Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Valmir de Costa.pdf: 845356 bytes, checksum: b2dcc944aeefba44d5650627ccdeb72a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-11-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This thesis aims to contribute to the deepen uhe understanding of immnence in the thought of Husserl, its length and constituition, fundamentally, from descriptive psychology (1900) and transcendental philosophy (1913). Phenomenology is characterized by the free exercise of reason, which through its own research method, performs ideal self apprehension of pure objects in consciousness. The immanence designates a region to be in those objects that assume the conditions of possibility of a pure manifestation, constituting the very identity of phenomenology as the theory of knowledge. Conceptually, at the beginning of phenomenological research, the immanence of psychic acts is opposed to all kinds of transcendent objects to those acts, which turns out to phenomenology as science of ideal objects (First and Second Chapters). His method of investigation, as determined by the specificity of its object, differs totally from the method of the natural sciences. Phenomenology, by the method of reduction and intuition, investigates the region to be the transcendent consciousness to the world with their pure and ideal objects, which, by their levels of incorporation and links actually the philosophical discourse to a rigorous science. The natural sciences, the empirical and deduction methods, are immanent to the world and constitute a 'real' objective relationship with his research object, therefore relative (Third Chapter). It will be seen that the immanence of the status of the position of pure object is consolidated, conversely, by the suspension of the entire thesis of the world, as opposed by epistemological phenomenology to empiricism. Husserl, in his way of consolidation of phenomenological research, constitutes, according to the evolution of his thinking, different levels of description of the acts of consciousness. He leaves thus the origin of a real immanence (Real), the logical inheritance and psychologism, through immanence 'Reell', referring to the descriptive psychology, to reach its highest level of development, with the pure immanence. If the level of last description that aims to phenomenology is achieved only when it comes to the transcendental, as a definitive break from all order of nature, the 'reduction' is the inaugural gesture that takes place every phenomenological analysis (Four Chapter). The immanence seeks to resolve a problem which, in the phenomenological theory, breaks the link with the world, is indispensable to the establishment of its meaning, manifested only by an absolute being. The apprehension of being in the world is only possible as well, in suspension and consequent denial. Phenomenology becomes thus a strict science of pure objects held by the inaugural gesture of epoché in the world, reduced their intentional manifestation, it consists, for an idea of time itself, transcendentally in consciousness (Fifth Chapter). The immanence of the statute is effected itself in the psychology which turns into pure phenomenology, and this to transcendental philosophy / A presente tese pretende contribuir para o aprofundamento da compreensão da imanência no pensamento de Husserl, sua extensão e constituição, fundamentalmente, da psicologia descritiva (1900) à filosofia transcendental (1913). A fenomenologia se caracteriza pelo exercício livre da razão, que através de um método de investigação próprio, executa a autoapreensão ideadora de objetos puros na consciência. A imanência designa uma região de ser em que os objetos assumem as condições de possibilidade de sua manifestação pura, constituindo a própria identidade da investigação fenomenológica como teoria do conhecimento. Conceitualmente, no início de sua investigação, a imanência dos atos psíquicos se contrapõe a toda ordem de objetos transcendentes a tais atos, o que acaba por constituir a fenomenologia como ciência de objetos ideais (Primeiro e Segundo Capítulos). Seu método de investigação, determinado pela especificidade de seu objeto, se distingue totalmente do método das ciências da natureza. A fenomenologia, pelo método da redução e da intuição, investiga a região de ser da consciência transcendente ao mundo, com seus objetos puros e ideais, em que, pelos seus níveis de constituição e verdade, vincula o discurso