There is widespread agreement that populism is on the rise around the globe. A concept that has been largely associated with Latin America has increasingly become related to the Global North where populists have gained power in several countries in the past decade. Previously, scholars argued that although populism has the ability to rapidly attract popular support it rarely persists in the long term. Yet there are both historical and contempary examples to contradict that notion. Which leads to the question; how do populists sustain power in a competitive democracy? This paper takes a closer look at how populists in power use media strategies to solidify their position. Existing scholarly literature on the use of media by populists is scarce and has mainly been focused on Latin America. For the research purpose, a detailed narrative spanning an eight year period was conducted to account for the media strategies used by populists in the Hungarian government. The results dinstinguish several strategies used by populists in Hungary which can be linked to their success in preserving power. The thesis contributes to the knowledge on populist media strategies and the wide literature on populism.

The 1988 Federal Constitution adopted a guarantor criminal model, which is based on the rule of law, which lists fundamental rights, ensuring the individualization of punishment and establishing limits to the state's punitive power, situations in which guilt plays an important role in maintaining constitutional essence. Regardless of the importance of guilt, it has been suffering a serious crisis generated by the tension between the political-criminal function and the need to determine the proportionality of the penalty applied. The analysis of guilt is now faced not as a constitutional guarantee limiting abuses from the punitive power of the state, but as an obstacle to the application of more severe sentences, giving space to the social need to ward off violence from the social sphere, regardless of the means therefore. In this sense, the satisfaction of the popular clamor for justice gains a prominent place in the criminal jurisdiction, being also adopted as a parameter of efficiency by the Judicial Power. In this context, the concept of justice expected by society is now confused with the maximum application of criminal law, even without compliance with constitutional guarantees. In view of such a scenario, encouraged and propagated by the media, the decisions handed down by the Judiciary Branch are, notably after Criminal Action no. 470/MG, judged by the Federal Supreme Court to follow a new paradigm, utilitarian and with a greater bias corruption and violence aimed at pacification and social welfare, less important if effective mitigation of compliance with the guarantees provided in the constitutional order. A new model of criminal law has been drawn up by the jurisprudence of the STF, which, in order to meet the social anxieties influenced and reverberated by the mass media, makes populist decisions, many in disharmony with the constitutional norm, leaving aside their observance. Constitutional interpretation becomes essential for the maintenance of the constitutional guarantor base, provided it is made according to its essence, rescuing the analysis of guilt, individualizing the sentence, ensuring a subjective judgment of imputation. / A Constituição Federal de 1988 adotou um modelo penal garantista, próprio de um Estado de Direito, elencando rol de direitos fundamentais, assegurando a individualização da pena e estabelecendo limites ao avanço do poder punitivo estatal, situações nas quais a culpabilidade exerce importante papel na manutenção da essência constitucional garantista. Em que pese tal importância da culpabilidade, a mesma vem sofrendo séria crise gerada pela tensão existente entre a função político-criminal e a necessidade de determinação da proporcionalidade da pena aplicada. A análise da culpabilidade passa a ser enfrentada não como uma garantia constitucional limitadora de abusos provenientes do poder punitivo estatal, mas como obstáculo à aplicação de penas mais severas, cedendo espaço à necessidade social de se afastar a violência do seio social, não importando os meios para tanto. Nesse sentido, a satisfação do clamor popular por justiça ganha lugar de destaque na jurisdição criminal, sendo também adotado como parâmetro de eficiência pelo Poder Judiciário. Nesse contexto, o conceito de justiça esperado pela sociedade passa a ser confundido com a aplicação máxima do direito penal, ainda que sem a observância das garantias constitucionais. Diante de tal panorama, incentivado e propagado pelos meios de comunicação, as decisões proferidas pelo Poder Judiciário caminham, destacadamente a partir da Ação Penal nº 470/MG, julgada pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, a seguir novo paradigma, utilitarista e com viés maior de combate à corrupção e à violência, visando atender à pacificação e ao bem-estar social, não importando se efetiva a mitigação da observância das garantias previstas na ordem constitucional. Um novo modelo de direito penal vem sendo desenhado pela jurisprudência do STF, que, visando atender os anseios sociais influenciados e reverberados pelos meios de comunicação, profere decisões populistas, muitas em desarmonia com a norma constitucional, deixando de lado a sua observância. A interpretação constitucional torna-se essencial para a manutenção da base garantista constitucional, desde que seja feita de acordo com a sua essência, resgatando-se a análise da culpabilidade, individualizando-se a pena, garantindo um juízo subjetivo de imputação. / São Cristóvão, SE

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Ivan Filipe de Almeida Lopes Fernandes / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Políticas Públicas, São Bernardo do Campo, 2018. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a relação existente entre a deterioração do contexto econômico e a ascensão eleitoral de partidos radicais (PRs) de direita (PRDs) e de esquerda (PREs) entre 2003 e 2016 na Europa. Partimos da hipótese de que a situação da economia não só gerou um sentimento anti-establishment na população dos países europeus, mas também realçou ressentimentos preexistentes, decorrentes de mudanças na estrutura produtiva e na composição étnica da população desde a década de 1980, com o aprofundamento da globalização produtiva. Estudamos 94 eleições para os Legislativos nacionais de 26 países das Europas ocidental e oriental, o que permite analisar a relação entre indicadores socioeconômicos, variações do sentimento anti-establishment e o desempenho de partidos radicais de ambos espectros políticos. Com o uso de dados em painel, encontramos evidências de que o desemprego constitui a principal variável econômica a afetar o sentimento anti-establishment da população no curto prazo, enquanto a modernização da economia o faz no longo prazo. Além disso, nossos dados mostram que o aumento do sentimento anti-establishment favorece mais os PREs do que os PRDs. Concluímos, assim, que a Grande Recessão trouxe consequências não só econômicas, mas, também, políticas para as democracias europeias, que terão que se adaptar ao novo status alcançado pelos partidos radicais. / This work aims at analyzing the existing relation between the economic deterioration and the ascension of radical right (RR) and left (RL) parties in the period 2003 to 2016 in Europe. We test the hypothesis that the economic situation not only has generated an anti-establishment sentiment in the population of European countries, but also reinforced previous resentments, caused by changes in the productive structure and ethnic composition since the 80s, as a result of the deepening of the productive globalization. We study 94 national legislative elections from 26 Western and Eastern European countries, which enables us to observe the relation between socioeconomic indicators, variations in the anti-establishment and the performance of radical parties from both ends of the political spectrum. Through the use of panel data, we find evidences that the unemployment constitutes the main economic variable affecting the anti-establishment sentiment of the population in the short-term, whereas the modernization of the economy does it in the long-term. Besides, our data show that the increase in the anti-establishment sentiment favors more the RLPs than it does the RRPs. Therefore, we conclude that the Great Recession has brought about not only economic but also political consequences to the European democracies, which will have to adapt to the new status achieved by the radical parties.

While several populist parties with ties to the left side of the ideological scale have become more prominent in the electoral arenas across Western Europe, the literature on populism still has a disproportionate focus on the right. To enhance the existing research on explanatory factors to the electoral fortunes of left-wing populist parties, this study tests two competing theories using multivariate regression analysis. The first theory concerns the effect of mainstream party convergence, and the second, the increased tension between governing parties’ responsive role towards the electorate and their responsible role as national leaders, here operationalized as the implementation of fiscal consolidation. The results show that austerity is conducive to left-wing populist success, and correspondingly supports the theory of the tension between governing parties’ responsibility and responsiveness. However, the effect is weaker when controlling for economic factors, which might be an indication of a partly spurious relationship or the included variables being endogenous. Despite a flexible operationalization, the convergence theory receives marginal to no support and the direction is opposite to what is expected in two of the models, rendering the results even more ambiguous and difficult to analyze. Whereas a lack of variation in the data denotes that the findings should be interpreted with caution, there is hence an indication that existing theories concerning the success of the populist left should not be taken for granted as long as empirical research is limited.

The aim of this study is to describe the characteristics of right-wing populist parties in Europe. The three parties included in the study are the Swedish Democrats (SD), the British National Party (BNP) and the National Front (NF) in France. The study includes a definition of right-wing populism based on previous research and from that an ideal type of a right-wing populist party has been created. The material used in the study to verify how well the parties were consistent to the ideal type and what similarities and differences the parties in the study have are the parties’ political programs and policies. The conclusion of the results is that the parties fit the ideal type even if they differ in a few certain aspects. The BNP is the party most similar to the ideal type, followed by the NF and then the SD.

