupo, observa-se que a tributação não induz o conservadorismo incondicional nos lucros divulgados, o que é esperado num contexto de neutralidade tributária. / Accounting standards and tax rules play a key role between determinants of accounting information´s quality. Law No. 11.638/2007 legitimized the adoption process of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Brazil, introducing a decoupled system of tax accounting purposes in the country. The main objectives of Law No. 11.638/2007are to improve financial reporting´s quality and reduce the influence of tax law on accounting standards. International literature shows evidence of lower earnings quality in environments where accounting rules and tax rules are closely linked. Furthermore, the influence of tax legislation on financial accounting is an incentive to unconditional conservatism, pointed as an accounting bias that does not give new information to investors and no advantage to contractual efficiency in financial markets. In this sense, it is expected that tax neutrality to provide an enabling Brazil to improved financial reporting institutional environment, reduction unconditional conservatism in reported earnings. Given the above, this research aims to investigate whether fiscal neutrality influences unconditional conservatism in public companies in Brazil.The methodology involves regressions for panel data. The sample is composed by Brazilian companies with disclosures on the basis of Economática® database in the period 2002-2014. The results show differences in the relationship between taxation and financial reporting among firms subject to different pressure levels in the Brazilian stock market. Unconditional conservatism is found in companies subject to greater pressure from the stock market only. In this same group, it is observed that taxation does not induce unconditional conservatism in reported profits, which is expected in a tax neutrality context.

In dieser Dissertation argumentiere ich (gegen John Rawls und andere) erstens dafür, dass perfektionistische Gründe gute Gründe für Gesetze sind, die ein Staat erlässt, ohne, zweitens, die These zu teilen, die Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom vertritt, dass nur die Gesetze eines Staates legitim sind, die mit perfektionistischen Gründen gerechtfertigt werden können – weil alle anderen die Autonomie der Bürger notwendig verletzen würden. Im ersten Punkt halte ich den Perfektionismus für die Standardposition, und die gängigen liberalen Argumente für einen neutralen Staat überzeugen nicht, egal ob sie als ökumenische oder nicht-neutrale vertreten werden. Die ökumenischen Argumente, wie sie etwa bei Rawls und Bruce Ackerman zu finden sind, überzeugen nicht, weil sich ihre behauptete Neutralität letztlich als schädlich parteiisch erweist. Die nicht-neutralen Argumente, die unter anderem von Rawls und Charles Larmore angeführt werden, reichen nicht aus, um die Notwendigkeit eines Prinzips der staatlichen Neutralität zu begründen. Und zwar aus verschiedenen Gründen: Einer dieser Gründe ist, dass die Berufung der Konsequenzialisten auf den Wert der Autonomie übersieht, dass der Wert der Autonomie in Wertkonflikten anderen Werten nicht überlegen ist, und ein zweiter Grund wäre, dass Rawls in seinem Appell an die „Bürden des Urteils“, etwa in seinem Buch Political Liberalism, eher voraussetzt als zeigt, dass Respekt vor der Autonomie der Bürger die staatliche Förderung des Guten ausschließt. Zu dem zweiten Punkt mache ich geltend, dass es unerheblich ist, ob die These von Raz, dass Autonomie wertlos wird, wenn den Bürgern nicht ausreichend gute Optionen an Lebensformen zur Verfügung stehen, zwischen denen sie wählen können, überzeugend ist oder nicht, weil daraus nicht folgt, dass der Staat das Gute in jedem möglichen politischen System fördern muss. Es ist einfach nicht der Fall, dass die Zahl der den Staatsbürgern offenstehenden wertvollen Lebensformen unter eine Schwelle fällt, die den Wert der Autonomie erst möglich macht, sobald der Staat das Gute nicht fördert. / I argue, in this dissertation, first, that, contrary to the views of John Rawls and others, governments are entitled to make policy on the basis of perfectionist judgements, but second, that the claim, in particular as it is argued for in Joseph Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, that governments must make policy on a perfectionist basis, failing which the autonomy of citizens will be damaged, cannot be sustained. I argue the first point on the grounds that perfectionism is the default position, and that standard liberal arguments, which I categorise as either ecumenical or non-neutral, for a principle of state neutrality fail. The ecumenical arguments, which I discover in the writings of Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, fail because their purported neutrality turns out to be damagingly partisan. The non-neutral arguments, which I discover in the writings of, amongst others, Rawls and Charles Larmore, fall short of establishing the necessity of a principle of state neutrality for a number of widely-differing reasons, which include, for example, that a consequentialist appeal to the good of autonomy cannot establish that the good of autonomy trumps all other goods, or any other combination of goods, in all conflicts of goods which might arise, and that Rawls’s appeal to the burdens of judgement, founds in his Political Liberalism, assumes rather than shows that respect for the autonomy of citizens rules out state promotion of the good. I argue the second point on the grounds that although Raz is correct in arguing that autonomy is of no value unless the options between which citizens can choose are worthwhile forms of life, it does not follow that the state must promote the good in any and every possible political dispensation, as it is simply not the case that, in general, unless the state promotes the good, the number of valuable forms of life available to citizens will fall below the threshold which is necessary for their autonomy to be worth having.