filosófico a uma ciência de rigor. As ciências da natureza, pelo método empirista e da dedução, são imanentes ao mundo e constituem uma relação objetiva real de investigação com seu objeto, por isso relativa (Terceiro Capítulo). Ver-se-á que a posição do estatuto da imanência de objetos puros se consolida, inversamente, pela suspensão de toda tese do mundo, como contraposição epistemológica da fenomenologia ao empirismo. Husserl, em seu percurso de consolidação da investigação fenomenológica, constitui, conforme a evolução de seu pensamento, níveis distintos de descrição dos atos de consciência. Parte, assim, na origem, de uma imanência real (Real), herdeira da lógica e do psicologismo, passando pela imanência Reell , referente à psicologia descritiva, até chegar a seu nível mais alto de elaboração, com a imanência pura. Se o nível de descrição último que visa à fenomenologia é alcançado somente quando se chega ao transcendental, como ruptura definitiva de toda ordem de natureza, a redução é o gesto inaugural em que se realiza toda análise fenomenologia (Quarto Capítulo). O estudo da imanência procura dirimir um problema, de que, na teoria fenomenológica, a ruptura do vínculo com o mundo é indispensável à constituição de seu sentido, manifestada, unicamente, por um ser absoluto. A apreensão do ser do mundo só é possível assim, por sua suspensão e consequente negação. A fenomenologia torna-se, desse modo, uma ciência estrita de objetos puros, realizada pelo gesto inaugural da epoché, em que o mundo, reduzido a sua manifestação intencional, é constituído, por uma ideia de tempo própria, transcendentalmente na consciência (Quinto Capítulo). O estatuto da imanência é o próprio resultado em que a psicologia se transforma em fenomenologia pura, e esta em filosofia transcendental

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jonas Moreira Madureira.pdf: 602505 bytes, checksum: e021610d48ec5847401dd3413ec2441e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / In this study, it is justified the phenomenology of the representations, found in the V Investigation of the Investigations logics of Edmund Husserl. More specifically, it refers to about the husserlian analysis of the equivocation of the term representation in the thesis all the acts either are representations or are established in representations . To explain the equivocation of the term representation especially in what concerns to the cited thesis and not in what it relates to the general use of the term -, it is necessary to discriminate the equivocation s elements. In the V Investigation, Husserl analyzes only four of them, which are: the mere representation (bloβe Vorstellung); the matter of act (Aktmaterie); the nominal act (nominaler Akt); the objective act (objektivierender Akt). From this quadruple equivocation, Husserl presents three possible interpretations of the thesis: (1) all act either is one mere representation or have one matter of act as a fundamental component in the intentional essence; (2) all act either is one nominal act or it is established in one or several nominal acts; (3) all act either is one objective act or it is established in one objective act. Thus, the main objective of this dissertation is to explain exactly these three interpretations. For this, it becomes necessary to clarify the husserlian structure of act, once the understanding of such structure is conditio sine qua non for the understanding of Husserl s the three interpretations / Nesta dissertação, explica-se a fenomenologia das representações, presente na V Investigação das Investigações lógicas de Edmund Husserl. Mais especificamente, trata-se de uma elucidação da análise husserliana da equivocação do termo representação na tese todos os atos ou são representações ou se fundam em representações . Para explicar a equivocação do termo representação especialmente no que diz respeito à referida tese e não no que se refere estritamente ao uso do termo , faz-se necessário discriminar quais são os elementos equivocados. Na V Investigação, Husserl analisa apenas quatro. São eles: a mera representação (bloβe Vorstellung); a matéria de ato (Aktmaterie); o ato nominal (nominaler Akt); o ato objetivante (objektivierender Akt). A partir dessa quádrupla equivocação, Husserl apresenta três interpretações possíveis da tese. São elas: (1) todo ato ou é uma mera representação ou possui uma matéria de ato como componente fundante na essencial intencional; (2) todo ato ou é um ato nominal ou está fundado em um ou vários atos nominais; (3) todo ato ou é um ato objetivante ou se funda em um ato objetivante. Assim, o objetivo central desta dissertação é explicar justamente essas três interpretações. E, para tanto, faz-se necessário clarificar, primeiramente, a estrutura de ato husserliana, uma vez que a compreensão de tal estrutura é a conditio sine qua non para a compreensão das três interpretações de Husserl

