Le néolibéralisme, un terme qui désigne couramment la raison d’état contemporaine, est largement associé à un désinvestissement de l’État pour la cause sociale ainsi qu’à un discours de légitimation des disparités socio-économiques. Il s’agit, pour plusieurs, d’une idéologie qui ne considère pas la justice comme un idéal collectif à poursuivre. Un retour sur certains penseurs à qui l’on attribue la formulation des idées néolibérales permet toutefois de constater que la justice fut, au sein de leurs travaux, l’un des thèmes majeurs. L’objectif général de ce mémoire est donc de présenter la conception de la justice chez deux penseurs du néolibéralisme : le journaliste américain Walter Lippmann et l’économiste autrichien Friedrich A. von Hayek. Cette perspective comparée me permettra d’identifier ce que je nomme la «conception néolibérale» de la justice, conception qui s’articule à partir d’une compréhension singulière du marché. Dans le premier chapitre, je présente le problème central de la conception néolibérale de la justice, en abordant la posture épistémologique privilégiée par Hayek et Lippmann. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je présente certaines modalités de cette conception et soulève ses principales apories. Je soutiens aussi qu’une rupture survient entre Hayek et Lippmann autour de la notion de «responsabilité». Finalement, je compare la conception néolibérale de la justice avec la conception libertarienne présentée par Nozick. C’est à partir des critères de justice respectifs de chaque théorie que j’avance la distinction, au troisième chapitre, entre les deux conceptions pourtant similaires. Contrairement à une analyse courante qui fait du néolibéralisme un projet amoral, je soutiens que la reconnaissance de la dimension morale du discours néolibéral ouvre une fenêtre à partir de laquelle il devient possible de critiquer le projet sur des bases éthiques. C’est en identifiant la notion de justice à l’oeuvre dans le discours néolibéral contemporain et en l’inscrivant dans la tradition morale présentée dans le cadre de ce mémoire que nous sommes mieux à même de comprendre l’idéologie du néolibéralisme. / Neoliberalism, a term commonly used to describe the current paradigm of the state, is largely related to a disengagement of the state from issues of social welfare and is associated with the legitimization of socio-economic inequalities. For many critics, it also represents an ideology that does not consider justice as a collective ideal that should be pursued. This stands in contradiction with the fact that justice was a central theme in the works of many thinkers to whom we attribute the formulation of neoliberal thought. Considering this paradox, the main purpose of this Master’s thesis is to expose the conception of justice as expressed by two key neoliberal thinkers: the American journalist Walter Lippmann and the Austrian economist Friedrich A. von Hayek. This comparative perspective will allow me to single out what I call the "neoliberal conception" of justice, a conception that builds on a particular understanding of the market. In the first chapter, I present the central challenge of the neoliberal conception of justice by broaching the epistemological stance common to Hayek and Lippmann. In the second chapter, I present specific properties of this conception and discuss its principal blind spots. I also show that Hayek and Lippmann disagree when it comes to the notion of "responsibility". Finally, I compare the neoliberal conception of justice with that of libertarians, as presented by Robert Nozick in his work Anarchy, State and Utopia. In this third section, I argue that Hayek and Nozick’s respective criteria of justice drive a wedge between two otherwise rather similar conceptions. In contrast to a standard analysis that treats neoliberalism as an amoral project, I contend that recognition of the moral dimension of neoliberal discourse opens up a perspective from which it becomes possible to challenge the project on ethical grounds. Understanding the idea of justice underpinning contemporary neoliberalism, as rooted in the moral tradition presented in this essay, is necessary if we are to criticize this ideology on moral grounds.

What happens to social democracy when the working class declines? The aim of this study is to examine ideological changes in The Swedish Social Democratic Party, in particular the party’s ideological changes regarding liberty. The material consists of 300 government bills equally divided over the parliamentary sessions of 1974, 1990/91 and 2005/06, in all of which The Social Democratic Party held office. Using the theoretical framework Two Concepts of Liberty, I found that an increasingly amount of bills draws on the idea of negative freedom. However, the result also shows that bills that draws on negative freedom subsequently decreases in favour of bills that draws on positive freedom, suggesting that the ideological changes regarding liberty in The Swedish Social Democracy Party are nonlinear rather than moving straightforward.

