Many economies throughout the world were devastated by the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Ireland in particular experienced a severe collapse in its housing market. Despite the progression of European-influenced planning policy that was meant to promote balanced regional development in Ireland, the country's housing market vastly overbuilt, exacerbating a housing market crash that ended the Celtic Tiger era. Drawing on Europeanization and historical institutionalism as theoretical frameworks, this thesis argues that the link between these EU-influenced policy principles and local Irish planning practice was weak during an important phase of Ireland's economic growth. This conclusion is demonstrated through the analysis of a case study, McEvoy and Smith v. Meath County Council. The findings show that while Ireland's national government created an ambitious National Spatial Strategy modeled on EU principles, non-binding Regional Planning Guidelines allowed local authorities to continue granting zoning changes and permissions. These decisions were therefore uninhibited by the constraints of population projections, consideration for infrastructure provision, and overall good planning practice. This research calls into question the effectiveness of transferring policy principles from the EU to Member States. It suggests more generally that to implement policy and law successfully, policy makers must appreciate the societal and economic context in which these rules will operate.

This thesis contributes to the growing EU-US literature by comparing and explaining the evolution of urban policy in these two federal systems. The thesis begins with a puzzle: after introducing two similar and equally short-lived regeneration schemes—Model Cities (MC) (1967) and URBAN (1994)—the US and the EU followed different paths: the former replaced MC with the durable Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) in 1974, while the latter ended urban policy by ‘mainstreaming’ URBAN in its regional policy in 2006. To solve the puzzle I formulate a two-part argument: first, I explain the similarities between MC and URBAN as resulting from three factors: a favourable political context, holistic urban policy ideas, and centre-periphery mistrust. I then explain subsequent trajectories by looking at the interplay of policy and politico-constitutional institutions. While both MC and URBAN were unable to ‘stick’ because of their inherent weaknesses, the result of their demise depended on the existence of a federal ‘city welfare’ state. In the US, the Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD) embodied this state, and channelled Nixon’s attacks on MC into the creation of the structurally stronger CDBG. In the EU, conversely, DG Regio could not provide a comparable anchor for urban policy: when URBAN was attacked by regions and cities, the DG just reverted to its ‘business as usual’ by mainstreaming the programme. I test my argument with a macro-historical comparison of the two cases and four in-depth city studies—Arlington, VA and Baltimore, MD on the US side, and Bristol, UK and Pescara, Italy on the EU side—aimed at analysing micro-level institutional dynamics. In both parts of the study I use a wide range of sources: secondary and grey literature, statistical sources and, especially, archival material and elite interviews. At both levels of analysis the test confirms my argument.

This thesis explores continuity and change in the developmental welfare approach in Thailand following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It examines both the exogenous and endogenous forces that generated change as well as both the ‘process’ and the ‘content’ of transformation or responses to the crisis. It uses the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) policy as a case study to explore these changes. The principle research question is: To what extent did the post 1997 crisis policy on social protection in Thailand represent a shift from its existing institutional path of developmental welfarism? Extending from this overarching question are subsidiary questions, which guided the thesis. They include: To what extent did the OTOP policy address the social protection gaps that became apparent in the Asian financial crisis? To what extent did the OTOP policy benefit its target population? The thesis uses historical institutionalism (HI) and the role of ideas as the analytic frameworks in analyzing change. The thesis argues that the exogenous shock of the 1997 financial crisis contributed to some departure from the institutional path of developmental welfarism in Thailand. However, the change did not follow the conventional punctuated equilibrium (PE) model under the HI framework in the sense of moving from one equilibrium to another after an exogenous shock. Rather, the radical change that took place after the exogenous shock was gradual. The new set of institutional arrangement prompted significant ideational and institutional transformations. They involved both intended and unintended consequences of incremental shifts in the forms of ‘layering’ ‘drift’ and ‘conversion’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In addition, the thesis argues that the transformation in Thailand after the 1997 financial crisis lies in an intermediate order of change that is found between shifts in policy instrument and a wholesale ‘paradigm shift’ (Hall, 1993). Here, apart from having introduced a new policy such as OTOP, the Thai government engaged in a broader rethinking of Thailand’s developmental welfare path. Moreover, the study finds that the structure of economic development in a developing country context can both promote and impede social protection, rather than only subordinate the latter. The claim is based on the finding that the expansion of economic policy goals in Thailand supported local development and increasing inclusiveness of the informal sector after the 1997 financial crisis. Finally, the thesis argues that social protection delivery or lack thereof reflects contestation of ideas as well as material interests. Both the state and the policy beneficiaries in the OTOP context pushed for their interests when there were gaps between policy formulation and implementation. As a result, changes occurred both in the policy goals and in who benefited from OTOP.

[pt] Esta dissertação observa o desenvolvimento do compromisso coletivo com a democracia representativa no âmbito da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA). Uma descrição dos casos em que a OEA atuou na promoção e defesa da democracia a partir da aprovação da Resolução 1080 e do Compromisso de Santiago é dada e permite o acompanhamento da criação de mecanismos de ação coletiva e a instituição de práticas que constituem o que se chamou de paradigma democrático nas Américas. O instrumental teórico do institucionalismo histórico oferece uma alternativa às análises realistas, racionalistas e funcionalistas sobre o papel da variável institucional no desenvolvimento desse paradigma. / [en] This dissertation observes the development of a collective commitment with representative democracy within the Organization of American States (OAS) from the 1990`s onward. A descriptive analysis of the cases in which the OAS acted for the promotion and defense of democracy is therefore given and allows the following of the creation of collective action mechanisms as well as the institution of practices that constitute what can be called a democratic solidarity paradigm in the hemisphere. The theoretical tools of historical institutionalism offer an alternative to realist, rationalist and functionalist analysis of the role of the institutional variable on the development of this paradigm.

The aim of this study is to analyse the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats idea development in the issue of migration in 2010-2018. The inquiry consists of the following two research questions. How has the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats positions regarding migration developed in 2010-2018? How can institutional theories explain the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats idea development? The study is encompassed by three theoretical perspectives also recognised as rational-choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and discursive institutionalism. In regard to the methodological approach, the study employs the comparative case study design with the most-similar system and is essentially an idea analytical study. The main results reveal that both the Moderate Party and the Swedish Democrats have adjusted their migration policies but to different degrees. The Swedish Democrats promote similar policies in 2010 as in 2018 with smaller alterations while the Moderate Party has customised larger alterations, distinguishing the party’s migration policy from 2010 and 2018. These policy alterations are primarily explained as a result of rational action, societal discourses and critical junctures.

馬列主義揭示無產階級政黨必然會帶領群眾走向共產天堂，這樣的「目的論」賦予了共產黨作為無產階級先鋒隊統治上的合法性。1978年以來，中共為了發展經濟改革而多次進行意識型態的修正，2000年以前中共所修正的意識型態都謹守在社會主義框架中，自我定位為工農階級政黨，但「三個代表」允許資本家入黨，卻將合法性基礎轉向了其他社會階層。 為什麼中共要提出「三個代表」，以及為何提出的時間點會在2000年？本文認為要從經濟結構和領導互動兩個變數來解釋。市場化的改革造成中國大陸經濟和社會的變動，私營經濟發展迅速、公有制經濟的優勢地位受到挑戰、紅色資本家人數上升，這些變化使理想與現實嚴重脫節。由於延續市場化路線在1990年代後已成為領導人的既定政策，加上前蘇聯因為脫離群眾而崩潰的經驗，使中共面對經濟社會變動時，選擇調整意識型態以符合現實需求。 1998年以後，經濟社會的變動更形劇烈，私營經濟負擔稅收、產值與就業的功能顯著提升，學界發表大量調研報告，加重了領導人的壓力，調整意識型態已經勢在必行。合法性基礎轉變以後，中共必需以政績尋求支持，並解決民眾需求。然而當「由下而上」的民意日趨重要時，勢必在未來衝擊「由上而下」的一黨專政體制。 / Marxism-Leninism theory claims that proletariat party will inevitability lead the people to arrive the paradise of communism. Such the “teleology” gives the legitimacy on as proletariat vanguard for Communist Party. Since 1978, the CCP revised ideology for many times to develop the economic reform. Ideology revised by CCP before 2000 was kept in the frame of socialism; the CCP positioned oneself as the class parties of workers and peasants. However the “Three Represents” allows capitalists to join the party, and turns the foundation to other social strata. Why did the CCP propose the “Three Represents” in 2000? I think there are two factors: the economic structure and interactions between the senior level. The market-based reform causes the economical and social change; like the rapid development of private economy, the challenge in the advantage of public economy, and the red capitalist's number rises. Which changes make ideal and reality disconnect seriously. The leaders extend the market-based policy, and the experience of the Soviet Union collapse, make the CCP in the face of the change of economy and society, choose to adjust ideology in order to accord with the current demand. After 1998, the violent change in the economic society appears even more violently, became that tax from private economy, the functions of the growth of output value, employment improve apparently, a large number of research reports were delivered by educational circles, has been imperative for the leader's to adjust ideology. After the transition of the legitimacy foundation, the CCP has to seek the support from the people by achievement in politics, and needs the demands of people. From top-to-bottom dictatorship system of one party will certainly be assaulted, when the “bottom-to-top” opinions of people become more important in the future.

No description available.

Dozens of major cities around the world have launched large-scale waterfront redevelopment projects over the past fifty years. Absent from this list of noteworthy achievements, however, is Toronto, a case of grand ambitions gone horribly awry. Despite three extensive revitalization plans in the second half of the 20th century, Toronto’s central waterfront, an area roughly double the city’s central business district, has remained mired in political gridlock for decades. The purpose of this dissertation is to explain why this came to pass. Informed by extensive archival and interview research, as well as geospatial data analyzed using Geographic Information Systems software, the thesis demonstrates that above and beyond political challenges typical of any major urban redevelopment project, in Toronto, issues of land ownership — specifically, public land ownership — were pivotal in defining the scope and pace of waterfront planning and implementation. Few, if any, waterfront redevelopment projects around the world have been attempted amidst the same degree of public land ownership and jurisdictional fragmentation as that which plagued implementation efforts in Toronto. From 1961-1998, no less than 81% of all land in the central waterfront was owned by one public body or another, dispersed across a patchwork of public agencies, corporations, and special purpose authorities nestled within multiple levels of government. Such fragmentation, specifically across public bodies, added a layer of complexity to the existing intergovernmental dynamic that effectively crippled implementation efforts. It created a “joint-decision trap” impervious to conventional resolution via bargaining, problem solving, or unilateral action. This tangled political history poses a considerable challenge to conventional liberal, structuralist, and regime-based theories of urban politics derived from US experiences. It also highlights the limits of conventional implementation theory in the study of urban development, and calls into question longstanding interpretations of federal-provincial-municipal relations and multilevel governance in Canada.

Dozens of major cities around the world have launched large-scale waterfront redevelopment projects over the past fifty years. Absent from this list of noteworthy achievements, however, is Toronto, a case of grand ambitions gone horribly awry. Despite three extensive revitalization plans in the second half of the 20th century, Toronto’s central waterfront, an area roughly double the city’s central business district, has remained mired in political gridlock for decades. The purpose of this dissertation is to explain why this came to pass. Informed by extensive archival and interview research, as well as geospatial data analyzed using Geographic Information Systems software, the thesis demonstrates that above and beyond political challenges typical of any major urban redevelopment project, in Toronto, issues of land ownership — specifically, public land ownership — were pivotal in defining the scope and pace of waterfront planning and implementation. Few, if any, waterfront redevelopment projects around the world have been attempted amidst the same degree of public land ownership and jurisdictional fragmentation as that which plagued implementation efforts in Toronto. From 1961-1998, no less than 81% of all land in the central waterfront was owned by one public body or another, dispersed across a patchwork of public agencies, corporations, and special purpose authorities nestled within multiple levels of government. Such fragmentation, specifically across public bodies, added a layer of complexity to the existing intergovernmental dynamic that effectively crippled implementation efforts. It created a “joint-decision trap” impervious to conventional resolution via bargaining, problem solving, or unilateral action. This tangled political history poses a considerable challenge to conventional liberal, structuralist, and regime-based theories of urban politics derived from US experiences. It also highlights the limits of conventional implementation theory in the study of urban development, and calls into question longstanding interpretations of federal-provincial-municipal relations and multilevel governance in Canada.

本文以「歷史制度主義」為途徑，去分析毛澤東時期「二線分工」的運作與變遷。並就「歷史制度主義」的三個主要觀點，包括「路徑依賴」、「關鍵點」以及「漸續平衡」為架構，去鋪陳本文的論證。 首先，在「路徑依賴」上，本文認為因「民主集中制」的矛盾，使得中共政治在運作上，衍生出另一套非正式制度以修補之。而「二線分工」就是這套非正式制度，其目的是為了防制「民主集中制」的三項缺失，包括權力集中、非正式政治的影響以及政治繼承的危機。是故，只要中共堅持「民主集中制」，則「二線分工」就會成為一項路徑依賴，以修補「民主集中制」的缺失。毛時期「二線分工」的起點是在一九五六年九月的八大，該會決議重組中央書記處，以作為和中央政治局分工的機構。因此，開啟了毛時期「二線分工」的運作。 其次，在「關鍵點」的改變上，以一九五九年四月，毛辭去國家主席，退居政務二線為重要的關鍵。促成該關鍵點的成因上，可以「內因」和「外因」分別說明之。「內因」是起於反右運動、大躍進運動以來，逐步繁瑣的內政事務，使得毛決心辭去國家主席，以減輕工作負擔。「外因」則起於中蘇關係的惡化，使得毛有意識的了解培養革命繼承人的重要性，遂將劉少奇扶植至政務一線，以培養其接班能力。 最後，在「漸續平衡」上，在歷經一九五九年四月的「關鍵點」後，中共的「二線分工」運作由原來的「優勢政治」型演變為「權力平衡」型。在「關鍵點」之前，毛集黨務、政務一線於一身，可以直接參與黨務與政務決策的制定，因此呈現出以毛為主的「優勢政治」運作。但在「關鍵點」之後，毛雖仍居黨務一線，但因退居政務二線，所以大幅減少對於重要會議的直接參與，部分決策權轉移至劉少奇、鄧小平手中，故乃呈現出一、二線互為抗衡的「權力平衡」型。 本文在最後的結論，將討論毛時期立下的「二線分工」運作，對於後毛時期的延續性。此外，將提出中共政治的「二線分工」模式，以做為本論文的研究發現與研究成果。 / In the political regime of CCP, democratic centralism is the formal system of an organized form. “Two-front arrangement” is informal system, which is used to renovate three defects of democratic centralism, including the effects of informal system, power centralization, and the crisis of political successor. This article is used three concepts of ”historical institutionalism”, which are path dependence, critical juncture, and punctured equilibrium, to explain the transition of “two-front arrangement” in CCP. First, in the path dependence, “two-front arrangement” is a method used by CCP to repair the deficiency of democratic centralism. Second, the path of “two-front arrangement” was gone through two critical junctures of transition, one is the CCP twelve party congress in 1982, and two is the CCP sixteenth party congress in 2002. At last, the results of these critical junctures produced new punctured equilibrium . The work of “two-front arrangement” changed to patron-client type after the CCP twelve party congress and evolved to functional type after the CCP sixteenth party congress. The change of “two-front arrangement” is gradually evolving to some kinds of institutionalization. From the random type in Mao’s era, the patron-client type in Deng’s era, to the functional type in Jiang’s era, we can find that the “two-front arrangement” has remarkable function to repair three defects of democratic centralism as time went by. So we can take it as the formation of institutionalization. We analyze the “two-front arrangement” during Mao Zedong’s era. “First-front” leaders are those who participated in the policy-making process directly while leaders on the “second-front” are referred to those who only indirectly involved in the process. The article argues that the best way to identify leaders in their affiliation in the “two-fronts” division of work is to have a detailed breakdown on personnel in the highest decision-making bodies, the Politburo and the Central Secretariat. We divide Chinese leadership during Mao’s era into four categories according to official document and reputation and status of the leaders. The article further delineates the operation of the “two-front arrangement” according to the division of work between the party and the state, charisma of the leaders and formal institutions. At the end, we try to assess the impact of the “two-fronts” model on Chinese politics.