Dissertação sobre o regime jurídico das infrações e sanções administrativas aplicadas pelo Conselho Monetário Nacional e o Banco Central do Brasil em conformidade com a legislação do Sistema Financeiro Nacional, especialmente a Lei 4.595/64. Apresenta o regime de distribuição da função legislativa a partir da Constituição Federal de 1998, o sistema jurídico das infrações e sanções administrativas e a diferenciação destas em relação a outros atos derivados do denominado poder de polícia. Em seguida, analisa a recepção pela Constituição Federal de 1988 do modelo normativo trazido pela Lei 4.595/64 e os limites da discricionariedade administrativa para aplicação de infrações e sanções administrativas à luz dos princípios da legalidade e da tipicidade apresentados pela doutrina. / Dissertation on the legal regime of the administrative infractions and penalties imposed by the National Monetary Council and the Central Bank of Brazil in accordance with the rules of the Financial System, especially the Law 4.595/64. Displays the distribution scheme of the legislative function from the Federal Constitution of 1998, the system of legal administrative infractions and penalties and differentiation of these acts in relation to others derived from the so called police powers. It then goes through the reception by the Constitution of 1988 of the normative model issued by Law 4.595/64 and the limits of the administrative authorities discretion for application of administrative infractions and sanctions in the light of the principles of legality and typicality as presented by the doctrine.

La protection pénale du consommateur conduit à envisager une union entre le droit pénal et le droit de la consommation, laquelle n’est pas évidente. En effet, le premier est tourné vers la protection de la société alors que le second a pour objet la protection d’une personne, le consommateur. Si l’intégration de l’action de groupe tend à donner au droit de la consommation une dimension plus collective, ces deux matières conservent cependant des finalités distinctes. Malgré l’opposition, le constat est sans appel : un rapprochement existe mais, surtout, la protection pénale semble être omniprésente. Dès lors, pourquoi y-a-t-il un recours quasi-systématique au droit pénal ? Ce recours est-il légitime ? De fait, la finalité de la protection et la nature de celle-ci sont incertaines. En réalité, il apparaît que, d’une part, le but poursuivi est essentiellement la protection du marché, et que, d’autre part, les méthodes empruntées au droit pénal traduisent plus une volonté de régulation que de répression classique. Le consommateur bénéficie bien d’une protection renforcée, mais sur un double constat : d’abord, elle n’est pas directe, ensuite, elle est la conséquence d’une dénaturation sensible du droit pénal. La création de nombreuses sanctions administratives par la loi Hamon du 17 mars 2014 ne peut que conforter cette évolution, tout comme la récente recodification à droit constant opérée par l’ordonnance du 14 mars 2016 ne la contredit en rien. / Criminal protection of the consumer leads to the consolidation of criminal and consumer laws. This burden on business is not obvious. Indeed, the criminal law is geared towards the protection of society whereas the purpose of the consumer law is to give redress to individuals, who, in this case, is the consumer. Regardless of whether introducing the concept of group action would give a more collective dimension, the criminal and consumer law retain distinct purposes. Despite arguments to the contrary, the findings are clear: common ground does exist but, more importantly, protection derived from the criminal law seems to be the sole solution used. We may ask why this near-systematic use of the criminal law should exist and if it is justified. Indeed, the aim of this type of protection and its nature are uncertain. Pragmatically, it would appear that the aim is mainly market protection yet the techniques borrowed from criminal law translate more into a willingness to regulate than to formally punish. The consumer does indeed benefit from enhanced protection but this comes with two costs: firstly, it is indirect thus it is a noticeable misrepresentation of the criminal law. Secondly, the creation of a plethora of administrative sanctions by the “Hamon law” of March, 17 2014 serves only to confirm this evolution.The ordinance of March 14, 2016 only reinforces this trend.