La présente étude se donne pour objectif principal de reconstruire les diverses (re-)mises en question de la notion de donné sensible dans le néokantisme et la phénoménologie sur la scène philosophique allemande au tournant du XXème siècle. À la question cruciale de savoir quel est l’intérêt d’ouvrir en 2013 un tel dossier vieux déjà de plus d’un siècle, nous répondons qu’il est au moins double : d’abord, nous voulons montrer que les critiques du donné ont joué un rôle capital dans la genèse des trois principaux mouvements présents sur la scène philosophique austro-allemande à la fin du XIXème siècle, à savoir le positivisme, la phénoménologie et le néokantisme. Ensuite, ce travail présente un intérêt tout à fait actuel, puisqu’il se conçoit comme une exploration de l’arrière-plan historique et continental de la controverse autour du « mythe du donné » (the Myth of the Given) initiée par Wilfrid Sellars en 1956, controverse qui continue à occuper une place de choix aujourd’hui, notamment dans les débats sur la perception dans la Philosophy of Mind. / This study is a reconstruction of the different ways neo-kantians and phenomenologists have questioned the notion of the sensory given. Why is it interesting to open—in 2013—this old dossier of criticisms of the given in german philosophy at the turn of the XXth. Century? First, it is shown that critiques of the given have played an essential role in the genesis of the three most important movements of german and austrian philosophy at the end of the XIXth century, namely, positivism, phenomenology, and neo-kantianism. Century. Second, this work contributes to live discussion because it is an exploration of the historical background in continental philosophy of the « Myth of the Given » introduced by Wilfrid Sellars in 1956, which still occupies a central place in contemporary debates about perception in philosophy of mind.

本文目的在探討作為方法論的現象學,在胡塞爾與海德格之間如何產生轉變.討論的主軸在於時間性,討論的起點則從意向性開始.第一章導論部份在提出胡塞爾與海德格現象學態度的不同,首先就表現在對意向性的看法上.本章論證了意向性作為問題討論之起點的必要性,以及意向性引發之種種問題.第二章則深入探討胡塞爾之意向性是否為最基本的結構,並論證海德格提出意向性之存有的必要性.第三章探討海德格所論之意向性之存有與超越性之關係,並說明超越性的時間意義.第四章論述了胡塞爾與海德格兩人對時間性的不同看法.第五章以時間性看法之差異,導致兩人哲學的分歧,並以<意義>和<主體性>兩個主題來檢視此一問題.

This study offers the first comprehensive account of the problem of situation-dependence and facticity in Husserl's phenomenology of meaning. On the basis of a reconsideration of the central ideas of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning and intentionality, it presents a reconstruction and assessment of Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning. Taking its lead from Husserl's self-critical remark on the analysis of "occasional expressions" in the Logical Investigations, the study uncovers the underlying problem with Husserl's initial conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. It is shown that the problem of occasionality does not relate to indexicality in a standard sense, but to the essential facticity and subject-relativity of the intentional individuation of real being in general and to the contingency and inexhaustible transcendence of the world. The reconstruction of Husserl's solution is carefully related to an interpretation of central ideas of Husserl's developed philosophy. Critically reviewing influential interpretations of Husserl, the study elaborates on the question of internalism and externalism, the question of representationalism, the question of ideal contents, the notion of noema and the issues of direct reference and de re meaning. It is shown how Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning is related to the analysis of horizon-intentionality, to the constitution of the transcendent real world and to the constitution of the lived body as a centre of situated orientation. It is argued that Husserl succeeds in maintaining phenomenological internalism with regard to intentionality in concreto, while accepting a form of externalism with regard to meaning, according to which the possibility of true identity of meaning is bound to the presumptive existence of the experienced world.

This thesis analyzes the impact of the political decision to broaden the scope of the Government of Canada's 3-year National Homelessness Initiative (Human Resource Development Canada, NHI, 2002) from an urban focus to one that includes smaller communities. This change provided the opportunity to study the phenomenon of homelessness and how rural responses are formed. This author postulates that this focus of attention on an almost invisible phenomenon—rural homelessness—and the accompanying community planning processes funded by the Supportive Community Partnership Initiative (SCPI) will impact local social policy development. A multi-dimensional analytical approach was adopted and considered three components: first, a policy review, a broad look at the policy agenda framework in Canada; then, a case study to illustrate implementation issues related to the National Homelessness Initiative; and, finally, a reflection on current practice in order to realize a holistic critique of public policy. The influence of socio-economic, political, and cultural factors on local planning and capacity building will be highlighted. Various models of governance were adopted across the country and guided the collaborative processes. This thesis presents an in-depth look at the community action plans and activities of the Simcoe County Alliance to End Homelessness (SCATEH) in both the rural and urban settings of Simcoe County. The processes adopted, capacity building components identified, and outcomes over the 7 years covered by the SCPI agreement are examined. The limitations of using participatory local action planning to respond to complex issues such as homelessness are detailed along with a modified community-based policy development model recommended as a learning tool to be used by those volunteers acting as agents of change. It is widely recognized that safe, affordable social housing is a fundamental need, and one that is extremely difficult to meet. The contribution this research makes is to reveal how effective government-community partnerships can be in a rural setting.

This thesis analyzes the impact of the political decision to broaden the scope of the Government of Canada's 3-year National Homelessness Initiative (Human Resource Development Canada, NHI, 2002) from an urban focus to one that includes smaller communities. This change provided the opportunity to study the phenomenon of homelessness and how rural responses are formed. This author postulates that this focus of attention on an almost invisible phenomenon—rural homelessness—and the accompanying community planning processes funded by the Supportive Community Partnership Initiative (SCPI) will impact local social policy development. A multi-dimensional analytical approach was adopted and considered three components: first, a policy review, a broad look at the policy agenda framework in Canada; then, a case study to illustrate implementation issues related to the National Homelessness Initiative; and, finally, a reflection on current practice in order to realize a holistic critique of public policy. The influence of socio-economic, political, and cultural factors on local planning and capacity building will be highlighted. Various models of governance were adopted across the country and guided the collaborative processes. This thesis presents an in-depth look at the community action plans and activities of the Simcoe County Alliance to End Homelessness (SCATEH) in both the rural and urban settings of Simcoe County. The processes adopted, capacity building components identified, and outcomes over the 7 years covered by the SCPI agreement are examined. The limitations of using participatory local action planning to respond to complex issues such as homelessness are detailed along with a modified community-based policy development model recommended as a learning tool to be used by those volunteers acting as agents of change. It is widely recognized that safe, affordable social housing is a fundamental need, and one that is extremely difficult to meet. The contribution this research makes is to reveal how effective government-community partnerships can be in a rural setting.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a non-reductive account of cognitive phenomenology and the experience of thinking. The nature of conscious thought is an issue that has occupied philosophers since ancient times, and still many questions in this domain remain unanswered. One of them is the relation between thought and experience or phenomenal consciousness, in the particular way explored in this thesis: when we undergo a certain cognitive mental episode, should we recognize an experience like our other sensory, perceptual, or emotional experiences or should we rather recognize a very different sort of experience? Experiences are usually characterized by a phenomenal character or what-it-is-likeness for the subject to undergo them, which is usually taken as the mark of phenomenal consciousness and which, for mainstream contemporary philosophy of mind, has been limited to sensory and perceptual experiences, or even to emotional experiences. My general thesis is that conscious thought should be included in the domain of phenomenal consciousness and that there is an experience of thinking or conscious thought with a specific phenomenal character, namely, a phenomenal character that cannot be reduced to other non-cognitive kinds of phenomenologies. The thesis has three main parts, which are divided in several chapters. In the first part, Introduction, I present the basic elements to be able to start the investigation. I firstly clarify the relevant issues involved in the debate (Chapter 1), I justify the terminology chosen and I present the main views and a brief history of the problem. I then propose a way to approach the experience of thinking from a methodological point of view (Chapter 2), through a study of some methodological problems in philosophy and psychology, mainly related to introspection and introspective evidence. In the second part of the thesis, Main Arguments in Cognitive Phenomenology, I defend my non-reductive view with several arguments. I present the obvious argument (Chapter 3) for the conclusion that conscious thoughts have phenomenal properties and I resist some putative cases against the argument. I then present my version of the phenomenal argument (Chapter 4), which shows that there is a phenomenal change between two cognitive experiences contrasted and that this change cannot be explained by appealing to the sensory/emotional elements that by hypothesis remain constant. My presentation of this argument is complemented by a defense against some restrictivist views (Chapter 5). I then present the epistemic argument, which claims that we have introspective immediate knowledge of the kind of mental episode we are in (and of different cognitive atittudes), and that this would not be possible unless cognitive episodes have a specific cognitive phenomenology (Chapter 6). I finally consider another argument, the ontological argument, that might support the reductionist view , but I argue that it does not succeed (Chapter 7). In the third part of the thesis, The Specification of Cognitive Phenomenology, and as a further step in the discussion, I propose a specification of cognitive phenomenology in relation to intentionality and its two main components in conscious thought, cognitive content (Chapter 8) and cognitive attitude (Chapter 9). This proposal provides us with a way of determining similarities and differences in cognitive phenomenology that result in different experiential kinds and different types of conscious thought in virtue of their phenomenology. Moreover, it offers an answer to the question of the relation of determination between both components and their phenomenal character. This dissertation questions well some well-established assumptions in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies: (i) it implies a comprehension of phenomenal consciousness as including cognition, (ii) it rejects the assymetry between sensory/perceptual experience and cognitive one (regarding temporal structure and specification attempts) and (iii) it questions separatist positions between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. It also opens new research in relation to other philosophical topics and empirical studies and it contributes to the examination of two research fields (consciousness and cognition) that have normally been investigated separately. / L’objectiu d’aquesta tesi és presentar una teoria no reductivista de la fenomenologia cognitiva i de l’experiència del pensament. La naturalesa del pensament conscient és una qüestió que ha preocupat als filòsofs des de l’antiguitat i un àmbit on encara trobem moltes qüestions que no tenen resposta. Una d’elles és la relació entre el pensament i l’experiència o la consciencia fenomènica, en el sentit particular que exploro en aquesta tesi: quan tenim una experiència d’un cert episodi mental cognitiu, es tracta d’una experiència com les altres experiències sensorials, perceptives o emocionals, o bé es tracta d’un tipus molt diferent d’experiència? Les experiències normalment es caracteritzen per tenir un caràcter fenomènic o un “com a què és” (what it is like) pel subjecte tenir aquestes experiències, que es prèn com la marca de la consciència fenomènica i que, en filosofia contemporània de la ment, generalment es restringeix a les experiències sensorials, perceptives o, fins i tot, emocionals. La tesi general que defenso és que el pensament conscient ha de ser inclòs en l’extensió de la consciència fenomènica i que existeix una experiència de pensament conscient amb un caràcter fenomènic específic, és a dir, un caràcter fenomènic que no es pot reduir a altres tipus de fenomenologies. Aquesta conclusió general qüestiona alguns supòsits ben establerts en filosofia de la ment i estudis sobre consciència, i així obre la porta a noves investigacions en aquesta direcció. Per tal de defensar aquesta teoria no reductivista, primerament clarifico les qüestions rellevants en el debat i examino com hem d’aproximar-nos a l’experiència del pensament (Capítols 1 i 2). En segon lloc, presento una sèrie d’arguments a favor de la meva tesi (Capítols 3, 4 i 6) i argumento en contra d’estratègies restrictivistes (Capítols 5 i 7). Finalment, com a un pas més en la discussió, proposo una especificació de la fenomenologia cognitiva en relació a la intencionalitat i els seus dos components principals en el pensament conscient, el contingut cognitiu (Capítol 8) i l’actitud cognitiva (Capítol 9), oferint respostes a la qüestió de la relació de determinació entre ambdós components i el seu caràcter fenomènic.

Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that it is already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation.

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