勞資關係中雙方存在合作與對立的態勢，主要的原因在於雙方利益具有衝突與一致之可能性。如何避免勞資間的衝突對立、強化勞資合作，是極為重要的課題。而另一方面，勞工意識抬頭，各種強調勞工權益之社會運動蓬勃發展，促成勞動者力量之提升，企業─私人之經濟體，已不再是僅由資方專制之組織。故，在企業內，勞工參與制度已獲得相當之重視與實施，不僅在決策方面、經營方面有參與之權利外，在企業經營報酬與成果方面，更應讓全體勞工加以分享─亦即經濟民主之概念。 因此，本文乃以經濟民主之概念出發，探討勞工財務參與制度之本質與內涵。蓋勞工財務參與制度早在歐美等先進國家實施已久，其功能、類型、目的、法令規範等等之間，皆因各國之社會、歷史、文化、勞資關係等影響因素下出現相當分歧之現象，頗值得進一步研究與了解。故，本文主要分析英、法、德、美等四國之勞工財務參與制度，包含現況、類型、法令、勞資立場、功能等方面，並將四國之情況作一比較分析，以獲知該制度之演變與目前實務上之運作情形。此外，將國內之勞工財務參與計畫(包含年終獎金、現金分紅、員工分紅配股等)與先進國家作一比較後，可以發現目前我國在法令上缺乏完善之規範外，普遍對於勞工財務參與概念尚停留在員工分紅配股之層級上，並用來作為圖利特定人員之工具。因此，我國如要解決現行制度之缺失，並達成財務參與制度之潛在功能，需從下列三點著手：一、法令規定排除高階經理人員(包含董監事)領取員工分紅配股權利，並限制不合理之領取條件(如差別待遇、不得賣出持有股份期限過長等)；二、加強企業內之勞工參與；三、制定完善之儲蓄投資薪資理財管道，讓勞工可依照本身情況，將薪資或分紅作為長期儲蓄投資之用，以促進勞動者財產形成與經濟生活保障。

邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文在忽略租稅負擔的情況下，探討公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例問題，文中發現：在開放體系下，廠商邊際成本固定並採Cournot數量競爭，唯在公營廠商生產效率較民營廠商生產效率低時政府才有動機將產業民營化，然而實際上租稅負擔會影響到廠商的有效邊際成本，進而影響其產出決策，最後再影響民營化的最適釋股比例。有鑑於此，本文在邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文中導入利潤稅制與公司稅制，別探討此二種稅制的引進如何影響到最適的釋股比例。文中發現：利潤稅的存在將提高政府的最適釋股比例，而且最適釋股比例隨著稅率增加而增加，不過，在利潤稅制下唯在公營廠商生產效率較民營廠商生產效率低時政府才有動機將產業民營化。然而，公司稅對於最適釋股比例影響方向並不明確。比較有趣的是，在公司稅制下即使公營廠商生產效率與民營廠商相同，政府仍有動機將產業民營化，此部份有異於邱俊榮與黃鴻 (2006) 一文所獲致的結果。

本論文主要由三大研究主題組合而成：第一個主題是依照中國金融體系的現況，針對國有銀行、政策性銀行、股份制商業銀行及城市商業銀行等四種不同類型銀行的獲利績效進行比較實證研究。其中的股份制商銀與城市銀行，其資本組成除少數仍有國務院持股（即中央政府持股）外，股東成員擴及地方政府、國有企業及民間企業，股本結構明顯較國有商業銀行及政策銀行多元化。不同的股本結構，尤其是官股比例（政府持股比例）是否對各家銀行的獲利能力產生影響，是本文主要研究興趣所在。本文採用Bankscope資料庫，涵蓋1997至2004年中國大陸49家銀行的財務及股東資料。結果發現：銀行股權結構中，中央政府持股比例越高，銀行獲利表現越差，地方政府持股的影響則較不明顯；而四類銀行中，股份制商銀與城市商銀的表現遠優於國有銀行及政策銀行。但1999年以後中國國有銀行的財務整頓措施的確使得國有銀行的相對表現有所提升。 鑑於外商銀行大舉進入中國金融市場，勢必對中國銀行帶來更多的競爭壓力，本論文第二個研究主題進一步將研究範圍擴及至世界資產排名前一百大的銀行，企圖比較中國銀行與世界百大銀行經營績效的差異。在這個主題中，延續前一主題「股權結構」的重要性，除了官股比例，同時考慮外資持股及本國人持股，分析三類持股對績效的影響，又鑑於總體面的政府治理因素可能對股權與銀行績效的關係產生變化，本研究也將政府治理變數，包括文獻中經常提到的證券市場內線交易情況、政府政策透明度及政府貪污情況等因素納入考量，比較這些因素對中國銀行與百大銀行影響有何差異。實證結果如下：對中國銀行及世界百大銀行而言，政府持股對銀行獲利的影響是負向的，而外資持股的影響則恰相反，開放程度愈高、銀行自由度愈高越有利於銀行績效提升。中國政府越無貪污情況時，越有助於外資持股對銀行績效的正向影響。對世界百大銀行而言，政府越無貪污情況時，越有助於外資持股對銀行績效的正向影響。而政府政策透明度越高，越有助於政府持股與本國人持股的正向影響。 第三個主題探討我國上市櫃公司不同的對外與大陸投資決策對母公司獲利性的影響。本文將投資決策對公司獲利的影響視為內生，也就是投資決策受公司特性因素的影響。同時，我們進一步假設公司的投資決策是分兩階段完成，第一步會先決定是否進行海外投資，一旦確定後，再決定是否赴大陸投資。因為有兩層的投資決策，本文以延伸的Heckman’s Two Stage Method進行估計。 實證結果顯示，在投資決策的影響因素方面，對第一層赴海外投資而言，規模愈大、國際化程度愈高、愈勞力密集的公司愈傾向赴海外投資；對第二層赴大陸投資的決策，影響因素也類似，只是公司規模不再是重要影響因素。至於獲利的影響因素方面，第一類「赴大陸投資的公司」與第二類「未赴大陸但赴其他國家投資的公司」的利潤型態較類似，長期負債對獲利都有負向顯著影響，總資產也傾向負向影響，至於第三類「未從事任何海外與大陸投資公司」的利潤型態則與前兩類不同，總資產與研發支出都呈現顯著負向影響。而三類公司的績效比較部分，第一類公司的平均預期資產報酬率雖若高於第二類，第二類公司又高於第三類公司，但三類公司兩兩之間平均預期資產報酬率的差距並未達統計上的顯著性。 / This dissertation contains three main parts. The first part studies the effects of government owned share on Chinese banks’ performance. After a series of financial reforms in the 1990s, joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks started to boom and play an increasingly important role in China’s banking industry which had previously been monopolized by four state-owned commercial banks. These two new bank-types are considerably more diversified in