Structural Violence and Great Power Competition: The Effects of Sino-U.S. Geopolitical Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific Abstract This paper examines the effects of the ongoing strategic rivalry between China and the United States for influence over the Indo-Pacific in order to demonstrate the negative impacts upon structural violence within the region. Using an amalgamation from various authors, this paper establishes a definition and set of criteria for the presence of structural violence which are then applied to the cases of Vietnam, Myanmar, and Japan. By correlating the mechanisms with which China and the United States garner influence with the specific consequences for the prevalence and severity of structural violence, this paper illustrates that the ongoing geopolitical rivalry poses considerable threats to all Indo-Pacific nations regardless of their development status or social, political, economic, and geographic characteristics. Results indicate that the extent of each country's structural violence was directly or indirectly affected by the presence of foreign involvement, and that different levels of alignment or independence can serve to reduce or exacerbate these effects. Furthermore, evidence indicated that China's methods pose a more immediate threat to induvial countries, but that the United...

The aim of this thesis is to answer the question of why rebel groups engage in conflict with each other despite sharing an identity. Previous research suggests that a shared identity should promote cooperation, but recent conflicts between rebel groups in Syria seem to suggest that shared identity can instead be a cause for rivalry. This thesis investigates this puzzle by using Pischedda’s theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability and Hafez theory on proxidistant ideologies. The cases of the thesis are the conflicts between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 and between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017. The results indicate that shared identity does cause rivalry, and both theories receive support for their explanation of inter-rebel conflict. All three rebel groups are labeled as extremists, which supports Hafez theory that extremist groups are more likely to engage in conflict with rivals. The military strength and the possible costs of attack of the rebel groups seem to support Pischedda’s theory that rebel groups use specific windows in time to attack their rivals. There are however some problems that neither theory can explain, such as Ahrar Al-Shams friendly relationship to Al Nusra between 2014 and 2017. This thesis provide insight into the understudied field of inter-rebel conflict of War Studies by highlighting the importance of identity.

This diploma thesis deals with the relationship between two regional powers in the Middle East - Iran and Saudi Arabia. Middle East is a conflict-prone region with a delicate balance of power. We work with the assumption that a specific combination of internal and external factors caused the rise of Iran as a regional power. The balance of power in the Middle East has thus changed and Iran has started to pose a threat to Saudi Arabia that needs to be balanced. First, we analyze the theoretical concepts of power and region in international relations and subsequently we propose a definition of a regional power. The theory of balance of threat by Stephen M. Walt is used as a framework for the analysis of the Iranian threat. Last chapter of this thesis is devoted to three case studies. Here, we analytically describe particular examples of Iranian threat and its balancing by Saudi Arabia in Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon.

This study examines through an equality lens, the lived experiences of nine female leaders in the male-dominated film industry in Sweden. The aim was to explore how women perceived equality in their workplace, their perception of the issue, and the coping strategies used by these women. In-depth interviews were done through a qualitative phenomenological approach. The theoretical framework used in this thesis is gendered organizations by Acker (2012), a social psychological perspective of gender gaps by Garcia and Hanek (2022), and how women can contribute to inequality by Parks-Stamm et al. (2008). I found themes influenced by a gendered industry, including masculine stereotypes and norms that affect employee behavior, and unintentionally contribute to organizational inequality.  My findings illustrate career obstacles for female leaders, in contrast to males who for instance, benefit from brotherhood, and loose requirements such as social skills. To succeed, women must work hard, act suitably, educate- and convince themselves, and use creative tactics for approval. I highlight strategies such as the competitive strategy to become “one of the boys”, and the chameleon strategy by adapting like a stereotypical female or male by mindset, male behaviors, or using male outfits. And specialization strategy, to ally with other women. Strategies were used to get access to particular environments and reach different goals. Two women didn’t experience gender discrimination, and the issue of equality was perceived in various ways. Collaborating with men had mutual benefits, as male mentors were well-intentioned, and male dominance didn’t exclusively drive inequality. My research also revealed contradictions in female rivalry showing disloyalty, abusive, unfavorable, and competitive behaviors rooted in self-protection and limited opportunities. However, the study illuminates the challenges and strategies of female leaders in a male-dominated industry. The women are creative, brave, and inspiring for other women by navigating against all odds in a profession they love.

