本研究旨在探討資訊揭露程度與盈餘管理間是否存有一反向關係，資訊揭露程度較高的公司是否就代表其盈餘管理程度較低。以92年上市資訊電子業為研究對象，實證結果如下： 1.在其他條件不變下，公司資訊揭露程度與盈餘管理兩者呈顯著的負相關，亦即當管理當局盈餘管理程度越高時，可能為保持其進行盈餘管理之彈性，公司資訊揭露程度會越低。 2.然而進一步加入公司目前表現的優劣加以分析，發現此一負向關係僅限於好消息年度獲得實證上的支持；於壞消息年度，揭露程度與盈餘管理間之關係則並不顯著。 3.從時效性的角度觀察發現：揭露程度低的公司，其盈餘反應好消息的時效性雖優於揭露程度高的公司，但兩者並無顯著的不同。揭露程度高的公司其盈餘反應壞消息的時效性則顯著高於揭露程度低的公司。 4.盈餘反應壞消息較好消息及時之關係僅限於資訊揭露程度較高的公司會成立；揭露程度較低的公司，此關係則並不成立。

本益比有資訊內涵存在 (Basu , 1977)，為投資人做投資決策時所廣泛使用。Lev (1992) 認為，本益比發生變動，或是公司本益比與產業平均數存在持續性差異，即顯示公司價值有錯誤評價之可能，因此，本研究將樣本分為三組，透過迴歸分析探討83年至90年間上市公司中，本益比持續性地高於（低於）產業平均數的公司，是否進行盈餘管理，以及相較於其他公司，其盈餘持續性與價格攸關性如何。研究結果發現，本益比持續性地高於產業平均數的公司，其盈餘管理行為並不明顯；本益比持續性地低於產業平均數的公司，確實會進行盈餘管理，使得盈餘持續性較差，但有較好的盈餘價值攸關性。 / There are information in Price-Earnings（PE） ratio so that many investors use it for making decisions. Changing in PE ratio , or PE ratio different from the average of industry over time ,will suggest to managers the possibility of misvaluation. Therefore, the study divides the samples to three parts, using regression analysis to investigate if the firms with PE ratio continuously higher (or lower) than the industry average number will use managerial discretion to proceed earnings management. Besides, comparing to other firms, the two sample companies will have what kinds of characteristics of earnings . The result indicate that the firms with PE ratio higher than industry average number, their earnings management behavior is not obvious. On the contrary, the firms with PE ratio lower than industry average number indeed proceed earnings management, inducing worse earnings persistence and better value relevance of earnings.

近幾年來，財務弊案層出不窮，管理當局參與創造性會計的情事日益嚴重，資本市場陷入紀律危機，徒增成本。為喚醒投資者對於盈餘品質的關注，以及對盈餘管理有更客觀的瞭解，本研究提出兩種不同基礎之盈餘品質分類法，並探討台灣上市公司在盈餘品質分類法下，財務特性與盈餘管理成分的差異。 以往國內文獻多個別探討盈餘品質的內涵，或盈餘管理的現象；將盈餘品質與盈餘管理兩大主題做結合，乃新嘗試。研究主要分為兩大部分，第一部份定義盈餘品質，而第二部分深入盈餘管理的課題。 研究以2002年第3季到2004年第3季，381家台灣上市公司，共3429個樣本點，進行迴歸模型分析。 首先將樣本以：一、盈餘對營運現金流量的關係，及二、應收帳款成長率對營收成長率的比較，共兩種基礎，區分盈餘品質。在區分盈餘品質後，以盈餘品質測試盈餘評價能力與持續性。發現以盈餘對營運現金流量關係作為基礎之盈餘品質，具有增額評價能力，而以應收帳款成長率對營收成長率的比較做為基礎者，無增額評價能力。而兩種盈餘品質對盈餘持續性有顯著貢獻。 第二部分將樣本分為盈餘平滑企業與非盈餘平滑企業，探討盈餘評價功能之強弱，發現在盈餘平滑與盈餘非平滑兩組別中，盈餘平滑化並不影響盈餘評價能力。接著導入盈餘品質，觀察在交叉分組下盈餘評價功能的差異，發現高盈餘品質結合盈餘非平滑化（Quality Non-Smoother）的組別中，有最高盈餘評價係數。盈餘進一步拆解成三個組成份子：營運現金流量，裁量性應計數，與非裁量性應計數。其中，觀察重點在於裁量性應計數，研究同樣加入盈餘品質，測試其評價能力與持續性。發現裁量性應計數具有評價功能，而在兩種盈餘品質指標分類下，高盈餘品質之裁量性應計數，並無增量評價貢獻；在持續性方面，兩種盈餘品質指標同樣對裁量性應計數有正向貢獻。 為測試盈餘品質在盈餘管理誘因下的反應，最後將盈餘管理誘因區分為達成損益兩平與超越前期盈餘兩項目標，並加入盈餘品質，觀察其交互作用。發現在「達成損益兩平」與「超越前期盈餘」兩種盈餘目標下，盈餘管理現象的確存在。加入盈餘品質變數後，在兩種盈餘品質變數之作用下，對「達成損益兩平」與「超越前期盈餘」兩項管理誘因均有抑制作用。 / During the last few years, there have been numerous cases of financial ma-nipulation and scandals of firms and the situation of the managing authority par-ticipating in creative accounting has become worsen which has posed enormous disciplinary risks and unnecessary costs on the entire capital market. In order to invoke the concern of investors towards earning quality and to objectively under-stand more broadly about earning management, this study focused on two dif-ferent earning quality categorization based on different basis. The other aim of this study was to discuss the differences of financial characteristics and earning management that arise under two different earning quality categorizations. Most of the local existing literature discussed separately on the essence of earning management or the phenomenon of earning management; this study would be a completely new attempt, which combined the above-mentioned two topics into one study. The first part of this study focused on the definition of earn-ing quality and the second part discussed in detail on issues concerning earning management. A regression analysis was conducted on 381 publicly listed firms in Taiwan during the period from the third quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2004 and the total sample points were 3429. Firstly, the samples were processed and the samples’ earning qualities were categorized based on: 1. the comparison between earning and operating cash flow; 2. the comparison between the growth rate of account receivables and the growth rate of revenue. After the categorization of earning qualities, earning qual-ity was used to test the ability of earning valuation and the persistence of the earning. It was revealed in this study that the earning quality based on the com-parison between earning and operating cash flow could greatly enhance the abil-ity of earning valuation. On other hand, the earning quality based on the compari-son between the growth rate of account receivables and the growth rate of reve-nue failed to enhance the earning valuation. However, both categories of earning qualities had significant contribution to the persistence of earning. The second part of the study separated the samples into earning smoothing firms and non-earning smoothing firms in order to discuss the power of the ability of earning valuation. The results showed that earning smoothing did not have any impact on ability of earning valuation. The next step was to introduce earning quality into this part of the study and to observe the differences in the ability of earning valuation that arise from cross grouping. It was revealed that the group of high earning quality combining non-smoother had the highest earning valuation coefficient. Earning was further decomposed into three components: operating cash flow, discretional accruals and non-discretional accruals. The focus was on the observation of discretional accruals, and in this part of the study, the earning quality was also introduced in order to test the ability to valuate and the persis-tence of earning. It was discovered that discretional accruals possessed the func-tion of valuation. Furthermore, under the categorization of earning quality indexes with two different bases, discretional accruals with high earning quality had no contribution toward the ability to enhance valuation; however, about the persis-tence, both earning quality indexes had positive contribution toward discretional accruals. Finally, in order to test the reactions of earning quality under the influence of the incentives of earning management, the incentives of earning management were categorized into two groups with two different goals: 1. to reach breakeven; 2. to exceed prior period earning. The earning quality was also introduced to ob-serve the interactions. It was observed that under the two different goals in earn-ing, the phenomenon of earning management did indeed exist. After including the variable of earning quality, under the influences of two different categories of earning quality variables, there was some kind of suppressive effects on the management incentives of “reaching breakeven” and “earning that surpasses the prior period earning”.

本研究係以裁量性應計數字及其組成成分衡量盈餘管理，以審計人員產業別市場佔有率與產業別客戶集中度之綜合衡量捕捉審計品質，探討不同樣本公司之盈餘管理特性，以及審計品質對不同盈餘管理特性之影響。管理者對應計項目的認列通常有某種裁量權，此裁量權可用以顯露私有資訊而增進盈餘的價值攸關性，或可投機性地管理盈餘而減低盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。所以探究盈餘管理行為是增加財務報告資訊性(information)或雜訊(noise)即非常重要。研究內容依盈餘管理特性區分為投機性盈餘管理與訊息發放性盈餘管理二大部分。每一研究內容則是先辨認盈餘管理本質，其次探討審計品質對盈餘管理之影響。在研究設計上，為避免實證代理變數之衡量誤差重大影響結果，乃採用實驗組公司與控制組配對公司相比較，以凸顯出前者之盈餘管理型態。 　　研究結果顯示，門檻公司從事盈餘管理以達前期盈餘門檻，且此盈餘管理不具未來現金流量持續性之涵義，係符合「隱藏當期不利績效、遞延本期不尋常盈餘至未來年度」以減低會計盈餘數字波動性之特性。就自願性盈餘預測此一資訊揭露工具而言，在盈餘預測偏屬樂觀之傾向下，仍有管理者自願揭露壞消息預期，即可知管理者之誠意，不失為一可資信賴之訊號。但自願預測盈餘增加，則不必然具有高公信力。甚至在管理者降低盈餘差距之動機下，易引起管理者操縱盈餘。此為財務報表使用者所需注意。就持股變動此一資訊揭露工具而言，在我國家族企業居多之情形下，增加持股並未代表任何特定之涵義。反而是減少持股所透露之訊息，值得投資人注意，尤須慎防其盈餘操縱行為。 　　面對增加所得之裁量性應計數字，審計品質有效阻止投機性盈餘管理。面對顯露私有資訊之盈餘管理，審計品質能夠協助管理者選擇最能彰顯未來現金流量預期之會計方法，以增強裁量性應計數字與未來現金流量變動之關聯性。在高審計品質所賦予之資訊公信力下，盈餘資訊在投資人之決策過程中有一定之重要性，故投資人發現裁量性應計數字增加（減低）盈餘價值攸關性，因而增加（減低）盈餘評價係數。然而對低審計品質所查核的財務報表，較低的資訊公信力，使盈餘未在投資人評價過程中扮演重要角色，因而盈餘管理特性亦不受投資人重視。 / This research examined characteristics of earnings management and effects of audit quality therein. Specifically, the magnitude of earnings management was proxied by the discretionary accruals, which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Different from prior research, the audit quality was captured by a combined measure of the auditor's market share and client concentration. The market share measured the auditor's competence (industry specialty) and the client concentration measured the auditor's independence. Managers usually exercised discretion to recognize accruals. They could either signal private information to enhance earnings' value relevance, or opportunistically manage earnings to reduce the reliability of earnings as the performance measure of the firm. As a result, it was important to examine earnings management and to identify whether it would increase the informativeness or noise of financial reports. This study was organized according to the characteristics of earnings management: opportunistic earnings management and signaling earnings management. For both parts, the nature of earnings management was identified first, and then the effects of audit quality therein examined. To reduce the impact of measurement errors of proxy variables, the treatment group and controlled group were compared and contrasted to make earnings management pattern of the treatment group more evident. 　　The results showed that threshold firms managed earnings to sustain last year's earnings level. Discretionary accruals of the threshold firms were not significantly associated with future cash flow changes. Those discretionary accruals were used to hide the current unfavorable performance, or to defer current unusual earnings to the future, so that managers could reduce the volatility of accounting earnings. As a means of information disclosure, voluntary earnings forecasts tended to be optimistic, but we still could observe some voluntary forecasts which decreased earnings. In those situations, we might conclude that managers tried to convey credible signals. However, it was not necessarily credible in the case of voluntary forecasting which increased earnings. Managers would manipulate earnings to reduce the difference between forecasted earnings and reported earnings. In respect of the information signal of changes in directors' share holding percentages, it signaled nothing when directors increased holding percentages because most companies were family businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, investors should look out the possibility of earnings manipulation when directors decreased their holding percentages. 　　Audit quality could effectively deter opportunistic earnings management but not the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Based on information signaling perspective of earnings management, auditors with higher audit quality tended to assist managers to choose accounting methods that might signal cash flow expectations. Stronger associations between discretionary accruals and future cash flows were observed for firms audited by higher quality auditors. Because higher audit quality might increase information credibility, earnings would play a more important role in the decision process of investors. When discretionary accruals increased (decreased) earnings' value relevance, earnings association coefficients would be increased (decreased). However, for the financial reports audited by lower quality auditors, earnings did not play an important role in the valuation process because of lower information credibility. Therefore, empirical results showed that investors of firms audited by lower quality auditors did not make decisions according to different characteristics of earnings management.

本研究主要探討中國上市公司內部控制品質與盈餘管理是否有關聯。在本研究中分別使用兩種盈餘管理方式進行實證，結果顯示內部控制品質和盈餘管理程度呈顯著負相關，意即內部控制品質越好，越能抑制公司管理者進行盈餘管理。精確來說，良好的內部控制品質可以抑制管理者利用裁決性應計數美化財務報表，意即好的內部控制可以減少應基礎盈餘管理；在實質盈餘管理方面，本研究發現良好的內部控制品質可以減緩管理者透過過度生產向上盈餘管理，降低管理階層增加裁決性費用已達到預期盈餘目標以及抑制公司透過操控銷貨以影響盈餘之情況，意即好的內部控制能有效減少管理者進行實質盈餘管理。整體而言，本研究結果發現好的內部控制，能有效減少管理者進行應計基礎及實質盈餘管理。 / The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether there is a relationship between internal control and earnings management. In this thesis, I use two types of earnings management: accrual-based and real activities earnings management and I find that there is a significantly negative relationship between quality of internal control and earnings management. Specifically, my results show that high-quality internal control inhibits managers from earnings management through discretionary accruals, implying that high-quality internal control could lower the level of accruals-based earnings management. Moreover, I document that high-quality internal control could reduce upwards real earnings management through increase production, decrease influence through decreasing manipulation discretionary expenses and lessen level of abnormal cash flow. Collectively, I find that high-quality internal control can lower the level of real and accrual-based earnings management behaviors.

本文主要目的係探討過度自信之管理者，是否傾向發行美國存託憑證，以及發行美國存託憑證之公司，是否會進行盈餘管理。本文衡量過度自信的方法，為公司之資產成長率；衡量盈餘管理的方法，則參照Zang (2012) 之研究，分為應計項目盈餘管理與實質盈餘管理；在實質盈餘管理方面，分別測試單一變數及合併變數。本研究之對象為1993年至2015年，中國在美國發行存託憑證之公司。實證結果發現，具過度自信管理者之中國公司，較願意赴美發行存託憑證，進入此較具競爭力之市場；除此之外，中國在美國發行存託憑證之公司，不管在應計項目，或實質項目方面，皆較不傾向進行盈餘管理。 / The main purpose of this study is to examine whether the overconfident managers tend to issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), and whether the firms issuing ADRs tend to conduct earnings management. In this paper, I employ the rate of asset growth as the proxy to measure overconfidence of managers, and follow the methods by Zang (2012) to measure earnings management including real earnings management and accrual earnings management. In addition, single variables and combined variables are used to test real earnings management. The research samples consist of Chinese firms which released ADRs for the period 1993 - 2015. The empirical results show that Chinese firms with overconfident managers tend to issue ADRs, indicating they are willing to enter the competitive market. The results also show that Chinese firms which issue ADRs are less likely to conduct real earnings management and accrual earnings management.

隨著1997的亞洲金融風暴、1998下半年陸續發生的台灣上市公司財務危 機事件，以及2001年底美國大型公司企業弊案的層出不窮，除了一再地打擊投資人的信心，擾亂資本市場秩序外，也使投資者與證券主管機關體認到，完善的公司治理機制（corporate governance），是健全資本市場與吸引國際資金的關鍵因素之一。 公司組織的代理關係衍生出盈餘操縱與公司治理的相關問題，本研究在 第一個部分所欲探討的是公司治理的機制是否能抑制管理階層進行盈餘操 縱?另外，一般投資大眾所關心的是他們的投資標的是否為其帶來優異的報酬，而公司股價報酬率是否能提高，除了外在總體經濟的因素外，不外乎是公司本身的變數，因此本研究以董監事特性、經理人特性、關係人特性及股權結構四個構面之公司治理變數，以及盈餘操縱程度為控制變數，探討公司治理與投資人的股價報酬二者間之關係。 研究結果顯示：當董事長兼任總經理時，公司盈餘操縱程度較高。超額 關係人資金往來比例越高，盈餘操縱幅度越高。董事會規模越大，盈餘操縱程度越低。監察人總人數、董監事質押比例、控制權與盈餘分配權的偏離程度、董事會獨立程度、超額關係人進銷貨比例、機構投資人持股比例、大股東持股比例與盈餘操縱的幅度都沒有顯著相關性。 董事會規模與公司公司股價報酬率呈負相關。監察人總人數與公司股價 報酬率成正相關。董監事質押比率與公司股價報酬率呈負相關。董事會獨立程度與公司股價報酬率呈正相關。超額關係人進銷貨比例與股價報酬率呈正相關。控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度、經理人是否由董事長兼任、超額關係人資金往來比例、機構投資人持股比例、外部大股東持股比例均與股價報酬率無顯著相關性。 / Along with Asia monetary crush in 1997, Taiwan business financial crisis happened one after another in 1998 and American large enterprise fraud cases appeared again and again in 2001, not only to beat investors’ confidence and to disturb capital market order, but also make investors and the authorities concerned recognize that a complete corporate governance mechanism is a key factor of healing capital market and attracting international capital. The agency relation of business organization derives problems about earnings manipulation and corporate governance. The first part of this research is want to discuss if corporate governance mechanism can restrain management level from manipulating earnings. The most concern of common investors is that whether their invest target can bring them well return. If we want to raise the stock-price return of a company, in addition to macro economic factors, the condition of business itself is really important. The second part of this research set broad characteristics, management characteristics, related party transaction and equity structure as research variables and earnings manipulation degree as control variables to discuss the relation between corporate governance and stock-price return. The result of the first portion of research shows that when CEO simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board and exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse is higher, the firms have higher earnings manipulation. There is a negative relation between broad size and earnings manipulation. Total number of supervisors, the rate of directors’ and supervisors’shareholdings that are pledged, the deviation between cash-flow right and seating right, broad independence, exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with earnings manipulation. The result of the second portion of research shows that total number of supervisors, broad independence and exceed-ratio of related party purchase and sales have positive relation with stock-price return. There is a negative relation between stock-price return and broad size and the rate of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings that are pledged. CEO simultaneously serves as Chairman of the board, the deviation between cash-flow rights and seating rights, exceed-ratio of related party capital intercourse, institutional investor holding rate, outside blockholders holding rate have no relation with stock-price return.

本研究以民國79年至民國87年為研究期間，探討當景氣出現波動時，企業是否有操縱盈餘的行為。首先探討景氣循環對企業經營績效的關連性，觀察不同產業企業之經營績效是否因景氣變動而有所差異。其次針對景氣循環與企業盈餘管理程度之關連性進行研究，探討不同產業企業盈餘管理的程於景氣擴張期與收縮期有無顯著的差異。 實證結果顯示：(1)整體而言，景氣循環與全體樣本公司之經營績效呈顯著的正向關係，個別產業而言，紡織業、塑化業及建築業在景氣擴張時期之經營績效顯著優於收縮時期；(2)當以ODACA（以總資產及成長率調整後與營業有關之裁決性應計項目的變動取絕對值）作為盈餘管理之代理變數探討景氣循環與盈餘管理之關聯性時，就全體樣本公司而言，企業在景氣處於收縮期的盈餘管理程度顯著大於擴張時期，就個別產業之分析結果，食品業及塑化業盈餘管理的程度於景氣收縮時期明顯大於擴張時期；(3)當以ODACS（以淨銷貨收入及成長率調整後與營業有關之裁決性應計項目的變動取絕對值）作為盈餘管理之替代變數探討景氣循環與盈餘管理之關聯性時，以整體樣本來說，企業在景氣處於收縮期的盈餘管理程度顯著大於擴張時期，觀察個別產業之情形顯示食品業、電機業及塑化業盈餘管理的程度在景氣收縮時期明顯高於景氣擴張時期；(4)當以NOI（(以總資產調整後業外收益變動取絕對值）作為盈餘管理之替代變數探討景氣循環與盈餘管理之關聯性時，就整體而言，樣本公司在景氣處於收縮期以業外淨損益操弄盈餘的程度顯著大於擴張時期，依個別產業觀察，電子業、電機業及建築業在景氣收縮時期利用業外損益管理盈餘的程度顯著高於擴張時期。 關鍵字：盈餘管理、經營績效、景氣循環 / Focusing on the firms listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange over the period of 1990 to 1998, this thesis investigates whether the sample firms manipulate earnings in the face of business cycle. First, this thesis examines the association between business cycle and corporate operating performance. Furthermore, it explores the relationship between business cycle and the magnitude of earnings management. The empirical results document that 1) business cycle is positively and significantly associated with the whole sample firms' operating performance and the relationship is founded in textile industry, plastic-chemical industry and construction industry. 2) When using the absolute value of changes of operating discretionary accruals adjusted by total assets and growth rate (ODACA) as a proxy variable for the magnitude earnings management, the empirical findings reveal that the ODACA of whole sample firms are significantly greater in contraction period than in expansion period. The results are also founded in food industry and plastic-chemical industry. 3) When using the absolute value of changes of operating discretionary accruals adjusted by net sales and growth rate (ODACS) as a proxy variable for the magnitude of earnings management, the empirical evidence indicates that the ODACS of all sample firms are significantly greater in contraction period than in expansion period. The evidence is also founded in food industry and plastic-chemical industry. 4) When using the absolute value of changes of non-operating income adjusted by total assets (NOI) as a proxy variable for the magnitude of earnings management, the empirical findings indicates that the NOI of all sample firms are significantly greater in contraction period than in expansion period. The results are also founded in electronic industry, electrical industry and construction industry. Key Words : earnings management, operating performance, business cycle

本文討論退休金長期預期報酬率之設定。根據會計公報規定，公司之退休金長期預期報酬率必須符合其資產配置。但是在本文中我們發現資產配置並無法有效的反應公司的退休金長期預期報酬率，因此我們提出展望理論及盈餘管理兩種理論來解釋退休金長期預期報酬率之設定。我們發現經理人企圖透過改變退休金長期預期報酬率的假設來進行盈餘管理，同時退休金長期預期報酬率也會因為公司的風險態度而有所改變。 / Abstract: We try to find out the considerations for managers to set their assumptions of expected long term rate of return on pension plan assets (ROPA). First, we use the asset allocations of pension funds and historical returns to calculate the expected rate of return based on historical asset returns (EROPA). There is difference between ROPA are EROPA, suggests that asset allocations are not the only consideration when managers setting their ROPA assumption. Two theories are examined in this paper to explain such difference between ROPA and EROPA: earnings management and prospect theory. We use two models to test the earnings management, single accrual model and threshold model. We find that the intentions to smooth the reported income are the main incentives for managers to manipulation their ROPA. The incentive to do earnings management can partly explain the difference between ROPA and EROPA. However, in threshold model, we can not observe any evidence in our research. We also introduce prospect theory to examine the risk attitude. We find that managers’ risk attitude affect the setting of assumptions, too. We conclude prospect theory provides a good explanation of the difference between ROPA and EROPA.

本研究以1999至2008年間國內上市公司為研究對象，觀察會計資訊品質對其募資決策之關聯性，並進一步探討會計資訊品質對於選擇舉債之企業的債務契約內容是否造成影響。 本研究參考Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008)，將會計資訊品質分為三個方面，以盈餘管理的程度、損失認列的及時性與價值攸關性作為衡量會計資訊品質之指標，進而個別分析其與企業之募資決策與債務契約內容之關聯性。 實證結果指出，盈餘管理的程度愈高、損失認列的及時性愈低或價值攸關性愈低之企業，愈有可能選擇舉債以募資；即會計資訊品質愈差之企業，愈有可能選擇舉債以募資。除此之外，盈餘管理的程度愈高或損失認列的及時性愈低之企業，其於債務契約內之借款利率水準愈高；即會計資訊品質愈差之企業，其所須負擔之借款利率愈高。再者，盈餘管理的程度愈高、損失認列的及時性愈低或價值攸關性愈低之企業，愈可能提供擔保品；即會計資訊品質愈差之企業，其於借款時愈可能被要求提供擔保品。