O presente estudo é resultado de uma pesquisa teórica, de natureza filosófico-educacional em torno da tese da neutralidade da ciência negada explicitamente pelos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais nos volumes que tratam do ensino de Ciências Naturais. O documento reitera insistentemente que o ensino de ciência deve favorecer a reflexão sobre o caráter não-neutro da ciência e suas implicações políticas e sociais, porém não oferece uma definição clara do conceito de neutralidade. Nosso objetivo foi o de identificar os elementos que devem compor uma noção adequada de neutralidade, sendo um dos requisitos o de que a negação da neutralidade da ciência não implique alguma forma de relativismo. Um autor que tem se dedicado a essa questão é Hugh Lacey, cujos trabalhos foram tomados como referencial básico em todas as nossas reflexões. O aspecto fundamental da filosofia da ciência de Lacey é sua abordagem da racionalidade científica em termos de valores (valores cognitivos e valores sociais), não em termos de regras, como acontece na tradição positivista. Ao processo epistemológico de seleção de teorias em termos de compromisso com um conjunto de valores exclusivamente cognitivos, Lacey atribui o atributo da imparcialidade. A defesa da imparcialidade não impede que os valores não-cognitivos (sociais) tenham também um papel essencial na prática científica. A presença de valores sociais no interior da ciência pode dar-se no nível das escolhas tecnológicas concretas – neutralidade aplicada –, e num nível mais abstrato denominado por Lacey de nível das estratégias – neutralidade cognitiva. Em última análise, é a estratégia que vai restringir os tipos de teorias que podem ser desenvolvidas e investigadas pela ciência moderna que, por conseguinte, carece de neutralidade cognitiva. Tal ciência é ensinada nas escolas como modelo único e fechado de racionalidade científica. Nossa conclusão é que uma maneira de se trabalhar o tema da neutralidade de forma construtiva é apresentá-la indiretamente aos alunos, ou seja, mostrando e discutindo outros possíveis sistemas explicativos da natureza. Numa sociedade realmente democrática, é importante que se valorizem os conhecimentos adquiridos por meio de abordagens alternativas. / This present study is the result from a theoric research, of philosophical and educational nature, around the thesis of science’s neutrality explicitly denied by the National Curriculum Parameters, on the books regarding the Natural Sciences teaching. The document says insistently that the teaching of science must aid the reflection about the non-neutral character of science and its political and social implications, however it does not offer a clear position of the concept of neutrality. Our goal was identify the elements that must be part of a proper notion of neutrality, being one of the requested items that the denial of science’s neutrality does not imply any shape of relativism. One author that has been dedicating himself to this question is Hugh Lacey, whose works have been taken as basic references at all our reflections. The fundamental aspect of Lacey’s science’s philosophy is his approach of science’s rationality on values’ terms (cognitive values and social values), not in terms of rules, as it happens at the positivist tradition. To the epistemological process of selection of theories in terms with compromise of a key of exclusively cognitive values, Lacey sets the attribution of impartiality. The defense of impartiality does not stop the non-cognitive values (social) from having an essential role at the scientific practice. The presence of social values at science’s core can happen at the technological choices’ level – applied neutrality – and, in a more abstract way, named by Lacey ‘strategy level’ – cognitive neutrality. In the end, it is the strategy that will restrict the kind of theories that can be developed and investigated by modern science that, as a consequence, lacks cognitive neutrality. Such science is taught in schools as a single model, away from scientific rationality. Our conclusion is that a way to work with the theme of neutrality in a constructive way is to present it indirectly to the students, that is, showing and discussing other possible systems that explain Nature. In a really democratic society, it is important to praise the knowledge acquired by other alternative approaches.