Häktning är ett av de mest ingripande tvångsmedel som staten kan vidta gentemot enenskild person. I kombination med restriktionsanvändning riskerar det att kränka ett flertalav den enskildes grundlagsskyddade rättigheter. Att reglera en häktningslagstiftninginnebär att göra en noggrann avvägning mellan de brottsutredande myndigheternas möjlighetertill en effektiv utredning samt lagföring och den enskildes skydd för grundläggande fri- och rättigheter. Med en så ingripande åtgärd mot en ännu ej dömd person är det av största vikt att ställa höga krav på reglering och tillämpning av tvångsmedlet och dess överensstämmande med grundläggande principer och rättigheter. Senaste årens ökningav häktningstider är således oroande och kräver förändring. Sverige har under flera decennier fått återkommande och omfattande kritik för sin regleringkring häktning. Kritiken har riktat sig mot att det inte finns någon övre tidsgränsför hur länge en person kan sitta häktad, en omfattande restriktionsanvändning samt avsaknaden av effektiva alternativa tvångsmedel till häktning. Till följd av kritiken presenterade regeringen år 2020 ett flertal förslag som syftade till en effektivare häktningsreglering. I min framställning kommer jag ta sikte på möjligheterna att minska de långa häktningstiderna.Flertalet av förslagen har indirekt betydelse för möjligheterna att minska delånga häktningstiderna och det mest omdebatterade förslaget är det om införandet av enövre tidsgräns för hur länge man får sitta häktad.I min slutsats argumenterar jag för att nuvarande utformning och tillämpning av häktningsregleringenkan antas strida mot överordnad rätt och i viss mån vara anledningen tillde långa häktningstiderna. Jag ställer mig positiv till de förslag regeringen presenterar isyfte att förändra nuvarande häktningslagstiftning. Jag tror det finns en stor sannolikhet för att förslagen kommer kunna leda till minskade häktningstider. Samtidigt ställer jag mig tveksam till i vilken utsträckning den maxtidsgräns som presenteras kommer lösasamma problem. Visserligen anser jag att den gräns som presenteras är viktig ur legalitetssynpunkt, men att den inte i tillräcklig utsträckning avhjälper den proportionalitetsproblematik som förekommer. Jag är inte heller övertygad om att häktningstiderna faktiskt kommer minska till följd av införandet av denna gräns. Konsekvenserna av förslagen innebär på det stora hela en minskad användning av häktning, en mindre godtycklig häktningsprocess och minskade häktningstider. Förhoppningen är att förslagen i viss mån kommer underlätta för åklagare och domstol vid beslut om häktning och särskilt bedömningen av huruvida häktningen är proportionerlig eller ej. Jag menar emellertid att mer kan göras för att komma tillrätta med nuvarande häktningsregleringoch långa häktningstider varför ytterligare förslag på förändring kommer presenterasi denna framställning. / Pre-trial detention is one of the most intervening means of coercion that the state authorities can use against an individual. In combination with the use of restrictions there is risk that it will infringe a numerous of the constitutional rights of the individual. To regulatet he law of detention means to balance the interests of the possibilities of the stateauthorities to an efficient investigation and prosecution and the individuals protection oftheir constitutional rights. With such an intervening action against a not yet condemnedperson it is of paramount importance to ensure high demands on the regulation and applicationof the means of coercion and its compatibility with constitutional principles andrights. The increasing times of pre trial detention the last couple of years are therefore agitating and requires a change. Sweden has during several decades received recurrent and extensive criticism regardingits regultation on detention. The critic has been adressed against that there is no upperlimit for how long a person can undergo pre-trial detention, a comprehensive use of restrictions and the lack of efficient alternative means of coercion to pre trial detention.Following the criticism the government 2020 presented a numerous proposals on how to change the legislation in purpose of a more efficient regulation of detention. In my thesis I focus on the possibilities to decrease the long times of detention. Most of the proposalsare of relevance for the possibilities to decrease the long times of detention and the most debated proposal is the one regarding the imposition of an upper limit of how long aperson can remain in continual detention.In my conclusion I argue for that the present regulation and application of detention canbe assumed to infringe superior constitutional law and to a certain extent be the cause of the long times of detention. I remain positive towards the proposals the government present in order to change the current regulation of detention. I think it´s highly likely thatthe proposals can lead to shorter times of detention. At the same time I remain doubtfultowards in what extent the upper time limit that is presented can solve the same problem. Indeed I believe that the presented limit is important in an aspect of legality, but that it´s not enough to remedy the complex problem of proportionality that exists. I´m neitherconvinced that the long times of detention actually are going to decrease as a consequence of the imposition of this limit.The consequences of the proposals can overall lead to reduced use of detention, a less arbitrary detention process and shorter times of detention. Hopefully the proposals canfacilitate for public prosecutors and courts regarding decisions of detention and especiallythe assessment of whether the detention is proportional or not. However, I mean that morecan be done to settle current regulation and long times of detention why further proposals will be presented in this paper.

