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En kris såsom Coronapandemin är en extrem situation som skiljer sig från normala förhållanden och kräver att rätt beslut tas. Det sätter press på chefen i en organisation att fatta ett beslut som många gånger är improviserat, dels på grund av tidspress och stress, dels på grund av att varje kris är unik där det är otydligare vad som är rätt och fel beslut. Det beslut som chefen tar under en kris kan många gånger skilja sig från hur beslutet hade tagits under en normal situation. Bör chefen göra mer analyser före beslutet tas eftersom krisen är så pass komplex eller bör chefen i stället förlita sig mer på sin magkänsla eftersom krisens komplexitet är alltför omfattande att göra en analys av? Det är en fråga som har fått mycket uppmärksamhet inom beslutsforskning, inte minst under extrema situationer och kriser såsom en pandemi. Syftet med denna studie är att öka förståelsen för hur chefer hanterar det improviserande beslutsfattandet som uppstår under en kris. I studien sätts analytiska beslut i kontrast till beslut baserade på intuition eller magkänsla, men öppnar samtidigt upp för en möjlighet att båda kan kombineras. Intervjuer har gjorts med chefer från olika branscher runtom i Sverige för att öka förståelsen för krisbeslut under Coronapandemin. Studien visar att de flesta chefer använder analys eller kombinerar analys med intuition. Endast ett fåtal chefer tenderar att enbart använda intuition. Vidare framkommer det att hur chefen betraktar krisen får en effekt på vilka beslut som tas. Betraktas pandemin enbart som ett hot väljer chefen att fokusera på interna aktiviteter som ämnar lindra pandemins negativa påverkan i organisationen och stödja medarbetarna. Väljer chefen att även betrakta pandemin som en möjlighet så öppnar det upp för externa aktiviteter som kan dra nytta av pandemin, såsom att expandera verksamheten till och bredda kontaktnätverken för nya affärsmöjligheter. I de allra flesta beslut framkommer det att de baseras på ett nära samspel och kommunikation med andra aktörer. Det är sällan som ett beslut tas utan någon som helst kommunikation med någon annan. Denna kommunikation tycks ha motarbetat de negativa effekter som olika biaser medför i besluten. Exempelvis är cheferna mindre partiska när andras perspektiv tas med i beaktning före ett beslut tas. Slutligen tror de flesta cheferna att denna pandemi har gjort dem till en bättre beslutsfattare och vissa tror att tidigare stressfulla situationer och kriser har varit till stor hjälp även under Coronapandemin. / A crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic is an extreme situation that differs from day-to-day situations and require that the right decisions be made. Such extreme situations put pressure on managers in organizations to make decisions that many times are improvised, in part because of time pressure and stress, and in part because each crisis is unique and makes it harder to know what the right decision is. The decisions managers make during a crisis are often different from how those decisions would have been made during a normal situation. Should the manager analyse the situation before the decision is made because the crisis is so complex, or should the manager instead follow his or her gut feeling because the crisis’ complexity is too overwhelming to possibly analyse? Such a question has received much attention in research of decision making, not least under extreme situations and crisis such as a pandemic. The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of how managers deal with the improvised decision making that occur during a crisis. This study contrasts analytical decisions to intuitive decisions, while at the same time opens for the possibility that both styles of decision making could be combined. Interviews have been made with managers from different industries throughout Sweden to increase the understanding of crisis decision making during the Covid-19 pandemic. The study shows that most managers use analysis or combine analysis with intuition. Few managers tend to use intuition only. Furthermore, this study shows that the way the manager views the crisis can affect the decisions that he or she makes. If the manager views the merely as a threat, he or she will tend to focus on internal activities aimed at reducing the negative effects caused by the pandemic on the organisation and their members. If the manager chooses also to view the pandemic as an opportunity, it can lead to external activities that can take advantage of the pandemic, by for example expanding their business and business network. The study shows that most decisions have been made through communication and interplay with other actors. Only few decisions have been made without any communication or interplay whatsoever. The fact that most decisions have been made through communication with others seem to have reduced the effect of different biases. Managers have become less partial when other people’s perspectives have been included in the decisions. Finally, most managers believe that this pandemic has made them a better decision maker, and some believe that prior stressful situations and crisis have greatly assisted them during this pandemic.