O presente estudo é resultado de uma pesquisa teórica, de natureza filosófico-educacional em torno da tese da neutralidade da ciência negada explicitamente pelos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais nos volumes que tratam do ensino de Ciências Naturais. O documento reitera insistentemente que o ensino de ciência deve favorecer a reflexão sobre o caráter não-neutro da ciência e suas implicações políticas e sociais, porém não oferece uma definição clara do conceito de neutralidade. Nosso objetivo foi o de identificar os elementos que devem compor uma noção adequada de neutralidade, sendo um dos requisitos o de que a negação da neutralidade da ciência não implique alguma forma de relativismo. Um autor que tem se dedicado a essa questão é Hugh Lacey, cujos trabalhos foram tomados como referencial básico em todas as nossas reflexões. O aspecto fundamental da filosofia da ciência de Lacey é sua abordagem da racionalidade científica em termos de valores (valores cognitivos e valores sociais), não em termos de regras, como acontece na tradição positivista. Ao processo epistemológico de seleção de teorias em termos de compromisso com um conjunto de valores exclusivamente cognitivos, Lacey atribui o atributo da imparcialidade. A defesa da imparcialidade não impede que os valores não-cognitivos (sociais) tenham também um papel essencial na prática científica. A presença de valores sociais no interior da ciência pode dar-se no nível das escolhas tecnológicas concretas – neutralidade aplicada –, e num nível mais abstrato denominado por Lacey de nível das estratégias – neutralidade cognitiva. Em última análise, é a estratégia que vai restringir os tipos de teorias que podem ser desenvolvidas e investigadas pela ciência moderna que, por conseguinte, carece de neutralidade cognitiva. Tal ciência é ensinada nas escolas como modelo único e fechado de racionalidade científica. Nossa conclusão é que uma maneira de se trabalhar o tema da neutralidade de forma construtiva é apresentá-la indiretamente aos alunos, ou seja, mostrando e discutindo outros possíveis sistemas explicativos da natureza. Numa sociedade realmente democrática, é importante que se valorizem os conhecimentos adquiridos por meio de abordagens alternativas. / This present study is the result from a theoric research, of philosophical and educational nature, around the thesis of science’s neutrality explicitly denied by the National Curriculum Parameters, on the books regarding the Natural Sciences teaching. The document says insistently that the teaching of science must aid the reflection about the non-neutral character of science and its political and social implications, however it does not offer a clear position of the concept of neutrality. Our goal was identify the elements that must be part of a proper notion of neutrality, being one of the requested items that the denial of science’s neutrality does not imply any shape of relativism. One author that has been dedicating himself to this question is Hugh Lacey, whose works have been taken as basic references at all our reflections. The fundamental aspect of Lacey’s science’s philosophy is his approach of science’s rationality on values’ terms (cognitive values and social values), not in terms of rules, as it happens at the positivist tradition. To the epistemological process of selection of theories in terms with compromise of a key of exclusively cognitive values, Lacey sets the attribution of impartiality. The defense of impartiality does not stop the non-cognitive values (social) from having an essential role at the scientific practice. The presence of social values at science’s core can happen at the technological choices’ level – applied neutrality – and, in a more abstract way, named by Lacey ‘strategy level’ – cognitive neutrality. In the end, it is the strategy that will restrict the kind of theories that can be developed and investigated by modern science that, as a consequence, lacks cognitive neutrality. Such science is taught in schools as a single model, away from scientific rationality. Our conclusion is that a way to work with the theme of neutrality in a constructive way is to present it indirectly to the students, that is, showing and discussing other possible systems that explain Nature. In a really democratic society, it is important to praise the knowledge acquired by other alternative approaches.