This work deals with the different concepts of justice that are presented by works of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Seeing that they are liberal authors, the first chapter is devoted to liberalism and its forms. Rawls is presented as a supporter of modern liberalism and Nozick is presented as a representative of classical liberalism, concretely libertarianism. The second chapter discusses how both authors describe natural state. The third chapter is devoted to it how Rawls and Nozick talk about conception of liberty. The following chapter describes and compares their theories of justice: justice as fairness and justice as entitlement. The fifth chapter deals with the final reflection on the theories of both authors. There are presented various reactions and interpretations of the mentioned theories. At the same time, there is shown considerable asset of Rawls?s Theory of Justice and Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia which both influenced political-philosophical discussion.

Ce mémoire a pour but de miner le projet libertarien d'une défense de la structure de la propriété libérale basée sur le principe de propriété de soi. Loin de nier le concept de propriété de soi, nous adoptons le principe associé à la pensée libertarienne et démontrons que l'adoption d'un tel principe nous mène à la restructuration du concept de propriété vers un concept qui est cohérent avec les valeurs égalitaristes et démocratiques. Nous espérons, ceci faisant, pouvoir montrer l'incohérence du projet libertarien, et fournir les outils nécessaires afin que les égalitaristes puissent défendre leurs idées en terrain libertarien. / The purpose of this thesis is to try and undermine the libertarian project of defending the liberal structure of ownership through its use of the principle of self-ownership. Far from denying the concept of self-ownership, we adopt the principle associated with libertarian thought and show that the adoption of such a principle leads us to a restructuring of the concept of ownership towards one that is coherent with egalitarian and democratic values. We hope that, by doing so, we are able to show the incoherence within libertarianism and give the tools necessary for egalitarians to defend their ideas on libertarian grounds.

