The primary argument in this thesis is that the common assumption that an actor has emotion inside him- or herself which can be evoked and projected outwards is an outdated misconception. A proposition is made to replace this possessive acting model, which underpins the realist tradition and is based on the popularized aspects of Stanislavsky’s system for actor training, by a situational acting model. This new model is founded on the idea that emotion is something that actors “do”. Furthermore, a theory of this situational model is advanced where the actor is seen to perform emotion in an interplay with action in three different ways: in the world symbolically as an expression, of the world phenomenologically as in-sensing or out-sensing, and with the world as a becoming – which opens the actor up to greater forces of nature and society.                                      The material in this thesis has been focused on from both a contextualizing and a theoretic perspective. The contextualizing perspective places the actor’s doing of emotions in a historical context. The theoretic aspect concentrates on how performing emotions is realized in practice, and it proceeds from an analysis of two contemporary Swedish examples: the actresses Lena Endre in the role of Lady Macbeth at the Royal Dramatic Theatre in Stockholm in a production of William Shakespeare’s Macbeth from 2006, and Mia Skäringer in her stage show Horny as Hell and Really Holy from 2010. In exploring this material, a combination of Paul Ricoeur’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” and Paul Stoller’s ”sensuous scholarship” is applied.           A synthetic theoretical approach is employed that is set on a phenomenological foundation in combination with theories of emotion and affect as well as gender theory and theatre theory. The discussion is informed by Michael Polanyi to gain an understanding of tacit knowledge and the role of kinesthesia; by Simone de Beauvoir to establish a perspective on the body as a situation; by Sara Ahmed to see the potential for a cultural politics of emotion and a queer view of intentionality; and by Maurice Merleau-Ponty to propose a way of looking at the human being as being of the world as opposed to in the world. Interpretations of a few of Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s concepts such as rhizome, becoming, and body without organs, are added to this list in order to provide a background for what the third way of doing emotion is about.

L'intentionalité est la faculté qu'a l'esprit humain de se diriger vers des objets de toutes sortes. On la capture linguistiquement à travers l'usage de verbes comme "savoir", "croire", "craindre", "espérer". Les énoncés intentionnels comme "Jean croit que Nosferatu est un vampire" ou "Oedipe aime Jocaste" défient les lois de la logique classique, remettant en cause la validité de principes logiques tels que la généralisation existentielle ou encore la substitution des identiques. Je propose dans ma thèse une analyse fondée sur les logiques intentionnelles explicites, des logiques où le langage est enrichi au moyen d'opérateurs qui expriment explicitement l'intentionalité. Des aspects originaux de la signification des énoncés intentionnels sont saisis au coeur des pratiques argumentatives, dans le contexte de la logique dialogique notamment. S'intéressant plus spécifiquement au cas de la fictionalité, paradigme où se mêlent naturellement considérations logiques, linguistiques et métaphysiques, je défends une théorie artefactuelle dans laquelle on définit des critères d'existence et d'identité pour les identités fictionnelles littéraires au moyen de la notion de relation de dépendance ontologique. La notion de dépendance ontologique est toutefois sujette à de graves difficultés que l'on repasse ici dans le contexte d'une sémantique modale-Temporelle, défendant alors une approche novatrice de la dimension artefactuelle des fictions. In fine, on propose une combinaison de la théorie artefactuelle à une sémantique pour l'opérateur de fictionalité qui permet l'articulation entre différents points de vue sur la fiction, les points de vue interne et externe notamment. / Intentionality is that faculty of human mind whereby it is directed towards objects of all kinds. It is recorded linguistically in verbs such as "to know", "to believe", "to fear", "to hope". Intentional statements such as "John thinks that Nosferatu is a vampire" or "Oedipus loves Jocasta" challenge classical logical laws such as existential generalization or substitution of identical. I propose here an analysis grounded on explicit intentional logics, i. e. logics in which languages are enriched by means of specific operators expressing intentionality. Some original aspects of the meanings of intentional statements are grasped within argumentative practices, more specifically in the context of dialogical logic. I focus more specifically on fictionality, a paradigm in which logical, linguistic and metaphysical considerations are naturally embedded. I defend an artifactual theory in which existence and identity criteria for fictional entities are defined by means of the notion of ontological dependence relation. That notion faces several difficulties overcome here in a modal-Temporal semantics in which an innovating approach to the artifactual diemnsion of fiction is defended. Ultimately, a combination of that theory to a semantic for the fictionality operator is suggested. This enable us to articulate external and internal viewpoints on fictionality.