A liberdade religiosa é o direito fundamental que tutela a crença, o culto e as demais atividades religiosas, dos indivíduos e das organizações religiosas, e consagra neutralidade estatal. A religião deve ser entendida em termos amplíssimos. Abrange toda atividade ligada ao sobrenatural. A religião não se confunde com ideologia, filosofia, sociologia. O Estado neutro não pode se posicionar a respeito do acerto ou desacerto de uma determinada crença religiosa. No entanto, pode controlar a sinceridade. Há três aspectos: individual (indivíduos), coletivo (organizações religiosas) e institucional (Estado). Em relação aos indivíduos, destacam-se o direito de isonomia (tratamento diferenciado), de crença e de privacidade religiosa. Em relação às organizações religiosas, destacam-se seus aspectos societários, cíveis, trabalhistas e tributários; a liberdade de culto e de proselitismo. Em seu aspecto institucional, a neutralidade impõe que o Estado não tome partido em favor de nenhuma religião; reconhece um valor positivo geral à religião. Temas analisados: direito penal; abuso de direito; transfusão de sangue; tratamento de saúde diferenciado; sacrifícios de animais; curas espirituais; proselitismo, pregação contrária ao homossexualismo e a crenças afro-brasileiras; rádios comunitárias; desconto e pagamento de dízimos e ofertas; direito urbanístico e de vizinhança; uso de símbolos religiosos por particulares e pelo Estado; ensino e casamento religiosos, entre outros. / Religious freedom is a fundamental right that protects beliefs, worship and other religious activities from individuals and religious organizations and ensures state neutrality. Religion ought to be widely comprehended. It comprehends all sorts of activities related to the supernatural. Religion should not be confused with ideology, philosophy and sociology. A neutral state must not take a stand about the strengths or weaknesses of a certain religious belief. Nonetheless, it can control sincerity. Religious freedom has three aspects: an individual one (regarding individuals), a collective one (regarding religious organizations) and an institutional one (regarding the state). In terms of individuals, the right to isonomy (equal treatment), religious belief and privacy is to be pointed out. In terms of religious organizations, social, civil, tributary and labor aspects are to be pointed out as well as freedom of worship and proselytism. As for the institutional aspect of religious freedom, the neutrality principle prevents the state from taking any stand concerning any religion and generally recognizes religion as something positive. Topics discussed: penal law; abuse of rights; blood transfusion; privileged health treatment; animal sacrifice; spiritual healing; proselytism; preaching against homosexuality and African Brazilian beliefs; community radio stations; withholding tithes and offerings; urban and neighborhood law; use of religious symbols by individuals and the state; religious teaching and weddings, etc.

A teoria da identidade mente-cérebro, que foi desenvolvida no início da segunda metade do século XX, especialmente por filósofos que trabalhavam em universidades australianas, como J. J. C. Smart e U. T. Place, os chamados materialistas australianos, sofreu grande impacto de uma teoria que foi desenvolvida logo após, o funcionalismo. A presente dissertação pretende mostrar que não há uma divisão rigorosa entre as duas teorias e que desenvolvimentos da teoria da identidade feitos por David Armstrong e David Lewis, posteriormente considerados como formas de funcionalismo, foram implicações naturais da teoria da identidade. / The mind-brain identity theory, developed in the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, especially by philosophers working in Australian universities, such as J. J. C. Smart and U. T. Place, the so called Australian materialists, suffered a large impact from a theory developed soon after, functionalism. This thesis intends to show that there is not a rigorous division between the two theories, and that the developments done in the identity theory by David Armstrong and David Lewis, later considered as types of functionalism, were natural implications from the identity theory.

A teoria da identidade mente-cérebro, que foi desenvolvida no início da segunda metade do século XX, especialmente por filósofos que trabalhavam em universidades australianas, como J. J. C. Smart e U. T. Place, os chamados materialistas australianos, sofreu grande impacto de uma teoria que foi desenvolvida logo após, o funcionalismo. A presente dissertação pretende mostrar que não há uma divisão rigorosa entre as duas teorias e que desenvolvimentos da teoria da identidade feitos por David Armstrong e David Lewis, posteriormente considerados como formas de funcionalismo, foram implicações naturais da teoria da identidade. / The mind-brain identity theory, developed in the beginning of the second half of the 20th century, especially by philosophers working in Australian universities, such as J. J. C. Smart and U. T. Place, the so called Australian materialists, suffered a large impact from a theory developed soon after, functionalism. This thesis intends to show that there is not a rigorous division between the two theories, and that the developments done in the identity theory by David Armstrong and David Lewis, later considered as types of functionalism, were natural implications from the identity theory.