The Sweden Democrats uses a term to describe a situation where “swedes” are being discriminated against by other ethnic groups and where the elite is promoting this. The term “svenskfientlighet” can be translated as “swedofobia” and in this thesis a speech by the party leader Jimmie Åkesson held during the election campaign that solely was dedicated to this term is being analyzed with the help of tools developed by the scholar Ruth Wodak. Ruth Wodak has previously analyzed the rhetoric by other European right-wing-populist parties like FPÖ in Austria and has asked for other researchers to analyze the speech used by right-wing-populist and extremist parties to get a better understanding for just how these parties construct their different enemies. This thesis show how the Sweden Democrats use a term that has been founded by more extreme parties, groups that they themselves claim they do not have much in common with. The rhetoric has though developed in a populist direction where the party members or even leaders put themselves in a position as victims of a widely spread hostility directed towards them, on the sole basis that they stand up for what is Swedish.

À travers la biographie intellectuelle d’un réformateur et rédacteur en chef de Boston, Benjamin O. Flower (1858-1918), de la création de son magazine, The Arena, en 1889 à sa mort, cette thèse explore les ambiguïtés du progressisme et ses « étranges combinaisons théoriques », selon l’expression de l’historien Robert Wiebe. Flower considérait la corruption, la pauvreté et la faillite morale de la société américaine comme des maladies physiques et spirituelles : les idées hétérodoxes de son temps (populisme, socialisme, expérimentations sociales dans le reste du monde mais aussi médecines et spiritualités alternatives) illustraient l’esprit américain de liberté et se révélaient autant de remèdes pour régénérer l’homme et la société. Flower entendait faire de ses magazines une « arène » où débattre librement pour provoquer un nouveau « Grand Réveil » et assurer le progrès de l’humanité. La fin de sa vie voit Flower aux prises avec les ambivalences de sa lutte pour la liberté. Pendant les années 1910, lors de sa croisade pour la « liberté médicale », il lutte contre la volonté de l’American Medical Association de contrôler les médecines alternatives et contre le projet du gouvernement fédéral d’établir un ministère de la Santé. Sa défense de la liberté de la presse face à la censure de la poste le mène ensuite à travailler pendant la Grande Guerre pour un journal anticatholique, The Menace. Ces controverses sur le sens du progrès et de la liberté permettent de comprendre les fractures culturelles qui divisent le réformisme et, à la faveur de l’érection d’un seul et vrai récit de la modernisation, la relégation de son progressisme antimonopolistique dans les marges de l’histoire. / By using as a case study the intellectual biography of Boston reformer and editor Benjamin O. Flower (1858-1918) from the founding of his magazine, The Arena, in 1889 to his death, this dissertation explores the ambiguities of progressivism and revisits its “strange theoretical combinations,” to use historian Robert Wiebe’s phrase. Flower considered the corruption, the poverty and the moral bankruptcy that plagued turn-of-the-century America as physical and spiritual diseases – the nonconformist ideas of his time (populism, socialism, social experiments in the rest of the world, but also alternative medicine and spiritualities) illustrated the American spirit of freedom and could cure and regenerate individuals and society. Flower wanted his magazines, notably the aptly named Arena, to function as an open forum where ideas could be debated freely, thus bringing about a new « Great Awakening » and ensuring progress. At the end of his life, Flower grappled with the ambivalences of freedom. In the 1910s, he fought for “medical freedom,” struggling against the American Medical Association’s move to control alternative medicine and against the creation of a federal Department of Health. He also defended freedom of the press against postal censorship, which led him to work for an anti-Catholic newspaper during the Great War, The Menace. These controversies over the meaning of progress and freedom shed light on the cultural gaps which divided reformism and led to the advent of the modernization narrative and, as a result, to the relegation of antimonopoly progressivism to the margins of history.