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 set Europe in sorrow, distress, and emergency. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is something Sweden has refrained from joining due to the country’s neutral stance. However, despite Sweden's long-standing neutrality of over 200 years, it was abandoned within only weeks. The short timeframe of decision-making raised questions about the level of rationality in the decision of the Swedish NATO application. Scholars and researchers have through different methods and theories attempted to explain this unpredictable shift, but still, the process appears to lack a clearly defined rationale. This case study seeks to understand the decision-making process of the government in times of crisis, examining how the rationality of such decisions may have been compromised by analyzing secondary data. The aim is to address the research gap, concerning the rapid and framed process for Sweden to join NATO. Analyzing the decision through the lens of Bounded Rationality Theory, applying variables such as (1) time pressure, (2) cognition, and (3) access to information (Simon, 1947), the possibility arises to shred light on the factors contributing to Bounded Rationality in the Swedish NATO process. These aspects were all present in the Swedish NATO process. In combination with characteristics of a government in crisis (Boin, Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2005), one can to a great extent understand the significant shift in stance towards NATO membership, given that governments tend to act differently when being subject to a crisis. It can be concluded that rationality was significantly bounded by limited access to information, to some extent by the ability to process information, and comprehensively by the constraints of time pressure. The Swedish NATO process, consisting of a government amid a crisis, was subject to and exemplifies Bounded Rationality in decision-making.

知訊者與非知訊者資訊不對稱之議題在學術殿堂一直廣為學者所研究討論，且各國證管機關為了維持證券市場公平性、保護非知訊者權益並且維持股票市場的穩定運作，適度的資訊揭露以維持證券市場的公平性一直都是各國證券交易所重視的政策目標。 是故，本研究利用代理人基人工股票市場來探討資訊揭露對於金融市場之影響。在此架構下之交易者皆已有限理性方式來呈現。他們是以遺傳規劃(genetic programming)之方式來學習並修正他們對於未來之金融市場之預期。在透過即時的模擬價格之資訊揭露，我們嘗試探討此資訊揭露之金融政策措施對於市場之波動性、市場之流動性之影響。 / The topic of asymmetric information between the informed traders and uninformed traders has been widely discussed by researchers in academics. To maintain the fairness of securities market, an appropriate information disclosure is quite important for authorities of securities regulation to protect the rights and interests of uninformed traders, and to maintain the operations of securities market stable. Based on these reasons, we construct an agent-based artificial stock market to investigate how information disclosure affects a financial market. In this framework of artificial stock market, all traders are characterized by bounded rationality. The traders are able to learn and adjust their predictions of financial market by means of a genetic programming algorithm. We try to understand how market transparency affects the volatility and the liquidity of a securities market.

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Made available in DSpace on 2009-11-18T18:56:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2004 / The present paper has the proposal to assess the management process of complex negotiation of the 5th OMC that took place at Cancun from September 10th until the 14th , 2003. This thesis points out the problems and questions that resulted on the collapse of a possible agreement, it also suggest proposal to solve these issues. The future of OMC is uncertain and traumatic changes suffered by many countries that live under the rules of OMC shows that something at OMC will have to change, principally on the process of complex negotiation, such as the integrity of the organization to avoid having to compromise and being damaged. There were searches for answers on the analysis and assessment of the negotiation process, studying and researching the bargain positional concepts, giving full details on the negotiation process based on principIes, exploring profusely the state of art for the management of difficult conversation. This thesis also tackles the sources of conflicts and the building of coalitions such as the G20, showing the difficulty existing in the resolution of public disputes and in the use of instruments to break the impasses. We also defined theoretical instrumental, which allowed the diagnostic ofthe actual situation at OMe. It was recommend to explore the valuation of conflicts, based on justice and equitant, the best form of negotiation by principIes, of management demanding public, on the multi stakeholder dialogue and the importance of informal parallel conversation. The environment of complexity and the extensive vision that it provides to adjust the functioning of autopoietics systems. / Pretende-se no presente trabalho avaliar a gestão do processo de negociação complexa da 5ª Conferência Ministerial da Organização Mundial do Comércio em Cancún, ocorrida entre os dias 10 e 14 de setembro de 2003, no México, apontando os problemas e questões que resultaram no colapso de um possível acordo. O futuro da OMC é incerto e mudanças traumáticas sofridas por muitos países que vivem sob as regras da OMC indicam que alguma coisa