Principbaserade standarder ger vag vägledning om hur standarder ska följas och de lämnarstort utrymme för tolkning och bedömning. I inkomstskattelagens 14 kap. 2 § uttrycks det attresultatet ska beräknas enligt bokföringsmässiga grunder samt att beskattningstidpunkten skafastställas i enlighet med god redovisningssed. Skatterättens legalitetsprincip uttrycker iregeringsformen att det måste finnas stöd i lag för att ett brott ska ha begåtts och inget straffkan annars påvisas. Det uttrycks därmed att ingen skatt får tas ut om det inte finns lagliggrund. Då företag ska fastställa beskattningstidpunkten i enlighet med god redovisningssed,kan det ge upphov till redovisningsmässiga skillnader. God redovisningssed som begrepp, ärsvårtolkat och kräver kompletterande normgivning för att skapa dess innebörd.Problematiken som återfinns då principbaserade normer påverkar ett företags beskattningtydliggörs främst då ett materiellt samband råder mellan redovisning och beskattning. Ettmateriellt samband innebär att redovisningsregler görs gällande även vid beräkning av detskattemässiga resultatet. Det materiella sambandet återfinns i inkomstskattelagen dåhänvisning görs till god redovisningssed. Enligt bokföringslagen är det Bokföringsnämndensansvar att utveckla god redovisningssed. Bokföringsnämnden har därför tagit framallomfattande regelverk som ska ge vägledning åt företag som upprättar redovisning efter godredovisningssed. K-regelverken ska gälla för företag i olika kategorier, beroende på dessstorlek. Studien undersöker de två vanligaste regelverken, K2 och K3.Syftet med studien är att undersöka om principbaserade normer är förenliga medlegalitetsprincipen. För att besvara studiens syfte genomförs en komparativ innehållsanalys avBokföringsnämndens K-regelverk, K2 och K3. Vi ämnar avgöra till vilken grad normernaskaraktär i K2 och K3 bör anses vara regel- respektive principbaserade samt dess förenlighetmed legalitetsprincipen och regeringsformen. Vid inledningen av denna studie kunde interelevant och tillräcklig forskning hittas inom området, varpå studien syftar till att bidra medkunskap. Vi vill även uppmärksamma problematiken då skatterätten hänvisar tillredovisningens god redovisningssed när tidpunkten för redovisning av intäkter och kostnaderska ske.Genom en modell har vi tydliggjort vår analys avseende normernas karaktär i K2 och K3.Modellen innefattar två dimensioner, dels till vilken grad normerna anses regel- respektiveprincipbaserade och dels till vilken grad normerna bör anses förenliga medlegalitetsprincipen. För att besvara studiens syfte har vi undersökt följande normer somåterfinns i båda regelverken: grundläggande principer, definitioner av tillgångar, skulder,intäkter och kostnader, materiella anläggningstillgångar, immateriella anläggningstillgångar,varulager, avsättningar och periodiseringar. Studiens slutsats är att principbaserade normer tillstörre grad bör anses som icke förenliga med legalitetsprincipen då de tillåter att analogislutkan tillämpas i redovisningen. Principbaserade normer i redovisningen skapar storttolkningsutrymme, vilket kan medföra att likartade företag upplever skillnader iredovisningen och följaktligen även skattemässiga skillnader. Således ska normerna i K3 inteanses vara förenliga med legalitetsprincipen och därmed anses grundlagsstridiga. / Principal-based standards give few guidelines of how the standards should be followed andthey give room for interpretations. The income tax act expresses that the income statementshould be calculated through accrual basis and the taxation time should be determined bygenerally accepted accounting principles. On the other hand, the tax law expresses a principleof legality in the governmental law that states that there has to exist a legal support for a crimeto be committed and no penalty can otherwise be addressed. When generally acceptedaccounting principles should determine the time of taxation it generates accountingdifferences. The term of generally accepted accounting principles is difficult to interpret andrequires additional standards to create its meaning.The problem that exists when principle-based standards affect a company’s taxation, clarifieswhen there is a material relationship between accounting and taxation. A material relationshipmeans that the accounting rules are applicable even for the taxable income. The material linkexists when the income tax act refers to generally accepted accounting principles, when thetaxation time should be determined. The Swedish Accounting Standards Board has thereforeestablished comprehensive framework’s that aims to guide companies when accountaccording to generally accepted accounting principles. The K-regulations shall apply forcompanies in different categories depending on their sizes. The study examines the two mostcommon frameworks, K2 and K3.The purpose of this study is to examine if principle-based standards are consistent