Likt flera branscher utvecklas revisionsbranschen under tidens gång. Nya arbetssätt och verktyg introduceras för att utveckla revisionsutförandet. Ett av dessa verktyg som har implementerats av många revisionsbolag är Big data analys. Forskningsområdet kring Big data analys användande i revisionsutförandet är i ett inledande stadie, och resultaten är skilda. Tidigare forskning är dock ense om att Big data analys har en påverkan på revisionsutförandet och att revisorns kompetenser spelar en avgörande roll om användandet av Big data analys blir framgångsrikt. Till följd av detta var studiens syfte att undersöka vilken påverkan användningen av Big data analys har på revisionsutförandet samt vilka kompetenser som behövs vid användandet av Big data analys. Utifrån studiens syfte formuleradestre forskningsfrågor som behandlade Big data analys påverkan på revisionskvaliteten, revisionsutförandets legitimitet samt vilka kompetenser som behövs för att uppnå komfort och upprätthålla professionell skepticism i revisionsutförandet.För att uppnå studiens syfte har insamlingen av empiri grundat sig i en kvalitativ metod. Tio respondenter deltog i studien, varav sju var auktoriserade revisorer och resterande tre var revisorsassistenter.De slutsatser som studien generat är att revisorns kompetenser ansågs väsentliga för hur välfungerande användandet Big data analys var. Dock ansåg inte respondenterna att det var några nya kompetenser som behövdes vid användandet av Big data analys. Utan det var alltjämt en god förståelse för revision och redovisning som behövdes. Vidare ansågs Big data analys bidra till mer komfort i revisionsutförandet. Samtidigt som den professionella skepticismen alltjämt genomsyrade allt i revisions arbetssätt, och då även Big data analyser. Däremot påvisades det att användandet av Big data analys kunde hjälpa revisorer finna fler revisionsbevis, vilket hjälpte revisorn att vara professionellt skeptisk gentemot det reviderade bolaget. Big data analys förtjänster att testa en större population, jämfört med traditionella stickprov, ansågs öka den övergripande revisionskvaliteten. Detta medförde även att legitimiteten påverkades positivt hos de bolag som hade större kunder med mer transaktioner. Medan revisionsbolaget som jobbade mot kunder med mindre verksamheter inte upplevde samma positiva inverkan på deras legitimitet vid användningen av Big data analys i revisionsutförandet. / Like several industries, the auditing industry is evolving over time. New methods and tools are being introduced to enhance the auditing process. One of these methods that has been implemented by many audit firms is Big Data analysis. The research field on the use of Big Data analysis in auditing is in its early stages, and the results are mixed. However, previous research agreed that Big Data analysis has an impact on the auditing process, and the auditor's competencies play a crucial role in the successful implementation of Big Data analysis.As a result, the aim of this study was to investigate the impact of using Big Data analysis on the auditing process and identify the competencies required for its effective use. Based on the study's objective, three research questions were formulated, addressing the impact of Big Data analysis on audit quality, the legitimacy of the auditing process, and the competencies needed to achieve comfort and maintain professional skepticism in the audit process when using Big Data analysis. To achieve the study's objective, empirical data was collected using a qualitative methodology. Ten respondents participated in the study, including seven certified auditors and three audit assistants. The study's conclusions indicate that the auditor's competencies were considered essential for the successful implementation of Big Data analysis. However, the respondents did not believe that any new competencies were required specifically for conducting Big Data analysis reviews. Instead, a solid understanding of auditing and accounting was deemed necessary. Furthermore, Big Data analysis was seen to contribute to greater comfort in the audit process. At the same time, professional skepticism continued to permeate the entire auditing approach, including Big Data analysis. However, it was demonstrated that the use of Big Data analysis could help auditors find more audit evidence, aiding the auditor in maintaining professional skepticism toward the audited company. The advantages of Big Data analysis in testing a larger population, compared to traditional sampling, were seen to enhance overall audit quality. This also had a positive impact on the legitimacy of companies with larger clients and more transactions. Conversely, audit firms working with smaller businesses did not experience the same positive impact on their legitimacy when using Big Data analysis in the audit process.

Nous nous proposons, dans le cadre de cette étude, de démontrer que les Essais de Montaigne contiennent bel et bien, en dépit d’une forme éclatée et d’un propos non systématique, ce qu’il convient d’appeler une morale. Non seulement cette morale ne s’oppose-t-elle pas au scepticisme des Essais, mais elle lui est même d’une certaine façon coextensive : la morale de Montaigne est une morale de l’essai, lequel constitue l’expression la plus achevée de son scepticisme. Ce dernier, pour être bien compris, doit préalablement être mis en parallèle avec la « voie » (ἀγωγή) que propose Sextus Empiricus dans ses Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes, dont l’influence sur Montaigne pourrait être bien plus importante que ne le laissent croire plusieurs travaux récents. / We will argue, in the following study, that Montaigne’s Essays, despite their fragmented writing and unsystematic form, indeed contain what deserves to be called an ethics. This ethics, far from contradicting his scepticism, identifies with it in a certain way: Montaigne’s ethics is an ethics of the essay, which is the definitive expression of his scepticisim. The latter, to be correctly understood, needs to be compared with Sextus Empiricus’ « way » (ἀγωγή), whose influence on Montaigne may be more important than it has been argued in recent years.

This thesis explores Herman Melville’s relationship to sceptical philosophy. By reading Melville’s fictions of the 1840s and 1850s alongside the writings of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, I seek to show that they manifest by turns expression, rebuttal, and mitigated acceptance of philosophical doubt. Melville was an attentive reader of philosophical texts, and he refers specifically to concepts such as Berkeleyan immaterialism and the Kantian “noumenon”. But Melville does not simply dramatise pre-existing theories; rather, in works such as Mardi, Moby-Dick, and Pierre he enacts sceptical and anti-sceptical ideas through his literary strategies, demonstrating their relevance in particular regions of human experience. In so doing he makes a substantive contribution to a philosophical discourse that has often been criticised – by commentators including Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Swift – for its tendency to abstraction. Melville’s interest in scepticism might be read as part of a wider cultural response to a period of unprecedented social and political change in antebellum America, and with this in mind I compare and contrast his work with that of Dickinson, Douglass, Emerson, and Thoreau. But in many respects Melville’s distinctive and original treatment of scepticism sets him apart from his contemporaries, and in order to fully make sense of it one must range more widely through the canons of philosophy and literature. His exploration of the ethical consequences of doubt in The Piazza Tales, for example, can be seen to anticipate with remarkable precision the theories of twentieth-century thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Stanley Cavell. I work chronologically though selected prose from the period 1849-1857, paying close attention to the textual effects and philosophical allusions in each work. In so doing I hope to offer fresh ways of looking at Melville’s handling of literary form and the wider shape of his career. I conclude with reflections on how Melville’s normative emphasis on the acknowledgement of epistemological limitation might inform the practice of literary criticism.

Submitted by Angela Maria de Oliveira (amolivei@uepg.br) on 2018-11-14T19:12:15Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Daniel Lucio.pdf: 1849801 bytes, checksum: 9f40c703e84f294bfa4ce9a95e933cc1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-14T19:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Daniel Lucio.pdf: 1849801 bytes, checksum: 9f40c703e84f294bfa4ce9a95e933cc1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-06 / O presente trabalho procurou examinar algumas considerações do intelectual brasileiro João Cruz Costa sobre a relação entre a história e a filosofia. Esta relação perpassou por toda a trajetória intelectual do autor, sendo, portanto, observada desde seu primeiro texto sobre a história das ideias no Brasil, em 1938, até as suas últimas intervenções, em meados da década de 1970. Durante toda a sua trajetória intelectual, Cruz Costa buscou compreender, a partir das noções de “experiência histórica” e de “sentido”, as vicissitudes das ideias no Brasil, desde o século XVI até meados do século XX. Em seus textos se desprende uma discussão mais geral que indica a preocupação do autor em refletir sobre a relação entre a história e a filosofia. A partir de algumas considerações do próprio autor sobre esta relação, o presente trabalho lançou, como fio condutor, a seguinte questão: seria Cruz costa um pensador cético? Longe da pretensão de apontar uma resposta, este trabalho apenas procurou incidir um pouco de luz sobre o problema. Pode-se dizer que a única conclusão satisfatória deste presente trabalho foi a convicção da necessidade de um retorno à obra de Cruz Costa e, por consequência, a instauração de um exame minucioso sobre os textos do autor. Retorno que deve responder a duas questões ainda em aberto sobre o pensamento de Cruz Costa: 1) o que foi o ceticismo de Cruz Costa? e 2) o que foi o seu ensaísmo? / This work aims to examine a set of considerations regarding the relation between history and philosophy by the Brazilian philosopher João Cruz Costa. The matter played a central role throughout the writer’s intellectual trajectory, being present from his very first writings about the history of ideas in Brazil, in 1938, until his last interventions, in the decade of 1970. In his works, the author looks for the vicissitudes of ideas in Brazil from the 16th to the 20th century, in terms of historical and sense perception. Thus, a wholesome discussion on the aforementioned relation can be extracted from his production, from which was selected as leading thought for this research, the question: was Cruz Costa a sceptical philosopher? It is not the main objective here to pose a direct and objective answer to that, but to raise an axiomatic discussion, which points out to the necessity of a more detailed reexam of the referred works. Two main unanswered questions regarding Cruz Costa’s philosophy are: 1) what was his scepticism? 2) what was his essayism?

Many of us have grown up hearing or using words meant as insults or negative adjectives that were in fact names for social groups. Most of them have gone unquestioned in the mainstream consciousness, but the term Gay in the generally negative meaning has in the past years been given attention as offensive and homophobic, with debates emerging in response over whether or not this is true, particularly on the internet. It is the articles and forum threads from these debates that make out the empirical material for a qualitative study as I ask what these people’s thoughts are about this term and how it is perceived. After a qualitative coding and analysis of these texts, and interpretation of the results based on Erving Goffman’s theory of Phantom acceptance and stigma terms, Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, Ferdinand de Sassure’s theory of signifier and signified and how it connects to the community and Baudrillards theory of simulacra, this is the principal conclusion that I have drawn: For some of the people in this debate, the term Gay and its use is about homophobia and heterosexism, though mostly it’s not overt but a subconscious part of the continued dehumanization and stigmatization of homo- and bisexual people. This is a position I call The socially focused skepticism. Others distance themselves from this idea, talking about language development, the lack of inherent meaning of words and freedom of expression. Using Baudrillard for guidance, I interpret this as having a different, more abstract view of language than those who connect the term to heterosexism, and with this focus on language I name this position The language centered defense. Yet another group frame their reasoning about the term in compromise, preferring to limit their use of it to certain contexts rather than disposing the habit entirely or risk causing offense. To these people, whether or not the word is homophobic is less relevant to the discussion than showing respect for how it can be perceived, which gives their position the name The compromising position.

Nous nous proposons, dans le cadre de cette étude, de démontrer que les Essais de Montaigne contiennent bel et bien, en dépit d’une forme éclatée et d’un propos non systématique, ce qu’il convient d’appeler une morale. Non seulement cette morale ne s’oppose-t-elle pas au scepticisme des Essais, mais elle lui est même d’une certaine façon coextensive : la morale de Montaigne est une morale de l’essai, lequel constitue l’expression la plus achevée de son scepticisme. Ce dernier, pour être bien compris, doit préalablement être mis en parallèle avec la « voie » (ἀγωγή) que propose Sextus Empiricus dans ses Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes, dont l’influence sur Montaigne pourrait être bien plus importante que ne le laissent croire plusieurs travaux récents. / We will argue, in the following study, that Montaigne’s Essays, despite their fragmented writing and unsystematic form, indeed contain what deserves to be called an ethics. This ethics, far from contradicting his scepticism, identifies with it in a certain way: Montaigne’s ethics is an ethics of the essay, which is the definitive expression of his scepticisim. The latter, to be correctly understood, needs to be compared with Sextus Empiricus’ « way » (ἀγωγή), whose influence on Montaigne may be more important than it has been argued in recent years.

