The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the nature and of the development of Brentano's theory of judgment. This description is followed by an introduction to the further development of Brentano's theory in the work of Brentano's most distinguished students Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Anton Marty (1843-1914) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The thesis is divided into five parts: The first part is dedicated to the explanation of Brentano's theory of judgment and starts with an interpretation of Brentano's two early books on Aristotle - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) and The Psychology of Aristotle (1867). The thesis presents Brentano's understanding of "being" in the sense of truth, his interpretation of the Aristotelian categories, his theory of parts and wholes, and his theory of intentionality and self-consciousness. Our interpretation then proceeds to Brentano's most known work, i.e. to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), and presents the basic concept of this book, the concept of psychical phenomena. The resulting classification of psychical phenomena into three kinds introduces judgments as a kind of psychical phenomenon whose main feature consists in existential affirmation or rejection of an intentional object....

The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the...

Submitted by Anderson Silva (avargas@icict.fiocruz.br) on 2012-05-10T19:27:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 rachel_s_belmont_ioc_ebs_0018_2010.pdf: 3285162 bytes, checksum: 77acec73f8a7cba411cf3cef99502a56 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-05-10T19:27:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 rachel_s_belmont_ioc_ebs_0018_2010.pdf: 3285162 bytes, checksum: 77acec73f8a7cba411cf3cef99502a56 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Fundação Oswaldo Cruz. Instituto Oswaldo Cruz. Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil. / A Biomecânica é uma disciplina de natureza interdisciplinar, comumente percebida como de difícil compreensão pelos graduandos e, parece ser pouco utilizada no cotidiano profissional de professores de Educação Física. Assumindo que tal conhecimento seja essencial para a prática desse profissional, o presente estudo qualitativo, sob a forma de estudo de caso, teve por objetivo compreender o processo da aprendizagem significativa dos 13 alunos matriculados na disciplina Biomecânica, do curso de Licenciatura em Educação Física da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, no segundo semestre de 2008. Assumimos a Teoria da Aprendizagem Significativa como principal referencial teórico, tanto para orientar a observação participante, que foi nossa principal estratégia metodológica, como para proceder à análise dos dados. Os registros, além das notas de campo da investigadora, compunham-se de transcrições das gravações de aulas e de entrevistas semi-estruturadas, realizadas com alunos e professor, de um questionário sobre o perfil dos alunos e, também, das atividades escritas inerentes ao desenvolvimento da disciplina. O conjunto dos dados coletados a partir desses registros integrou a descrição interpretativa do processo de aprendizagem dos alunos, ao longo da disciplina e, dependendo da natureza de tais registros, compôs o conjunto dos dados apresentados, ou em tabelas ou em categorias elaboradas através de Análise de Conteúdo, cujo enfoque privilegiava aspectos semânticos das respostas dos alunos. Apesar do caráter qualitativo deste estudo, alguns dados foram quantificados e, em uma determinada parte da investigação, calculou-se o coeficiente de correlação de Pearson. Assim, procedemos uma triangulação dos dados obtidos. Visando à compreensão do processo de aprendizagem dos alunos, optou-se pela análise de um tema trabalhado ao longo de diferentes momentos da disciplina. Os resultados sugeriram que a aprendizagem tendia mais a uma aprendizagem mecânica, apesar de evidente avanço do conhecimento, o qual, em relação ao conjunto das atividades realizadas, parecia mostrar-se aquém de nossas expectativas. Além disso, os alunos demonstraram pouca intencionalidade para aprender e, dentre aqueles que a apresentavam, a qualidade da aprendizagem significativa ficara prejudicada, porque tais alunos pareciam priorizar uma aprendizagem mecânica ou porque seus conhecimentos prévios estariam ausentes e/ou fragmentados, ou porque esses seriam de natureza alternativa. Assim, com este estudo, esperamos poder colaborar para a melhoria do conhecimento sobre processos de ensino e de aprendizagem da Biomecânica. Esperamos, além disso, aprimorar conhecimentos sobre a formação do profissional de Educação Física, contribuindo com essa pesquisa tanto para a formação do profissional da área, como para a investigação em ensino das Biociências e Ciências da Saúde, em geral, e da Biomecânica, em particular. / Biomechanics is a discipline characterized by its interdisciplinary nature, so that undergraduate students often perceived it as a discipline that is quite difficult to understand. Thus, physical education professionals do not use it much in their everyday teaching events. As its knowledge is essential to the improvement of their practice, this qualitative study, which has a case study format, aims at understanding the students' meaningful learning process of the discipline Biomechanics, in the Physical Education course at the State University of Rio de Janeiro, during the second semester of 2008. The Meaningful Learning Theory constituted our main theoretical framework, and it guided participant observation, which embodied our main methodological strategy for data analysis. The records of events, in addition to the researcher’s field notes, were: the recordings of interviews, together with transcriptions of the classes and of the semi- structured interviews of students and teacher; a students’ profile questionnaire; the written activities related to the development of the discipline during that semester. This set of data integrated the interpretative description of the students’ learning process along the ongoing flow of the discipline. According to the nature of these records, data were presented in tables or categories, which were developed according to the parameters of content analysis, focusing on semantic aspects of the students' answers. In spite of the qualitative character of this study, there was a quantification of some data in a particular instance of this investigation. We tallied Pearson’s correlation coefficient and, then, triangulated these data. As we aimed at understanding the students' learning process, we decided to analyze a topic that had been already studied at different moments of that semester. Findings suggest that, in spite of what could have indicated an apparent progress, in relation to the overall knowledge conveyed by the set of performed activities, the learning process seemed to favor rote learning, since it pointed out to data that could indicate that there had not been enough students’ knowledge evolution in relation to the concepts involved in Biomechanics. Furthermore, the students did not show much willingness to learn and, because of this, meaningful learning might have been hindered inasmuch as students emphasized rote learning. Our research suggests that there might be three explanations for the occurrence of rote learning: some students did not seem to care much about what they already knew about the area/ discipline; their prior knowledge could be either absent or fragmented; or their previous knowledge was of an alternative nature (misconception). We look forward to offering, with this study, some sort of support so as to help improve the processes of knowledge construction in the teaching and learning of Biomechanics in physical education and/or kinesiology professionals, and also to have contributed for further research on the teaching of Biosciences and Health Sciences, in general, and of Biomechanics, in particular.

This thesis is about expanded narrative, a new field of experimental narrative practices that are not represented by single subjects or by categories such as ‘interactive’. It is defined by works that present a challenge to the form, fiction or nonfiction, in terms of the content, structure, style of writing or audience engagement. Extending the cognitive term ‘perceptual multistability’, that refers to switching between interpretations experienced when we look at an ambiguous figures, such as, the Necker cube, this thesis develops the position that expanded narrative practices and specifically locative narrative, a genera of expanded narrative, hold the potential to prompt the experiential effects of multi-stability. The metaphor of multi-stability introduced here stands in for three aspects of experience: language, perception and belief. While ambiguity and misperceptions have been recognised in the literature of experiential narrative practices, further exposition is required. The thesis asks what are the conditions in which the qualities of the metaphor of multi-stability may be prompted and what framework usefully articulates the parameters of experience? Drawing upon the writings of the philosopher William James, subsequent pragmatists, cognitive neuroscience and narratology, it explores how a radical empiricist perspective can form the basis of a non-foundational experiential framework that questions the status of knowledge and the problems of translation between experience and narrative interpretation. It suggests that the subjective classification of imagined and perceptual objects can be affected by the relations between the narrative form, the environment and the participant’s beliefs. The major contributions of the thesis are (1) the development of the Jamesian experiential framework that sets up cross-disciplinary parameters for the thematics of experience to engage with the ontological and epistemological challenges of evaluating and designing for multistability presents; (2) a relational approach to interpretation and coding participants’ feedback of locative narratives; (3) that is employed in the development of a collection of speculative strategies for evoking the effect of the metaphor of multi-stability, based on the development of four published locative narrative apps and ten prototypes. While highly contingent, participant introspective accounts of experience are central here to the methodology, the process of serial hypothesis forming and the iterative development of prototypes and locative narrative case studies. This research does not attempt to draw causal connections from science to that of narrative experience or vice versa. The thesis first considers the field of expanded narrative and the semantic and pragmatic framings of the term narrative and narratological framings of language as multi-stable. It goes on to examine the antecedent and coexistent practices of locative narrative. The epistemological implications for misperception, the function of representation and intentionality in perception are examined in relation to the environmentally situated perceptual, interpretative, aesthetic and emotional dimensions of experience. This research contributes to research in narrative and creative practices. It extends the form of locative narrative with the concept of multi-stability that has a wider application with the field of expanded narrative, creative practice and narratology.

Submitted by Paulo Uzai Júnior null (paulouzai@gmail.com) on 2016-08-25T20:01:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 [final-final]Dissertação_Paulo Uzai Junior_Pos-Filosofia_ A relação mente-corpo em John Searle.pdf: 946382 bytes, checksum: 71f7585fff76b8a8396671fe967408be (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-08-29T17:17:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 uzaijunior_p_me_mar.pdf: 946382 bytes, checksum: 71f7585fff76b8a8396671fe967408be (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T17:17:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 uzaijunior_p_me_mar.pdf: 946382 bytes, checksum: 71f7585fff76b8a8396671fe967408be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Há mais de três décadas, o filósofo estadunidense John Rogers Searle voltou-se para as questões de filosofia da mente, donde apresenta sua solução para os variados problemas acerca da natureza do mental. Sua primeiro incursão se deu com o livro Intentionality, onde seu principal objetivo não era, num primeiro momento, solucionar problemas referentes a essa questão, mas sim oferecer uma fundamentação conceitual mais sólido para sua teoria dos atos de fala. Contudo, a partir deste livro Searle se volta decisivamente para questões propriamente de filosofia da mente. Um de seus principais focos é a relação entre mente-corpo, onde ele acredita que a solução teórico-cenceitual para tal questão não é tão difícil quanto pensamos. Porém ele não deixa de abordar uma série de outros temas afins que julga de extrema importância na consolidação de seu escopo teórico, tal como o problema da causação mental e a subjetividade humana. Dessa forma, a presente dissertação tem por objetivo principal apresentar, discutir e avaliar criticamente a solução que Searle propõe a esses quatro problemas centrais da filosofia da mente: relação mente-corpo, causação mental, subjetividade e intencionalidade. Os três primeiros capítulos têm por objetivo mostrar como Searle enxerga essas questões, ou seja, o que ele julga estar errado na filosofia da mente e qual seria a solução mais adequada. No capítulo quatro iremos apresentar as principais críticas à solução de John Searle, focando-nos numa abordagem temática. Dessa forma, apresentaremos críticas a esses quatro temas que Searle julga serem essenciais em filosofia da mente e sobre o qual construiu seu naturalismo biológico. Por fim, faremos uma avaliação crítica do que foi apresentado. Com isso iremos analisar qual o peso das críticas feitas à filosofia searlena, o que acreditamos estar correto nela e o que discordamos. / There is more than thirty years, the American philosopher John Rogers Searle turned around to the questions of philosophy of mind, whence presents his solution to varied problems about the nature of mental. His first incursion occurred with the book Intentionality, where your main objective was not to solve, at first, problems relating to this issue, but rather to offer a theoretical grounding more solid to his theory of speech acts. However, from this book Searle turns to questions specifically of philosophy of mind. One of his main focus is the relationship between mind-body, where he believes that the solution theoretical-conceptual for that question is not so difficult as we thought. Nevertheless he is not leave of to broach a number of other related topics that he considers of utmost importance in the consolidation of his theoretical scope, such as the causation mental problem and the human subjectivity. Thereby, the present dissertation have for main objective to show, to discuss and critically evaluate the solution that Searle proposes these four central problems of the philosophy of mind: mind-body relationship, mental causation, subjectivity and intentionality. The first three chapters aims to show as Searle see these questions, in other words, what he believes to be wrong in philosophy of mind and what would be the most appropriate solution. In chapter four, we will go to show the main critics to John Searle's solution, focusing in a thematic approach. Thus we will present critics of these four subjects that Searle believes to be essentials in philosophy of mind, about which built your biological naturalism. Lastly, we will make a critically evaluate of what was presented. Therewith we will go to analyze the what weight of criticisms to Searle's philosophy, what qe believe to be right and what we disagree.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Felipe Netto Lauer.pdf: 575327 bytes, checksum: 6022e98d212cd348ccaf658ccf21811a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-03 / Fundação Araucária / The conductive thread of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger s phenomenological investigations is the concept of intentionality; his analysis has for purpose to solve the fundamental methodological problem concerning the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience (Erlebnis). So that it becomes clear, it is necessary to consider him formally. In Husserl, the sphere of lived experience is the one of the pure ego or pure consciousness, and the intentionality is understood as intentionality of consciousness; in Heidegger, it is treated of what denominated factical life or existence of Dasein, in that the intentionality designates the type of comportment that the human existence maintains in relation to itself and to the world. This work seeks a critical confrontation among the two positions, pointing out the heideggerian concern with the inadequacies of the theoretical attitude and her form of conceiving the field of the formal, towards an investigation concerning the nature and the formation of the concepts and philosophical statements as formal indications. / O fio condutor das investigações fenomenológicas de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger é o conceito de intencionalidade; sua análise tem por finalidade resolver o problema metodológico fundamental acerca do modo de abrir cientificamente a esfera dos vividos (Erlebnis). Para que se torne claro, é necessário considerá-lo formalmente. Em Husserl, a esfera dos vividos é a do ego puro ou consciência pura, e a intencionalidade é compreendida como intencionalidade da consciência; em Heidegger, trata-se do que denominou vida ou existência fáctica do Dasein, em que a intencionalidade designa o tipo de comportamento que a existência humana mantém em relação a si e para com o mundo. Este trabalho visa um confronto crítico entre as duas posições, salientando a preocupação heideggeriana com as insuficiências da atitude teorética e sua forma de conceber o campo do formal, em direção a uma investigação acerca da natureza e da formação dos conceitos e enunciados filosóficos como indicações formais.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vinicius Valero.pdf: 850008 bytes, checksum: e649b8db2303d0859527b5a6b33b53bb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-20 / This work consists in the exam of Brentano s account of the unity of consciousness. One can defend that the concept of unity has a crucial role in the argumentative frame of Psychology from an empirical standpoint, published in 1874, and constitute an essential step toward latter investigations in descriptive psychology. Under the concept of unity are centralized psychological and ontological questions that pervade the whole philosopher s work. The assumption of Brentano s mereology, understood as the pure theory of relational properties of psychic parts, is already presented in the work of 1874, where the philosopher reaches his own understanding of consciousness as a complex unity. The influence of these questions in the later descriptive work can also help one to illuminate some controversial points of Brentano s scholarly debate, and insists on the importance of a more comprehensive reading of his work. The complexity of psychic acts is understood as a consequence of the concepts of intentionality and inner perception, a consequence that advance the discussion about the essentially complicated nature of mental structures and the necessity of conceiving psychic phenomena as wholes comprised by parts with different kinds of intimacy. This work defends that it is exactly the solution of this problem that establishes the path for ontology of mental phenomena as relations of parts and wholes encountered in descriptive psychology. / Este trabalho consiste no exame da teoria da unidade da consciência de Brentano. Defende-se que o conceito de unidade tem um papel central na trama argumentativa do livro Psicologia do ponto de vista empírico, publicado em 1874 e constitui uma etapa essencial das investigações posteriores de psicologia descritiva. Sob o conceito de unidade se centralizam questões de caráter psicológico e ontológico que permeiam toda a obra do filósofo. Os pressupostos da mereologia brentaniana, entendida como a doutrina pura das propriedades das relações das partes psíquicas, estão presentes no trabalho de 1874, onde Brentano alcança uma compreensão própria da consciência, entendida como unidade complexa. Por outro lado, os desdobramentos das questões de 1874 no trabalho posterior, ilumina controvérsias interpretativas e reforça a necessidade de uma leitura mais abrangente da obra do filósofo. A complexidade dos atos psíquicos é entendida como o corolário das teorias da intencionalidade e da percepção interna e tematiza a natureza essencialmente complicada da estrutas psíquica e a necessidade conceber o fenômenos psíquico enquanto ser constuído de partes com diferentes tipos de intimidade. O trabalho defende que é exatamente a solução deste problema que funda a possibilidade de uma ontologia dos fenômenos psíquicos como a encontrada na psicologia descritiva.

萊維納斯是二十一世紀最重要的哲學家之一。他早期的哲學著作聚焦在現象學的知識論與方法論的問題上。由於曾師事海德格，所以他也展現了如何將胡賽爾的著作視為一種存有學。但這不意味著他的哲學是一種胡賽爾現象學或海德格存有學。如同海德格一般，他穿梭於現象學中，但以某種方式同時靠近、同時遠離海德格的學說。他堅持必須超克的不只是現象學，還有存有學，而這最徹底的層次便是倫理，或他所稱的 「異於存有」。但這種 「異於」如何可能？而萊維納斯的倫理與胡賽爾的現象學、海德格的存有學之間的關係又為何？意識概念便是其中的關鍵。而這也是這本博士論文的主要任務。 這份探詢分三個部分，第一部分帶出現象學對自然哲學的批判，並處理萊維納斯對胡賽爾的理解與批判，例如意識不再是一個封閉的、不變的實體，而是具有朝向外在世界的可能。這朝向外在的可能，作為ㄧ種超越，來自意識結構本身。 「意識總是某物的意識」說明了意識本身的結構，這結構以能思-所思 (noesis-noema) 這樣的方式呈現。在這種運作方式，解讀為將外在化為內在的過程，所有被納入意識的事物都變成一種以 「現在」為優位的表象(representation)。 第二部分說明何為萊維納斯所謂的 「意識」。而這個論述是從理論態度進入到實踐的態度開始，同時這也是萊維納斯與海德格的關係。在此我們將看到萊維納斯如何抗拒海德格的基礎存有學，並確立 「實顯」作為意識的定位。在定位之後才開始有欲望、營養與家園等將他者化為同一的活動。另在第二部分結尾說明萊維納斯將 「意識」一詞區分為兩的向度，意向性與非意向性，同時這也是存有學與倫理的的區別。 第三部分著重在非意向性，亦即倫理的層次。在這裡說明如何從存有學層次的欲望、營養與家園轉變為責任、鄰近性與替代。非意向性意識所能建構的不是以自我為核心的帝國，而是以他人為優先的整個宇宙。在這之中，問題不在是存有或非存有，而是我的存有是否正當？我們可以發現，非意向性意識的功能不在於對反、摧毀意向性意識的功能，而只是打斷其安於現狀的安全感。正因不斷擾動、不斷質問，意識總是可以活躍的運作，而不只是陷入某個固定的迴圈。這種非意向性意識是強烈的，但它不是一種貪婪，或許可以說它是一種獻身的大愛。 / Emmanuel Levians, internationally renowed as one of the gtreat philosophers in the twentith century. In his early philosophical writings he focused on the epistemological and methodological problems of phenomenology. Having studied with Heidegger, he also showed how Husserl's work can be read as an ontology. But that does not means that his Philosophy is a sort of Husserlian phenomonology or Heideggerian ontology. Like Heidegger, he passed through phenomenology, but in a way simultaneously close and very foreign to that of Heidegger. An insistence on the necessity of overcoming not noly phenomenology but also ontology, and this most radical sphere is ethic, or what Levinas calls "byomd Being". But how can this beyond be possible, and what is the relation between Levinas's ethic with Husserlian phenomenology or heideggerian ontology? The Key point is the concept of consciousness. And this is the central task of this dissertion. This inquiry is divided into three parts. The first part brings out the phenomenology of natural philosophy and handles Levinas' understanding and criticism of Hussail. For example, consciousness is no longer a closed and unchanged entity, It is possible toward the outside world. This possibility, as a transcendence, comes from the structure of consciousness itself. "Consciousness is always the consciousness of something" illustrates the structure of consciousness itself, which is presented in such a way as noesis-noema. In this mode of operation, interpreted as the process of externalization into an internal process, all things that are incorporated into consciousness become a representation of the present. The second part explains what Levinas called "consciousness." And this discourse begins with the theoretical attitude into practical attitude, and this is also the relationship between Levinas and Heidegger. Here we will see how Levinas resisted Heidegger's fundamental ontology and established the "hypostasis" as the location of consciousness. Only after the positioning of consciousness, then, it begin the the movement that absorb the other to the Same by desire, nutrition and at home. At the end of the second section, another chapter shows Levinas's division of the word "consciousness" into two dimensions, intentionality and non-intentionality. At the same time, this is the difference between ontology and ethics. The third part focuses on non-intentionality, that is, ethical level. Here we show how we can shift the desire, nutrition and at home from the ontology leve to responsibility, proximity and substitution. The non-intentional consciousness can construct not the self-centered empire, but the entire universe, which is prioritized by others. Among them, the question is not to be or not to be, but is my existence right to be? We can see that the function of non-intentional awareness lies not in the function of opposing and destroying intentional awareness, but only in disrupting the security of the status quo. It is precisely because of constant disturbance, constant questioning, consciousness can always be active operation, not just fall into a fixed loop. This non-intentional awareness is strong, but it is not a kind of greed, perhaps it can be said that it is a devoted love.

This work is an essay on the reference of names in language and thought. According to the Theory of Direct Reference, nowadays dominant in philosophy of language, the semantic content of a proper name is directly its referent (Chapter 1).<p>Nevertheless, despite its current fame, this theory must face two major difficulties, familiar since Frege and Russell: the Co-Reference and the No-Reference Problems. The traditional response to these problems consisted precisely in abandoning Referentialism in favour of a version of Descriptivism according to which the semantic content of a proper name would be, not its referent, but a descriptive condition (Chapter 2).<p>However, it is also this traditional version of Descriptivism that the arguments offered by the pioneers of modern Referentialism—including Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan—have largely discredited (Chapter 3).<p>The theoretical tools developed within the framework of possible worlds semantics enable to restate the problems generated by Referentialism in terms of the opacity of linguistic intensions and Modal Illusions (Chapter 4).<p>At this stage, our semantic theory of names seems to have reached a dead end: on the one hand, modern Referentialism recreates the problems which classical Descriptivism was meant to solve, but, on the other hand, this kind of Descriptivism appears to be refuted by the argumentation of new Referentialists. A common reaction, then, has been to devise more complex semantic theories purporting to combine Referentialism with crucial features from Descriptivism. However, a careful examination reveals that the various versions of this strategy fail (Chapter 5).<p>Another type of reaction, also ecumenical, has been to draw a distinction between two kinds of contents which would be associated with names and the sentences in which these occur: while the first kind of content would be descriptive, the second would be referential. The Two-Dimensionalist framework has received several interpretations (pragmatic, semantic, metasemantic); but a new construal, metasyntactic, is defended in this work (Chapter 6).<p>The metasyntactic interpretation of Two-Dimensionalism allows for a radical gap between language and thought: while the thoughts of their users can remain descriptive, names are supposed to achieve direct reference by themselves, and independently of the mental states of their users. Hence, names must be regarded as objects living in the external world, on a par with other ordinary objects like trees or chairs, and not as mental objects. An Externalist metaphysics of names is then submitted, as well as a corresponding epistemology, according to which external names are described in the mind through a description of their reference (Chapter 7).<p>The general strategy pursued in this work amounts to combining a Theory of Direct Reference in language with a Descriptivist (hence, Internalist) account of thought. Also, certain influential arguments — notably devised by Burge — intended to support Mental Referentialism (hence, Externalism) beyond Linguistic Referentialism, are rejected; it is moreover argued that a Non-Descriptivist conception of the mental is incapable of securing the introspective transparency of thoughts, which, however, seems indispensable, among other things in order to solve and even pose the Co-Reference and the No-Reference Problems (Chapter 8).<p><p>----------<p><p>Ce travail est un essai sur la référence des noms dans le langage et la pensée. Selon la Théorie de la Référence Directe, aujourd'hui dominante en philosophie du langage, le contenu sémantique d'un nom propre est directement son référent (Chapitre 1).<p>Or, malgré son succès récent, cette théorie Référentialiste se heurte à deux obstacles majeurs, reconnus depuis Frege et Russell : les Problèmes de la Co-référence et de la Non-Référence. La réponse traditionnelle à ces problèmes consistait précisément à abandonner la conception Référentialiste en faveur d'un Descriptivisme selon lequel le contenu sémantique d'un nom propre serait, non pas son référent, mais une condition descriptive (Chapitre 2).<p>Toutefois, c'est aussi ce Descriptivisme traditionnel que les arguments formulés par les hérauts du Référentialisme moderne—dont Kripke, Putnam, et Kaplan—ont largement discrédité (Chapitre 3).<p>Les outils théoriques développés dans le cadre de la sémantique des mondes possibles permettent de reformuler les problèmes générés par le Référentialisme en termes d'opacité des intensions linguistiques et d'Illusions Modales (Chapitre 4).<p>A ce stade, la théorie sémantique des noms semble dans une impasse : d'une part, le Référentialisme moderne recrée des problèmes que le Descriptivisme classique devait résoudre, mais d'autre part, ce Descriptivisme paraît bel et bien réfuté par l'argumentation des Référentialistes. Aussi, une réaction commune a été de chercher à concilier le Référentialisme et une forme de Descriptivisme au sein d'une même théorie sémantique. Cependant, un examen approfondi révèle que les différentes versions de cette stratégie échouent (Chapitre 5).<p>Une autre réaction, elle aussi œcuménique, a été d'opérér une distinction entre deux types de contenus qui seraient associés avec les noms et les phrases dans lesquels ceux-ci figurent : le premier contenu serait descriptif, tandis que le second serait référentiel. Le cadre offert par un tel Bi-Dimensionnalisme a reçu plusieurs interprétations très différentes (pragmatique, sémantique, métasémantique) ; mais c'est une nouvelle version, métasyntaxique, qui est défendue dans ce travail (Chapitre 6).<p>Le Bi-Dimensionalisme métasyntaxique autorise une séparation radicale entre langage et pensée : tandis que les pensées de leurs utilisateurs peuvent rester descriptives, les noms sont censés référer directement par eux-mêmes, indépendamment des états mentaux de leurs utilisateurs. Dès lors, les noms doivent être considérés comme des objets appartenant au monde extérieur, au même titre que des objets ordinaires tels que les arbres ou les chaises, et non comme des objets mentaux. Une métaphysique externaliste des noms est proposée, ainsi qu'une épistémologie assortie, selon laquelle les noms externes sont décrits dans l'esprit à travers une description de leur référence (Chapitre 7).<p>La stratégie générale qui est défendue dans ce travail revient à combiner une Théorie de la Référence Directe dans le langage avec une conception Descriptiviste (et donc, Internaliste) de la pensée. Aussi, certains arguments influents — émis par notamment Burge — censés établir un Référentialisme non seulement linguistique mais aussi mental (et donc, un Externalisme) sont rejetés ; il est en outre défendu qu'une vision Non-Descriptiviste du mental apparaît incapable de garantir la transparence introspective des pensées, cependant indispensable, notamment pour résoudre et même poser les Problèmes de Co-Référence et de Non-Référence (Chapitre 8). / Doctorat en Langues et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

No description available.