with theprinciple of legality. To achieve the purpose of this study, a comparative content analysis ofthe The Swedish Accounting Standards Boards K-regulations, K2 and K3, is conducted. Wewish to evaluate to what extent the standards characteristics are rule- or principle-based and toevaluate the extent of the standards consistency with the principle of legality and thegovernmental law. In the beginning of this study we did not find enough relevant literature inthe field of study and we therefore want to contribute with knowledge. We also want toobserve the problems that the tax law contributes when it refers to the term of generallyaccepted accounting principles.We have clarified our analysis of the standards in K2 and K3 in a model. The modelincorporates two dimensions, partly to what extent the standards should be considered as ruleorprinciple-based and partly to what extent the standards should be considered consistentwith the principle of legality. To achieve the purpose of this study we examined standards thatoccur in both frameworks: fundamental principles, definition of assets, liabilities, incomesand costs, tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, inventories, provisions and accruals. The conclusion of the study is that principle-based standards in a large extent should beconsider non consistent with the principle of legality due to that an analogy is permitted inaccounting. Principle-based standards create room for interpretation, which leads todifferences between similar companies both in accounting and in taxation. The standards inK3 should accordingly not be considered consistent with the principle of legality.This study is further on written in Swedish.

L'existence de mécanismes efficaces de contrôle de l'activité administrative est une problématique commune aux pays européens. Le contrôle des juges y apparaît fondamental. Il est un gage de la soumission de l'administration au droit, via le respect du principe de légalité. Le rôle qu'ils jouent ne selimite toutefois pas à cette simple fonction. C'est ce que tend à démontrer une étude comparée globale du recours pour excès de pouvoir français et la judicial review anglaise. Alors que chacun de ces deux mécanismes apparaît comme une forme limitée de contrôle de la légalité, ils ont en réalité une portée plus étendue. Sous l'effet du développement des contraintes pesant sur l'action administrative, conséquence de l'enrichissement normatif des ordres juridiques, le rôle des juges s'accroît. La place qu'ils occupent au sein des institutions nationales doit être clairement définie, afin d'en assurer la légitimité.N'étant plus uniquement les garants de la volonté d'un Parlement de plus en plus contraint, les juges voient les fondements de leur rôle être renouvelés. La liberté dont ils disposent va croissante. Ce mouvement révèle leur double figure : tantôt acteurs du contrôle de légalité, et principal outil de soumission de l'administration à un droit en constant développement, ils sont également un moteur de ce mouvement. Cela leur permet d'en fixer les limites afin de ne pas scléroser l'activité administrative, elle aussi porteuse d'une légitimité propre. L'étude comparée du recours pour excès de pouvoir et de la judicial review permet la mise en lumière de cette dualité : les juges en définissent les différentes facettes et participent ainsi activement à la définition de leur propre rôle. / The existence of efficient mechanisms of control for administrative activity is a common problem in European countries. Judicial control is of primary importance. It is a guarentee of the respect of law by public authorities, through the principle of legality. But, the role of judges is not only defined by this function. This can be demonstrated by a global comparison of the French recours pour excès de pouvoir and the English judicial review. While both mechanisms seem to allow a limited control of legality, the picture is not as simple. Because of the development of the strains on administrative action, due to the normative enrichment of legal orders, the role of the judiciary is extending. The position of judges within national institutions has to be clearly defined, in order to guarantee their legitimacy.As they can no longer be described as protectors of the will of Parliament, the foundations of their role is reassessed. Their discretionary power is increasing. It reveals their dualiaty: they are active in the control of legality, and as such they are the main instrument of the submission of public authorities to a developing legality, and they are also actors of this movment. As such, they draw limits in order not to ossify administrative activity, which is also legitimate. The comparision between the recours pour excès de pouvoir and judicial review can reveal this duality : the judges define its various aspects and actively participate to the definition of their own role.