that the primary shareholders include the central government, local governments, state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, not just the central government. Using 49 Chinese banks’ financial data retrieved from Bankscope, this part examines the effect of different ownership structures, in general, and government-owned-shares, central vs. local, in particular, affect the profitability and risk of banks in China. It also compares the profitability of four types of banks, namely state-owned banks, policy banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks. We conclude that, without equivocation, the higher the ratio of state-owned shares is, the worse is the profitability of the bank. And we also note the profitability of joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks is much better than that of state-owned and policy banks. In light of the ever-growing foreign competition facing Chinese banking industry, the second part expands the sample banks to World’s top 100 banks and studies the differences between Chinese banks and foreign banks from the respects of ownership structure, government governance and bank regulations. Our empirical results reveal that for both Chinese banks and top 100 banks, government owned share has a negative effect on banks’ profitability, while foreign owned share has an opposite effect. For both of them, the more the foreign institutions have access to the banking market and the more freedom the banking industry enjoys, the better the bank performs. For Chinese banks, lesser corruption helps strengthen foreign share’s positive effect on banks’ performance. Furthermore, higher transparency would increase the positive effect of government owned share and domestic owned share. The third part studies the profitability of Taiwan’s listed companies with and without investment in China. Unlike past studies which deal with the decision of investment in overseas and China as exogenous, the decision is endogenous in this paper. That is, the decision making is based on the firm’s characteristic factors. We further assume that there are two hierarchy decisions made by firms when they decide in investing in overseas and China. The first decision is whether it should invest overseas. Once the first decision is made, the next one is whether a firm should invest in China. This two decision model, which allows us to extend Heckman’s two-step method, is referred to as an extended-Heckman method in this paper. Our empirical results regarding the determinants of investing overseas and China are as follows. With respect to the investment in overseas, firm size and export ratio show positive influence on the decision of investment, while capital labor ratio shows negative effect. Next, with respect to the investment in China, determinants are similar except that firm size is no longer significant. Our results regarding the profit performance reveal that for ‘the firms with investment in China’ and ‘the firms without investing in China, only investing