With this dissertation, firstly, I address the issue of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) so-called ‘immoralism’. When he calls himself an ‘immoralist’ and even ‘the first immoralist’ (EH Destiny 2), he seems to be the first philosopher to consider morality as something negative, something we had better got rid of. Yet, he favours ‘noble morality’ and ‘higher moralities’ which he insists ought to be possible (BGE 202). I shall interpret Nietzsche’s explicit claim of ‘immoralism’ and his ‘campaign against morality’ as a rejection of a particular kind of morality ¾ Christian morality ‘that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself’ (EH Destiny 4). His ‘immoralism’ does not reject the idea of an ethical life. Nietzsche favours a ‘supra-moral’ version of life (GM II 2&BGE 257). The move from a moral to a supra-moral orientation to life implies a kind of self-overcoming, a process which has both a ‘negative’ (‘destructive’) and a ‘positive’ (‘productive’) side. Firstly, I shall give an account of the ‘negative’ side, which involves Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality. In his Genealogy, Nietzsche criticizes the man of ressentiment, the metaphysical two-worlds distinction: ‘true world’ and ‘apparent world’, and the ascetic ideal of the will to truth, which he considers as a will to nothingness (GM III 28). His notion of perspectivism advocates a plurality of values and perspectives as opposed to any notion of an absolute truth. Then, I shall look into his ‘positive’ ethic, as exemplified in the figures of Zarathustra and the Übermensch, and the paradox of the Übermenschas ‘the annihilator of morality’ (EH Books 1) and as ‘the designation of a type of supreme achievement’ (EH Books 1). By proclaiming a process of ‘self-overcoming of morality’ (BGE 32), I believe that Nietzsche proposes an experimental morality in order to improve mankind. He considers morality as a pose, as progress (BGE 216), and ‘mere symptomatology’ (TI ‘Improvers’ of Mankind 1). Morality is the effect, or symptom of a continuous improvement within an individual. Nietzsche seeks to make us become aware of our continuous self-improvement, that we should invent our own virtue (A 11) in order to become what we are. Nietzsche envisions the possibility of evolving a magnanimous and courageous human type who is capable of giving style to his character (GS 290), the supreme human achievement ¾ the Übermensch. His idea of the Übermensch implies a never-ending struggle for self-perfection and self-fulfilment. There are affinities between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Buddhism, such as emphasizing practice, the recognition of the transient nature of human existence, and an emphasis on impermanence. Buddhist teachings show various feasible ways to attain enlightenment and buddhahood. The path to enlightenment and buddhahood can be shown to share some features with Nietzsche’s process of self-overcoming, which leads to self-transformation and self-perfection. The emphasis on the practice of the spirit of Bodhisattva by Humanistic Buddhism seems to lend itself as complement to Nietzsche’s philosophy, a notion I explore in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. / Dissertation (MA (Philosophy))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Philosophy / unrestricted

Företeelsen förnedringsrån har lyfts fram i den svenska debatt som ett nytt, oroande inslag och har formulerats som hatbrott mot svenskar. Syftet med denna studie är att belysa den bild av det svenska samhället som manifesteras i reaktionerna på ett uppmärksammat fall av förnedringsrån med utgångspunkt i tillståndet ressentiment. Begreppet betecknar ett samhällstillstånd präglat av en känsla av oförrätt då samhällets statushierarkier har förändrats till förmån för minoriteter. Studien har genom en kvalitativ tematisk innehållsanalys av en tråd på diskussionsforumet Flashback undersökt de föreställningar om det svenska samhället som förmedlas. Vi har särskilt intresserat oss för funktionen och konstruktionen av Den rasifierade andre i denna samhällsbild. Studien finner stora likheter med tidigare forskning om Tea party-rörelsens anhängare i USA. Trots att Sverige och USA är två länder med stora skillnader i samhällsstruktur och välfärdssystem uppvisar flashbacktrådens användare snarlika upplevelser av samhället. Studien visar att det specifika förnedringsrånet för flashbackanvändarna utgör en perfekt allegori över tillståndet i samhället. De uppfattar att Sverige och det traditionella folkhemmet är hotat. Den centrala karaktären i denna berättelse är invandraren, Den rasifierade andre, som med sina lägre stående egenskaper beskylls för samhällsmoralens förfall. Studien visar även att bilden av svensken och svenskhet inte är entydigt positiv. I tråden återfinns ett förakt mot den naive och tafatte svensken som tillåtit Sverige att gå förlorat. Som dess motpol står flashbackanvändarna – starka, hedervärda och upphöjda. Gärningspersonernas och brottsoffrens respektive etnicitet är av central betydelse för flashbacktråden. Rubriceringen av händelsen som ett hatbrott mot vita svenskar är helt avgörande för konstruktionen av användarnas världsbild. Utan hatbrottet utgör händelsen inte längre ett exempel på den oförrätt och förnedring användarna upplever sig utsatta för. När åtal i fallet väcks utan hatbrottsrubricering tolkas detta som bevis på att samhällseliten tystar ned sanningen. Denna samhällsbild byggd på ressentiment står på två ben: på gärningspersonernas och brottsoffers etnicitet och den konspiratoriska mörkläggningen. Utan dessa centrala element faller deras världsbild.

This thesis examines the way that subversivity is produced in relation to the name of the author, as understood by Foucault, and what potential for ressistance that can be glimpsed there. This from the reading of three text that in different ways relate to that theme. Firstly, throught the reading of "Isis mamma är genusvetare, skribent och konstnär, min mamma är f.d. städerska, kokerska och dagisfröken, numera förtidspensionär med diagnosen fibromyalgi" by Lidija Praizović, a text that actively work with the internal production of different exteriorities. The text uses these exteriorities, both to commit the violation needed in order to establish it's perspective toward a capitalist publicity, and to anticipate the response and argument towards the text in the same publicity. The becoming of the proletarian class awereness is in the text partly formed in terms of origin and political ressentiment. But when used in litterature the analysis show that they produce subversive collective assemblies and question the border of political discourse. The way we become subjects in submission in terms of being bodies, irrational, specific in relation to a liberal sphere that produces the superior as invisible and bodyless, can establish it's pespective as human and universal when turned into literature. Throughout this processes the proletarian position is produced as an instance of power both internal to the text and pointing outwards, from the text. The analysis futher shows how conventions that regulate the spreading of discourse through the name of the author in capitalism, can be used to circulate experiences of submission that has the formation of collective assemblies as their potential. A process that is directly related to the post-­‐fordist capitalisms needs for new forms of life in order to reproduce. The two other texts, "Nej, man har inte rätt att skriva vad man vill" by Lyra Ekström Lindbäck, and "I huvudet på Lidija Praizović" by Tove Folkesson, was produceed as a reaction to the first texts apperance in the public sphere. The first one is critical to the text and the name, but is still making claims on a subversive position. The reading of it shows that the making of that claim, in relation to the need to produce ones own name as an author name in community with the liberal public sphere, results in a blocking of the subversive potential and a reduction of the subversive to only a marker on the name. A reaction that is in turn foreseen by the first text in it's working with the anticipation of readers responce. The reading of the second text shows how, throught the production of a complete affinity with the exteriority that is the athor name of Lidija Praizović, the potentially dangerous class position is reduced and disarmed. That occurs partly throught a reduction of the class position to aspects that only allows political ressentiment and loneliness. This turns the subversivity and the violation associated with the name of Lidija Praizović to functions for the name of Tove Folkesson. Something that in turn shows not only the potential of using these aspects of political becomings as grounds for building something that goes beyond them, but also the dangers of it. Both texts can therefore be seen as two different attempts to block the spreading of the subversive by using it solely to produce the name of the author.