On the 1st of January 2009, a new regulation regarding interest deduction limitations was enforced. The aim was to prevent tax structure with interest deductions in a community of interest. The changes meant that intra-group share transfers, which generates an intra-group loan structure, can lead to borrower losing their right to deduct interest expenses. Except from the main rule two exceptions were also introduced. These eliminates the limitations, and accept the deductibility despite the above conditions. The exceptions are named ten-percent rule and “ventilen”. It was found that Swedish municipal communities also engaged in such arrangements. As a result of this discovery the Swedish Tax Authority was delegated the task to investigate companies that are in a community of interest with a fully or partially exempted taxpayer in general and its relationship to the tax structure of interest deductions in particular. The application of “ventilen” creates problems regarding the definition of business purpose as well as the relationship between business and organizational purposes. The assessment of organizational purposes is of particular importance for municipal communities of interest where transparency, control and quality assurance are of great importance. Needs of rationalization and organizational changes occurs continually within municipal community groups. Unclarity due to organizational purpose makes these changes, within the municipal communities, problematic. Both municipal communities as well as experts regard the deduction limitations due to municipal community interest unclear. Due to the unclarity a few municipal communities have chosen to switch their internal loans to ones through Kommuninvest. This to avoid the rising risk-taking as any interest deductibility limitations may entail. The Swedish High Administrative Court has in their judgements expressed their support for this kind of loan structure. It is unclear how the law concerning “ventilen” should be applied in regards to municipal communities interest, which also raises questions about “ventilens” compatibility with the principle of legality. The High Swedish Administrative Court has solved the problem, at least for now, by approving an alternative approach, the one including Kommuninvest, which thereby reduces the stress for the Court to come to a conclusion regarding “ventilens” proper functioning and application. / Den 1 januari 2009 trädde en ny lagstiftning i kraft gällande ränteavdragsbegränsningar. Syftet var att förhindra skatteupplägg med ränteavdrag inom en intressegemenskap. Förändringarna innebar att koncerninterna andelsöverlåtelser, som genererar en koncernintern upplåning hänförlig till lånet, kan resultera i att låntagaren förlorar sin avdragsrätt för ränteutgifterna. Till huvudregeln infördes två undantag som undanröjer begräsningen, och godtar avdragsrätt trots ovan förutsättningar. Undantagsreglerna betecknas tioprocentsregeln samt ventilen. Syftet med ränteavdragsbegränsningarna är att förhindra skatteupplägg med ränteavdrag inom intressegemenskaper, och då främst inom privata internationella sådana. Det har dock framkommit att även svenska kommunala intressegemenskaper ägnar sig åt dylika upplägg. Med anledning av denna upptäckt fick SKV i uppdrag att utreda bolag som befinner sig i intressegemenskap med helt eller delvis skattebefriade skattesubjekt i allmänhet samt dess relation till skatteupplägg med ränteavdrag i synnerhet. Tillämpningen av ventilen, i förhållande till kommunala intressegemenskaper, genererar problem gällande såväl definitionen av affärsmässigt samt relationen mellan affärsmässiga och organisatoriska skäl. Bedömning kring organisatoriska skäl blir av stor vikt för kommunala intressegemenskaper där insyn, kontrollutövande och kvalitetssäkring är betydelsefullt. Det uppkommer ständigt behov av effektivisering och förändring för att kunna uppnå en acceptabel nivå av kontroll och inblick i bolagen som kommunen äger och förvaltar.  