One of the central questions in political theory deals with the nature of rights. What sorts of rights do people possess? How are these rights justified? How ought these rights be reflected and related when seen in political, economic, and social institutions? Following the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), rights have once again returned to dominate much of contemporary political theory. However, natural law, which was the historical basis of the early Enlightenment theories of rights, is no longer the primary system appealed to when discussing rights. In fact, classical natural law has been all but discarded in most of political theory today. There has also been renewed debate over the nature of public neutrality, and what the relationship ought to be between the public and private sphere. The mainstream view of how our liberties relate to our rights, as well as what kinds of rights we have over our private affairs, has come under fire from a newly emerging political philosophy known as communitarianism. This thesis will present a robust theory of rights that provides a new understanding of the relationship between positive and negative rights through a defense of classical natural law as an ethical foundation for political theory. It will side with the communitarian critics of public neutrality, and offer a practical method of determining when the state is justified in limiting private liberties due to public interest.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: On The io" of May 1994 Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected black president of South Africa. The occasion was regarded, both nationally and internationally, as a triumph for humanity and perfused with a widespread optimism for the future of South Africa. Mandela proclaimed in his inaugural speech that "Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will experience oppression of one by another .... The sun shall never set on so glorious an achievement." However, now, less than 10 years later the rapidly accelerating and devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic is again 'obscuring the sun'. Those people affected so negatively by the racial, economic and gender injustices of the apartheid past, seem again to be suffering a possible injustice, because of a health and welfare system that is struggling to meet the needs of the HIV affected population. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the concept of distributive justice in South Africa, within the context of this devastating epidemic. I begin by discussing the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. I argue that an acceptable framework for a theory of justice for health care in South Africa, must be worked out against the background of this egalitarian Bill of Rights. I then consider the extent of the HIV epidemic, the effect it is having on the people of South Africa and the consequent implications for health care needs. It is within this context that I examine and compare three theories of distributive justice, namely utilitarianism, John Rawls' theory of "Justice as Fairness" and a libertarian concept of justice, as proposed by Robert Nozick. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory that focuses on producing the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number'. I argue that many health policy decisions in South Africa are in fact guided by this principle. However utilitarianism has both strengths and weaknesses which are critically examined. Within the framework of health care policy making, utilitarian justice dictates that rights are derivative and that the welfare of the majority usually takes precedence over the pressing needs of a minority. This issue in particular is discussed. Rawls' theory of "Justice as fairness" is critically discussed next. This theory has been adapted to health care by Norman Daniels, who argues that the Rawlsian principle of "fair equality of opportunity" is a suitable founding principle for health care institutions. Apartheid entrenched a system of 'inequality of opportunity'. Consequently, a theory that focuses on equality of opportunity, has many advantages within the South African context. I examine this theory in detail and provide justification for my assertion that it could be usefully adapted to South African healthcare and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Finally, I discuss a Libertarian (Nozickian) theory of justice and examine both the strengths and weaknesses of this theory. I attempt to demonstrate why a libertarian system, with it vigorous commitment to moral and economic individualism and belief that one is only entitled to that share of healthcare that can be paid for, would be unjust, if rigorously applied within the post-apartheid South African context. I conclude my dissertation by reiterating my assertion that "Justice as Fair Equality of Opportunity" could be used as a just foundation for a theory of justice for health care in current day, HIV/AIDS affected South Africa. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Teorieë van geregtigheid en 'n gesondheidsbeleid vir die VIGS epidemie in Suid Afrika: 'n vergelykende ontleding. Op die 10de Mei 1994 is Nelson Mandela ingehuldig as die eerste demokraties verkose swart president van Suid- Afrika. Die geleentheid is in beide Suid-Afrika en in die buiteland beskou as 'n oorwinning vir humaniteit. Optimisme oor Suid-Afrika se toekoms was oral tasbaar. Mandela het in sy inhuldigingstoespraak verkondig dat dit nooit weer sal gebeur dat hierdie pragtige land sal lyonder die onderdrukking van een oor die ander nie. Hy het gesê dat die son nooit salondergaan op so 'n wonderlike prestasie nie. Nou, minder as tien jaar later, is die verwoestende VIGS epidemie besig om weer die 'son te laat ondergaan'. Dieselffde mense wat alreeds onder apartheid se rasisme en ekonomiese en geslagsongeregtighede gely het, blyk nou weer verontreg te word; hierde keer omdat die gesondheids- en welsynsisteem sukkel om in die behoeftes van die VIGS-geaffekteerde populasie te voorsien. Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om die konsep van distributiewe geregtigheid in die konteks van die dreigende VIGS epidemie te bespreek. Ek begin met 'n bespreking van die Verklaring van Regte soos vervat in die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet. Ek voer aan dat enige aanvaarbare teorie oor geregtigheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse gesondheidsisteem gegrond moet word op hierdie egalitêre Verklaring van Regte. Tweedens kyk ek na die omvang van die VIGS epidemie, die effek wat dit op die HIV-positiewe populasie en hulle familielede het, en die gevolglike implikasies vir gesondheidsbehoeftes. Dit is binne hierdie konteks dat ek drie teorieë van distributiewe geregtigheid ondersoek en vergelyk; naamlik utilitarisme, John Rawls se teorie van "Justice as Fairness", en 'n libertynse konsep van geregtigheid soos voorgestel deur Robert Nozick. Utilitarisme is 'n konsekwensialistise teorie wat beteken dat die regte daad die een is wat in enige situasie die grootste geluk vir die meeste persone sal meebring. Ek voer aan dat baie van die beleidsrigtings wat 'n gesondheidsorg in Suid-Afrika gevolg is, deur hierdie teorie beïnvloed is. Utilitarisme het uiteraard sterk en swak punte en beide kante word krities ondersoek. In 'n gesondheidsorg konteks beteken utilitarisme dat regte altyd afgelei is en dat die welsyn van die meerderheid gewoonlik belangriker is as die van 'n minderheid, selfs wanneer die probleme van die minderheid ernstig en dringend is. Rawls se teorie van geregtigheid word vervolgens krities bespreek. Hierdie teorie is deur Norman Daniels aangepas vir gesondheidsorg. Hy stel voor dat Rawls se beginsel van 'regverdige gelykheid van geleentheid' baie effektief aangepas kan word vir gesondheidsorginstellings. Apartheid het 'n sisteem van ongelyke geleentheids verskans; gevolglik hou 'n teorie wat gelykheid van geleentheid verseker baie voordele vir die Suid- Afrikanse situasie in. Ek bespreek hierdie teorie in detail en poog om my standpunt dat die teorie besonder geskik is vir Suid-Afrikaanse gesondheidsisteem - veral in die konteks van die VIGS epidemie - te regverdig. Laastens bespreek ek die libertynse teorie van geregtigheid soos voorgestel deur Robert Nozick. Ek probeer aantoon waarom hierdie teorie, wat gebaseer is op morele en ekonomiese individualisme en gevolglik aanvoer dat mense geregtig is op gesondheidsorg alleenlik as hulle daarvoor kan betaal, onregverdig is in die Suid-Afrikaanse post-apartheid konteks. Ek sluit hierdie. verhandeling af deur weer te argumenteerdat Rawls se teorie en die beginsel van 'geregtigheid as gelyke geleentheide' uiters geskik is as 'n grondslag vir gesondheidsorg in Suid-Afrika vandag.