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Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-05-15T11:36:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Viviane Inês Weschenfelder_.pdf: 3054064 bytes, checksum: abe2815c770b90c4735f29c00503acb8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-15T11:36:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Viviane Inês Weschenfelder_.pdf: 3054064 bytes, checksum: abe2815c770b90c4735f29c00503acb8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-28 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Esta Tese teve como problemática central compreender como se engendram os processos de subjetivação dos sujeitos que se reconhecem como negros no Brasil contemporâneo e de que modos estas subjetividades contribuem para pensar a educação das relações étnico-raciais. A pesquisa teve como inspiração a perspectiva pós-estruturalista, articulando-se a partir do campo dos Estudos Foucaultianos, das Relações Raciais e da Educação. O fortalecimento da negritude brasileira, evidenciada a partir de 1970, permitiu que ela fosse entendida como uma matriz de experiência, com base no esquema analítico de Foucault. A matriz de experiência da negritude é composta por três eixos: o eixo dos saberes que funcionam como verdades, dos poderes que governam a população negra e o eixo da subjetivação/ética, que permite que os sujeitos negros governem a si mesmos a partir da relação com as verdades da negritude, consigo e com os outros. Para compreender o eixo da subjetivação, foram analisadas 36 narrativas autobiográficas produzidas e publicadas por mulheres negras no blog Blogueiras Negras, entre os anos de 2013 a 2016. Nesta pesquisa, as noções de discurso e de escrita de si operaram como ferramentas teórico-metodológicas. O Blogueiras Negras funciona como um potente espaço educativo, tanto pelo governamento dos modos de constituir-se mulher negra, quanto por acionar a aprendizagem permanente dos sujeitos que estão em contato com o blog, incluindo a gestão dos afetos e a luta contra a discriminação racial. Além da descrição e da análise do processo de subjetivação identitário e do ressentimento racial, escola e docência foram problematizadas a partir das narrativas selecionadas, o que permitiu pensar sobre a Educação das Relações Étnico-Raciais. Deste modo, defende-se a tese de que o processo de subjetivação identitário, vivenciado pelos sujeitos que fazem parte da matriz de experiência da negritude, tem como um dos seus principais efeitos a expressão do ressentimento racial. O ressentimento coloca as relações raciais em tensionamento e pode ser canalizado para a luta política e a transformação ética. Na medida em que a docência for constituída pelo compromisso com uma educação antirracista e pelas dimensões ética, estética e política, a escola pode vir a desenvolver processos de in/exclusão menos violentos e relações raciais que resultem, sobretudo, em subjetividades singulares. / The main goal of this Dissertation was to understand how the processes of subjectivation of the subjects whose recognize themselves as Black are produced in contemporary Brazil and how these subjectivities help us to problematize the Multicultural Education. The research relies on post-structuralism perspective, articulating Foucaultian Studies, Racial Relations studies, and the Education field. The strengthening of Brazilian blackness, evidenced since the 1970s, allowed blackness to be understood as a matrix of experience, based on Foucault’s theoretical framework. The blackness’ matrix of experience is composed of three axes: the axis of knowledge that works as truths, the axis of power that governs the Black population, and the axis of subjectivation/ethic, allowing Black subjects to control themselves since the relationship with self, with the blackness’ truths and with others. In order to understand the axis of subjectivation, 36 autobiographical narratives produced and published by Black women in the Blogueiras Negras’ blog, between 2013 and 2016 year, were analyzed. Furthermore, the notions of discourse and self-writing are used as theoretical and methodological tools. Blogueiras Negras works as a strong educative place, because the ways of government to become Black women, as well as to activate the permanent learning of these subjects that are in contact with the blog, including the management of the feelings and the struggle against the racial discrimination. Beyond the description and the analysis of process of identity subjectivation and racial ressentiment, school and teaching were problematized from the selected narratives, what made possible to think about Multicultural Education. Thus, the thesis put forward that the process of identity subjectivation, experienced by the subjects that are part of blackness’ matrix of experience, has as one of the main effects the expression of racial ressentiment. The ressentiment put the racial relations in tension and those feelings may be redirected to the political struggle and the ethical transformation. Insofar as teaching will be constituted by the commitment with an antiracist education and by its ethic, aesthetic and political dimensions, the school could develop fewer violent processes of in/exclusion and racial relations that result, above all, in singular subjectivities.