Då rättsläget enligt kommuner och sakkunniga är oklart har flertalet kommunala intressegemenskaper lagt om sina interna lån via Kommuninvest. Det har gjorts för att undvika det ökade riskatagande som en eventuell förlorad ränteavdragsrätt kan komma att innebära. HFD har i praxis uttryckt sitt stöd för denna typ av omläggning. Gällande rätt bör dock anses vara oklar gällande ventilens tillämpning inom kommunala intressegemenskaper, vilket även väcker frågor kring ventilens kompatibilitet med legalitetsprincipen. HFD kan dock ha ansetts finna en, om än en provisorisk sådan, lösning på problematiken genom att godkänna en omläggning till Kommuninvest som därmed minskar stressen för HFD att komma till en slutsats gällande ventilens korrekta tolkning och tillämpning.

Le droit est devenu de plus en plus illisible et compliqué. Les causes de ce mal juridique sont multiples, il s’agit d’une part, de ce qu’on a appelé une inflation législative où le rythme d’élaboration et de modification des textes juridiques bat tous les records. D’autre part, cette complexité normative a été renforcée par l’apparition de matières juridiques nouvelles faisant appel à des concepts techniques et scientifiques, il s’agit par exemple du droit des nouvelles technologies. Enfin, la crise de la norme juridique est due aussi à la dégradation de la qualité rédactionnelle des textes. Pouvoirs publics et personnes privées s’accordaient pour dénoncer un phénomène d’insécurité juridique. C’est dans ce contexte que le Conseil d’Etat a consacré un principe de sécurité juridique comme moyen de remédier à ce phénomène. Au lendemain de cette consécration la doctrine dans sa majorité estimait qu’il s’agissait d’un principe qui respecte la portée objective de notre droit administratif. Nous avons estimé, avec d’autres, qu’il s’agit en revanche d’un principe inspiré du principe de protection de la confiance légitime. Celui-ci d’origine allemande, et adopté par le droit Communautaire et celui de tous les Etats européens, est de portée subjective. Ainsi nous avons développé l’idée qu’à travers le principe de sécurité juridique, le Conseil d’ Etat consacre un droit public subjectif à la sécurité juridique qui rompt avec cette tradition objective du droit administratif français. En effet, depuis la consécration du principe de sécurité juridique, notre droit administratif prend une tournure subjective. / Law has become increasingly illegible and complicated. The causes of this are multiple, it acts on the one hand, of what one called a legislative inflation where the rhythm of development and modification of the legal texts breaks all the records. In addition, this normative complexity was reinforced by the appearance of new legal matters calling on technical and scientific concepts, such as for example new technology law. Lastly, the crisis of the legal standard is due also to the deterioration of the editorial quality of the texts. Public authorities and individuals agreed to denounce a phenomenon of legal insecurity. It is in this context that the Council of State stated a principle of legal security like means of curing this phenomenon. After this decision, the doctrines in its majority estimated that it was a principle which respected the objective range of our administrative law. With others, we feel that it is principle inspired of the principle of protection of legitimate confidence.This one, of German origin, and adopted by the Community law and that of all the European States, is of subjective range. Thus we developed the idea that through the principle of legal security, the Council of State establishes a subjective public right to the legal security which breaks with this objective tradition of the French administrative law. Indeed, since the principle of legal security is proclaimed, our administrative law takes a subjective turn.