Exploramos aspectos da espacialidade nos videogames, aplicando o conceito de círculo mágico como abordado por Johan Huizinga, refletindo sobre a experiência da imersão e da observação externa. Empregamos, como objeto do pensamento, ferramentas provenientes da teoria dos games, geometria, semiótica, fenomenologia, psicologia, informática e pós-estruturalismo. Observamos a estrutura triádica na percepção do jogador alicerçada sobre três categorias espaciais: físico-tátil, imagético- narrativa e intencional. Levantamos informações relativas aos sistemas de objetos próprios dos jogos eletrônicos. Classificamos esquemas espaciais utilizados para a apresentação do espaço diegético na tela. Aplicamos o conceito de flow, criado por Csikszentmihalyi, para avaliar a imersão e o engajamento do jogador. Investigamos possíveis extrapolações do círculo mágico formado pelo jogar. Observamos modos de virtualização e atualização na interface dos games. Abstraímos o jogo como obra de metadesign, considerando modos de autoria pelo interator. Verificamos processos de embodiment através do agenciamento via avatar. Contemplamos aspectos topológicos de rede e estruturas labirínticas. Ponderamos sobre as possibilidades abertas pelo game thinking, como processos de ludificação e simulação. Por fim, divisamos as circunstâncias de transcendência do espaço do jogo por meio da alteridade e da expansão do círculo mágico. / We explored aspects of video game spatiality, using the magic circle concept, as approached by Johan Huizinga, pondering upon the experience of immersion and external observation. We applied, as object of thought, tools originated from the theory of gaming, geometry, semiotics, phenomenology, psychology, computing and post-structuralism. We observed the triadic structure of the player\'s perception based on three spatial categories: physical-tactile, imagery-narrative and intentional. We collected data related to the system of objects used in electronic games. We classified spatial diagrams utilized in the presentation of diegetic space on screen. We applied the flow concept, created by Csikszentmihalyi, to valuate immersion and engagement of players. We explored possible surpassing of the magic circle created by the act of playing. We observed modes of virtualization and updating of the gaming interfaces. We abstracted gaming as a work of metadesign, considering means of authorship by the interactor. We verify embodiment processes via avatar agency. We observed topological aspects of network and labyrinth structures. We pondered the possibilities opened by game thinking, like processes of gamification and simulation. Finally we glimpsed the circumstances of gaming space transcendence by the means of alterity and the expansion of the magic circle.