Le thème que nous nous proposons d’aborder dans la présente thèse est celui du populisme comme idéologie avec ses manifestations dans le monde, en Europe et surtout en Roumanie, où ses amples développements ont été à notre avis insuffisamment explorés jusqu’ici. L’hypothèse que nous avançons et que nous essaierons de valider par notre étude est celle que le populisme roumain n’est pas récent ou de fraiche importation, mais qu’il est solidement enraciné dans l’histoire et que ses évolutions ont un intérêt académique certain. L’interrogation méthodique, approfondie de la bibliographie spécialisée nous a révélé l’existence d’un intérêt minimum pour les variantes roumaines du populisme. La bibliographie internationale sur le populisme roumain est restreinte (Ghiţă Ionescu, Aurel Braun, Vladimir Tismăneanu, tous d’origine roumaine, sont actuellement les références citables). En Roumanie, quelques recherches isolées, surtout des dix dernières années, ont abordé des aspects ponctuels.Notre démarche tient sur trois piliers. Un premier chapitre théorique vise à interroger et clarifier la notion de populisme. Nous sommes partis à la recherche du populisme en utilisant la méthodologie de Margaret Canovan et Guy Hermet. Nous avons donc entrepris de refaire l’histoire du concept (narodniki russes, populistes américains, agrariens est-européens de l’entre-deux guerres, populismes latino-américains et d’Europe occidentale d’après guerre. L’étude taxonomique s’est accompagnée d’un passage en revue des conditions locales ayant généré les avatars du populisme sur quatre continents. Nous avons par la suite procédé à un état de la recherche sur la notion de populisme pour aboutir à une définition propre qui intègre des éléments dus à Jaguaribe, Hermet, Albertazzi et Mc Donnel, Laclau.Forts de la définition, nous avons passé en revue les rapports entre populisme et les diverses variantes du nationalisme, en insistant sur le national-populisme théorisé en première par Gino Germani, fort présent en Europe centrale et orientale et sans doute en Roumanie. Nous avons insisté sur les spécificités et les variables (temps, existence d’un leader charismatique) du populisme dans cette région, en retraçant, à la manière de Hermet, l’histoire politique de ces pays (Bulgarie, Hongrie, Pologne, République Tchèque, Roumanie, Slovaquie) avec un accent sur les mouvements considérés (à raison ou à tort) comme populistes.Le premier chapitre constitue la trame de fond du second, qui fait un panorama des avatars du populisme roumain des origines et jusqu’au début de la seconde guerre mondiale. Nous y avons surtout utilisé des sources roumaines (monographies de courants idéologiques, biographies, études et synthèses historiques, collections de revues et journaux, documents d’archives). En Roumanie, le populisme s’est manifesté depuis les débuts de la modernité politique, au XIXe. Le problème paysan a représenté la matrice du populisme roumain et l’examen des solutions pour y répondre constitue le fil conducteur de ce chapitre. Nous en avons dressé l’inventaire :populisme d’État modernisateur à la Peron (prince Cuza), socialisme de Gherea avec la paysannerie en arrière-garde du prolétariat, radicalisme bourgeois de gauche (le poporanism de Stere), populisme romantique et passéiste (le semeurisme de Iorga), boulangisme tardif (général Averescu), paysannisme avec sa doctrine coopératiste (PNP de Maniu et Mihalache), mais aussi le fascisme déviant de la Garde de Fer, qui a ciblé elle aussi les campagnes. Tous ces projets politiques ont illustré l’échec du populisme face aux problèmes de la société roumaine en voie de modernisation.Le troisième chapitre est consacré à la récrudescence populiste après la longue parenthèse communiste. Une analyse du national-communisme de Ceauşescu nous permet d’identifier bien des facteurs ayant façonné la société roumaine de 1989. Le national-populisme a connu un important essor en Roumanie post-communiste. Nous avons mis à profit des recherches internationales (De Waele, Tismăneanu), mais aussi locales comme des discours, articles de presse, sondages, archives électroniques. Nous avons accordé une attention particulière au Parti de la Grande Roumanie de Corneliu Vadim Tudor, le cas typique auquel nous avons consacré une étude. D’autres formations (PUNR, PNG de George Becali, Parti du Peuple – Dan Diaconescu, les anémiques héritiers du Mouvement Légionnaire) ont été passées en revue, pour constater leur inconsistance doctrinaire et leur faible impact électoral. De même, nous avons conclu que le national-populisme roumain post-communiste s’inscrit dans la continuité du national-communisme et très marginalement dans celle de ‘entre-deux-guerres. S’adressant aux perdants de la transition, ces partis ont failli à laisser leur marque. Deux leaders ayant fini en prison, un autre mort, la voie populiste semble momentanément fermée, bien qu’elle ait réussi une percée récente dans le discours des partis mainstream. Notre thèse retient une fin qui saurait aussi bien s’avérer un nouveau commencement. / The theme we intend to investigate in this dissertation is populism as an ideology with its embodiments throughout the world, in Europe and most of all in Romania, where its vast developments have been in our view insufficiently explored until now. The hypothesis we submit and which we shall try to validate by our research is that