La recherche s’intéresse aux rapports qu’entretiennent le droit de l’UE et les systèmes répressifs nationaux italien et français. Elle vise notamment à analyser les problèmes posés par l’influence croissante des sources européennes sur l’exercice par les Etats du droit de punir. Elle analyse également la compatibilité des obligations européennes de punir par rapport au principe de la légalité des délits et des peines, consacré au niveau constitutionnel en Italie et en France. En effet, quoiqu’issus d’une même tradition romano-germanique, ces deux systèmes semblent consacrer des conceptions sensiblement différentes du principe de la légalité. Par exemple, alors que le droit italien conçoit la légalité surtout comme relevant de la loi au sens formel, le système français semble insister sur la clarté, l’intelligibilité et l’accessibilité de la norme pénale qui seules peuvent en assurer la prévisibilité. Compte tenu de la pratique de la Cour de Justice d'interpréter le droit européen selon les traditions communes aux États membres, la comparaison entre les systèmes juridiques de deux États membres permettra de mieux apprécier les choix opérés dans le cadre de l'harmonisation européenne en matière pénale.Une fois le principe défini, la deuxième partie du travail se concentre sur la possibilité d'utiliser les obligations de criminalisation et la primauté du droit de l'Union pour protéger les droits fondamentaux des victimes. A ce propos le travail vise à un équilibre entre légalité pénale et protection effective des droits fondamentaux qui découlent de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.Descripteurs : Principe de légalité des délits et des peines, obligations d’incrimination ; droit pénal comparé ; droit pénal européen ; droits fondamentaux ; droits des victimes. / The research focuses on the influence of the EU competence in criminal law on Italian and French criminal systems. More specifically it refers to the impact of this competence on the traditional principle of legality and on individual safeguards it represents. The first part deals with the increasing Union’s power to impose specific obligations of criminalization in relation to the fundamental principle of legality in criminal law. This principle acquires different meanings according to different national systems. While in Italy it is mainly conceived as a statute monopoly, France considers clarity, ascertainability and foreseeability of criminal norms as the main aspect. The research analyses whether it is possible to set aside certain national specific features in order to achieve a new European common definition of the principle of legality. Given the practice of the Court of Justice to interpret Union law according to traditions common to Member States, the research has been conducted following a comparative approach. A comparative analysis makes it possible to better assess the choices made by the European Union towards harmonization in criminal matters.The second part of the thesis concerns the possibility to use EU obligations of criminalization and the primacy of Union law to protect fundamental interest, in particular fundamental rights of victims. The research aims therefore at finding a compromise between the legality principle in criminal law and an effective protection of fundamental rights stemming from the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.Keywords: Principle of legality ; obligations of criminalisation ; comparative criminal law ; EU criminal law ; fundamental rights; victims’ rights.

Une notion relative (formée d’un concept de base et d’un qualificatif) pourrait apparaître comme unedisposition équivoque. Le principe de légalité impose cependant de fonder toute décision sur unenorme de référence ; la saisine d’une juridiction laisse d’ailleurs supposer que le justiciable en a uneconnaissance spontanée, ni le contexte législatif ni des mesures d’instruction ne suffisant à corrigerl’imprécision linguistique de la loi. Si la coutume permet d’expliciter le concept de base, elle necirconscrit pas pour autant le seuil induit par le qualificatif législatif. La marge d’appréciationprétorienne en découlant ne rend alors la sanction concevable qu’en fonction d’une flagrancefactuelle. Cette dernière conduit à renverser la charge probatoire, en faisant peser sur le défendeurla preuve de la normalité des faits au regard de la norme socialement acceptée. Elle exclut aussi duchamp judiciaire les situations insuffisamment caractérisées, suggérant que le Code civil tolère unepart d’anomalie dans la société et impliquant une personnalisation circonstancielle de la décision. Ensomme, la disproportion des faits est seule sanctionnée et implique une pondération des droits enconflit. Ainsi comprise, la relativité procure au droit quelque souplesse, sans entraîner d’arbitrairejudiciaire : elle permet d’englober des situations marginales dans une même finalité politique. Lerecours aux notions relatives participe donc de l’idée de ne pas réglementer par un droit imposé deplano et révèle le recul de l’ordre public de direction. Le danger réside alors