<p>I argue in my dissertation that the Marxist ethical claim against capitalism could be bolstered through: 1) a recognition of the inaccurate human ontology that capitalist theories of entitlement presuppose, 2) a reconceptualization and replacement of that old paradigm of human ontology with a concept that I call “organicism” and 3) a normative argument for why this new paradigm of human ontology necessitates a new political economy and a new way of structuring society. I use the debate between Robert Nozick and G.A. Cohen as a launching point for my case.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In his book, <i>Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality</i>, G.A. Cohen argues that Robert Nozick’s “entitlement theory” is unable to produce the robust sense of freedom that libertarians and capitalist proponents aggrandize. According to Cohen, the reason for this is due to the limitations and consistency errors produced by the libertarian adherence to the “self-ownership principle.” (the moral/natural right that a person is the sole proprietor of their own body and life). Namely, that the pale freedom that the proletariat enjoys within capitalism is inconsistent with the Libertarian’s own standard for freedom. So, Cohen argues for the elimination of the self-ownership principle. My project picks up where Cohen’s leaves off, claiming that the consistency errors don’t lie in entitlement theory’s use of the self-ownership principle (it is important that we don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater). Rather, the errors lie in the principle’s metaphysics - specifically in the ontology of the human being. The self-ownership principle is only faulty because it presupposes an impossible self. I show that entitlement theory heedlessly presupposes the self (or a human ontology) as a “rational, autonomous, individual.” I then deconstruct each of these three features (rationality, autonomy, and individuality) to show that this picture of the human being is not necessarily incorrect, but it is incomplete.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Although we are indeed rational, autonomous, individual creatures, these are only emergent characteristics that merely arise after the organic and socially interconnected aspects of our selves are nurtured. I encompass these latter features of our selves under the heading: “organicism”. So, my contribution is to provide a different ontological foundation of the human being – “organicism” – to replace the Enlightenment grown: “rational, autonomous, individual”. I draw heavily from Karl Marx’s philosophical anthropology, and G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of Geist/Spirit, with a little inspiration from Aristotle and ecological theory to construct “organicism” – a pancorporealist, naturalistic materialism. It is the theory that the human being is, in essence, an organic creature, inseparable from nature, but <i>through </i>the nurturing of these material, organic, symbiotic relationships (with other humans and with the ecosystem) that these “super”-natural capacities of rationality and autonomy arise along with and because of a <i>full</i> self-consciousness.</p> <p><br></p> <p>Finally, I infer the normative implications of this ontology of subjectivity. This organicist conception of the self has transformational effects on our notions of property and the way we structure society. So, I contend that organicist ontology then serves as the foundation for a normative theory of political economy that sees the flourishing or health (broadly speaking) of the organicist human as the primary ethical goal. I speculate on an alternative political economy that can provide the robust sense of freedom that Nozick’s entitlement theory (capitalism) was lacking because it actually produces the <i>conditions</i> necessary for rationality, autonomy and individual freedom.</p>

No description available.

The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level.           The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection.