This thesis aims at analysing the novel History Is All You Left Me by Adam Silvera using a queer phenomenological lens in order to reveal to what extent it depicts aspects of sexuality, consent and relationships in a non-heteronormative way. Furthermore, the thesis discusses different ways of making visible the effects of normativity on student’s learning and development through the proposed queer phenomenological pedagogy.  The literary analysis is conducted by implementing queer theory, queer phenomenology and reader-response to reveal and convey the above-mentioned aspects in a way that enables critical thinking from a non-heteronormative perspective. The pedagogical implications show how the different aspects of sex/sexuality, consent and relationships can be put in juxtaposition and evaluated to broaden the pupils’ understanding and perception. The thesis concludes that the novel History Is All You Left Me contain several examples of sexuality, consent and relationships, amongst others, in a non-heteronormative way, which can be put in juxtaposition in the classroom to further enable critical thinking regarding the topics. Furthermore, the thesis concludes that a queer phenomenological pedagogy can work against normalisation and for pupils finding or expressing their identity and uniqueness.

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Text in Afrikaans / Die doel van die studie is om krities te besin oor die noodsaaklikheid van Fundamentele Andragogiek in die opleiding van onderwysers in 'n kontemporer-moderne wereld, ten einde aan te toon dat dosente beter toegerus vir hulle begeleidingstaak sal wees indien hulle oor kennis van Fundamentele Andragogiek beskik. HOOFSTUK EEN Die tema word ingelei deur titel- en begripsverheldering, probleemstelling, doelformulering, metodologiese verantwoording en programaankondiging. HOOFSTUK TWEE Fundamentele Andragogiek word antropologies-ontologies begrond, enkele grondvorme van menswees word beskryf en uitgele en aandag word gegee aan die hunkeringe van die onderwysstudent-in-opleiding as ageinsgebeure. HOOFSTUK DRIE 'n Snel veranderende wereld waarin onderwysersopleiding voltrek word, word ondersoek om vas te stel in watter mate snelle verandering 'n bedreiging vir die grondvorme van menswees inhou. HOOFSTUK VIER Die opleiding van onderwysers in 'n kontemporer-moderne RSA word ondersoek, om vas te stel watter eise en verwagtinge die Ministerie van Onderwys en Opleiding het. HOOFSTUK VYF 'n Terugskou word op die studie gedoen en en enkele toekomstake word ge'identifiseer. / The study aimed at reflecting critically on the need for Fundamental Andragogics in the training of teachers in a contemporary modern world. CHAPTER ONE The theme is introduced through clarification of the title and concepts, stating problems, goal setting, methodological justification and exposition of further programme. CHAPTER TWO Fundamental Andragogics is anthropologic-ontologically grounded. Some basic forms of being human are described and attention is given to the yearnings of the teacher trainee. CHAPTER THREE The rapidly changing world is researched in order to ascertain to what extent rapid change poses a threat to the basic forms of being human. CHAPTER FOUR The training of teachers in a contemporary modern RSA is researched in order to ascertain what the demands and expectations of the Ministry of Education and Training are. CHAPTER FIVE The study is viewed in retrospect and some future objectives for teacher training are identified. / Educational Studies / M. Ed. (Philosophy of Education)