other countries’, long term liability ratio has a significantly negative impact on profitability, whereas total asset, R&D expenditure show a negative effect on profitability for ‘the firms without investing overseas, nor investing in China’. As for the performance comparison among firms of these three investment types, the differences are insignificant. This result implies that there are still considerable individual differences among the firms of the same investment type.

隨著國內外相關弊案的爆發，「公司治理」近幾年來一直是企業相當重視的議題。除了由於受到國際環境變化劇烈所影響之外，公司治理也與整體企業監控制度有密切之關聯。在國內外有相當多的學者從不同角度進行公司治理的相關的研究，而主管機關如金管會、證交所等也陸續制定相關的措施，希望能夠盡最大的力量來保障投資人的權益。 本研究主要是藉由公司治理的主要變數來探討企業購併案所造成的超額報酬與公司治理之間的影響，並進一步討論當公司治理愈差時，宣告購併所產生的超額報酬是否會較低。研究期間為民國87年1月至97年3月間，曾發生併購活動的上市、櫃公司，共選取100個樣本。而實證結果如下： 一. 經理人持股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關 二. 大股東股比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著正相關 三. 獨立董事占董事會的比例和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關 四. 董事會的規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈顯著負相關 五. 市值規模和公司宣告購併所造成的超額報酬呈現正相關，但不顯著 另外，本研究也針對公司治理較差的公司去進行研究分析，發現若公司治理較差的公司去從事購併案時，可賺取的超額報酬愈少，而當公司治理愈差時，這種關係將愈顯著。最後，本研究也彙整一些相關建議，以供後續學者、企業以及政府機關做參考。 / As scandals related to managers and the wealth of investors spring up worldwide, corporate governance has become an important issue recently. In addition to drastic international macroeconomics changes, corporate governance is also strongly influenced by overall monitor systems. Scholars around the world have done lots of research regarding corporate governance for decades. In addition, relevant efforts and measures, aimed at protecting investors’ rights and interests, have also been done by authorities such as FSC and TSE. The purpose of the study is to study the relationship between abnormal return of M&A and corporate governance by examining the factors we choose. Furthermore, we discuss if a company performs poorly on its corporate governance system, whether the abnormal return caused by merger deals will also decrease? 100 samples were selected from the listed companies from TSE and OTC between 1998~2008. Main findings include the following： (1). The ratio of the stock held by managers has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (2). The ratio of the stock held by major stockholders has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (3). The ratio of the outside independent directors has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (4). The scale of the board has a negative relationship with abnormal return of M&A. (5). The market value has a positive relationship with abnormal return of M&A Moreover, the study has also done some empirical research on companies whose corporate governance pale in comparison with others and found that those who do poorly on corporate governance tend to make less abnormal return when making acquisition announcements. Last but not least, the study has also made some suggestions for scholars, businesses and government and hope that they may come in handy in the future.