Romanian populism is not recent or freshly imported, but it is deeply rooted in history and its evolutions are of undoubted academic interest. The deep, thorough examination of specialized bibliography revealed us a limited interest for the Romanian variants of populism. The international bibliography on Romanian populism is far from extensive (Ghiţă Ionescu, Aurel Braun, Vladimir Tismăneanu, all of Romanian origin, are now the quotable references). In Romania, the research is not abundant either, but over the ten last years some individual aspects of the topic have been investigated. Our approach is threefold. A first theoretical chapter aims to questioning and clarifying the notion of populism itself. We set off in search of populism making use of Margaret Canovan and Guy Hermet’s methodology. We have thus ventured to trace back the concept’s history (Russian narodniki, American populists, East-European agrarianisms in-between the world wars, Latin-American and Western European populisms after WWII. The taxonomic study was accompanied by a review of local contexts having generated the avatars of populism on four continents. We have subsequently drawn a state-of-play of the research on populism as a concept in order to come up with our own definition which integrates elements owed to Jaguaribe, Hermet, Albertazzi & Mc Donnel, Laclau.On the solid ground of the definition, we have reviewed the relationships between populism and the diverse variants of nationalism, focusing on the national-populism first theorized by Gino Germani. National-populism is to be widely encountered in Central and Eastern Europe and undoubtedly in Romania. We have insisted on the specificities and variables (time, existence of a charismatic leader) of populism in this region, by recounting in the manner of Hermet the political history of these countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia) with special regard to movements rightly or wrongly considered as populist. The first chapter sets the framework of the second one, which brings about a panorama of the Romanian populist avatars from its origins to the start of WWIII. We have mostly made use of Romanian sources (monographs of ideological trends, biographies, historical studies, collections of magazines and newspapers, documents from the archives).Populism has been a constant presence in Romania, since the beginnings of the country’s political modernity in the 19th century. The peasant problem represents the matrix of Romanian populism and the review of the foreseen solutions to solve it represents the unifying thread of this chapter. We have proceeded to an inventory :modernizing state populism à la Peron (prince Cuza), Gherea’s socialism with the peasantry seen as the rearguard of the proletariat, left bourgeois radicalism (Stere and his poporanism), Romanticist & revivalist populism (Iorga and his sămănătorism), late boulangisme (General Averescu), agrarianism with the underlying cooperatist doctrine (National Peasant Party of Maniu and Mihalache), but also the Iron Guard’s deviant fascism, which targeted rural areas as well. All these political projects illustrated the failure of populism to address the problems of Romanian society on its way to modernity. The third chapter deals with the populist revival in Romania after the fall of communism in 1989. An analysis of Nicolae Ceauşescu’s national-communism enables us to identify many factors having shaped the Romanian society of 1989. National-populism enjoyed massive success in post-communist Romania. We took advantage of international (De Waele, Tismăneanu), but also local research and explored speeches, press items, polls, electronic archives.Particular attention was paid to Corneliu Vadim Tudor’s Greater Romania, the typical case which we studied. Other parties (PNUR, George Becali’s NGP, Dan Diaconescu’s People’s Party, the feeble heirs to the Legionary Movement) were reviewed, only to conclude to their doctrinal shallowness and weak electoral impact. We have come to the conclusion that Romania’s post-communist national-populism is based on the legacy of national-communism and only marginally on the heritage of Romania’s interwar populisms. Targeting the losers of transition, these parties failed to achieve major success. Two of their leaders ended up in prison, a third one is dead, so the populist path seems momentarily shut, though it has managed a recent breakthrough into the discourse of mainstream parties. Our dissertation closes on an end note which may well prove a new beginning. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Orientador: Fernando Teixeira da Silva / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-24T05:25:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Araujo_CamiloBuss_D.pdf: 5977929 bytes, checksum: fbba05f5e02bd679fece451f97368b5b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Entre 1945 e 1964, o Brasil vivenciou um período de criação de partidos políticos e eleições diretas para os principais cargos dos poderes do executivo e legislativo. Foi também um contexto marcado pela euforia desenvolvimentista, por greves e por motins urbanos contra o aumento do custo de vida. O trabalhador na condição de eleitor tornava-se central para a conquista do poder público. Florianópolis, ao contrário de outras capitais ou de cidades com grandes indústrias, não tinha um grande