Bank demand guarantees have become an established part of international trade. Demand guarantees, standby letters of credit and commercial letters of credit are all treated as autonomous contracts whose operation will not be interfered with by courts on grounds immaterial to the guarantee or credit itself. The idea in the documentary credit transaction/demand guarantee transaction is that if the documents (where applicable) presented are in line with the terms of the credit/guarantee the bank has to pay, and if the documents do not correspond to the requirements, the bank must not pay. However, over the years a limited number of exceptions to the autonomy principle of demand guarantees and letters of credit have come to be acknowledged and accepted in practice. In certain circumstances, the autonomy of demand guarantees and letters of credit may be ignored by the bank and regard may be had to the terms and conditions of the underlying contract. The main exceptions concern fraud and illegality in the underlying contract. In this thesis a great deal of consideration has been given to fraud and illegality as possible grounds on which payment under demand guarantees and letters of credit have been attacked (and sometimes even prevented) in the English, American and South African courts. It will be shown that the prospect of success depends on the law applicable to the demand guarantee and letter of credit, and the approach a court in a specific jurisdiction takes. At present, South Africa has limited literature on demand guarantees, and the case law regarding the grounds upon which payment under a demand guarantee might be prevented is scarce and often non-existent. In South Africa one finds guidance by looking at similar South African case law dealing with commercial and standby letters of credit and applying these similar principles to demand guarantees. The courts, furthermore, find guidance by looking at how other jurisdictions, in particular the English courts, deal with these issues. Therefore, how the South African courts currently deal/should be dealing/probably will be dealing with the unfair and fraudulent calling of demand guarantees/letters of credit is discussed in this thesis. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

Cette étude consiste à démontrer que les procédures administratives d’urgence ont entraîné une modification de la conception du rôle du juge administratif : d’une part, par rapport aux libertés fondamentales dont le juge administratif a dû déterminer et encadrer la notion ; d’autre part, par rapport à l’autorité administrative vis-à-vis de laquelle le juge administratif a retiré un pouvoir accru qui lui donne la vigueur d’un juge administrateur. Cette étude est présenté en deux parties on s’attacher, dans une première partie, à montrer comment les procédures d’urgence, mises à sa disposition par la loi du 30 juin 2000, permettent au juge administratif de faire cesser les atteintes aux libertés fondamentales. Dans une deuxième partie, on tentera de mettre en lumière l’évolution du rôle du juge administratif dans ses relations avec l’administration. Les procédures d’urgence ont conduit à l’élargissement de ses pouvoirs, ce qui a entraîné un renforcement de l’autorité du juge administratif par rapport l’administration. / This study is aims to demonstrate that the administrative procedures of urgency has led to a redefinition of the role of administrative judge: first, in relation to the fundamental libertie whose the administrative judge had a duty to determine this concept. Secondly, in relation to administrative authority vis-à-vis which the administrative judge withdrew an increased power that gives it the force of a administration judge. This study is presented in two parts: in the first part, we show how the urgency procedures provided by the law N° 2000-597 of 30 June 2000, allows the administrative judge to stop violations of fundamental liberties. In The second part we attempt to highlight the changing role of the administrative judge in its relations with the administration. The urgency procedures have led to the expansion of its powers, which led to a strengthening of the authority of the administrative judge against the administration

Le jugement d’annulation d’une décision administrative a, au Liban comme en France, une autorité de la chose jugée. Cette autorité est relative, face à l’administration, au requérant et au juge qui a rendu le jugement d’annulation et absolue face au tiers et aux autres juges.Cet effet absolu peut mettre en question les intérêts et les droits des tiers qu’ils croyaient acquis. Pour des raisons liées à la stabilité des situations juridiques, le juge administratif, en France plus qu’au Liban, fait prévaloir les droits des tiers sur le principe de légalité. Les tiers peuvent intervenir en cours d’instance ou recourir à la tierce opposition.Le juge administratif et le législateur ont mis des procédures d’incitation pour aider l’administration à respecter l’autorité de la chose jugée, ils ont même posé des procédures de contrainte.Autre cette particularité d’effet dans l’espace, le jugement d’annulation a une caractéristique d’effet dans le temps. L’annulation d’un acte administratif a pour conséquence la suppression rétroactive de cet acte. Cette disparition est parfois difficile voire impossible et provoque des dommages importants sur la sécurité des situations juridiques.Le juge administratif, français autant que libanais, a été persuadé à trouver des solutions de nature de limiter les inconvénients de cette rétroactivité, telles la théorie du service fait et la théorie du fonctionnaire de fait, et la modulation de l’effet rétroactif de jugement d’annulation. / Annulment’s judgment of an administrative decision, in Lebanon and France, has the authority of res judicata. This authority is relative facing the administration, the applicant and the judge who delivered the judgment of annulment and it’s absolute face the third parties and other judges.This absolute effect may question the interests and rights of third parties that they believed acquired. For reasons related to the stability of legal situations, the administrative court in France more than in Lebanon, upholding rights of third parties on the principle of legality. Third parties may intervene in the proceedings or resort to third opposition.The administrative judge and the legislature have incentive procedures to help the administration to respect the authority of res judicata, they even asked constraint procedures.Another special feature of this effect in space, the annulment judgment has effect characteristic in time. The annulment of an administrative act results in the retroactive elimination of the act. This disappearance is difficult sometimes even impossible and causes significant damage to the security of legal situations.The administrative judge, especially French, was persuaded to find solutions to limit the inconvenience of retroactivity, as the done service theory, the fact employee theory, and modulation of the retroactive effect of the judgment annulment.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Antonio de Moura Cavalcanti Neto.pdf: 1566983 bytes, checksum: 13d32595adf825086320591e5d34cf6b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-02 / This paper aims to discuss mainly the legality of the theory of the accomplished fact. The jurisprudence always refers to such theory as an exceptional circumstance, but it is not enough to close the debate regarding the issue. On the contrary, it is important to stress that the exceptional being has nothing to do with being legal. This argument has been only used in lawsuits filed against Public authorities, which demonstrates that, in cases where the public authority is not the defendant, there would be no accomplished fact. This conception indicates clearly that the legal institutions that permeate the debate about accomplished fact have been inserted in the context of liquid modernity , in which the rigid rules of behavior give way to personal desires of each agent. The problem is more serious when the debate involves decisions issued by the Judiciary, once, in a democratic State, such decisions cannot prevail on the Legislative Power s expressions. Concerning the issue subject of this paper, the manifestations of the Legislative Power are clear and fruitful: regulate the summary injunction with depth as well as the juridical fact. If the current jurisprudence has a penchant for removal of these concepts clearly defined in the name of principles, there is no way to note something about the accomplished fact without making a foray brief about the theory of principles discussed in the works of Humberto Avila, Marcelo Neves, Robert Alexy and Ronald Dworkin. If this is essential, so is the definition of what is an accomplished fact, that is and how the natural, physical or social events are held in the legal world without any normative implications (chronological time, the practice of acts during the term the summary trust, good faith in the action of the measure applicant and so forth). After this time, the argument of the accomplished fact has to be compared with the corresponding assumptions and with those established by the jurisprudence itself, in an analytical study to allow, with some confidence, understand what effectively it comes and keeps compatibility with the juridical discourses rationality. Based on the analysis made in this paper, it is allowed a clear conclusion towards the lack of legality of the theory the accomplished fact, which it should not be relied upon in the litigations against the Public authorities for suffering from lack of normative justification and democratic argument. It is an argument of authority, subjective and uncontrollable that, without a critical perspective, can preserve the legal system situations that are remarkably strange / Questionar a juridicidade da teoria do fato consumado é o grande objetivo do presente trabalho. A referência sempre viva na jurisprudência de que se trata de situação excepcionalíssima não basta para fechar a discussão. Muito pelo contrário, o ser excepcional não tem nada a ver com ser jurídico. Esse argumento é utilizado unicamente em demandas contra o Poder Público, demonstrando que, se não fosse ele o demandado, não haveria fato consumado. Isso demonstra com clareza que os institutos jurídicos que permeiam o debate foram inseridos em um contexto de modernidade líquida, em que as rígidas regras de conduta cedem lugar aos desejos pessoais de cada agente. O problema é mais grave, entretanto, quando estão em discussão decisões do Poder Judiciário, que em um Estado Democrático de Direito, em regra, não podem anular as expressões do Poder Legislativo. Na temática, as manifestações do Legislativo são claras e férteis: regulam as tutelas sumárias com profundidade, bem como o fato jurídico. Se a jurisprudência tem se inclinado pelo afastamento desses conceitos tão bem definidos em nome de princípios, não há como constatar algo a respeito do fato consumado sem fazer uma breve incursão na teoria dos princípios, a partir das obras de Humberto Ávila, Marcelo Neves, Robert Alexy e Ronald Dworkin. Se isso é indispensável, também é a definição do que é o fato consumado, em que consiste e como os fatos naturais, físicos ou sociais são mantidos no mundo jurídico sem qualquer incidência normativa (o tempo cronológico, a prática de atos durante a vigência da tutela sumária, a boa-fé na ação do requerente da medida etc). Após esse momento, o argumento do fato consumado precisa ser cotejado com as premissas fixadas e com aquelas estabelecidas pela própria jurisprudência, em um estudo analítico que permita, com alguma segurança, compreender do que efetivamente se trata e se guarda compatibilidade com a racionalidade do discurso jurídico. Feita essa análise, é permitida uma conclusão clara no sentido da carência de juridicidade da teoria do fato consumado, que não deve ser invocada nas lides contra o Poder Público por padecer de falta de justificação normativa e argumentação democrática. É argumento de autoridade, subjetivo e incontrolável que, sem uma perspectiva crítica, pode preservar no sistema jurídico situações que lhe são notavelmente estranhas

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcio Lamonica Bovino.pdf: 1475782 bytes, checksum: cb43960199a251d7a0b457dba14fb964 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-03 / This thesis main objective, already under the Law 13.105/2015, is to propose pure preventive inhibitory or mandatory protection on threat of the illegal act and of abuse of rights. We seek to frame the intention of committing an abuse of rights as the foundation of inhibitory or mandatory individual judicial protection. The challenges are based on the framework of the illegal act despite the actual existence of damage, through the evidence of the intention of the exercise clearly beyond the limits imposed by economic or social order for the good faith or the good morals that the rule imposes, ending the race the probability of the right and the danger of harm or risk to the fruitful result of the process, as the basis of the request for early or injunctive interim injunction. The new Code of Civil Procedure (NCPC) which will come into force on March 16, 2016 (Law 13105 of March 16, 2015), deals with court injunctions guardianships the sole paragraph of Article 497, stating that the action that has the engaged in providing do or not do, the judge if the relief sought, grant specific protection to deter, prevent the repetition or even seeking the removal of illegal (not to be confused with prevention) regardless of the demonstration of the occurrence of damage or of fault or willful misconduct. As it turns out , the legislator has standardized , albeit not fully fit in our view, the three (3) categories of inhibitory: a) preventive inhibitory (also known as pure inhibitory protection); b) inhibitory protection to stop the repetition e c) inhibitory protection to stop the continuation of the illegal act. We feels the convenience of adoption of preventive inhibitory or mandatory protection as an autonomous differentiated judicial protection, not just one of the possible inhibitory effect of the sentence currently treated in Chapter XIII of Title I of Book I of the New Civil Procedure Code (NCPC). We suggest the adoption of inhibitory technique as an autonomous differentiated judicial protection, proposing legislative changes to the NCPC which will come into force on March 16, 2016 / A tese tem por objeto central, desenvolvido sob a perspectiva da Lei 13.105/2015, tratar da tutela judicial inibitória do ato ilícito e também diante da ameaça de abuso de direito. Buscamos enquadrar a intenção de praticar um abuso de direito como fundamento da tutela individual judicial inibitória. Os desafios partem do enquadramento do ato ilícito à despeito da existência efetiva de dano, passando pela prova da intenção do exercício manifestamente fora dos limites impostos pelo fim econômico ou social, pela boa-fé ou pelos bons costumes que a norma impõe, encerrando na prova da probabilidade do direito e o perigo de dano ou o risco ao resultado útil do processo, enquanto fundamento do pedido de tutela provisória antecipada ou cautelar. O novo código de processo civil (NCPC) que entrará em vigor no dia 16 de março de 2016 (Lei 13.105 de 16 de março de 2015), trata das tutelas inibitórias judiciais no parágrafo único do art. 497, dispondo que na ação que tenha por objeto a prestação de fazer ou de não fazer, o juiz, se procedente o pedido, concederá a tutela específica destinada a inibir, impedir a reiteração ou mesmo buscar a remoção do ilícito (esta última que não se confunde com a prevenção), independentemente da demonstração da ocorrência de dano ou da existência de culpa ou dolo. Como se vê, o legislador normatizou, ainda que de forma não plena a nosso ver, as 3 (três) categorias de tutela inibitória: a) tutela preventiva do ato ilícito (também conhecida como tutelar inibitória pura); b) tutela impeditiva da reiteração do ilícito e c) tutela impeditiva da continuação do ato ilícito. Entendemos que a tipicidade das ações inibitórias judiciais, matéria bastante debatida pela doutrina, poderia ter sido melhor explorada do ponto de vista. Inserida no capítulo que trata do cumprimento de sentença, nos parece que o legislador perdeu uma boa oportunidade de tipificar a ação inibitória ao invés de tratar no Capítulo XIII do Título I do Livro I apenas dos possíveis efeitos inibitórios da sentença. Defendemos a conveniência da adoção das ações inibitórias judiciais enquanto tutela jurisdicional diferenciada autônoma, e não apenas um dos possíveis efeitos inibitórios da sentença tratado atualmente no Capítulo XIII do Título I do Livro I do Novo Código de Processo Civil (NCPC). Sugerimos a adoção da técnica inibitória enquanto tutela jurisdicional diferenciada autônoma, propondo alteração legislativa no NCPC que entrará em vigor em 16 de março de 2016

Die Dissertation befasst sich mit der juristischen Problematik, ob ein Rechtsbehelf anzuerkennen ist, der es Anspruchsgegnern ermöglicht, in lauterkeitsrechtlichen Unterlassungsstreitigkeiten Verfahren des einstweiligen Rechtsschutzes zu initiieren. Ein solcher Rechtsbehelf ist für Anspruchsgegner bislang nicht anerkannt. Dies stellt sich als sehr problematisch dar, da Eilverfahren im Lauterkeitsrecht eine sehr hohe Bedeutung zukommt und Anspruchsgegner in diesen Verfahren signifikant benachteiligt werden. Dieser Umstand begründet auch eine erhebliche Gefahr von Fehlentscheidungen zu Lasten der Anspruchsgegner. Im Wettbewerb kann diesen Fehlentscheidungen große Bedeutung zukommen, weil durch sie beispielsweise der Vertrieb neuer innovativer Produkte untersagt werden kann. Die Arbeit kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein entsprechender Rechtsbehelf anzuerkennen ist, da er dem Anspruchsgegner eine Möglichkeit verschafft, sich wirksam vor schädigenden Fehlentscheidungen zu schützen und damit der Verwirklichung der verfassungsrechtlichen Vorgaben prozessualer Waffengleichheit und effektiven Rechtschutzes dient. / The dissertation deals with the juristic problem whether a legal remedy is to be recognized which enables opponents to initiate procedures of interim legal protection in disputes regarding injunctive relief in the field of unfair competition law. Such a legal remedy is not recognized for opponents up to now. This appears to be very problematic, as preliminary proceedings are of high importance in the field of unfair competition law and opponents are being significantly disadvantaged in these procedures. This fact also founds a considerable danger of wrong decisions at the expense of the opponents. In competition these wrong decisions may be of great importance as, for example, the distribution of new and innovative products can be prohibited by them. The work comes to the conclusion that a corresponding legal remedy is to be recognized, because it provides the opponent with an effective option to protect itself from damaging wrong decisions and it serves the realization of the constitutional requirements of procedural equality of opportunity and effective legal protection.

L’injonction anti-suit ou anti-procédure est le seul moyen susceptible d’empêcher une partie de s’engager, de mauvaise foi, dans une procédure initiée devant un tribunal étatique de son choix dans le but d’entraver l’arbitrage. Sa forme la plus efficace est celle d’une mesure provisoire. Cet outil juridictionnel peut, conformément aux lois et règlement d’arbitrage modernes, être obtenu des tribunaux arbitraux, qui jouissent habituellement d’un imperium suffisant pour le prononcer ainsi que pour sanctionner tout non-respect de l’ordre. S’il peut être octroyé « avant dire droit », l’arbitre doit néanmoins le fonder sur une base légale se trouvant dans le champ de sa compétence juridictionnelle. L’apparence d’une possible violation de l’une des obligations découlant de la clause compromissoire, comme celle de l’exécuter de bonne foi, ou d’un manquement à une cause de confidentialité insérée dans le contrat principal en sont des exemples. Cette mesure d’interdiction est, en outre, disponible au juge étatique français, l’injonction « de ne pas faire » n’étant guère inconnue en droit français. En matière d’arbitrage, elle pourrait par ailleurs être autorisée, en dépit de l’arrêt West Tankers, au regard du nouveau Règlement Bruxelles I bis et, surtout, lorsqu’elle prend la forme d’une mesure provisoire. Lorsque son émission paraît légitime, il revient principalement au juge étatique du siège d’un arbitrage de décider si une injonction anti-suit doit être prononcée en soutien de l’instance arbitrale. Cependant, pour des raisons d’efficacité, la juridiction d’un autre Etat qui serait en mesure de mieux faire respecter l’injonction anti-suit peut aussi l’ordonner. / The anti-suit injunction is the only means capable of preventing a party from being involved in proceedings commenced before a domestic court of its choice in bad faith and with the only objective of disrupting arbitration. It is most efficient in the form of an interim measure. In accordance with modern arbitration laws and rules, this jurisdictional tool may be obtained, in this form, from arbitration tribunals, which normally have sufficient imperium to order it, as well as to impose sanctions on any non-compliant party. Although it can be issued before the parties’ rights have been determined, the arbitrator must nevertheless make sure that its legal basis falls under his jurisdiction. Examples of such legal bases are the prima facie potential breaches of one of the obligations contained in the arbitration clause, such as to perform it in good faith, or of a confidentiality clause contained in the main contract. This restraining measure is also available to the French judge, since prohibitory injunctions are hardly unknown to French law. In the field of arbitration, it appears that its use may be permitted under the new Brussels 1 bis Regulation in spite of the West Tankers case and, especially, where it takes the form of an interim measure. When its issuance appears to be legitimate, it is primarily for the court of the seat of an arbitration to decide whether it should be ordered in support of the arbitration proceedings. However, for reasons of efficiency, if the court of another country happens to be in a better position to ensure compliance with the anti-suit injunction, it may also order it.

Longtemps, en matière de protection effective des droits et libertés fondamentaux des administrés, le juge administratif a été relégué au second plan, derrière son homologue judiciaire, en raison d’une inefficacité chronique de ses procédures d’urgence. Le législateur a cependant remédié à cette défaillance en créant, notamment, le référé-liberté dont l’objectif avoué était de faire du juge administratif un véritable juge des libertés, au même titre que le juge judiciaire de la voie de fait administrative. En dix années d’application, le juge administratif a su pleinement se saisir de l’opportunité qui lui a ainsi été donnée de concurrencer le juge judiciaire par une politique jurisprudentielle évolutive et constructive. Cette politique s’est traduite par une conception très extensive de la notion de « libertés fondamentales », et par l’avènement de véritables mesures injonctives au service de celles-ci. L’étendue des libertés jugées comme fondamentales et celle du degré de leur protection vont indéniablement dans le sens de l’accession du juge administratif des référés au rang de protecteur effectif des droits et libertés fondamentaux des administrés. / Regarding citizens’ effective protection in terms of fundamental rights and liberties, the administrative judge has, for a long time, been overshadowed by his judicial counterpart, because of a chronic ineffectiveness concerning urgency procedures. However, lawmakers have redressed that situation in particular by creating the “freedom summary procedure” which explicitly aimed at transforming the administrative judge into an actual custodial judge in the same way the judicial judge is for illegal administrative acts. In the ten years following that creation, the administrative judge has fully seized the opportunity to compete with the judicial judge thanks to a progressive and constructive judicial policy. This policy resulted in a significantly extended conception of the notion of “fundamental liberties” and in the appearance and development of injunctive actions to protect them. The range of liberties considered as fundamental as well as the consequent degree of their protection will undeniably serve the aim of a rise of the administrative judge to the rank of effective protector of the citizens’ fundamental rights and liberties.

The principle purpose of the study was to investigate the role of women in the mission and ministry of The Lutheran Church in Southern Africa (LCSA). The researcher raised the question of why women are viewed as inferior within the LCSA, and whether this is Biblically supported. I investigated the distinction between men and women with regard to the church culture, tradition, pastoral office, priesthood, and authority within the LCSA. As a general theoretical framework, I used two theories in church mission: (1) The unity of the Church and apostolic practice as propounded by Schenk in 1983. (2) Paradigm shifts in theology: mission as ministry by the whole people of God as propounded by Bosch in 1991. These theories explain the mission of proclaiming the Gospel of God as belonging to everyone (both male and female) as His servants in the Church. To obtain people’s views and interpretations of Scriptures, culture, church practice, and the social reality of women’s roles in the LCSA, focus-group and individual interviews were used to gather qualitative data from 525 respondents. The data was collected and analyzed using the descriptive qualitative research approach. Based on the research findings in Chapter 2 (pages 37-42), Chapter 6 (page140) presents proposals for the involvement of women in the LCSA. The findings show that participants were concerned about the topic and those women’s rights and voices are not yet acknowledged in many societies in Southern Africa. However, the scope of the study is limited to the LCSA, and its findings cannot be generalized. Valuable insights were gained into the church’s traditional construction of women’s roles in the LCSA, not allowing women to preach the Gospel and to administer the Sacraments in the Church mission work. From a missiological study perspective, the researcher recommended that women should be allowed to participate fully in the Church mission work. Therefore, the Involvement of Women in Mission in LCSA was an important dissertation research topic, affecting women in Southern Africa particularly, and potentially, in the African continent at large. / Dissertation (MA Theol)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / gm2014 / Science of Religion and Missiology / unrestricted

隨知識經濟發展，有關智慧財產權之管理與對因智慧財產權所衍生之訴訟紛爭因應之道，對企業越來越重要。因大企業多利用我國民事訴訟保全程序中假處分程序較提起本案訴訟所需支出之程序費用較低，取得定暫時狀態假處分之時間較本案訴訟耗費冗長之審理時間迅速，加上我國法律准許原告得提供擔保金代替聲請假處分需提出之事實與理由，導致大企業可挾雄厚財力於提請侵權訴訟之前，提供高額擔保金向法院聲請對競爭對手核發定暫時狀態假處分之裁定，故我國現行智財訴訟定暫時狀態假處分制度遭批評成為大企業用來對付新興中小企業競爭對手之手段。 有鑒於智慧財產案件與一般訴訟案件性質不同，著重承審法官須具備法律以外專門知識與技術知識，且因我國司法採取公私法二元化審判權區分，始同一智慧財產權紛爭案件可提起民事、刑事及行政訴訟程序，產生訴訟程序遲滯、裁判矛盾等問題，加上現行假處分制度有上述缺失。我國研擬智慧財產法院組織法、智慧財產案件審理法，並決定明年3月成立智慧財產專責法院，統一審理智慧財產案件，因此新制實行後能否徹底解決現行諸多缺失，亦係企業十分關心之議題。 隨台灣企業於國際間代工獲利增長、面板產業、資訊科技產業快速成長發展，外國擁有相關技術智慧財產權之大廠，紛紛對台灣企業於美國涉嫌侵權行為提起訴訟，獲取洽談授權金或和解金、賠償金之利益。因國外大廠於提起智慧財產侵權訴訟之際，均會依假處分規定，聲請法院下裁定禁止涉嫌侵權之企業繼續為生產、銷售及進口等行為，使台灣企業無法繼續生產商品銷售至美國，受有商機、商譽等重大損失。且台灣企業於美國侵權訴訟程序需耗費巨額訴訟費用及冗長之訴訟程序進行，台灣現行並無訴訟保險制度，無法將面臨智慧財產侵權訴訟須支出之費用藉由保險制度分散風險，故台灣企業面臨智慧財產權利人提起假處分或侵權訴訟時，應採取何種因應措施與訴訟策略，平時對其所有之智慧財產權應為如何管理，均係相當重要之議題。 ＊關鍵字：定暫時狀態假處分、擔保金、智慧財產法院、訴訟保險、智慧財產權管理、訴訟策略 / In today's knowledge-based economy, management of intellectual property rights is more important and litigation arising out of disputes about intellectual property rights is more than ever among transnational companies. In light of the lengthy procedure of litigation, companies often take advantage of the preliminary injunction system in Taiwan before filing a lawsuit, especially in cases of disputes about intellectual property rights. An applicant of a preliminary injunction is allowed to provide a security bond in lieu of explaining in detail the merit of its lawsuit and can obtain a preliminary injunction issued by the court within a relatively short period of time before the final judgment has been rendered. Consequently, the preliminary-injunction system has been criticized for its shortage in protecting the counterparty's legitimate interest. Because the current preliminary-injunction system has the above-mentioned disadvantages, and the litigation in connection with intellectual property rights differs from the ordinary litigation, i.e. the judges must have certain engineering or scientific knowledge in addition to the understanding of the legal system. Furthermore, our country adopts the "dual system" in terms of jurisdiction, i.e. there might be criminal, administrative, and civil litigations simultaneously arising out of the same intellectual-property disputes, which results in delay and contradictions among the judgments in relation to the same disputes. In view of the above, the Judicial Yuan drafts the "The Act for Establishing the Specialized Intellectual Property Court" and "The Code for Hearing Procedures Concerning Intellectual Property Disputes", and plans to launch the Specialized Intellectual Property Court by March 2007 to be in sole charge of the hearing of intellectual-property cases. Therefore, whether the new system adopted by the Judicial Yuan can resolve the aforementioned shortcoming is the major source of concern for the industries. Owing to the increase in the profits sustained by Taiwan companies when performing their OEM services, and the rapid growth of Taiwan's TFT-LCD and IT industries, foreign companies owning the intellectual property rights in relevant technologies in droves file lawsuits against Taiwan companies in the United States, in order to gain advantages when negotiating royalties or compensation with Taiwan companies. When foreign companies file lawsuits, it is a trend to also apply for preliminary injunction with the court to forbid the infringing companies continuing manufacturing, selling, or importing the products. Thus Taiwan companies cannot proceed to sell the products to the United States and incur huge losses in commercial opportunities and reputation. In addition, litigation in the United States will cost Taiwan companies notable expenditure, and make Taiwan companies endure lengthy procedures. Nonetheless, as currently there is no litigation insurance in Taiwan, Taiwan companies cannot shift the risks in disbursing the litigation expenditure by means of insurance. Accordingly, the management of intellectual property rights in "peacetime", and the measures and litigation strategy for the lawsuits or preliminary injunction filed/applied by the owner of the intellectual property rights, are crucial to Taiwan companies. ＊Keywords：Preliminary injunction、Security Bond、The Specialized Intellectual Property Court、Litigation insurance、the management of intellectual property、the strategy of litigation