na OMC terá que mudar, principalmente nos processos de negociação complexa, de forma que a integridade da organização não seja comprometida. Buscou-se respostas na análise e avaliação da gestão do processo de negociação, estudando e pesquisando os conceitos de barganha posicional, detalhando o processo de negociação baseado em princípios, explorando em profundidade o estado da arte para gestão de conversas difíceis. Dissecando a questão dos conflitos e das coalizões, mostrando a dificuldade existente na resolução de disputas públicas e no uso de instrumentos para quebrar o impasse nas negociações buscou-se estabelecer o instrumental teórico que possibilitasse aprofundar o diagnóstico da situação atual na OMC. Como recomendação explorou-se a avaliação de conflitos, com base na eficiência - teoria dos jogos-, justiça e na eqüidade, a melhor forma de negociação baseada em princípios, de gestão de público demandante, no diálogo dos multistakeholders, a importância das conversas informais paralelas, o ambiente da complexidade e a visão ampla que proporciona o enfoque do funcionamento de sistemas decisórios autopoiéticos.

Submitted by Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro Gonçalves (lgribeirogoncalves@gmail.com) on 2016-03-17T23:30:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2016-03-23T14:59:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2016-03-30T17:30:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-30T17:38:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 GONÇALVES, Leonardo Gomes Ribeiro_dissertação.pdf: 1606735 bytes, checksum: 22d73e62ebec198cb8b8f9a1fcf85787 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-22 / The water and sewage public service relevance is widely recognized. Nevertheless, there is high deficit level of access in Brazil, with different situations in the various country regions. In this sense, the objective of this dissertation is (i) from the interdisciplinary perspective of the Transaction Costs Economics, introduce an understanding of water and sewage public service in Brazil, currently regulated by Law No. 11,445/2007, (ii) evaluate the efficiency of the mainly used mode of governance, and (iii) eventually purpose alternative designs for the organization of the provision, economically superior in terms of reducing transaction costs for necessary investments to fulfill the fundamental objectives defined in art. 2 of Law No. 11,445/2007. The research used as a methodological strategy an interdisciplinary approach to law, economics and organizations, based on the new institutional economics. From the study of the basic institutional environment, with support in the theoretical framework, it was observed that the governance mechanism predominantly used to provide the water and sewage public service in Brazil, ie delegations to State Sanitation Companies through long-term contracts (program contracts) does not favor investments in specific assets (infrastructure) necessary for the supply and does not ensure policy goals. It was also found that there are viable alternatives to overall governance design, although the use of alternative forms probably are not feasible by implementing simple transplant standards, that is, by formal means. The modification of the prevailing water and sewage public service mode of governance, overcoming the verified low performance (low-level equilibrium), can not be held without charge. Therefore, it is necessary to overcome the costs for breaking the path dependence caused by hold-up carried out by the Sanitation State Companies to public service holders (municipalities), as well as costs for the disruption of path dependence in the Brazilian administrative law, which restricts the development of a legal theory of regulation to enable the construction of an adequate regulatory governance to reduce transaction costs in order to make viable investments in infrastructure assets with a high degree of specificity. / O serviço público de saneamento básico tem relevância amplamente reconhecida. Apesar disso, ainda são verificados no Brasil elevados índices de déficit ou de atendimento precário, com situações distintas nas diversas regiões do país. Nesse sentido, o objetivo desta dissertação é (i) apresentar, a partir da perspectiva interdisciplinar da Economia dos Custos de Transação, uma compreensão do serviço público de saneamento básico no Brasil, atualmente regulamentado pela Lei nº 11.445/2007, (ii) avaliar a eficiência do modo de governança majoritariamente utilizado e, (iii) eventualmente, propor desenhos alternativos para a organização da prestação que sejam economicamente superiores em temos de redução de custos de transação para a realização de investimentos necessários ao cumprimento dos objetivos fundamentais definidos no art. 2º, da Lei nº 11.445/2007. A pesquisa adotou como estratégia metodológica a utilização de uma abordagem interdisciplinar de direito, economia e organizações, nos termos da análise econômica da nova economia institucional. A partir o estudo do ambiente institucional básico, com apoio no referencial teórico, observou-se que o mecanismo de governança predominantemente utilizado no serviço público de saneamento básico no Brasil, isto é, delegações a Companhias Estaduais de Saneamento por meio de