Exploramos aspectos da espacialidade nos videogames, aplicando o conceito de círculo mágico como abordado por Johan Huizinga, refletindo sobre a experiência da imersão e da observação externa. Empregamos, como objeto do pensamento, ferramentas provenientes da teoria dos games, geometria, semiótica, fenomenologia, psicologia, informática e pós-estruturalismo. Observamos a estrutura triádica na percepção do jogador alicerçada sobre três categorias espaciais: físico-tátil, imagético- narrativa e intencional. Levantamos informações relativas aos sistemas de objetos próprios dos jogos eletrônicos. Classificamos esquemas espaciais utilizados para a apresentação do espaço diegético na tela. Aplicamos o conceito de flow, criado por Csikszentmihalyi, para avaliar a imersão e o engajamento do jogador. Investigamos possíveis extrapolações do círculo mágico formado pelo jogar. Observamos modos de virtualização e atualização na interface dos games. Abstraímos o jogo como obra de metadesign, considerando modos de autoria pelo interator. Verificamos processos de embodiment através do agenciamento via avatar. Contemplamos aspectos topológicos de rede e estruturas labirínticas. Ponderamos sobre as possibilidades abertas pelo game thinking, como processos de ludificação e simulação. Por fim, divisamos as circunstâncias de transcendência do espaço do jogo por meio da alteridade e da expansão do círculo mágico. / We explored aspects of video game spatiality, using the magic circle concept, as approached by Johan Huizinga, pondering upon the experience of immersion and external observation. We applied, as object of thought, tools originated from the theory of gaming, geometry, semiotics, phenomenology, psychology, computing and post-structuralism. We observed the triadic structure of the player\'s perception based on three spatial categories: physical-tactile, imagery-narrative and intentional. We collected data related to the system of objects used in electronic games. We classified spatial diagrams utilized in the presentation of diegetic space on screen. We applied the flow concept, created by Csikszentmihalyi, to valuate immersion and engagement of players. We explored possible surpassing of the magic circle created by the act of playing. We observed modes of virtualization and updating of the gaming interfaces. We abstracted gaming as a work of metadesign, considering means of authorship by the interactor. We verify embodiment processes via avatar agency. We observed topological aspects of network and labyrinth structures. We pondered the possibilities opened by game thinking, like processes of gamification and simulation. Finally we glimpsed the circumstances of gaming space transcendence by the means of alterity and the expansion of the magic circle.

The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence.

El concepto clave para poder acercarse al pensamiento de Wojtyla es la experiencia. Tal concepto pretende mostrar la relación cognoscitiva directa que permite acercarse a la persona y la acción como realidad dinámica. El método que utiliza el autor para el acercamiento a la realidad de la persona es el fenomenológico utilizado, sin embargo, con un profundo correctivo: la epojé. Precisamente lo que Wojtyla pretende evitar es poner entre paréntesis la existencia misma de la persona, su punto de partida es el hombre concreto y real. Wojtyla usa en su lugar la reducción entendida como exploración de la experiencia: se trata más bien de explorar la realidad de la persona en toda su riqueza, ya que en ella afloran los elementos esenciales necesarios para construir una verdadera antropología filosófica. En este sentido la tesis básica del autor es que la estructura personal de la autodeterminación permite objetivar la subjetividad personal. / The key concept to be able to approach Wojtyla’s thinking is experience. This concept tries to show the direct cognoscitive relationship that allows the approach to the person and the action as a dynamic reality. The method used by the author for the approach to the reality of the person is the phenomenological one, otherwise used as a deep correction: the epoché. What Wojtyla aims to avoid is precisely the questioning of the existence of the person itself. Instead, Wojtyla uses the reduction understood as an exploration of experience: it is rather about the exploration of the reality of the person in all its richness, as it is within it that the essential elements which are necessary to build a true and philosophical anthropology emerge. In this sense, the author’s basics thesis is that the personal structure of the self-determination allows to put in objective terms the personal subjectivity.

The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence.

This work considers the theoretical, epistemological and methodological criteria for a hermeneutic phenomenological approach to the study of spiritual experience founded within a qualitative paradigm. Spirituality is noted to be of increasing significance in society and as a developing discipline within the academy and spiritual experience is offered as an opening to greater understanding and appreciation of an individual's understandings of their spirituality. The methodology provides an interpretative approach towards an opportunity for resonance, identification and empathy between individual and reader through richly descriptive narratives offering insights into such experiences and developing themes and threads of particular interest prior to seeking universal and semi universal traits between or amongst narratives. Practical methods for applying the methodology are considered, including ethical and researcher reflexive issues. The assessment of the methodology includes its application to a case study, located within contemporary Christianity in the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St Andrews and Edinburgh, Scotland, which due to limitations of space focuses particularly on the notion of the Gift and assists in the determination of the efficacy and validity of hermeneutic phenomenology in the study of spiritual experience.

Le présent travail est une analyse du concept d’instrument qui en fait apparaître les exigences théoriques et demande si et dans quelle mesure le système de Thomas d’Aquin les remplit. D’abord, on montre que la notion d’instrument telle que Thomas la définit en général et conformément à l’aristotélisme dont il hérite — à savoir, comme un «moteur mû» — est contradictoire, dans la mesure où rien, d’après Thomas, ne peut être à la fois moteur et mû selon le même mouvement. Ensuite, on montre que la notion d’instrument telle que Thomas la redéfinit dans le contexte restreint de sa théologie sacramentelle — à savoir, comme ce qui «agit en vertu d’un autre» — échappe à cette contradiction, même si elle est, à son tour, problématique, parce qu’elle implique qu’un même pouvoir (virtus) transite de l’agent principal à l’instrument. Il faut étudier le modèle auquel Thomas renvoie — à savoir, l’être intentionnel des espèces sensibles — pour répondre à ce problème : il s’agit alors de montrer comment l’apparence peut être conçue comme une propriété en transit numériquement identique en plusieurs sujets (la chose, le milieu, le percepteur). Enfin, on justifie l’application de ce modèle au pouvoir instrumental grâce à deux thèses centrales de l’ontologie thomasienne des pouvoirs — à savoir, qu’ils sont distincts de la forme substantielle et qu’ils en fluent — qui reviennent à accorder au pouvoir, comme tel, le même statut ontologique qu’à l’espèce sensible, c’est-à-dire un être intentionnel (esse intentionale). On en conclut que ce qui fonde, en définitive, la causalité instrumentale, ce n’est pas tant la physique d’Aristote que l’ontologie des pouvoirs de Thomas. / The aim of this study is to offer a better understanding of instrumental causation in Aquinas. It starts by calling into question the idea that an instrument is a « moved mover ». Behind this apparently innocuous phrase lurks a contradiction, for, as Aquinas states, it is impossible for something to both be a mover and be moved according to the same motion. Having argued that this contradiction may not be satisfyingly solved, an alternate definition is suggested, according to which an instrument acts "in virtue of another". Indeed, according to Aquinas’s sacramental theology, an instrument acts insofar as it contains a certain power (virtus). This power isn’t its own, but the individual property of something else, namely the principal cause. The question here is to account for what seems to be a transferable trope: an individual power present both in the principal and in the instrumental cause. Aquinas does this by comparing the power in the instrument to the species of color in the air. We follow this cue. First, by understanding how a sensible species may be understood as numerically identical across different subjects, namely the sensible object, the medium and the perceiver. Second, by turning to Aquinas’s thesis that powers are distinct and flow from a thing’s substantial form. This, it is argued, amounts to granting powers the same ontological status as sensible species, namely intentional being (esse intentionale). The study concludes that it is not Aristotelian physics but Aquinas’s metaphysics of powers that ultimately grounds instrumental causation.

[pt] Aplicações ubíquas estão inseridas em ambientes inteligentes integrados ao mundo físico e compostos de usuários com diferentes preferências, dispositivos heterogêneos e vários provedores de serviço e conteúdo. Além disso, essas aplicações são especializadas em oferecer serviços e conteúdos em qualquer lugar e momento, auxiliando os usuários em suas atividades diárias sem incomodá-los. Baseado nesse mundo idealizado, o paradigma em qualquer lugar e momento impõe alguns desafios para a comunidade de Engenharia de Software, tais como: heterogeneidade de dispositivos, ambientes distribuídos, mobilidade, satisfação de usuário, adaptação de conteúdo, sensibilidade de contexto, privacidade, personalização, transparência, invisibilidade e constante evolução das tendências tecnológicas. Visando lidar com esses novos desafios tecnológicos, é proposta uma abordagem orientada à reutilização de software para desenvolvimento incremental e sistemático de aplicações ubíquas intencionais. Foram escolhidos dois principais objetivos para conduzir a pesquisa dessa tese: (i) a construção de conjuntos de apoio, orientados à reutilização de software, com base em uma investigação detalhada de aplicações ubíquas e do paradigma de Sistemas Multi-Agentes Intencionais – ou seja, Desenvolvimento para Reutilização; e (ii) o desenvolvimento incremental e sistemático de aplicações ubíquas, dirigidas por Sistemas Multi-Agentes Intencionais, com base na abordagem orientada à reutilização de software – ou seja, Desenvolvimento com Reutilização. Algumas contribuições do nosso trabalho são: (i) uma arquitetura orientada à reutilização de software e baseada nos conjuntos de apoio – i.e. blocos de construção principalmente compostos de modelos conceituais, frameworks, padrões e bibliotecas – obtidos a partir da Engenharia de Domínio das Aplicações Ubíquas; (ii) uma Engenharia de Aplicações Ubíquas orientada à reutilização de software visando o desenvolvimento incremental e sistemático de aplicações ubíquas com base nos blocos de construção propostos; (iii) um modelo de raciocínio focado em regras condicionais de lógica nebulosa e no modelo Crença-Desejo-Intenção para melhorar a capacidade cognitiva dos agentes; (iv) um mecanismo específico, baseado em agentes intencionais, para lidar com questões de privacidade, balanceando privacidade e personalização bem como transparência e invisibilidade; (v) um catálogo que graficamente apresenta os principais requisitos não-funcionais ubíquos, as interdependências entre eles e formas de se operacionalizá-los com base na combinação de tecnologias tradicionais e emergentes; (vi) ontologias para permitir a construção dinâmica de interfaces e melhorar a comunicação e inter-operabilidade dos agentes de software; e (vii) um modelo de banco de dados dinâmico para carregar e recuperar os perfis ubíquos (ex. perfis de usuário, dispositivo, rede e contrato), melhorando o gerenciamento de dados em tempo de execução. A abordagem proposta foi avaliada desenvolvendo diferentes aplicações ubíquas (ex. aplicações ubíquas de comércio eletrônico e de clínica odontológica). / [en] Ubiquitous applications are embedded in intelligent environments integrated into the physical world and composed of users with different preferences, heterogeneous devices and several content and service providers. Moreover, they focus on offering services and contents anywhere and at any time by assisting the users in their daily activities without disturbing them. Based on this idealized world, the anywhere and at any time paradigm poses some challenges for the Software Engineering community, such as: device heterogeneity, distributed environments, mobility, user satisfaction, content adaptability, context awareness, privacy, personalization, transparency, invisibility and constant evolution of technological trends. In order to deal with these new technological challenges, we propose a Reuse-Oriented Approach for Incremental and Systematic Development of Intentional Ubiquitous Applications. We have chosen two main goals that drive our research in this thesis: (i) the construction of reuse-oriented support sets based on an extensive investigation of ubiquitous applications and the Intentional-Multi-Agent Systems paradigm – i.e. Development for Reuse; and (ii) the incremental and systematic development of Intentional-Multi-Agent-Systems-driven ubiquitous applications based on the reuse-oriented approach – i.e. Development with Reuse. Some contributions of our work are: (i) a reuse-oriented architecture centered on support sets – i.e. building blocks mainly composed of conceptual models, frameworks, patterns and libraries – obtained from the Domain Engineering of Ubiquitous Applications; (ii) a reuse-oriented Ubiquitous Application Engineering for incremental and systematic development of intentional ubiquitous applications centered on the proposed building blocks; (iii) a reasoning engine focused on fuzzy conditional rules and the Belief-Desire-Intention model to improve the agents cognitive capacity; (iv) a specific mechanism based on intentional agents to deal with privacy issues by balancing privacy and personalization as well as transparency and invisibility; (v) a catalogue that graphically presents the main ubiquitous non-functionalrequirements, their interdependencies and ways to operationalize them based on the combination of traditional and emergent technologies; (vi) ontologies to allow the dynamic construction of interfaces and to improve the communication and inter-operability of software agents; and (vii) a dynamic database model to store and retrieve the ubiquitous profiles (e.g. user, device, network and contract profiles) by improving the data management on the fly. The proposed approach was evaluated by developing different ubiquitous applications (e.g. e-commerce and dental clinic ubiquitous applications).