<p>Sverige befann sig i en tid där andra världskriget fortfarande var i färskt minne. Geografiskt ligger landet centralt placerad mellan två supermakter, och det råder en spänd stämning i det internationella säkerhetspolitiska läget. Det svenska luftrummet har en stor strategisk betydelse i en internationell kontext. Med förtroendeskapande löften om alliansfrihet och ett avskräckande initiativ i form en av världens starkaste flygvapen försöker Sverige hålla sig utanför eventuella väpnade konflikter. Alliansfrihet syftande till neutralitet i krig är den officiella säkerhetspolitiska ställning Sverige har haft i nästan 200 år, och inte minst under två världskrig. Detta arv försökte Sveriges politiker föra vidare för att skona svenska liv. Paradoxalt nog har Sverige som suveränt land gjort analysen att förstärkningar måste tillföras utifrån ifall landet blir invaderad av en motståndare. Det uppstår ett dilemma mellan att bibehålla alliansfrihet och ett beroende av väst. Denna uppsats är en komparativ litteraturstudie som tar sin utgångspunkt i en statlig utredning och oberoende forskare för att skapa ett underlag för att belysa den balansgång mellan alliansfrihet och de västorienterade flygoperativa förberedelserna. Uppsatsens frågeställningar är; Vad finns det för likheter och skillnader mellan forskarna och SOU 1994:11 i fråga om synsätt och slutsatser? Hur kan man uppfatta och tolka gränsområdet mellan flygoperativa förberedelser och alliansfrihet? Med hjälp av de teoretiska modellerna ”avskräckning och förtroendeskapande” samt ”integration och avskärmning” åskådliggörs den balansgång som Sverige använde sig av för att hålla vårt land utanför krig och väpnade konflikter.</p> / <p>Sweden found itself in an era when World War II was still fresh in memory. Geographically the country is centrally located between two superpowers, and there is a tense atmosphere in the international community. The Swedish air space has a high strategic importance. By using Neutrality and one of the world's strongest air force Sweden is trying to stay out of armed conflicts. To be neutral has been Sweden official political statement for almost 200 years, not least during two world wars. At the same time Sweden has made the analysis that reinforcements has to be acquired if the country finds itself being invaded. Sweden struggle with the dilemma between maintaining neutrality and a dependence on the West. This paper is a comparative literature study based on a government inquiry and independent researchers. This paper aims to illustrate how the gray area in this very complex security dilemma can be interpreted. The main questions are these: What are the similarities and differences between scientists and SOU 1994:11 in terms of their approach and conclusions? How can one understand and interpret the border area between the flight preparation and non-alignment? With the help of the theoretical models "deterrence and confidence-building measurements" and "integration and independent" this papers illustrates the balancing act that Sweden had to accomplish in order to stay out of conflicts in the Cold War.</p>

The subject matter of the thesis is new as the phenomenon of the Box Corporation has not been the subject of a specialized investigation from the fiscal perspective before. A foreign subsidiary indirectly owned in a third country jurisdiction is in the thesis classified as a Box Corporation. The subject of the thesis is primarily to analyze and establish the following connections: the intended corporate objectives and ends and the modus operandi and the means that often require the Box Corporation as a necessary vehicle to attain those ends. The close connections between corporate law and tax law as intended legal results interdependent on one another. The application of the Box Corporation as an important vehicle for international tax planning by Swedish corporate groups on ever increasing competitive international markets and the special tax problems connected to the Box Corporation as it presents serious challenges to the pursuits for a consistent, neutral and undistorted Swedish corporate tax system. The thesis also investigates legislative and regulatory public reactions to the Box Corporation in the ways of CFC tax provisions, of denying tax treaty privileges by Limitation of Benefits clauses and of increasing domestic requirements on reportable transactions and international exchange of information and co-operation.

Should a liberal state meet claims for accommodation of cultural difference with a liberal multicultural approach that grants cultural rights to minorities? The present thesis tries to answer this question by investigating if a liberal state may adopt a multicultural approach and still remain liberal. The purpose of the thesis, more specifically, is to study whether the accommodation of multiculturalism through cultural rights can be based on liberal values or not. The inquiry focuses on three influential liberal multicultural approaches which claim that cultural rights are congruent with equality, toleration and autonomy respectively. The coherence of these models is, however, questioned in the thesis. These models may neither be claimed to promote liberal values in a coherent and unambiguous way, nor be described as the adequate response to the type of burden of assimilation that members of minority cultures experience in liberal states. The main conclusion of the study is that liberal multiculturalism does not follow consistently from liberal premises and that the possibility of a normative conjunction between multiculturalism and liberalism therefore should be characterized as an open question in political theory. From liberal premises, a liberal neutralist model of integration based on anti-discrimination and equality of opportunity, in fact, still seems to be the most promising basis for a multicultural policy. It is argued in the thesis that this model can be developed if combined with a liberal scheme for deliberation on multicultural issues based on the principle of equality of opportunity.