Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.

Wie schätzen Menschen quantitative Größen wie zum Beispiel den Verkaufspreis eines Autos? Oft benutzen Menschen zur Lösung von Schätzproblemen sogenannte Cues, Informationen, die probabilistisch mit dem zu schätzenden Kriterium verknüpft sind. Um den Verkaufspreis eines Autos zu schätzen, könnte man zum Beispiel Informationen über das Baujahr, die Automarke, oder den Kilometerstand des Autos verwenden. Um menschliche Schätzprozesse zu beschreiben, werden häufig linear additive Modelle herangezogen. In meiner Dissertation schlage ich alternative ein heuristisches Modell zur Schätzung quantitativer Größen vor: das Mapping-Modell. Im ersten Kapitel meiner Dissertation teste ich das Mapping-Modell gegen weitere, in der Literatur etablierte, Schätzmodelle. Es zeigte sich, dass das Mapping-Modell unter unterschiedlichen Bedingungen in der Lage war, die Schätzungen der Untersuchungsteilnehmer akkurat vorherzusagen. Allerdings bestimmte die Struktur der Aufgabe - im Einklang mit dem Ansatz der „adaptiven Werkzeugkiste“ - im großen Maße, welches Modell am besten geeignet war, die Schätzungen zu erfassen. Im zweiten Kapitel meiner Dissertation greife ich diesen Ansatz auf und untersuche, in wie weit die Aufgabenstruktur bestimmt, welches Modell die Schätzprozesse am Besten beschreibt. Meine Ergebnisse zeigten, dass das Mapping-Modell am Besten dazu geeignet war die Schätzungen der Versuchsteilnehmer zu beschreiben, wenn explizites Wissen über die Aufgabe vorhanden war, während ein Exemplar-Modell den Schätzprozess erfasste, wenn die Abstraktion von Wissen schwierig war. Im dritten Kapitel meiner Dissertation, wende ich das Mapping-Modell auf juristische Entscheidungen an. Eine Analyse von Strafakten ergab, dass das Mapping-Modell Strafzumessungsvorschläge von Staatsanwälten besser vorhersagte als eine lineare Regression. Dies zeigt, dass das Mapping-Modell auch außerhalb von Forschungslaboratorien dazu geeignet ist menschliche Schätzprozesse zu beschreiben. / How do people make quantitative estimations, such as estimating a car’s selling price? Often people rely on cues, information that is probabilistically related to the quantity they are estimating. For instance, to estimate the selling price of a car they could use information, such as the car’s manufacturer, age, mileage, or general condition. Traditionally, linear regression type models have been employed to capture the estimation process. In my dissertation, I propose an alternative cognitive theory for quantitative estimation: The mapping model which offers a heuristic approach to quantitative estimations. In the first part of my dissertation l test the mapping model against established alternative models of estimation, namely, linear regression, an exemplar model, and a simple estimation heuristic. The mapping model provided a valid account of people’s estimates outperforming the other models in a variety of conditions. Consistent with the “adaptive toolbox” approach on decision, which model was best in predicting participants’ estimations was a function of the task environment. In the second part of my dissertation, I examined further how different task features affect the performance of the models make. My results indicate that explicit knowledge about the cues is decisive. When knowledge about the cues was available, the mapping model was the best model; however, if knowledge about the task was difficult to abstract, participants’ estimations were best described by the exemplar model. In the third part of my dissertation, I applied the mapping model in the field of legal decision making. In an analysis of fining and incarceration decisions, I showed that the prosecutions’ sentence recommendations were better captured by the mapping model than by legal policy modeled with a linear regression. These results indicated that the mapping model is a valid model which can be applied to model actual estimation processes outside of the laboratory.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-03-25T23:59:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 0000142C.pdf: 3493803 bytes, checksum: b888b7b4d1367f34552288f1f116937e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-25T23:59:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 0000142C.pdf: 3493803 bytes, checksum: b888b7b4d1367f34552288f1f116937e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho visa a estabelecer as bases para a construção, a partir da obra de Ronald Dworkin, das premissas de uma teoria democrática da decisão jurídica que seja adequada para o Brasil. A ideia é identificar e discutir algumas das principais teses e hipóteses do jusfilósofo norte-americano, propondo uma apropriação de seus conceitos interpretativosno contexto da experiência constitucional brasileira. Para tanto, promove-se