Homo Perfidus: An Antipathology of the Coward’s Betrayal identifies and speaks to an ethical and methodological lacuna in western metaphysics with regards to betrayal. Following Levinas’ call for an ‘Ethics as first philosophy,’ my research question is: ‘How can I think of betrayal responsibly?’ I offer to approach betrayal as an accusation, one that comports an excessive hatred towards the identified ‘traitor.’ Suspending its moral vilification, I construct a broadly phenomenological method – which I call ‘antipathology’ – that proposes to take this hatred seriously; not as the sign of a lack to be filled or purloined with shame, but of a communication to respond-to. Tracking western thought’s metaphysical engagements – mainly via Kant, Hegel and Heidegger – my antipathology witnesses an exceedingly systematic muting of this hatred. Such a principled effacement of hatred’s signs is the very mechanism by which western thought “de-problematizes” betrayal, appropriating its otherness for its own metaphysical ends. To those ends, betrayal ceases to be an event and becomes its ‘prefiguration,’ a twist on an assumed temporal and causal progression. I focus here on the coward’s betrayal, broadly defined as secession from a principle – seen to give cohesion and legitimacy to a ‘Whole’ – of which this traitor was nevertheless an integral part until the event of her betrayal. Antipathology follows young Hegel’s ‘antisemitic’ association of the “Jewish spirit” with a principle of alienation and secession, a vain and hateful self-assertion that only “Christian spirit” can successfully negate, turning this drive for hateful dissociation to one of loving association (with progressively diminishing “remainders”). Reading modern philosophy’s treatment of the skeptic I show how her doubt can be appropriated and turned to ‘Truth’ in the same way that the Jews’ hateful and cowardly betrayal can be turned to absolute faith/love; what Hegel calls “negating the negation.” Both ‘Jew’ and ‘Skeptic’ here become antibodies in a process through which a ‘Whole’ slowly becomes immune, or insensitive to, the threat of future interruptions: outside of this process – offering no ‘Whole’ of their own – their respective interruptions are seen as expressions of vanity, of a ‘self’ that breaks-away from the bonds of belonging and love in a fit of gratuitous hatred and doubt; all in the name of a “who knows what” that for Hegel, as well as for Kant and Heidegger, amounts to precisely ‘Nothing.’ I conclude by a performative ‘antipathological’ reading of Dante’s Inferno alongside Kafka’s In the Penal Colony: while Dante, as a faithful ‘Christian’ witness to Divine Justice (Hell), desires to internalize the Truth of God, progressively renouncing the vain resistances of a ‘self’ not yet fully reconciled to God’s Being (the theological ‘Pleroma’ of the ‘Whole’), Kafka’s nameless traveler, as a skeptical ‘coward-witness,’ not only remains “unconverted” but also causes the violence that is implicit in the Dante-esque ‘progression’ to show itself. ‘Faith’ is here shown as progression from one betrayal-event to another, all of which require the believer to sacrifice another part of their resistance to the demands of the ‘Whole’ until no such resistance remains (or, at least, felt/expressed). Similarly, the Dante that begins his journey weeping for the suffering of Hell’s sinners, ends up kicking one of them in the face; deliberately, yet without hatred, as if it were a mere rock on the road. The coward’s betrayal consists in her ‘vain witness’ to time as rupture, as event, as the opening that puts her previous beliefs and attachments in radical question. The hatred towards the coward and the accusation of ‘traitor’ mark this question as a threat to the ‘Whole;’ a mark that, approached antipathologically, can open a discourse concerning the violence (and self-violence) that was and is necessary to keep the ‘Whole,’ through a narrated causal-historical time, from breaking apart. Painful and dangerous, this approach is, nonetheless, the only way to keep a system that abolished all ‘positions to complain’ from being equated with a ‘wholly just’ system; or to keep a knowledge-machine that successfully tames all doubts from being absolved.

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Cette thèse propose une analyse de la question de la survivance – notion ayant retenu l’attention de penseurs issus de différentes disciplines tels que Janine Altounian, Jacques Derrida et Georges Didi-Huberman – dans l’œuvre de Sarah Kofman, plus particulièrement dans son récit autobiographique intitulé Rue Ordener, rue Labat, paru en 1994. Quatre grandes orientations guident ce travail dont l’approche théorique se situe à la croisée de la littérature, de la philosophie, de la psychanalyse, de l’histoire (tant sociale que de l’art) et du juridique. Premièrement, nous nous intéressons à ce qu’implique non seulement le fait d’« échapper à la mort », en observant les moyens mis en œuvre pour y parvenir, mais aussi celui de « continuer à vivre » après l’événement de la Shoah. Deuxièmement, nous étudions les différentes manifestations de « la survivance active de l’enfant en nous » (J.-B. Pontalis) de même que celle de « l’objet perdu » dans le travail de deuil impossible, encore autrement « interminable », qui a pris corps dans l’œuvre de Sarah Kofman. Troisièmement, nous abordons la « survivance » au sens du Nachleben d’Aby Warburg et repérons la trace des autres écrits de la philosophe, elliptiquement condensés dans son récit par la reprise de thèmes, le retour de sujets antérieurement évoqués. Quatrièmement, nous interrogeons la locution pronominale « se survivre » et la portée de ses compléments : « dans son œuvre », « dans son témoignage », « dans les mémoires ». Parmi les points qui sont analysés en profondeur dans les chapitres de cette thèse, notons les motifs du ressentiment, du double tragique, du pardon et de l’oubli, de la « disgrâce », de la honte et de la culpabilité, ainsi que les différentes modalités de la survivance – la capacité d’adaptation et le rôle des mères, la lecture, le rire, les arts visuels – mises en œuvre par Sarah Kofman. Dans cette « œuvre-vie » (Pleshette DeArmitt), ce corpus singulier et unique, il s’est toujours agi de ceci, quoi qu’il lui en coûta : « affirmer sans cesse la survie », selon l’expression de Derrida. / This thesis considers the notion of survival—a concept that has attracted the attention of thinkers from various disciplines, from Janine Altounian to Jacques Derrida and Georges Didi-Huberman—in the work of Sarah Kofman, and specifically in her autobiography, Rue Ordener, rue Labat, which came out in 1994. Four lines of inquiry guide this work, whose theoretical approach lies at the crossroads of literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and history (both social history and art history), and which, in the central chapter, addresses the legal sphere as well. We begin by looking not only into what it means to “escape death,” (including the attempts to achieve such a goal), but also into the drive to “live on” after the event of the Shoah. Secondly, we study various manifestations of the “active survival of the inner child” (J.-B. Pontalis), as well as the manifestations of the “lost object” in the work of impossible mourning, equally “interminable,” as it takes shape in Kofman’s works. Thirdly, we address the question of “survival” in the sense of Aby Warburg’s Nachleben (a concept studied by Georges Didi-Huberman) and find traces of other writings by Kofman, elliptically condensed in her autobiography, which takes up themes and revisits subjects previously touched upon in her writings. Fourthly, we question the pronominal French locution “se survivre” (to outlive, to outlast) and the scope of its complements: “in his/her work,” “in his/her testimonial,” “in memories”—all drawn together in Kofman’s work in an exemplary manner. Among the points analyzed in depth in the chapters of this thesis are the motifs of resentment, the tragic double, forgiveness and forgetting, “disgrace,” shame and guilt, as well as various modalities of survival—the adaptation ability and the role of mothers, reading, laughter, the visual arts—all used by Kofman. This “LifeWork” (Pleshett DeArmitt), this singular and unique corpus, has always been about “ceaselessly affirming survival,” in the words of Jacques Derrida—no matter how high the price.

Cette thèse propose une analyse de la question de la survivance – notion ayant retenu l’attention de penseurs issus de différentes disciplines tels que Janine Altounian, Jacques Derrida et Georges Didi-Huberman – dans l’œuvre de Sarah Kofman, plus particulièrement dans son récit autobiographique intitulé Rue Ordener, rue Labat, paru en 1994. Quatre grandes orientations guident ce travail dont l’approche théorique se situe à la croisée de la littérature, de la philosophie, de la psychanalyse, de l’histoire (tant sociale que de l’art) et du juridique. Premièrement, nous nous intéressons à ce qu’implique non seulement le fait d’« échapper à la mort », en observant les moyens mis en œuvre pour y parvenir, mais aussi celui de « continuer à vivre » après l’événement de la Shoah. Deuxièmement, nous étudions les différentes manifestations de « la survivance active de l’enfant en nous » (J.-B. Pontalis) de même que celle de « l’objet perdu » dans le travail de deuil impossible, encore autrement « interminable », qui a pris corps dans l’œuvre de Sarah Kofman. Troisièmement, nous abordons la « survivance » au sens du Nachleben d’Aby Warburg et repérons la trace des autres écrits de la philosophe, elliptiquement condensés dans son récit par la reprise de thèmes, le retour de sujets antérieurement évoqués. Quatrièmement, nous interrogeons la locution pronominale « se survivre » et la portée de ses compléments : « dans son œuvre », « dans son témoignage », « dans les mémoires ». Parmi les points qui sont analysés en profondeur dans les chapitres de cette thèse, notons les motifs du ressentiment, du double tragique, du pardon et de l’oubli, de la « disgrâce », de la honte et de la culpabilité, ainsi que les différentes modalités de la survivance – la capacité d’adaptation et le rôle des mères, la lecture, le rire, les arts visuels – mises en œuvre par Sarah Kofman. Dans cette « œuvre-vie » (Pleshette DeArmitt), ce corpus singulier et unique, il s’est toujours agi de ceci, quoi qu’il lui en coûta : « affirmer sans cesse la survie », selon l’expression de Derrida. / This thesis considers the notion of survival—a concept that has attracted the attention of thinkers from various disciplines, from Janine Altounian to Jacques Derrida and Georges Didi-Huberman—in the work of Sarah Kofman, and specifically in her autobiography, Rue Ordener, rue Labat, which came out in 1994. Four lines of inquiry guide this work, whose theoretical approach lies at the crossroads of literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and history (both social history and art history), and which, in the central chapter, addresses the legal sphere as well. We begin by looking not only into what it means to “escape death,” (including the attempts to achieve such a goal), but also into the drive to “live on” after the event of the Shoah. Secondly, we study various manifestations of the “active survival of the inner child” (J.-B. Pontalis), as well as the manifestations of the “lost object” in the work of impossible mourning, equally “interminable,” as it takes shape in Kofman’s works. Thirdly, we address the question of “survival” in the sense of Aby Warburg’s Nachleben (a concept studied by Georges Didi-Huberman) and find traces of other writings by Kofman, elliptically condensed in her autobiography, which takes up themes and revisits subjects previously touched upon in her writings. Fourthly, we question the pronominal French locution “se survivre” (to outlive, to outlast) and the scope of its complements: “in his/her work,” “in his/her testimonial,” “in memories”—all drawn together in Kofman’s work in an exemplary manner. Among the points analyzed in depth in the chapters of this thesis are the motifs of resentment, the tragic double, forgiveness and forgetting, “disgrace,” shame and guilt, as well as various modalities of survival—the adaptation ability and the role of mothers, reading, laughter, the visual arts—all used by Kofman. This “LifeWork” (Pleshett DeArmitt), this singular and unique corpus, has always been about “ceaselessly affirming survival,” in the words of Jacques Derrida—no matter how high the price.