contratos de longo-prazo (contratos de programa), não favorece a realização de investimentos em ativos específicos (infraestrutura) necessários à prestação e cumprimentos de metas da política. Foi também constatado que existem alternativas de governança viáveis ao desenho predominante, embora a utilização de formas alternativas provavelmente não possua execução viável pelo simples transplante de normas, isto é, pela via formal. A modificação da forma de governança predominante no saneamento básico no Brasil, com a superação do baixo desempenho verificado (low-level equilíbrium), não é possível de ser realizada sem custos. Nesse sentido, é necessário superar os custos para o rompimento do path dependence provocado pelo hold up realizado pelas Companhias Estaduais de Saneamento Básico sobre os titulares do serviço público (municípios), bem como os custos para o rompimento do path dependence no direito administrativo brasileiro, o qual restringe o desenvolvimento de uma teoria jurídica da regulação apta a viabilizar a construção de uma governança regulatória adequada à redução dos custos de transação, de modo a tornar viáveis investimentos em ativos de infraestruturas com elevado grau de especificidade.

The thesis consists of four chapters. The introductory chapter clarifies different notions of rationality used by economists and gives a summary of the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 2 proposes an explanation for the common empirical observation of the coexistence of infrequently-changing regular price ceilings and promotion-like price patterns. The results derive from enriching an otherwise standard, albeit stylized, general equilibrium model with two elements. First, the consumer-producer interaction is modeled in the spirit of the price dispersion literature, by introducing oligopolistic markets, consumer search costs and heterogeneity. Second, consumers are assumed to be boundedly-rational: In order to incorporate new information about the general price level, they have to incur a small cognitive cost. The decision whether to re-optimize or act according to the obsolete knowledge about prices is itself a result of optimization. It is shown that in this economy, individual retail prices are capped below the monopoly price, but are otherwise flexible. Moreover, they have the following three properties: 1) An individual price has a positive probability of being equal to the ceiling. 2) Prices have a tendency to fall below the ceiling and then be reset back to the cap value. 3) The ceiling remains constant for extended time intervals even when the mean rate of inflation is positive. Properties 1) and 2) can be associated with promotions and properties 1) and 3) imply the emergence of nominal price rigidity. The results do not rely on any type of direct costs of price adjustment. Instead, price stickiness derives from frictions on the consumers’ side of the market, in line with the results of several managerial surveys. It is shown that the developed theory, compared to the classic menu costs-based approach, does better in matching the stylized facts about the reaction of individual prices to inflation. In terms of quantitative assessment, the model, when calibrated to realistic parameter values, produces median price ceiling durations that match values reported in empirical studies.<p><p>The starting point of the essay in Chapter 3 is the observation that the baseline New-Keynesian model, which relies solely on the notion of infrequent price adjustment, cannot account for the observed degree of inflation sluggishness. Therefore, it is a common practice among macro- modelers to introduce an ad hoc additional source of persistence to their models, by assuming that price setters, when adjusting a price of their product, do not set it equal to its unobserved individual optimal level, but instead catch up with the optimal price only gradually. In the paper, a model of incomplete adjustment is built which allows for explicitly testing whether price-setters adjust to the shocks to the unobserved optimal price only gradually and, if so, measure the speed of the catching up process. According to the author, a similar test has not been performed before. It is found that new prices do not generally match their estimated optimal level. However, only in some sectors, e.g. for some industrial goods and services, prices adjust to this level gradually, which should add to the aggregate inflation sluggishness. In other sectors, particularly food, price-setters seem to overreact to shocks, with new prices overshooting the optimal level. These sectors are likely to contribute to decreasing the aggregate inflation sluggishness. Overall, these findings are consistent with the view that price-setters are boundedly-rational. However, they do not provide clear-cut support for the existence of an additional source of inflation persistence due to gradual individual price adjustment. Instead, they suggest that general equilibrium macroeconomic models may need to include at least two types of production sectors, characterized by a contrasting behavior of price-setters. An additional finding stemming from this work is that the idiosyncratic component of the optimal individual price is well approximated by a random walk. This is in line with the assumptions maintained in most of the theoretical literature. <p><p>Chapter 4 of the thesis has been co-authored by Julia Lendvai. In this paper a full-fledged production economy model with Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory features is constructed. The agents’ objective function is assumed to be a weighted sum of the usual utility over consumption and leisure and the utility over relative changes of agents’ wealth. It is also assumed that agents are loss-averse: They are more sensitive to wealth losses than to gains. Apart from the changes in the utility, the model is set-up in a standard Real Business Cycle framework. The authors study prices of stocks and risk-free bonds in this economy. Their work shows that under plausible parameterizations of the objective function, the model is able to explain a wide set of unconditional asset return moments, including the mean return on risk-free bonds, equity premium and the Sharpe Ratio. When the degree of loss aversion in the model is additionally assumed to be state-dependent, the model also produces countercyclical risk premia. This helps it match an array of conditional moments and in particular the predictability pattern of stock returns. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The general topic of our thesis is forward looking behavior in strategic situations. Mixing theoretical and experimental analysis, we document how strategic thinking is affected by the specific features of a dynamic interaction. The overarching result is that the information regarding decisions that are close to the current one, receive a qualitatively different consideration, with respect to distant ones. That is, the actual decisions are based on reasoning over a limited number of steps, close to actual decison node. We capture this feature of behavior both in a strategic (limited backward induction) and in a non-strategic (limited farsightedness) set up, and we identify relevant consequences on the outcome of the interaction, which powerfullly explain many observed experimental regularities.<p>In the first essay, we present a general out-of-equilibrium framework for strategic thinking in sequential games. It assumes the agents to take decisions on restricted game trees, according to their (limited) foresight level, following backward induction. Therefore we talk of limited backward induction (LBI). We test for LBI using a variant of the race game. Our design allows to identify restricted game trees and backward reasoning, thus properly disentangling LBI behavior. The results provide strong support in favor of LBI. Most players solve intermediate tasks - i.e. restricted games - without reasoning on the terminal histories. Only a small fraction of subjects play close to equilibrium, and (slow) convergence toward it appears, though only in the base game. An intermediate task keeps the subjects off the equilibrium path longer than in the base game. The results cannot be rationalized using the most popular models of strategic reasoning, let alone equilibrium analysis.<p>In the second essay, a subtle implication of the model is investigated: the sensitivity of the players’ foresight to the accessibility and completeness of the information they have, using a Centipede game. By manipulating the way in which information is provided to subjects, we show that reduced availability of information is sufficient to shift the distribution of take-nodes further from the equilibrium prediction. On the other hand, similar results are obtained in a treatment where reduced availability of information is combined with an attempt to elicit preferences for reciprocity, through the presentation of the centipede as a repeated trust game. Our results could be interpreted as cognitive limitations being more effective than preferences in determining (shifts in) behavior in our experimental centipede. Furthermore our results are at odds with the recent ones in Cox [2012], suggesting caution in generalizing their results. Reducing the availability of information may hamper backward induction or induce myopic behavior, depending on the strategic environment.<p>The third essay consists of an experimental investigation of farsighted versus myopic behavior in network formation. Pairwise stability Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] is the standard stability concept in network formation. It assumes myopic behavior of the agents in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. Assuming that agents are perfectly farsighted, related stability concepts have been proposed. We design a simple network formation experiment to test these extreme theories, but find evidence against both of them: the subjects are consistent with an intermediate rule of behavior, which we interpret as a form of limited farsightedness. On aggregate, the selection among multiple pairwise stable networks (and the performance of farsighted stability) crucially depends on the level of farsightedness needed to sustain them, and not on efficiency or cooperative considerations. Individual behavior analysis corroborates this interpretation, and suggests, in general, a low level of farsightedness (around two steps) on the part of the agents. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished