<p>This paper studies the structural issues concerning possible human rights violations found in the Dublin Regulation; An EU regulation aiming to allocate a responsible member state to a third-country-nationals asylum application. It is one of the criticized legal documents within the scholarly field of human rights. Hence, this study aims to study the details of the regulation to find out the elements of the regulation that are prone to human rights violations. Asking the question: What are some details of the Dublin Regulation that could potentially result in human rights violation of the third-country nationals seeking international protection within the territory of member states? Hence, exploring the gap found between the regulation and human rights of the asylum seekers. This was done by a normative legal analysis study of the law, studying the text of the regulation, relevant human rights law, and jurisprudence from two courts of law: ECHR and ECJ. The findings of the study highlights, first, the regulation upholds only the superficial elements of human rights law. Second, the regulation assumes that every member state is a safe country. Third, there is an imbalance of responsibility on either of the two or more member states involved. These are the details of the regulation highlighted in this study that is potentially the result of possible human rights violations and the criticism of the topic. </p>

This thesis analyzes how compulsory heterosexuality is present in Polish legislation on women* and trans* people’s reproductive and sexual rights. The aim of this study is to increase an understanding of how compulsory heterosexuality’s presence in legislation regarding reproductive and sexual rights can consequently affect women* and trans* people in practice. By the means of qualitative content analysis and the operationalization of compulsory heterosexuality through the lens of queer feminism, this thesis analyzes three Polish legislations on reproductive and sexual rights, namely the Constitution of Poland, the Family Planning, Human Embryo Protection and Conditions of Permissibility of Abortion Act, and the Family and Guardianship Code. Adrienne Rich’s theory of compulsory heterosexuality suggests that heterosexuality is not natural, but a violent institution enforced in society through e.g. law. This thesis found that compulsory heterosexuality was present in all three legislations, and presented itself through: erasure of women* and trans* people, denial of their sexuality, idealization of heterosexuality, rape and violence, control of their bodies, robbing of their children, punishment for being LGBTQIA+, diminishing their aspirations, restricting their self-fulfillment to parenthood and marriage, keeping them from seeking reproductive care, erasure of their traditions, objectification, and dismissive language. Possible consequences identified were: invalidation and invisibilization of queer and trans* people, increased oppression, the social norm being a negative bias against LGBTQIA+ people, criminalization of LGBTQIA+ people, more deaths at the hands of the law, more parentless children, making women* and trans* people question their body or intuition, and an increase in illegal unsafe abortions or abortion tourism.

One of the key issues discussed over the last few years in connection with the ECHR is a large number of individual applications lodged to the court although the court does not have sufficient capacity to resolve them. The majority of the cases falls into category of so- called repetitive cases. This thesis aims to identify the tools, ECHR disposes of, and to what extent those tools may affect national legislation and case law of national courts. Reforms of problematic institutes at the national level implemented as a result of the ECHR decisions are able to exclude the future influx of repetitive cases to this transnational judicial authority. The process of the influence of ECHR case law on national legal systems is analyzed on the example of Russian Federation, which currently holds the first place regarding the number of individual applications that have been filed with the ECHR.

Die vorliegende Arbeit analysiert den Umgang mit dem Tatbestand der Holocaust-Leugnung durch die Europäische Union (EU) und den Europäischen Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (EGMR). Derzeit befinden sich diese in einer heiklen Situation: Sie müssen das Gedenken an ein für die europäische Identität zentrales historisches Ereignis – den Holocaust – pflegen und schützen und zugleich die Achtung der Grundrechte, insbesondere der Meinungsfreiheit, gewährleisten. Diese besondere Situation erfordert eine gründliche Untersuchung des europäischen Umgangs mit dem Tatbestand der Holocaust-Leugnung. Der erste Teil der Dissertation steckt den Anwendungsbereich der europarechtlichen Verpflichtungen zur Kriminalisierung der Holocaust-Leugnung ab. Bewertet wird insbesondere die Bedeutung des Rahmenbeschlusses 2008/913/JHA über Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit für die EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Dabei werden einige Beispiele der Umsetzung in staatliches Recht dargestellt. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit der Rechtsprechung des EGMR und untersucht das Verhältnis zwischen dem Tatbestand der Holocaust-Leugnung und der Meinungsfreiheit mit dem Ziel, die Grundsätze, nach denen Staaten verpflichtet sind, entsprechende Äußerungen zu kriminalisieren, herzuleiten. Die übergreifenden Ziele der Untersuchung sind: a) den Charakter des Zusammenspiels zwischen EU und EGMR herauszuarbeiten; b) zu ermitteln, ob die jeweiligen Positionen gegensätzlich oder komplementär sind; c) die Rechtsnatur und den Inhalt der für die Mitgliedstaaten begründeten Verpflichtungen zu bestimmen; d) herauszuarbeiten, ob eine europaweite Kriminalisierung verpflichtend ist oder lediglich gefördert werden soll; und e) ob beziehungsweise unter welchen Bedingungen ein mit Kriminalstrafe sanktioniertes Verbot der Holocaust-Leugnung erstrebenswert wäre. / The present study aims to analyse the legal treatment of the crime of denialism by the two main actors in European justice, namely, the European Union (‘EU’) and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’). Presently, these two systems find themselves in a delicate position: they must cherish and protect the memory of an historical event – the Holocaust – which is central to Europe’s own identity, while simultaneously promoting respect for fundamental rights such as the freedom of speech. This unique balance raises a need for a thorough investigation into Europe’s approach to the crime of denialism. The dissertation’s first section seeks to measure the scope of EU-imposed obligations to make denialism a crime. Notably, the impact on EU Member States of the Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on racism and xenophobia is assessed, with illustrations of a few archetypal examples of domestic implementing legislation. The second part of the dissertation turns to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to examine the relationship between Holocaust denial as a crime and the right to freedom of expression, with a view to deducing the principles under which States must comply in the criminalization of this kind of utterance. The work’s overall goals are to assess: a) the nature of interactions between the EU and ECtHR; b) whether their positions on denialism are better portrayed in terms of contrast or mutual support; c) the legal nature and content of the obligations originating for the Member States; d) whether a Europe-wide criminal prohibition on denialism is dictated or simply encouraged; and e) whether such a prohibition would be desirable, and if so, under what conditions.

Par l’arrêt Pla et Puncernau contre Andorre du 13 juillet 2004, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a fait une entrée remarquée dans le contrôle de l’interprétation des actes juridiques privés. Tenante d’une conception réaliste du droit, elle a élaboré des Principes européens d’interprétation qui sont autant d’obligations qui pèsent sur le juge national. La CJUE partage en grande partie ces principes, mais possède ses particularités et hésite encore à s’aligner sur le contrôle du juge de Strasbourg. Le juge français est quant à lui confronté à des directives d’interprétation qui sont de simples conseils, tandis que la Cour de cassation se refuse à opérer un autre contrôle que celui de la dénaturation. Dès lors, elle n’est pas en mesure de redresser les fautes commises par les juges du fond notamment, et encourt le risque d’engager la responsabilité de l’Etat français devant la Cour EDH. Si la Cour de cassation a entamé une réflexion sur la façon de rendre la justice en coordination avec les cours européennes, la modification du système herméneutique français se heurte à de nombreux obstacles révélateurs de la conception traditionnelle du droit français des obligations. / With the case of Pla and Puncernau versus Andorra on 13 July 2004, the European Court of Human Rights has made a dramatic entrance in the supervision of the interpretation of private contracts. Defending a realist conception of law, it developed European Principles of interpretation, which are obligations for national courts. The CJEU largely shares these principles, but has its particularities and it is still reluctant to align with the Strasbourg Court’s supervision. The French judge is itself faced with interpretive guidelines that are simple advice, while the Court of Cassation refused to operate another supervision than the denaturation. Therefore, it is not able to correct the errors committed by the trial judges in particular, and takes the risk to commit a violation of the European law. If the Supreme Court considers by now how to deliver justice in coordination with the European courts, changing the French hermeneutic system faces many obstacles revealing the traditional conception of French law of obligations.