inicialmente uma discussão sobre o seu conceito de democracia (partnership conception) e sobre a sua concepção de revisão judicial da legislação (judicial review). A decisão jurídica é apresentada como uma questão de democracia, ideia que é defendida por meio de um contraste com o pensamento de Jürgen Habermas e Jeremy Waldron, e de uma aproximação com a perspectiva adotada, no Brasil, por Lenio Streck. Por meio de uma análise teórica e filosófica do debate Hart/Dworkin, são defendidas as seguintes premissas: a) a tarefa central da teoria jurídica contemporânea é normativa, no sentido de que deve fornecer critérios para a decisão; b) a verdade não é estranha ao domínio da Moral, sendo possível fazer juízos morais objetivos (há um debate, neste ponto, com o pensamento de Brian Leiter); e c) o Direito, desde um ponto de vista interpretativo, pode ser concebido como uma subdivisão da moralidade política, sem que isso prejudique a sua autonomia. O Direito é um conceito interpretativo e, no domínio da interpretação, são as ideias de responsabilidade e de valor que aproximam o argumento da verdade. Defende-se, assim, a epistemologia da responsabilidade proposta por Dworkin: quando se adere a uma prática interpretativa (um gênero interpretativo), atribui-se a esta um propósito e assume-se a responsabilidade de promover aquele valor. Este argumento pode ser iluminado pela Hermenêutica Filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer, cujos pontos de contato com o interpretativismo dworkiniano são investigados. Transportadas estas ideias para o âmbito do Direito, passa-se a defender a estratégia de leitura moral (moral reading) de dispositivos constitucionais. De acordo com a leitura moral, as decisões jurídicas devem ser geradas por princípios. A interpretação construtiva da Constituição leva à tese de que uma decisão jurídica e democraticamente correta deve ter a sua legitimidade confirmada de dois modos: por um lado, deve ser produto de um procedimento constitucionalmente adequado, por meio do qual se garanta, aos interessados, aquilo que Dworkin chama de participação moral; por outro, a decisão deve estar fundamentada numa interpretação que, dirigida à integridade, honre a responsabilidade enquanto virtude. A isso demos o nome de dupla dimensão da resposta correta. / This research aims to lay the basis for the construction of a democratic theory of legal decision, suitable for Brasil, grounded upon the work of Ronald Dworkin. The idea is to identify and discuss some of the main theses and hypotheses of the American legal philosopher, proposing an appropriation of his interpretive conceptsin the context of the Brazilian constitutional experience. In order to do so, it promotes a discussion of his concept of democracy (partnership conception) and of his conception of judicial review. Legal decision-making is presented as a question of democracy, and this point is argued by means of a contrast with the work of Jürgen Habermas and Jeremy Waldron, and by an approximation to the perspective adopted in Brazil by Lenio Streck. Through a theoretical and philosophical analysis of the Hart/Dworkin debate, the following assumptions are stated: a) the central task of legal theory is normative, meaning that it should provide criteria for decision-making; b) there is truth to be found in the Morality domain; it is therefore possible to make objetive moral judgements (there is a debate, at this point, with the ideas of Brian Leiter); and c) Law, from an interpretive standpoint, can be conceived as a branch of morality, without losing its autonomy. Law is an interpretive concept and, in the interpretation domain, ideas of responsability and valuepoint the argument toward the truth. Integrated epistemology, as proposed by Dworkin, is adopted here: when someone joins an interpretive practice (an interpretive genre), he not only sets a purpose to it, but he also assumes the responsability to promote that value. This argument may be illuminated by Hans-Georg Gadamer’sPhilosophical Hermeneutics, and the possible links between Gadamer’s work and dworkinian interpretivismare investigated. Once these ideias are brought into the Law realm, the moral reading of the Constitution strategy emerges. According to the moral readingthesis, legal decisions should be generated by principles. Constructive interpretation of constitutional provisions leads to the thesis that a legal and democratically correct decision should have its legitimacy confirmed in two ways: first, it must be the result of a constitutionally proper procedure, by which isguaranteed, to its participants, what Dworkin calls moral participation; second, the decision should be grounded upon an interpretation that aims to integrity and honors responsability as a virtue. This is what is called the double dimension of the right answer.

Submitted by Patrícia Valim Labres de Freitas (patricial) on 2016-03-16T14:57:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Vinicius de Melo Lima_.pdf: 2893899 bytes, checksum: 2b276ce182bdaa8ca701404a102a50e6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-16T14:57:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vinicius de Melo Lima_.pdf: 2893899 bytes, checksum: 2b276ce182bdaa8ca701404a102a50e6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-11 / Ministério Público do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul / A presente tese de doutoramento tem como objeto da pesquisa os fundamentos da responsabilidade política do intérprete na produção do sentido normativo, em observância aos ideais de coerência e de integridade decisória, na perspectiva de uma exploração hermenêutica das dimensões da resposta constitucionalmente adequada à concretização dos direitos sociais, tanto em nível procedural, quanto no plano substancial. Os problemas a serem investigados são os seguintes: Como controlar o poder e ampliar as liberdades fundamentais dos cidadãos, em especial os direitos sociais? Quais os limites e as possibilidades de concretização judicial dos direitos sociais no Estado Democrático de Direito Brasileiro? A investigação científica, alicerçada no método fenomenológico-hermenêutico, tendo como referencial teórico a filosofia hermenêutica e a hermenêutica filosófica (Martin Heidegger-Hans-Georg Gadamer), o Direito como Integridade, de Ronald Dworkin, em uma interlocução com o Constitucionalismo Garantista, de Luigi Ferrajoli, à luz da filtragem da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito, de Lenio Luiz Streck, procura identificar parâmetros hermenêuticos para o controle judicial e a eficácia dos direitos sociais, a partir do desenvolvimento de uma Teoria Hermenêutica da Responsabilidade. O trabalho insere-se na linha 1 de pesquisa do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da UNISINOS, cuja pertinência temática amolda-se à disciplina de Hermenêutica Jurídica e Concretização de Direitos, ministrada pelo Professor Doutor Lenio Luiz Streck. O objetivo da tese consiste, pois, na reconstrução hermenêutica dos direitos sociais, tendo como fundamento estruturante uma compreensão adequada da responsabilidade decisória como garantia constitucional de efetivação da democracia substancial. As hipóteses trabalhadas possuem as seguintes perspectivas de compreensão: 1) A legitimidade da jurisdição na concretização dos direitos sociais, à luz da concepção dos direitos fundamentais como trunfos (Ronald Dworkin), havendo uma complementaridade entre direitos individuais e direitos sociais, os quais preexistem à decisão judicial. A ideia da responsabilidade hermenêutica é condição de possibilidade para a inserção da decisão jurídica no mundo prático, afastando a noção de “escolha”, cuja tradução jurídica encontra ressonância na concepção de discricionariedade; 2) A resposta hermeneuticamente adequada em matéria de direitos sociais reclama a adoção de um construtivismo decisório, em atenção à igual consideração e respeito que balizam a convivência comunitária, evitando-se as “razões de Estado”; 3) As dimensões de garantia da decisão jurídica democrática, em nível procedimental e substancial, tendo como foco o conteúdo que emana da resposta adequada à Constituição, podem ser divididas, para fins didáticos, em temporal, político-jurídica, socioeconômica, moral, cultural e integrativa; 4) A construção de uma Teoria Hermenêutica da Responsabilidade procura identificar determinados parâmetros hermenêuticos para a concretização judicial dos direitos sociais, quais sejam, a diferença ontológica entre os direitos fundamentais e a compreensão das dimensões da decisão jurídica democrática, o “romance em cadeia”, o círculo hermenêutico e a garantia de fundamentação, a tradição, a coerência e a integridade, a unidade do valor, a faticidade e a igual liberdade. A exigibilidade dos direitos sociais e os limites e as possibilidades de atuação da jurisdição têm preocupado comunidade em geral, razão pela qual se impõe a diferenciação entre judicialização da política e ativismo, além de uma crítica ao modelo do neoconstitucionalismo recepcionado no Brasil, nas fronteiras entre o Direito e a Política. Na sequência, a leitura do fenômeno da corrupção como um problema de direitos fundamentais decorre da necessidade de se denunciar o patrimonialismo e o estamento, os quais, associados à lógica do free rider, contribuem para o incremento das desigualdades sociais. A raiz do dilema está na discricionariedade e na eventual construção, por intermédio do discurso jurídico, de uma verdadeira zona de imunidade, a qual se contrapõe à intensa danosidade social e quebra da confiança legítima em decorrência das práticas corruptivas. Por sua vez, a ideia dos direitos sociais revela a importância de uma perspectiva holística, fundada na unidade do valor (Dworkin) e no giro ontológico-linguístico, para a compreensão do dilema entre procedimentalismo e substancialismo, das omissões inconstitucionais e do controle jurisdicional de políticas públicas. Desenvolvem-se, enfim, os fundamentos de uma teoria da responsabilidade decisória, propondo-se uma autêntica reviravolta hermenêutica em relação à efetivação dos direitos sociais, com realce para a justiciabilidade no Supremo Tribunal Federal. O recorte quantitativo e qualitativo levou em consideração as decisões proferidas entre 1º de maio de 1996 e 30 de agosto de 2015, mormente em razão da evolução jurisprudencial em torno da eficácia e da aplicabilidade das normas de direitos fundamentais sociais no referido período. / This doctoral thesis has the purpose of research the foundations of the political responsibility of the interpreters in the production of normative sense, in compliance with the ideals of coherence and operative integrity, the perspective of a hermeneutic exploration of the dimensions of constitutionally adequate response to the realization of rights social, both in procedural level, and in the substantial plan. The problems to be investigated are: How to control the power and extend the fundamental freedoms of citizens, in particular the social rights? What are the limits and possibilities of judicial realization of social rights in a Brazilian Law Democratic State of Brazilian Law? Scientific research, based on the phenomenological-hermeneutical method, theoretically based hermeneutics philosophy and philosophical hermeneutics (Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer), Law as Integrity, of Ronald Dworkin, in a dialogue with the Constitutionalism Guarantees of Luigi Ferrajoli in the light of filtration Critical Hermeneutics of Law of Lenio Luiz Streck, seeks to identify hermeneutical parameters for judicial review and the effectiveness of social rights, from the development of Hermeneutics Theory of Responsability. The work is part of the first line of research of the Pos-Graduate Program in Law UNISINOS, whose thematic relevance conforms to the discipline of Legal Hermeneutics and Implementation of Rights, taught by Professor Lenio Luiz Streck. The aim of the thesis is therefore the hermeneutic reconstruction of social rights, with the structuring based on a proper understanding of the decision-making responsibility as constitutional guarantee of realization of substantial democracy. The hypotheses worked have the following perspectives of understanding: 1) The legitimacy of the jurisdiction in realization of social rights in the light of the concept of fundamental rights as trumps (Ronald Dworkin) and there is a complementarity between individual rights and social rights, which pre-exist the judicial decision. The idea of hermeneutics responsibility is the condition of possibility for the inclusion of the legal decision in the practical world, away from the notion of “choice” whose legal translation resonates in the design of discretion; 2) The hermeneutically appropriate response in terms of social rights calls for the adoption of a decision constructivism, in keeping with equal concern and respect that guide the community life, avoiding the “reasons of state”; 3) The dimensions guarantee the democratic legal decision on procedural and substantive level, focusing on content emanating from the appropriate response to the Constitution, can be divided, for didactic purposes, in temporal, political-legal, socio-economic, moral, cultural and integrative; 4) The construction of a Hermeneutics Theory of Responsability seeks to identify certain hermeneutical parameters for the judicial realization of social rights, namely, the ontological difference between the fundamental rights and the understanding of the dimensions of democratic legal ruling, the "romance chain", the hermeneutical circle and the statement of assurance, tradition, consistency and integrity, the value of the unit, the facticity and the same freedom. The enforceability of social rights and the limits and jurisdiction possibilities of action have worried community at large, which is why is necessary to differentiate between legalization of politics and activism, as well as a critique of neoconstitutionalism the type approved in Brazil, on the borders between Law and Policy. Following the reading of the phenomenon of corruption as a fundamental rights problem stems from the need to report patrimonial and estate, which, combined with the logic of the free rider, contribute to the increase in social inequalities. The root of the dilemma is at the discretion and the eventual construction, through the legal discourse, a true zone of immunity, which is opposed to the intense social danosidade and breach of legitimate expectations as a result of corrupting practices. In turn, the idea of social rights reveals the importance of a holistic approach, based on the value of the unit (Dworkin) and ontological-linguistic turn, to understanding the dilemma between proceduralism and substantialism, the unconstitutional omissions and judicial control public policy. Are developed, finally, the foundations of a theory of decision-making responsibility, proposing an authentic hermeneutic turn in relation to the effectiveness of social rights, with emphasis on the justiciability of the Supreme Court of Brazil. The quantitative and qualitative fragment took into account decisions taken between 1 May 1996 and 30 August 2015, especially given the jurisprudential developments around the effectiveness and applicability of fundamental social rights standards in the period.

L'intelligence artificielle est l'un des domaines les plus florissants et les plus passionnants de la recherche et de l'industrie. Au cours des dernières années, les approches utilisant l'apprentissage profond ont permis de nombreuses avancées dans divers domaines, notamment la vision par ordinateur, la traduction automatique, la reconnaissance et la génération d'images, ainsi que la compréhension et la génération de textes (tels que GPT-4). Dans cette thèse, je cherche à savoir si et comment l'intelligence artificielle peut être utilisée pour améliorer l'accès à la justice et à l'information juridique pour les justiciables. Le citoyen moyen est souvent dépassé et impuissant lorsqu'il est confronté à des problèmes juridiques. Il peut avoir du mal à comprendre comment la loi s'applique à sa situation et à utiliser le système juridique pour résoudre son problème, même s'il est conscient de ses droits. En conséquence, leurs problèmes restent irrésolus ou ils ne profitent pas des possibilités qui leur sont offertes. C'est pourquoi j'ai développé et mis en œuvre la méthodologie "JusticeBot", qui utilise l'IA pour aider les justiciables à résoudre leurs problèmes juridiques. Les outils qui en résultent utilisent une approche hybride de raisonnement basée sur des règles et des cas pour poser à l'utilisateur des questions pertinentes, analyser sa situation juridique et lui fournir des informations juridiques appropriées ainsi que des cas antérieurs similaires liés à son problème juridique particulier. L'utilisateur peut utiliser ces informations pour négocier une solution mutuellement acceptable ou pour naviguer dans le processus juridique ardu. JusticeBot est donc un outil d'intelligence augmentée, qui améliore le niveau de connaissance de l'utilisateur pour l'aider à résoudre ses problèmes juridiques. Je décris la méthodologie globale et la manière dont je l'ai mise en œuvre dans des outils logiciels, par exemple le "JusticeCreator", une interface permettant de créer et de mettre à jour les outils JusticeBot. Je présente également un outil JusticeBot déployé dans le domaine des litiges entre propriétaires et locataires, qui est accessible au public à l'adresse https://justicebot.ca. Cet outil a été utilisé plus de 17 000 fois et 86 % des utilisateurs ayant répondu à une enquête ont déclaré qu'ils recommanderaient le système à d'autres personnes. Je pense que JusticeBot peut contribuer à aider les individus à résoudre leurs problèmes juridiques, ainsi qu'à renforcer la confiance et l'identification aux institutions juridiques au niveau sociétal en améliorant l'accès à la justice et l'accès à l'information juridique pour le citoyen moyen. / Artificial intelligence is one of the most thriving and exciting areas in research and industry. Recently, approaches using deep learning have led to a number of breakthroughs in a range of areas, including computer vision, machine translation, image recognition and generation, and text understanding and generation (such as GPT-4). In this thesis, I investigate if and how artificial intelligence (AI) can be used to improve access to justice and access to legal information for laypeople, i.e. people without legal training. The average citizen is often overwhelmed and helpless when dealing with legal problems. They may struggle to understand how the law applies to their situation, and further have trouble using the judicial system to resolve their issue, even if they are aware of their rights. This results in their problems going unresolved or prevents them from benefiting from opportunities available to them. For this reason, I developed and implemented the “JusticeBot” methodology, which uses AI to support laypeople with their legal issues. The resulting tools use a hybrid rule-based and case-based reasoning approach to ask a user relevant questions, analyze their legal situation, and provide them with suitable legal information and similar previous cases related to their particular legal problem. They can use this information to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution, or to navigate the arduous legal process. Thus, JusticeBot is an augmented intelligence tool, enhancing the user’s knowledge level to help them solve their legal problems. I describe the overall methodology and how I implemented it into software tools, e.g. the “JusticeCreator”, an interface to create and update JusticeBot tools. I also elaborate on a deployed JusticeBot tool in the area of landlord-tenant disputes, which is accessible to the public at https://justicebot.ca. This tool has been used over 17k times, and 86% of users responding to a survey report that they would recommend the system to others. I believe that JusticeBot can contribute to helping individuals resolve their legal problems, as well as increasing trust in and identification with legal institutions on a societal level, by improving access to justice and access to legal information for the average citizen.

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais. / The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais. / The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais. / The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.