現今，世界經濟脈動迅速，科技發展日新月異，如何在瞬息萬變的趨勢洪流中掠取先機，端賴自身競爭力強弱而定。然而管理當局短視行為的發生，卻易損及企業的競爭優勢，甚至對企業未來有不利影響。造成管理當局短視之因源於多方面，來自資本市場投資人的影響即為其一。而資本市場中，機構投資人往往是大家注目的焦點，因此本研究乃對機構投資人持股比例與管理當局短視行為的關係進行探討，並期望能對公司治理制度的擬定上有所助益。 本研究以民國八十四年至民國九十年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司研究其管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例間的關係，並探究在電子與非電子產業間兩者關係是否相同。此外，本研究亦比較機構投資人與個人投資者，各自持股比例與管理當局短視行為的相關情形，進以探尋真正能發揮監理機制的投資人類別。 實證結果顯示：(1)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例高低有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例間則有顯著的正向關係。(2)在非電子產業中，機構投資人持股與管理當局短視行為呈顯著負向關係，而電子產業中兩者則無顯著關係。(3)管理當局短視行為與機構投資人持股比例變動的幅度有顯著之負向關係，而與個人投資者持股比例變動則有顯著的正向關係。(4)在非電子股產業方面，機構投資人持股比例變動幅度與管理短視行為間無顯著關係；但在電子產業中，則兩者間呈現顯著之負向關係。 / Nowadays, the economy situation is changing so fast and the development of new technology has altered with each passing day. To be ahead of their competitors, firms must sharpen their competitive edge. However, management myopia often damage their competitive advantages and would do harm to the firms in the future. The phenomenon of management myopia is derived from many reason, one of them is the effect of the investors in the capital market. Furthermore, participants in the capital market always pay attention to the behavior of institution investors. Thus, this research explores the relationships between the ownership of institution investors and management myopic. We hope it would be beneficial to the enactment of the system of corporate governance. This research focuses on the relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors of the listed companies in Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2001. It also explores if the relationship is the same in both electronic industry and non-electronic industries. Besides, the study also compares the effect of the ownership of individual or institution investors on the management myopia in order to point out the type of investors that can provide monitory function clearly. The empirical study indicates that (1) there is a significant negative relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of institution investors. Conversely, there is a significant positive relationship between the myopic behavior of management and the ownership of individual investors. (2) In the electronic industry, the relationship between the ownership of institution investors and the myopic behavior of management is not significant. However, it is significant negative in other industries. (3) The change of percentage of ownership of institution investors has significant negative relationship with the management myopia. However, it is opposite to the individual investors. (4) No significant relationship between the institution investors and the management myopic in non-electronic industries. But in the electronic industry, it is significant negative.

本文所稱之「先購後併」乃係指併購公司或公開收購公司於併購或公開收購消息公開前，於市場上先行購買目標公司之股份提前佈局的行為，亦有以「立足點持股」或「預先持股」稱之。於先購後併之情況下，是否併購方有構成內線交易之疑慮，因我國無論證券交易法或企業併購法對此議題皆無明確規定，故素來即存在爭議，實務上亦不乏收購人因建立投資部位而招致內線交易訴訟之案例存在。 本文試以我國內線交易法規範之根源—美國法作為比較法，分析先購後併的情況下，是否併購人或公開收購人本身為內線交易之主體，以及併購人或公開收購人是否得與他人一同建立投資部位，再加入104年7⽉月8⽇公布之企業併購法第27條第10項⾄至第15項關於併購前建立投資部位之最新修訂說明，以及實務案例研析，並於文後嘗試提出本文見解。

La Porta 等人以提高內部人持股可使內、外部股東利益一致，進而降低代理問題的觀點出發，在2002 年發表的實證研究中指出，提高內部人持股有助於提升公司的價值，特別是在對外部投資人保護較差的國家；他們也發現，對投資人保護程度愈好的國家，該國企業的價值也較高。本研究則從提高內部人持股可能產生的代理問題著手，在利弊同時存在之下，以涵蓋範圍更廣、時間更長的樣本，探討在不同的投資人保護環境下，提高內部人持股對公司價值的影響，以及投資人保護程度對於內部人持股集中與分散的公司價值是否也有不同的影響。 本研究發現，在投資人保護較佳的國家，提高內部人持股會傷害公司價值，但在投資人保護較差的國家，提高內部人持股可增加公司價值。另外，公司價值與內部人持股率之間呈現曲線關係，當內部人持股率相對較低時，提高內部人持股對公司價值是弊多於利；當內部人持股水準相對較高時，提高內部人持股則是利多於弊。而投資人保護程度對於內部人持股較分散的公司而言，顯得較為重要。因此，法律層面對投資人的保護程度和內部人持股集中度對於公司價值的影響有顯著的替代效果。 / This paper uses a sample of companies from 34 countries around the world to shed light on the relationships among legal protection of shareholders, ownership structure, and firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate a positive relationship between cash flow, ownership, and firm value, especially in countries with poor investor protection. Besides, they also find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. However, they don’t consider the effect of higher ownership on the cost of stealing, which may cause the controlling shareholders to expropriate more from minority shareholders. Also, their study covers only large firms with a controlling shareholder by one year data. Their results can be restricted to large firms and a particular year. Therefore, we use more comprehensive time series and cross section data to probe into the subject. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that higher ownership improves valuation in poor protection countries while higher ownership deteriorates valuation in good protection countries. In addition, stronger legal protection improves firm value, especially the firms with low ownership concentration. That is, there is a substitute effect of legal protection and ownership concentration on firm valuation. Finally, we also testify that dividends are valued more in poor protection countries and firms with low ownership concentration.

本研究主要在探討近年來兩大租稅改革：兩稅合一制及最低稅負制之施行對上市公司外資持股比率之影響，是否降低外資持有我國上市公司股票之意願，影響我國企業的股權結構。 兩稅合一制施行後，消除股利所得之重複課稅，國內法人股東與自然人實質稅負減輕；但根據所得稅法第七十三條之二規定，非中華民國境內居住之個人、在中華民國境內無固定營業場所及營業代理人之營利事業，其獲配股利所含之稅額，不得扣抵其應納稅額，外資無法享受股東可扣抵稅額消除重複課稅的好處，外資在台投資實質總稅負仍維持為40%，較境內自然人股東之實質稅率6%~40%為高，股東可扣抵稅額比例愈高，外資損失越大。再者，最低稅負制施行主要影響對象為外資持股最多的電子業，且最低稅負制之施行對於公司補繳之稅負，外資股東也無法享受股利抵稅權。故可推論兩稅合一制、最低稅負制之施行及股東可扣抵稅額與上市公司外資持股比率應呈負向關係。 本研究之樣本為民國85年到民國95年及最低稅負制前、後之台灣上市公司。主要實證結果彙整如下： 1、兩稅合一制之施行及股東可扣抵稅額與上市公司外資持股比率呈負向關係，最低稅負制之施行與上市公司外資持股比率呈正向關係，但其效果應為股價指數之影響所致而非最低稅負制之施行；又最低稅負制施行後，外資仍偏好持有公司有效稅率低於10%之股票。 2、另外以民國93年到民國95年資料額外檢測，最低稅負制下限制投資抵減金額之效用，推論投資抵減金額在最低稅負制施行後與上市公司外資持股比率應呈負向關係，實證結果為負向關係但不顯著。 / The objective of this study is to examine whether the implementation of the Imputation Tax System and Alternative Minimum Tax System will affect the willing of foreign investors to invest in listed companies. The sample of this study consists of firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1996 through 2006. The empirical results in this research are summarized as follows: 1、 The implementation of the Imputation Tax System and a firms' imputation tax credit ratios have a negative impact on the percentage of foreign ownership in listed companies, but the implementation of Alternative Minimum Tax System has a positive impact on that. We conduct further examination and find the increasing effect of the percentage of foreign ownership is more rely on the effect of stock index than that of the implementation of Alternative Minimum Tax System. Further, foreign investors still prefer to invest in listed companies whose effect rates are lower than 10%. 2、With the implementation of Alternative Minimum Tax System, the use of investment tax credit was restricted. The empirical result of this study shows that after the implementation of Alternative Minimum Tax System, the investment tax credit has a negative but not significant impact on the percentage of foreign ownership in listed companies.