German text / Die vorliegende Arbeit schlägt eine Brücke über den Graben zwischen dem normativ-ethischen Anspruch an die Lebenslänglichkeit einer Ehe und Gottes gnädigem Handeln gegenüber dem scheiternden Menschen. Anhand des Umgangs der Kirchen und Glaubensgemeinschaften mit Ehescheidung und Wiederheirat wird dieser Graben aufgezeigt. Es ergibt sich, dass die bestehende Spannung jeweils durch die einseitige Betonung von Norm oder Gnade aufgelöst wird. Die Grundlage für die Diskussion bilden das massgebende Eheverständnis sowie die Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen theologischer Ethik und dem Konzept der Gnade als Handlungsprinzip Gottes. Darum werden in dieser Forschungsarbeit zuerst die theologiegeschichtlich gewachsenen Eheverständnisse und die unterschiedlichen Normen- und Gnadenverständnisse der römisch katholischen Kirche, der evangelischen Kirchen und der evangelikalen Gemeinschaften in Bezug auf den Umgang mit Scheidung und Wiederheirat untersucht. Aufgrund der herausgearbeiteten Übereinstimmungen und Unterschiede wird anschliessend anhand eines von der Vergebung ausgehenden Denkansatzes der Graben zwischen normativer Ethik und dem Konzept der Gnade überbrückt, die Spannung aber nicht aufgehoben. Daraus werden mögliche Auswirkungen im Umgang mit Scheidung und Wiederheirat für die Kirchen und Gemeinschaften abgeleitet. / The present thesis bridges the gap between the normative-ethical standard of lifelong marriage on the one hand and God’s grace for men‘s failures on the other hand. Considering the practices of churches and communities with regard to divorce and remarriage, this gap is demonstrated. It is found that the associated tension is eliminated by an unilateral choice of either the normative aspect or the principle of grace. The basis for the discussion is provided by the relevant understanding of marriage and the determination of the relationship between theological ethics and grace as the principle of God's action towards mankind. Therefore, this thesis investigates the evolution of the theological understanding of marriage during history and the different understandings of norms and grace in the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church and the Evangelical Free Communities with regard to their handling of divorce and remarriage. Considering the resulting similarities and differences, I propose – building on the fact of God’s forgiveness – how to bridge the gap between normative ethics and the concept of grace without eliminating the obvious tension. Finally, possible consequences for how to handle divorce and remarriage by churches and communities are drawn. / Philosophy & Systematic Theology / M. Th. (Theological Ethics)

This thesis is an ethnography of the global belly dance community with particular reference to the transmission of dance paradigms from Cairo to the international dance community. Key words describing my topic include dance, gender, performance, group dynamics, social norms and resistance, public vs. private, tourism, and globalisation. I hypothesize that social dancing is used in many parts of the world as a space outside ordinary life in which to demonstrate compliance with or to challenge prevailing social paradigms. The examination of dance as a globalised unit of cultural capital is an emerging field. With this in mind I investigate the way this dance is employed in professional, semi-professional, and non-professional settings in Egypt and in other parts of the world, notably North America and Europe. Techniques included interviewing members of the international dance community who engage in dance tourism, travelling from their homes to Egypt or other destinations in order to take dance classes, get costumes, or in other ways seek to have an 'authentic' dance experience. I also explored connections dancers fostered with other members of the dance community both locally and in geographically distant locations by using online blogs, websites, listservs and social networking sites. I conducted the first part of my fieldwork in Cairo following this with fieldwork in belly dance communities in the United States and Britain.

Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

Cette recherche tente de comprendre le rôle de la culture des nouveaux médias (Jenkins, 2006a) dans le processus d'affirmation qui mène au dévoilement de l'orientation sexuelle (aussi nommé « sortie du placard ») des jeunes gais, population souvent perçue en tant que vulnérable. Pour ce faire, une approche interprétative a été choisie ainsi qu'une méthode d'entrevues rétrospectives semi-structurées et axées sur la participation des jeunes gais en ligne, telle qu'abordée par Ito et al. (2010). Suite aux deux entrevues avec chacun des cinq participants, il semble que leur engagement en ligne soit influencé par leurs contextes hors ligne. Les résultats montrent le rôle des nouveaux médias dans la construction identitaire et la sortie du placard des participants, notamment via l'exploration des relations affectives, la création et la gestion de profils et leurs réflexions sur la culture néomédiatique et sur « être gai ». Toutefois, le cœur de la discussion est centré sur le processus de ce que j'appelle l'accueil de la différence. J'aborde et je discute alors des concepts tels que la différence (Hall, 1997)et la normativité sociale (Butler, 1990; Duggan, 2002). / This research attempts to understand how does new media participate in gay youth's - often perceived as a vulnerable population - self assertion and coming out processes (Jenkins , 2006a). An interpretive approach was chosen as well a method of semi-structured retrospective interviews which focused on their online participation, as discussed by Ito et al. (2010 ) . After two interviews with each one of the five participants, it seems that their online engagement cannot be separated from their offline contexts. The results give account of the role that new media plays in the participant's identity construction and coming out processes, including the exploration of emotional relationships, online profiles management and reflection upon new media culture and "being gay ." However, the heart of the discussion revolves around the process of what I call the welcome of the differences. It is essential to further discuss difference (Hall, 1997) and social normativity (Butler , 1990; Duggan, 2002).