« Apophatique » signifie « négatif » ou « par négation ». Le terme est principalement employé pour qualifier une forme particulière de théologie qui 1. ne peut rien dire de Dieu car énoncer une qualité serait lui ôter la qualité antinomique. Il est facile d'en comprendre la logique : dire que Dieu est grand c'est dire qu'il n'est pas petit ce qui est incompatible avec le fait de dire qu'il est tout. 2. consiste à énoncer ce que Dieu n'est pas : mauvais ou un chien, par exemples. Par exemple aussi, cette recherche n'est pas l'occasion d'une anthologie des meilleurs textes de théologie négative, mais la méthode – le scepticisme teinté de pensée logique et/ou mystique – n'est pas sans alimenter les développements à venir. Une des solutions qui s'offre à moi consiste à n'évoquer en rien l'art, l'esthétique, et tout autre domaine relatif aux dites sciences de l'art – un texte sur le nombre pi aurait fait l'affaire d'une esthétique apophatique. Cependant positivement fonder une pensée sur/avec la négation me rend heureux, par espièglerie, esprit de contradiction, par inquiétude fondamentale ; je ne m'en priverai donc pas au profit d'un tour de passe-passe, aussi réjouissante que soit l'idée de vous imaginer lire présentement une théorie du chou-fleur. / “Apophatic” means “negative” or “by negation”. The term is mainly used to designate a particular form of theology which 1. can't say anything of God because stating a quality would be taking the antinomic quality away from him. It is easy to understand the logic : to say that God is great is to say that he is not small, which is incompatible with the fact of saying that he is everything. 2. consists in stating what God is not : bad or a dog, for example. For example also, this research is not the occurrence of an anthology of the best texts of negative theology, but the method – the scepticism tinged with logical and/or mystic thought – is not without fueling the developments to come. One of the solutions that is given to me consists in not mentioning art in any way at all, the aesthetics, and any other field related to the so-called sciences of the arts – a text on the number Pi would have suited an apophatic aesthetics. However positively establishing a thought on negation makes me happy, by mischievousness, for the sake of argumentation, by fundamental concern; I will thus not deprive myself of it in favor of a quick/cheap trick, as delightful as the idea of imagining you currently reading a theory of the cauliflower might be.

This thesis examines and explains how the three Scandinavian populist radical right parties, the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party approaches the climate issue in their latest manifesto, and how it has changed over a period of ten years. By means of a content analysis and categorisations of climate scepticism, climate omission and climate measures, this thesis finds explicit evidence of climate scepticism in the Progress Party whereas there is no such evidence for the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People’s Party completely omits the issue. On the other hand, there is evidence of measures to fight climate change in the Progress Party, and the same goes for the Sweden Democrats. However, the only relevant difference when comparing the manifestos over a ten-year period is a decreased usage of statement connected to both climate scepticism and climate action in the Progress Party’s manifestos.

This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective' evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group. In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective' evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form 'S knows that p.' Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors. In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective' thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred' on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.

The diploma thesis discusses the relationship between humanism and hedonism. However, its main objective is not to explain the terms in their summarized historical relatedness but to point out their internal coherence. The fundamental issue the thesis deals with is the fact that sentient beings suffer from sorrow. Enumerating the reasons why it is important to search for a solution would be a waste of our reader's time. It is necessary to understand that we don't expect empirical science to solve the problem since - despite the enthusiasm significant for this modern period - has not introduced any relief from sorrow. Here comes the opportunity for philosophy and, eventually, ethics. In its first part the thesis maps out the context of humanism and hedonism, studies their apparent as well as hidden nature, and lays the conceivable foundations of humanistic hedonism. The following section suggests a set of particular steps. Adhering to these instructions makes it possible to experience delight and to eliminate sorrow.