dansl’instrumentalisation de la relativité pour en faire un outil légistique d’exaltation des droits subjectifs. / A relative notion (consisting of a basic concept and a qualifier) could appear as an equivocalprovision. However the principle of legality imposes to base every decision on a reference norm ;referral to a court implies moreover that the person subject to trial has a spontaneous knowledge ofit, neither the legislative context nor investigative measures being sufficient to correct the linguisticimprecision of the law. If custom allows to make explicit the basic concept, it doesn’t for all thatdelimit the threshold inferred by the legislative qualifier. The margin of praetorian appreciationfollowing from it renders then the sanction conceivable only according to factual obviousness. Thelatter leads to reverse the onus of proof by loading the defendant with the proof of the normality ofthe facts with regard to the socially accepted norm. It also excludes from the judicial field theinsufficiently characterized situations, suggesting that the civil code tolerates a share of anomaly insociety and entailing a personalization of the decision for the occasion. In short, only thedisproportion of facts is sanctioned and involves a balancing of the rights in dispute. Understood likethis, relativity gives to the law some flexibility without leading to judicial arbitrary : it affords toinclude marginal situations into a same political finality. The recourse to relative notions is akin to theidea to not regulate by a law imposed ipso jure and reveals the retreat of directional public order. Thedanger lies then in the instrumentalization of relativity in order to make of it a legistics tool pavingthe way for an ill-considered flourishing of one’s rights.

L’approche de la qualification en droit pénal se fait traditionnellement sous l’angle d’une opération intellectuelle dominée par le principe de légalité et, en particulier, par le principe de l’interprétation stricte de la loi pénale. Une telle approche occulte la dimension procédurale de la qualification en droit pénal qui est, pourtant, essentielle à la sauvegarde des libertés individuelles. La conjugaison de ces deux aspects de la qualification en droit pénal aboutit à faire émerger une forme statique de qualification : la qualification pénale des faits. Située entre l’incrimination et l’infraction, la qualification pénale des faits offre un statut intermédiaire où la nature des faits pénaux va être représentée intellectuellement en tenant compte de l’évolution du procès pénal. Plus précisément, la qualification pénale des faits s’analyse en une représentation encadrée et appliquée de la nature pénale des faits. Encadrée doublement par le principe de légalité et le principe du procès équitable, la qualification pénale des faits offre une représentation légaliste et équitable de la nature pénale des faits. Mais l’encadrement de la qualification pénale ne suffit pas à lui seul à l’élaboration de la qualification pénale des faits. Son élaboration commence bien en amont, alors que la qualification pénale des faits n’est que pure présomption dans l’esprit de l’autorité qualifiante. C’est au cours d’une application répressive et symbolique que la qualification pénale des faits se concrétise, faisant ainsi apparaître la qualification pénale des faits comme un objet juridique. D’une opération particulière au droit pénal, la qualification pénale des faits devient, à l’analyse, un concept proposant à l’esprit une manière de concevoir la nature pénale des faits. / The approach of the characterization of the facts in criminal law is generally treated as an intellectual operation ruled by the principle of legality and more particularly by the principle of the strict interpretation of criminal law. Such an approach hides the procedural dimension of the characterization of facts in criminal law which is, however, essential to the protection of individual freedoms. The union of these two aspects of the characterization leads to a static form: the characterization of facts. Situated between the incrimination and the offense, it proposes an intermediate status where the nature of the criminal facts will be represented intellectually taking into consideration the evolution of the criminal trial. More precisely, the characterization of facts is analyzed as a framed and applied representation of the nature of the criminal facts. Framed by the principles of legality and of the right to a fair trial, the criminal characterization of facts offers a legalist and fair image of the criminal nature of the facts. But the frame alone is not sufficient to elaborate the notion of characterization of facts. Its elaboration begins upstream when it is a sheer presumption in the mind of the qualifying authority. It is during the process of a repressive and symbolic application that the characterization of the facts materializes, thus becoming a judicial object. In a manner peculiar to criminal law, the characterization of the facts becomes a concept which suggests a way to apprehend the criminal nature of the facts.