contingente de operários. Sua dinâmica assentava-se na condição de centro administrativo do estado de Santa Catarina. Contudo, a ausência de uma classe operária em sentido "clássico¿ não significou a esterilização das lutas sociais. A partir da análise de fontes variadas ¿ como jornais, pesquisas de opinião, dados eleitorais, documentos parlamentares ¿ essa tese investigou os canais de diálogo estabelecidos entre classes trabalhadoras e grupos políticos. Verificou-se uma conjuntura mais complexa do que as tradicionais interpretações da história política catarinense. Alguns postulados que tomavam o estado como polarizado entre UDN e PSD, com um PTB fraco e restrito ao papel de "fiel da balança¿ no equilíbrio entre os dois maiores partidos, foram relativizados. Interpretações consagradas, tendo por base os resultados das eleições, afirmaram que Florianópolis apresentava "forte predomínio¿ do PSD. Todavia, a investigação das múltiplas experiências tecidas entre candidatos, partidos e trabalhadores, consubstanciada com a análise da distribuição dos votos dos candidatos por regiões da cidade, permitiu enxergar para além da prevalência de uma sigla. Lideranças políticas, lembradas posteriormente como "donos da cidade¿, como Aderbal Ramos da Silva, nem sempre tiveram esse reconhecimento. Personagens taxados de "agitadores¿ ou "demagogos¿, como Manoel de Menezes, foram forças políticas expressivas e, algumas vezes, colocaram em xeque o domínio dos chamados grandes partidos. A relação entre políticos e classes trabalhadoras florianopolitanas não foi e nem pode ser pensada como mera reprodução das movimentações nacionais tampouco como epifenômeno isolado em suas peculiaridades. A partir das relações entre o regional e o nacional, esse trabalho tentou compreender as instáveis alianças entre os atores sociais e os variados meios através dos quais as classes trabalhadoras inseriram a luta por direitos na pauta política da cidade / Abstract: Between 1945 and 1964, Brazil experienced a period of political parties creation and of the establishment of direct elections for the most important positions of the executive and legislative powers. The period was also marked by developmentalist euphoria, strikes and urban riots against the rising on the living cost. The worker, recognized in the voter condition, became central to the achievement of public power.Florianópolis, unlike other capitals or cities with large industries, had no significant contingent of workers. The city¿s dynamic relied on the condition of administrative center of the state of Santa Catarina. However, the absence of a working class in the "classic¿ sense did not mean the sterilization of social struggles. From the analysis of various sources ¿ such as newspapers, opinion polls, electoral data, parliamentary documents, this study investigated the channels of dialogues established between the working classes and political groups. It was verified a more complex conjuncture than the traditional interpretation of Santa Catarina political history. Some understandings of the state as polarized between UDN and PSD, with a weak PTB, restricted to the role of "true balance¿ in the equilibrium between the two major parties, were relativized. Interpretations based on the results of the elections equally affirmed that Florianópolis presented "strong predominance¿ of PSD. However, the investigation of multiple experiences woven among candidates, parties and workers, embodied with the analysis of the vote distributions of the candidate for city regions, allowed seeing beyond the prevalence of one acronym. Political leaders, such as Aderbal Ramos da Silva, later remembered as the 'city owner¿, was not always recognized. On the other hand, characters labeled as "troublemakers¿ or "demagogues¿, likeManoel de Menezes, were significant political forces, sometimes able to put into question the dominance of the so-called big parties. The relationship between politics and the working class from Florianópolis was not, nor can it be thought of, as mere reproduction of national movements, neither as epiphenomenon isolated in its peculiarities. Thus, from the relations between the regional and the national, the present work seeks to understand the unstable alliances between social actors and the various means by which the working classes inserted the fight for rights on the political agenda of the city / Doutorado / Historia Social / Doutor em História

This thesis examines and explains how the three Scandinavian populist radical right parties, the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party and the Progress Party approaches the climate issue in their latest manifesto, and how it has changed over a period of ten years. By means of a content analysis and categorisations of climate scepticism, climate omission and climate measures, this thesis finds explicit evidence of climate scepticism in the Progress Party whereas there is no such evidence for the Sweden Democrats and the Danish People’s Party completely omits the issue. On the other hand, there is evidence of measures to fight climate change in the Progress Party, and the same goes for the Sweden Democrats. However, the only relevant difference when comparing the manifestos over a ten-year period is a decreased usage of statement connected to both climate scepticism and climate action in the Progress Party’s manifestos.