本研究針對我國1996年至2006年之上市櫃公司，以最終控制集團發生異動之公司作為經營權異動樣本，探討經營權異動之決定性因素，與異動後經營績效表現與公司治理機制間之關聯。 實證結果顯示，董監事持股比率愈低、最終控制者無超額持股、經營控制權與所有權偏離愈大、董監事持股質押比率愈高之公司，其經營權發生異動之可能性愈高。獨立董監事之設置雖與經營權異動之可能性呈正向相關，惟其關聯性未達顯著水準。經營權異動之公司，其財務績效在異動前後並無顯著差異，表示經營權異動之目的可能不在取代無效率之管理當局，也可能表示併購的綜效需要較長的時間才得以顯現。其中，董監事持股比率較高之公司，其經營績效在經營權異動後表現較佳。本研究顯示董監最低持股可發揮利益連結的效果，對於近期金管會擬取消董監最低持股規範之提案，本研究認為有作更深入討論之需要。 / Using companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and GreTai Securities Market over the period of 1996 to 2006, this study empirically investigates the determinants of change in corporate control and the subsequent period performance after the change. The change in corporate control is measured in terms of change in business group of a specific firm. The empirical results show that companies with less shareholdings owned by their board members, inadequate shareholdings to support their control, larger deviation in cash flow right from voting right, and higher ratio of shareholding pledged by their board members, have higher probabilities of occurrence of change in corporate control. However, the result doesn’t support that independent directors play a role in corporate control change. With respect to the firm performance in the period subsequent to the corporate control change, there exists no significant difference as compared to that of prior period. The evidence thus suggests that the replacing unqualified management may not be the primary purpose of corporate control change, or simply that the synergies take more time to show. In addition, this study also finds that firms subject to corporate control change tend to perform better if their board members hold a larger fraction of shares. This result lends itself to the proposal recently discussed by the Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan Taiwan on abolition of requirement of minimal shareholding by the board members. It appears that shareholdings by the board members can have interest-alignment effect.

本論文主要目的係探討政府持股與企業避稅間之關係。本文以2005年至2014年台灣公開發行以上公司為樣本，分析政府持股比例、代表政府董監事席次比例對租稅規避的影響，並檢視公股主導企業之避稅程度。 實證結果顯示，政府持股比例對企業避稅無顯著影響，然而，當代表政府的董監事席次比例愈高，企業會減少避稅行為。此外，研究結果亦指出公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低。進一步分析公股主導之企業和雙權偏離互動對企業避稅之影響。實證分析發現，當股份盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較高，隱含公股主導之企業會透過避稅行為將財富移轉至企業本身；反之，當席次盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低，表示政府掌握董事會席次時，能有效監督企業遵循稅法規定，採用較保守的租稅政策。 / The purpose of this study is to examine the association between government shareholding and tax avoidance. This study uses the data of Taiwan public companies from 2005 to 2014 to analyze whether government shareholding percentage and the ratio of directors held by the government have impact on tax avoidance, and investigate the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies. The empirical results reveal that government shareholding does not significantly affect corporate tax avoidance. However, when the ratio of directors held by the government increases, companies would reduce the level of tax avoidance. In addition, the results also indicate that government-controlled companies are less tax avoidance compared with family-controlled companies. This study conducts further analysis on the influence of the interaction of government-controlled companies and the deviation between control rights and cash flow rights on tax avoidance. The results show that the higher the level of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies than family-controlled companies. It implies that government-controlled companies might transfer fund to themselves through tax avoidance. On the contrary, when the deviation between the ratio of controlled board seats and cash flow rights increases, the government-controlled companies engage in less tax avoidance than family-controlled companies. It represents that when the board of directors is controlled by the government, it could effectively supervise the company to comply with tax regulations, and the company would adopt conservative tax strategies.