Cette étude de l’impartialité des magistrats dans la procédure pénale française à l’aune du droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme propose une analyse renouvelée de ce principe, clé de voûte, d’un procès pénal juste.Tout d’abord, l’objet de l’étude induit de définir le principe d’impartialité grâce au droit conventionnel. Ce dernier a forgé le principe d’impartialité et est encore retentissant en la matière. Cependant, la théorisation d’ampleur des appréciations conventionnelles relatives à l’impartialité faisant défaut, la présente étude a vocation de remédier à cette carence. La définition conventionnelle de l’impartialité sert de socle à la présente étude et l’analyse de la jurisprudence conventionnelle, relative à l’impartialité, permettra de déterminer les points de convergence ou de divergence entre le droit conventionnel et le droit français. Ensuite, l’impartialité est soutenue, permise par divers principes de procédures ; l’indépendance, la collégialité, la publicité, la motivation, la séparation des fonctions, l’oralité, le contradictoire, qui n’ont pas la même intensité selon la procédure pénale envisagée. L’étude de la teneur des principes procéduraux soutiens de l’impartialité, devant les juridictions de droit commun et les juridictions spécialisées, permet de déterminer les disparités de garanties de l’impartialité dans la procédure pénale française. En outre, la question de l’impartialité des magistrats avant le jugement se pose avec beaucoup d’acuité. D’une part, le droit conventionnel s’est prononcé récemment sur l’extension ou non du principe d’impartialité en amont du jugement. D’autre part, le juge d’instruction dont la suppression est souvent envisagée comme une solution favorable à la procédure pénale, par ceux qui souhaitent le voir disparaitre, n’est pas opportune au regard du principe d’impartialité. L’étude permettra de démontrer que la phase d’instruction, bien que perfectible, apporte, une réelle plus-value à l’impartialité dans la procédure pénale et qu’au contraire, l’impartialité des magistrats du parquet est soit sporadique, soit absente. / This study about magistrates impartiality in the french criminal procedure in the light of the law of the European Convention on Human Rights focuses on a renewed analysis of this key principle during a fair trial.Firstly, the object of this study leads to the definition of the principle of impartiality thanks to the law of the ECHR that still molds it.However, the absence of theorising conventional appreciations regarding impartiality leads us to find a solution to this deficiency. The conventional definition of impartiality serves as a base to this study. The analysis of the ECHR jurisprudence regarding impartiality enables the determination of the converging and divergent elements between french and conventional law.Furthermore, impartiality is allowed thanks to various procedural principles : independance, collegiality, public disclosure, motivation, the separation between presiding judges and the prosecution services, orality, hearings in court with both parties. The study of the content of procedural principles as a support to impartiality, during proceedings in front of common and specialized jurisdictions, enables the determination of the differences of the garanties of impartiality during the french criminal procedure.In addition, the question of the magistrates impartiality before judgement has to be tackled with much acuteness. This is the reason why the suppression of the examining judge (juge d’instruction), often wanted by some, is not appropriate as far as impartiality is concerned. This study shows and proves that the inquiry, even if improvable, brings a real added-value to impartiality during the criminal procedure and that, on the contrary the prosecution services impartiality is either sporadic or absent.

L’effet horizontal implique l’application de la Convention EDH dans les relations interindividuelles. Justifiée par la théorie des obligations positives, cette construction jurisprudentielle permet la mise en jeu de la responsabilité internationale de l’État lorsque celui-ci ne prend pas les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir et réprimer les violations de la Convention commises par les personnes privées. La reconnaissance de l’effet horizontal par le juge européen a pour conséquence la prolifération des obligations substantielles et procédurales de l’État. La transposition de celles-ci dans l’ordre juridique interne astreint les autorités publiques, y compris les tribunaux, à intervenir dans les rapports privés. Nécessaire à l’effectivité des droits de l’homme, la diffusion de l’effet horizontal a pour contrepartie l’accroissement de l’intervention étatique dans la sphère privée et l’apparition des devoirs individuels fondés sur le respect des droits et libertés d’autrui. La Cour EDH, pionnière de l’ « horizontalisation », refuse d’en élaborer une théorie générale. Le défi est dès lors de délimiter l’extension des droits de l’homme aux relations interindividuelles afin que celle-ci ne devienne pas un facteur d’affaiblissement de la protection verticale des droits de l’homme. / The horizontal effect involves the application of the ECHR in interindividual relationships. Justified by the theory of positive obligations, this jurisprudential construction allows to establish the international responsibility of the State when it fails to take necessary measures to prevent and suppress violations of the Convention committed by private persons. Recognition of the horizontal effect by the European judge results in the proliferation of substantive and procedural obligations of the State. Transposing them into domestic law compels public authorities, including courts, to interfere in private relations. Necessary for the effectiveness of human rights, the diffusion of the horizontal effect generates, in return, an extension of State intervention in the private sphere and the emergence of individual duties based on the respect of the rights and freedoms of others. The European Court of Human Rights, pioneer of the « horizontalization », refuses to develop a general theory. The challenge is therefore to delimit the extension of human rights to relations between individuals so that it does not become a factor of weakening of the vertical protection of human rights.

Délimitée par référence à la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, le champ pénal de l’Union européenne se révèle plus conséquent que ce que l’apposition du qualificatif « pénal », en droit de l’Union, ne le laisse penser. Envisager dans sa globalité, à l’aune des caractéristiques d’un système juridique et des modèles pénaux existant, les éléments du champ pénal de l’Union européenne peuvent alors s’agencer comme les pièces d'un puzzle qui prend progressivement forme et dont l'image générale se dessine peu à peu. Le champ pénal de l’Union européenne n’est plus qu’une compilation de normes. Il constitue désormais un système juridique : un ensemble d'éléments en interaction, évoluant dans un environnement déterminé, structuré en fonction des finalités qu’il est destiné à satisfaire, agissant sur son environnement et se transformant avec le temps sans perdre son identité. Son idéologie pénale à dominante répressive n’a rien de particulièrement original ; sa physionomie, en tant que système pénal, en revanche, reproduit l'atypisme proprement unioniste / Defined by the Europe court of human rights (ECHR), the EU extend its scope of action beyond the definition of « penal » as found in the EU law. Seen as a whole, taken the characteristics and models of already existing law systems, the different elements of the EU law scope can be put together like a jigsaw puzzle, revealing pieces after pieces the general picture. The penal scope of the EU isn’t just about regulations anymore. It acts as a legal system - a set of elements interacting with one another, evolving in set environment, structured to meet set up goals, taking action on its environment and evolving with time without losing its identity/nature. Its penal ideology and restrictive tendencies are not innovative, but its structure, on the other hand, replicate the atypical trait of the EU

In this thesis, the legal theory of Robert Cover is employed to analyse the procedural turn of the ECtHR. The text studies how Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom (ADI) and subsequent case law relate to the margin of appreciation doctrine and how this can be understood from a Coverian point of view. The margin of appreciation is thus seen as a product of an interplay between paideic and imperial forces where the imperial, or world-maintaining, influences on the doctrine are the strongest. ADI and later cases are read as further accentuating the focus on the nomos of the state relative to competing nomoi already at work in the case law of the procedural turn. The thesis is closed with an amalgamation of Cover’s ideas with the democratic theory of Jacques Derrida which results in a discussion on what a Coverian re-evaluation of the approach outlined in ADI could look like.

In the early 1990s the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicted that the gravest effects of climate change could be on human migration, as millions would be displaced by coastal erosion, flooding, and drought. Today, this is considered a reality that is coming ever closer. Yet, there are currently no binding international frameworks dedicated to the issue of climate induced migration. In addition, the current regime of international refugee law is woefully inadequate at responding to the issue. Individuals that do not fall under the refugee definition are thus commonly left with the general scope of international human rights law standards, so-called complementary protection.   On these premises, this thesis sets out to examine the circumstances under which the non-refoulement principle in international human rights law could be applied in the context of climate change effects and especially slow onset processes, and how the principle could potentially be developed. Principally through examining jurisprudence concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, this thesis finds that while there is a possibility for non-refoulement obligations to arise due to the effects of climate change, the precise scope of such protection is unclear. Although case law has emerged and continues to do so, the complex nature of climate induced migration and the undeveloped jurisprudence on this issue leaves important questions unanswered. This thesis finds that there seems to be no obvious response to the question whether climate change is a relevant factor in the legal analysis of non-refoulement claims, and whether it should be. Furthermore, there are great challenges in discerning the required intensity of harm for the threshold to be met and protection to be granted. In addition, this thesis finds that applying the non-refoulement principle in the context of slow onset processes entails several difficulties, particularly concerning the timing and prediction of the harm. It is therefore concluded that, as long as there is no framework dedicated to the issue of climate induced migration, clarity will be much needed in case law as to the scope of non-refoulement obligations in the context of, especially, slow onset processes due to climate change.