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Educational Studies / M. Ed.

Le Catholicisme et l’Islam, les deux plus grandes religions du monde numériquement, connaissent des rapports oscillants entre dialogue et rivalités. Ces deux derniers se manifestent à travers une variété d’actions, nationales et internationales, ainsi que par des écrits et des déclarations. Du côté catholique, ce dynamisme est promu en particulier par la pensée du Pape Benoit XVI à l’égard du dialogue avec la religion musulmane, qui est centrée sur le respect des libertés religieuses loin de la violence, ainsi que la préservation de l’identité. Du côté musulman, il existe plusieurs acteurs soucieux de présenter une image paisible de leur religion. Leurs efforts prennent différentes formes de dialogue, dont certaines s’opèrent dans un contexte étatique où le politique prime sur le religieux, à l’image des démarches des royaumes saoudien et jordanien. À ces activités de nature plus étatique, s’ajoutent des activités académiques et théologiques d’intellectuels et de religieux musulmans, tels que le professeur sunnite tunisien Mohammed Talbi et l’Imam chiite libanais Muhammad Hussein Fadlullah. Ils soulèvent les mêmes craintes identitaires et prônent les mêmes revendications de liberté et de dialogue que le Pape Benoit XVI, à partir de leurs perspectives musulmanes. L’entente cordiale entre l’Islam et le Catholicisme est donc mêlée à des controverses et des points conflictuels qui soumettent le dialogue à des enjeux religieux, historiques et politiques propres au contexte de ses tenants. À travers toute cette subtilité et ces complications, le dialogue reste toujours un objectifde chacun des protagonistes. / Catholicism and Islam, the two largest religions numerically on earth, are known to entertain relations that oscillate between dialogue and rivalry. These are reflected in a variety of activities, statements and writings, at both national and international levels. On the Catholic side, this dynamic relationship is promoted in particular by Pope Benedict XVI who believes that religious freedom is one of the main issues in the dialogue with Muslims, alongside with safeguarding a Christian identity that is rooted in peaceful behavior. On the Muslim side, there are several actors striving to present a peaceful image of their religion. Their efforts take different forms of dialogue, some of which include specific state actors where politics dominates over religion, such as the case of the two kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In addition to these more state related activities, there are others of a more academic and theological nature, as those of the Tunisian Sunni professor Mohammed Talbi and the Lebanese Shiite Imam Muhammad Hussein Fadlullah. Both raise the same fears of identity and advocate the same claims for freedom and dialogue than does Pope Benedict XVI, from their own Muslim perspectives. The friendly relations between Islam and Catholicism are mixed with conflicts and controversies that influence the dialogue in terms of religious, historical, and politica l challenges unique to the context of each practitioner. Throughout these subtleties and complications, the dialogue remains a major objective for each one of the protagonists.

Thèse réalisée en cotutelle avec l'Institut supérieur de philosophie, Université catholique de Louvain. / L’argument de cette thèse est le suivant : dans la rivalité, un agent peut tenter de satisfaire ses préférences aux dépens de celles des autres si cela permet de produire des bénéfices sociaux impossibles à produire autrement (et si ces comportements ne causent pas des torts trop grands). Développer cet argument équivaut à développer une éthique adversative, c’est-à-dire une formulation de la moralité dans des contextes comme une compétition sportive ou un procès. Cette éthique sera développée et appliquée aux comportements des agents économiques dans les marchés économiques. On répondra à deux questions. La première question porte sur le design de nos institutions sociales. On peut façonner une institution en ayant recours à un schème adversatif, c’est-à-dire un pattern d’interactions sociales remplissant sa fonction par une dynamique de rivalité. Quand est-il désirable d’avoir recours à ce type de schème? Il est désirable si le rapport entre sa fonctionnalité et ses torts est 1) acceptable et 2) comparativement préférable aux autres schèmes. Ces deux conditions forment un test (développé dans le premier chapitre). Le marché réussit ce test (deuxième chapitre). Dans un schème adversatif, on doit avoir la permission de se comporter de manière adversative. Mais cette permission ne s’applique pas à l’extérieur du schème ou à l’intérieur de schèmes non adversatifs incorporés (comme une entreprise dans un marché ou une équipe dans une compétition sportive). Superposées l’une à l’autre, ces deux limites créent une division tripartite ou une tripartition de la moralité applicable à un agent économique. Cette tripartition permet d’éviter certains problèmes du modèle de la primauté des actionnaires et de la théorie des parties prenantes (troisième chapitre). La deuxième question porte sur la moralité à l’échelle individuelle. Comment doit-on se comporter dans un schème adversatif? Il faut incarner l’idéal de la rivalité bénéfique, ce qui implique 1) de contenir ses comportements adversatifs à l’intérieur du schème, 2) d’en respecter les règles et 3) d’adopter des comportements permettant au schème de réussir le test (quatrième chapitre). Cet idéal évite certains problèmes avec l’idéal de la saine concurrence de Joseph Heath et l’idéal de la concurrence positive de Lynn Sharp Paine (cinquième chapitre). / The argument of my thesis can be summarised as follows: in the context of rivalry, an agent may attempt to satisfy his or her preferences at the expense of other agents’ preferences if this generates social benefits that could not be generated otherwise (without producing too much harm). This argument leads to an adversarial ethics, that is, a description of our moral obligations in contexts like a sport competition or a trial. This ethics will be developed and applied to the behavior of economic agents in the market. I will address two main questions. The first question focuses on the design of our social institutions. An adversarial scheme is a pattern of social interactions that fulfills its function through a dynamic of rivalry. Parts of our institutions can be modeled as adversarial schemes. When is it desirable to use these schemes? It is desirable if the balance between the scheme’s functionality and harms is 1) acceptable and 2) preferable by comparison with other schemes. These two conditions yield a test. The test is developed in the first chapter. The second chapter argues that the market passes this test. An agent must be allowed to adopt adversarial behaviors in an adversarial scheme. But this permission does not apply to his or her behavior outside the scheme or inside non-adversarial incorporated schemes (like a firm in the market or a team in sport competitions). These two criteria, once combined, yield a threefold distinction or a tripartition of the moral obligation of economic agents, which solves some of the problems with the shareholder primacy view and the stakeholder theory. The tripartition and its implications are presented in the third chapter. The second question focuses on our moral obligations at the personal level. How ought we to behave in an adversarial scheme? In the fourth chapter, I argue that we ought to adopt the ideal of beneficial rivalry, which implies that we ought to: 1) contain our adversarial behaviors inside the scheme, 2) respect the scheme’s rules and 3) adopt a behavior that will allow the scheme to pass the desirability test (developed in the first chapter). The fifth chapter argues that this ideal avoids some of the problems with Joseph Heath’s ideal of healthy competition and Lynn Sharp Paine’s ideal of positive competition.

Ce mémoire vise la compréhension du mécanisme des choix stratégiques de l’Inde en fonction de la menace perçue de la Chine. Selon une logique réaliste néoclassique, l’étude de l’effet des contraintes systémiques et domestiques présente un paradoxe dans les volontés stratégiques indiennes. L’Inde est soumise à la pression systémique de la montée de la Chine dans un monde post-Guerre froide qui la verrouille dans sa position traditionnellement défensive, alors que sa volonté de projection de la puissance guidée par sa perception, ses idées et sa culture stratégique la porte à adopter une position plus offensive. L’Inde perçoit la menace chinoise de manière dissonante avec l’orientation stratégique chinoi-se. Elle se concentre ainsi sur des signaux et des indices particuliers afin de justifier cette me-nace perçue. C’est pourquoi l’ambiguïté du langage diplomatique de la Chine envers l’Arunachal Pradesh et de sa présence dans l’océan Indien engendre un accroissement de la menace chinoise et une réponse plus agressive conséquemment. La réponse stratégique in-dienne doit s’adapter aux changements de la puissance relative de la Chine. N’ayant pas les capacités relatives suffisantes, l’Inde choisit une stratégie située entre une émulation dans une logique de poursuite aux armements afin de maintenir la parité technologique et un engage-ment afin de désamorcer la rivalité et éviter une réaction chinoise pré-emptive. La culture stratégique de l’Inde traditionnellement défensive se transforme vers une position offensive sous l’effet du nation building du nationalisme hindou. Les préférences stratégiques indiennes agressives s’illustrent principalement dans le choc multidirectionnel des sphères d’influence sino-indiennes en Asie. / This thesis seeks to understand the process of India strategic choice based on the perceived threat of China. According to a neoclassical realism framework, the study of the effect of sys-temic and domestic constraints shows a paradox in India strategic intentions. India is lock in a defensive posture by the systemic pressure of China rise in a post-Cold War era, although its desire to project his power lead by its perception, ideas, and strategic culture shows a progres-sive shift for an offensive posture. India perceives China threat in dissonance with the strategic aims of China. It is focusing on specific signals and indices in order to justify the perceived threat. This is why China’s ambi-guity toward its diplomatic discourse concerning Arunachal Pradesh and its presence in the Indian Ocean creates an increase Chinese threat and therefore a more aggressive response. India’s strategic response must cope with the changes in China’s relative power. Without the necessary relative capacity, India chooses a strategy between emulation defined by a pursuit of armaments logic in order to keep the technologic parity and engagement for the purpose of defusing the rivalry and avoiding a pre-emptive reaction from China. Traditionally defensive India’s strategic culture progressively transforms itself under the influence of the Hindu na-tion building that clash with the nehruvian nationalism. The aggressive Indian strategic pref-erences principally show themselves in the multidirectional clash of India and China spheres of influence in Asia.

A une date mal fixée au cours des années 380, mais généralement placée en 387, l’empereur Théodose, princeps depuis 379, abandonne officiellement les quatre cinquième de l’Arménie aux Perses sassanides. C’est un acte sans précédent : depuis plus de quatre siècles, la plupart de ses prédécesseurs avaient tout mis en œuvre pour maintenir le royaume caucasien dans la sphère d’influence romaine ou, à défaut, neutre face à un Etat iranien menaçant ou jugé comme tel. Dorénavant, la présence de l’Empire y est limitée à une bande de terre étroite située le long de ses frontières orientales et qui s’étend, du nord au sud, de l’extrémité orientale du Pont (Pontus en anglais) à la pointe septentrionale de la Syrie. Le cœur du pays et ses régions les plus importantes d’un point de vue historique et stratégique sont aux mains du grand rival oriental. Comment expliquer ce quasi retrait romain qui établit une situation qui perdurera jusqu’au début du 6ème siècle, une longueur inédite pour un accord entre les deux parties ? L’objectif de notre étude est de répondre à cette interrogation, en distinguant notamment les prémices de cette politique de repli à partir de la seconde moitié du 4ème siècle. / At an uncertain date in the 380's A.D. yet generally set in 387, Emperor Theodose, princeps since 379, officially abandons four fifths of Armenia to the benefit of the Sassanide Persian people. This had never happened before since for over four centuries, most his predecessors had managed to maintain the Caucasian kingdom into the Roman sphere of influence , or even to keep it neutral to a threatening -or considered as such - Iranian state. Now the presence of the Empire is limited to a narrow strip of land located along its oriental borders that stretches over from the eastern end of the Pontus to the northern end of Syria. The heart of the land and its most important regions from a historical and strategical point of view belong to the great opponent from the east. How can we explain this Roman quasi-withdrawal which lead to a situation that will last to the beginning of the 6th century – a period of time for an agreement between the two parties that had never been seen before in history ?Our study aims at answering this question, by identifying more particularly the beginnings of such a withdrawal policy from the second half of the 4th century.