The United Kingdom Combined Code is today the most fundamental corporate governance code applicable in United Kingdom. The nation of United Kingdom encourages governance practices by implementing the Directive 2006/46/EC on a voluntary basis before being mandatory. While corporate governance is applicable to many corporations, pension providers may be seen as one of the ideal market sector for governing, since they act as institutional investors representing a major shareholder group. Institutional investors may even improve corporate governance practices as they represent a major part of public sector capital. Owning large amount of shares, their function is to supervise in the firms’ corporate governance activities in order to monitor the transparency and disclosure procedures. To be able to monitor other companies' activities, pension providers must set up an example for enforcing corporate governance practices themselves and follow them respectively.   This descriptive case study observes the corporate governance structures represented in annual reports of five large chosen pension providers during the years 2007 to 2009 capturing the financial crisis occurring in 2008, in United Kingdom. The purpose of the study is to examine if strong corporate governance is incorporated in the following pension providers, Aberdeen Asset Management plc, Aviva plc, Prudential plc, Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Limited and Standard Life plc. The focus is on board composition and established committees. The scope of this study answers the following research question: How do the five pension providers, Aberdeen, Prudential, Royal London, Standard Life and Aviva, comply with or explain deviations found in their respectively annual reports from 2007-2009 in accordance with the Combined Code 2008 and the Annotated Combined Code 2005?   Fundamental for pension providers is to work on a long-term basis with value creation as goal. Still the core focus of corporate governance remains, to create a system offering protection for all stakeholders. As the result shows, all of the five chosen corporations strongly implement national corporate governance practices throughout 2007-2009 on both board composition and established committees. Still, they suffered short-term negative fluctuations from the United Kingdom financial crises in 2008, but recovered shortly afterwards. Even though these fluctuations occurred, all of the corporations have long-term value as one of their main objectives. The long-term value can partly be sustained by strong corporate governance practices as it a main objective in corporate governance.

Bakgrund: Behovet av bolagsstyrning är stort för mindre familjeföretag, då det kan hjälpa dem att hantera deras komplexa omvärld. Framförallt är det styrelsen som har en viktig roll när det gäller bolagsstyrning i familjeföretag. Ett aktivt styrelsearbete är viktigt för att de ska kunna stå sig i den ökande globala konkurrensen. En extern styrelseledamot kan bidra till ett aktivt och effektivt styrelsearbete och därmed ge företaget konkurrensfördelar. Det finns dock vissa problem förknippade med tillsättandet av externa styrelseledamöter som kan påverka valet att ta in utomstående i styrelsen. Därmed väcks frågan; vad är det egentligen som påverkar ett litet familjeföretags beslut att tillsätta en extern styrelseledamot? Syfte: Studiens syfte är attförklara varför små familjeägda aktiebolag väljer att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter. Metod: Studiens syfte har besvarats genom en kvalitativ metod med en deduktiv ansats. Empiriskt material har samlats in genom djupgående intervjuer med representanter för tre små familjeägda aktiebolag, varav två av företagen har tillsatt en extern styrelseledamot medan ett företag inte tillsatt en extern styrelseledamot. Slutsats: Studien visar att tillsättandet av externa styrelseledamöter drivs av behovet av en extern styrelseledamot. Behovet, i sin tur, påverkas av ägarfamiljens komplexitet och företagets komplexitet. Desto större komplexitet, desto större är behovet av externa styrelseledamöter. Har företaget däremot en utvecklad struktur så minskas behovet. En annan slutsats som dragits från studien är att det krävs ett initiativ utifrån för att små familjeföretag ska ta beslut om ett tillsättande av en extern styrelseledamot. Dessutom visar studien att familjeföretag söker att förstärka deras styrelses servande roll, genom att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter. / Background: The need for corporate governance in small family businesses is large since it helps the companies to handle their complex environment. The board of directors has a prominent role of corporate governance in family businesses, where an active board is important for the businesses in order for them to meet the increasing global competition. An outside director can contribute to a more active and efficient board work and thereby give the business competitive advantages. However, there are some problems associated with the appointment of outside directors that can affect the choice of bringing an outsider to the board. Consequently, raises the question; what really affects the decision to appoint an outside director in a small family business? Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain why small family owned limited companies choose to appoint outside directors. Method: In order to fulfillthe purpose of the study a qualitative method with a deductive approach hasbeen used. Empirical data was collected trough profound interviews withrepresentatives of three small family businesses, out of which two has outside directors while one business has not appointed an outside director. Conclusion: The study shows that the appointment of outside directors is driven by the need for an outside director. The need is affected by the level of family complexity and business complexity. A high level of complexity equals a large need for outside directors. The need will diminish if the business has a well developed structure. Another conclusion is that it takes initiative from outside the company for them to take a decision to appoint an outside director. Furthermore, the study shows that family businesses want to improve the service role of the board by appointing an outside director.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

企業在彼此競爭以爭食市場大餅時，除了須要持續監控外部商機，積極掌握市場脈動，並推出符合其需求的商品以滿足顧客需求之外、也須要有效率地運用有限資源，妥善處理如採購、資金規畫、廠房設置乃迄於人員調派等各類非屬核心的支援性創價活動，綜言之，即透過高效率的公司治理，才有可能達成永續經營的終極目標。本研究透過個案研究，利用個案公司– A公司各類資料，以公司治理之理論架構為基礎，據此深度觀察A公司所採取之各類關鍵策略、行動和結果，乃迄於最終的財務面經營績效，據此釐清決定個案公司經營績效的關鍵失敗因素，以及公司治理在其中發揮的功能，作為實務界的參考。 本研究針對A公司2003年至2008年發展及決策進行深入探討，據此瞭解A公司為何2006甫上櫃，2008年就因資金周轉不靈而跳票下櫃。經研析後，可得知A公司在2003年至2008年之間，遭遇以下各類關鍵經營問題： 1.本業經營績效逐年下滑 2.投資規劃過於樂觀，未考量當不如預期時對公司之可能影響。 3.對新產品營收過於樂觀，未考量由於新產品送樣期過長，產線建置過早，致使相關設備閒置。 由於A公司管理階層與外部股東之間存在「帝國建立」的代理矛盾，再加上A公司的董事長兼任總經理，因此具有「所有權與經營權重疊」現象。此時則A公司便極有可能因為負責人「帝國建立」的傾向，導致決策失誤，進而危害到公司所有利害關係人之利益。本研究利用中華公司治理協會所提出之公司治理實地評量表進行研析，亦得知造成A公司跳票下櫃之主要原因在於其未積極「強化董事會職能」，並未強化「管理階層的紀律與溝通」。 由於A公司管理階層具有「帝國建立」傾向，再加上A公司由於未能保持「經營權與所有權分離」，並「強化董事會職能」、「強化管理階層的紀律與溝通」，終而使得「本業經營績效逐年下滑」，但仍於短時間內進行大量投資，終而使得「投資過速且投資標的所產生之現金流量過少、速度過慢，投資效益未能顯現」等兩類原因，最終因跳票而黯然下櫃。 關鍵字：公司治理、董事會職能、被動元件產業 / Firms shall efficiently allocate limited internal resources, dealing with all kinds of activities including procurement, capital planning, etc. so as to raise up chances of effective competition against other competitors. In others words, firms must rely on effective company governance to assure sustainable development & profitability. Based on company governance related theory & structure, the paper pays attention to conducting cases study method on Company A. Via in-depth digging how Company A performed during the period of 2003 to 2008, why Company A over-invested during 2003 – 2008, why Board of Directors didn’t function well so as to correct the causing-disaster decision by kinds of analyses, this paper finds out below reasons to cause Company A to be delisted in 2008: 1.Performance of core business (manufacturing and sales of ferrite core) getting worse gradually. 2.Over-investment due to overconfidence regarding internal resources allocation. 3.Overconfidence regarding sales of new product. The root causes why Company made above mistakes could be generalized as below list: 1.“Empire Building” agency conflict existed between managers and stockholders. 2.The un-separation of Ownership and control. 3.Independent directors of Board of Directors don’t function well to provide insightful, effective-monitoring opinions. Managers are under loose monitoring of Board of Directors. 4.There is little discipline regarding how managers behave in daily operation and critical decision making. Keyword: Company governance, Board of Directors, Passive Component Industry

L’objectif de ce travail de recherche consiste à déterminer l’impact du comité d’audit sur la performance financière des PME libanaises. Ceci dit que l’objectif consiste aussi à étudier l’influence du système de gouvernance sur l’indépendance du comité d’audit. Les variables mobilisées sont relatives aux caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et du comité d’audit. A cela s’ajoute, trois déterminants qui sont relatifs à l’indépendance du comité d’audit, la structure du conseil d’administration et l’impact du système dual. A titre indicatif la rentabilité des PME est relatée notamment à partir des rapports annuels. L’échantillon comprend 58 PME libanaises et l’étude s’étale sur une période de 4 ans, à savoir entre 2011 et 2014. Les résultats font apparaître que le comité d’audit peine à avoir une indépendance totale. Cela peut être expliqué par l’apposement d’un système dual et aussi par le nombre limité au sein du comité. Dans ce sens, le comité d’audit dans les PME libanaises est réprimé notamment à travers le déploiement de ses responsabilités et de sa contribution au niveau de la revue des états financiers. Ce qui s’avère préjudiciable à une meilleure croissance de la performance financière pour les PME / The aim of this research study is to determine the impact of the audit committee on the financial performance of Lebanese SMEs. This research focuses also on the influence of the governance system on the independence of the audit committee. The variables used are related to the characteristics of the board and of the audit committee. Moreover, three other determinants are referred as the independence of the audit committee, the structure of the board and the impact of the dual system in order to bring some elements of answers to our main interrogation. As an indication, SMEs profitability is reported especially from annual reports. The sample includes 58 Lebanese SMEs and the study covers a period of 4 years, from 2011 till 2014. The results show that the audit committee hardly has a total independence. This can be explained by the appeasement of a dual system and also by the presence of a limited number within the committee. In this sense, the audit committee in Lebanese SMEs is repressed and cannot be clearly active through the deployment of its responsibilities and its contribution in reviewing the financial statements. This appears as detrimental to a better growth for the SMEs sector financial performance

Corporate bodies are essential for the development of companies activities, and their minutes provide a means of evidence and proof of the deliberations and resolutions adopted therein. In certain conlict situations, the presence of a notary public is required in the meetings in order to verify the legality and validity of the resolutions adopted. This is why the General Corporations Law provides for the possibility that the notary public witnesses the general shareholders meeting, but omits it in the case of the board of directors. In this context, the amendment of article 170 of the General Corporations Law expressly incorporates the possibility of counting with the presence of a notary public in the board of directors in order to certify the authenticity of the resolutions and implement immediately the decisions adopted by both corporate bodies. / Los órganos sociales son esenciales para el desarrollo de las actividades de las sociedades y sus actas constituyen un medio de constancia y prueba de las deliberaciones y acuerdos adoptados en ellos. En ciertas situaciones confictivas, se amerita la presencia de un notario en las reuniones para dejar constancia la legalidad y validez de los  acuerdos adoptados. Por ello, la Ley General de Sociedades preveía la posibilidad de que el notario presencie las juntas generales de accionistas, pero lo omitía en el caso del directorio. En este contexto, la modiicación del artículo 170 de la Ley General de Sociedades incorpora de manera expresa la posibilidad de contar con la presencia de un notario en el directorio para certiicar la autenticidad de los acuerdos y poder ejecutar de inmediato las decisiones de ambos órganos sociales.

Submitted by Marcia Regina Sá de Sousa Meirinho (meirinho.marcia@hotmail.com) on 2016-12-20T13:20:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação versão final 201216.pdf: 1729948 bytes, checksum: 955b08e81fd36b2999a858c9adb32606 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2016-12-21T18:51:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação versão final 201216.pdf: 1729948 bytes, checksum: 955b08e81fd36b2999a858c9adb32606 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-04T16:56:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação versão final 201216.pdf: 1729948 bytes, checksum: 955b08e81fd36b2999a858c9adb32606 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-28 / This study aimed to identify the governance failures that allow the occurrence of fraud, embezzlement as well as financial and reputational losses in listed companies. Therefore, a study of multiple cases was conducted involving five public companies, from which four are traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). Data was obtained from interviews with experienced stock market professionals and other secondary sources that were confronted in the light of the Theory of Agency, which examined the relationship between owner and agent or managers. Two critical points were addressed in the interviews: primarily the work of the Board of Directors, which requires higher skills and willingness to deal with strategic issues relevant to the company. The second point was the motivation of agents who at times apply opportunistic practices to benefit themselves at the expense of the company's interests, which in turn creates the need for instruments and mechanisms for monitoring and control of the manager's performance. Corporate governance is not only related to the implementation of good practices and rules, but rather to the most efficient way to enhance decision making in business, so that managers, shareholders and Board of Directors have a voice and unify efforts to bring better results for the company. / Este estudo teve como objetivo identificar as falhas de Governança que possibilitam a ocorrência de fraudes, desvios e perdas financeiras e de reputação em empresas listadas. Para tanto, foi realizado um estudo de casos múltiplos envolvendo cinco empresas de capital aberto, sendo quatro com ações negociadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BOVESPA). Os dados foram obtidos a partir de entrevistas realizadas com experientes profissionais do mercado de capitais e outras fontes secundárias, que foram confrontados sob a luz da teoria da agência, que analisou a relação do proprietário e do agente ou gestores. Nas entrevistas, dois pontos críticos foram abordados, primeiramente a atuação do Conselho de Administração, que requer maior qualificação e disponibilidade para tratar dos assuntos estratégicos pertinentes à empresa. O segundo ponto foi a motivação dos agentes, que em alguns momentos se utilizam de práticas oportunistas para benefício próprio em detrimento dos interesses da empresa. Este fato, por sua vez, gera a necessidade de criar instrumentos e mecanismos de monitoramento e controle da atuação do gestor. A Governança Corporativa não está relacionada apenas à aplicação de boas práticas e regras, mas sim à maneira mais eficiente encontrada para a tomada de decisão nas empresas, de modo que gestores, acionistas e Conselho de Administração tenham voz e unifiquem os esforços para trazer melhores resultados para a empresa.

Submitted by Navjeet Singh Gill (navjeetgill7@gmail.com) on 2018-02-23T18:00:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017-18_Navjeet_Gill v6.pdf: 1539898 bytes, checksum: c559bf4e5d8539b1b89e7d6f75555716 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Josineide da Silva Santos Locatelli (josineide.locatelli@fgv.br) on 2018-02-23T18:06:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2017-18_Navjeet_Gill v6.pdf: 1539898 bytes, checksum: c559bf4e5d8539b1b89e7d6f75555716 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-26T12:51:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2017-18_Navjeet_Gill v6.pdf: 1539898 bytes, checksum: c559bf4e5d8539b1b89e7d6f75555716 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-01-16 / This empirical research examines the relationship between board’s diversity and firm performance, providing a comprehensive quantitative analysis between diversity factors (demographic - gender and race, cognitive - age, education, role and network) and financial factors (ROA, ROE, ROIC, asset turnover and current ratio) in the component companies of the FTSE 100 index. The dataset also includes a wide array of information about 1053 board members. The results indicate that a diverse board positively impacts ROA, ROIC, asset turnover and current ratio but were insignificant for ROE. It proves that diversity leads to better social reputation, performance and financial performance. / Esta pesquisa empírica examina a relação entre a diversidade do conselho e o desempenho da empresa, fornecendo uma análise quantitativa significativa entre os fatores de diversidade (demográfico - gênero e raça, idade cognitiva, educação, papel e rede) e fatores financeiros (ROA, ROE, ROIC, rotatividade de ativos e liquidez geral) nas empresas que compõem o índice FTSE 100. O conjunto de dados também inclui uma ampla gama de informações sobre 1053 membros do conselho. Os resultados indicam que um conselho diversificado impacta positivamente no ROA, ROIC, rotatividade de ativos e liquidez geral, mas são insignificantes para ROE. Isto demonstra que a diversidade leva a uma melhor reputação social, performance e desempenho financeiro.

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas / Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:39:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:47:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:47:54Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-19T17:59:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-16 / The aim of this study is to map the main aspects of corporate governance in Brazil used by publicly traded companies and analyze them from a comparative perspective, contrasting companies that have suffered Private Equity and Venture Capital investment with the remaining public firms. The investigation is a result of the companies that in fact responded to the third version of the Survey on Corporate Governance in Brazil, previously conducted in 2005 and 2007. Analysis of adherence to BM&FBovespa’s corporate governance levels show a significantly greater adherence of the PE/VC backed companies in higher listing levels. Particular characteristics of the corporate governance of companies are detailed in an attempt to determine whether the clear advantage found in the comparison among the premium listing levels extends to other issues. The findings show significant differences in certain areas, i.e. processes of the board of directors, formation of committees, external auditor, shareholders rights, disclosure and compensation of officers and directors, which can be explained by the previous relationship of the backed enterprise, the PE/VC investor and the term sheet agreed upon between the parties.

Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)