Ce mémoire s'inscrit dans la constellation de questions regroupées sous l'étiquette de l'éthique de la croyance. Plus spécifiquement, il cherche à analyser la viabilité des jugements tout bien considéré portant sur les croyances lorsque des raisons de types distincts (raisons épistémiques et raisons pragmatiques) entrent en conflit. Cette analyse se fera à l'aune d'une recherche portant sur l'instrumentalisme de la croyance, la position avançant que les croyances sont instrumentales à nos intérêts et que, par conséquent, la normativité de la croyance se jauge en fonction de nos objectifs. L'instrumentalisme de la croyance est tombé sous le coup de plusieurs critiques dans les dernières années et se mémoire se donne comme mission d'en évaluer la portée. Si d'aventure l'instrumentalisme de la croyance devait être une position viable, il y a lieu de penser qu'il existe une commensurabilité possible entre raisons de différents types. / This thesis is part of a larger group of philosophical inquiries usually placed under the label of "Ethics of Belief". Specifically, my aim is to examine the possibility of all things considered judgments concerning beliefs for which there is a conflict between reasons of distinct kinds (epistemic reasons and pragmatic reasons). This inquiry will mostly concern epistemic instrumentalism, the position holding that one's beliefs are instrumental to one's own objectives and thus, that the rationality of beliefs must be an instrumental rationality. It appears that this position has been the aim of a few criticism in the recent years and my goal is to evaluate the strength of such criticism. If epistemic instrumentalism ends up being a viable thesis, we can expect that there may not be any incommensurability between reasons for belief of different kinds.

In dieser Arbeit werden verschiedene Entwicklungsmodelle des Menschen vorgestellt und in ihrem Gebrauch in und für die Pädagogik kritisch reflektiert. Zunächst werden Vorüberlegungen zur Etymologie und Systematik der Begriffe Entwicklung (zwischen Natur und Kultur) und Modell (gegenüber Theorie, Simulation und Schema) angestellt. Anhand des Gangs von Beispiel zu Beispiel (Günther Buck) werden jeweils die Entwicklungsmodelle des Menschen von Rudolf Steiner, Maria Montessori, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Erik Erikson und Werner Loch kritisch dargestellt und problematisiert. Es schließen sich bildungs- und erziehungstheoretische Überlegungen an, wie das Phänomen der Entwicklung heute in angemessener Weise behandelt werden kann. Anhand der dargestellten Modelle zeigt sich, dass nur ein von absoluter Teleologie und Linearität befreiter Entwicklungsbegriff mit modernen Vorstellungen pädagogischer Anthropologie und Ethik kompatibel sein kann. Deswegen können Entwicklungsmodelle lediglich eine veranschaulichende oder regulierende Funktion ausüben. Sie stehen jedoch so zumeist im Widerspruch zu den grundlegenden Momenten der freien Bildsamkeit und Mitbestimmung des Einzelnen im Erziehungsprozess. Eine Rehabilitation des Entwicklungsdenkens erweist sich dennoch als sinnvoll, da dieser in der Lage ist, auf die komplexe Genealogie menschlichen Lebens und die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen pädagogischer Einsätze zu verweisen. / The issue of developmental models of human beings and their implementation in both pedagogical practice and theory are critically reflected within this thesis. In the beginning, preliminary considerations of the etymology and systematization of development (between nature and nurture) and model (as opposed to theory, simulation, scheme) are framed. Based on Günther Bucks''s approach (from „Beispiel“ to „Beispiel“) several developmental models by Rudolf Steiner, Maria Montessori, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Erik Erikson and Werner Loch are critically examined. Subsequently, considerations on addressing the phenomenon of development from the perspective of education theory and „Bildung“ in an appropriate contemporary way are given expression. On the basis of the outlined models it is depicted that only a concept of development that is exempt from absolute teleology and linearity can be compatible with modern ideas of educational anthropology and ethics. Hence, developmental models may only serve visualizing and regulating purposes. They often contradict fundamental principles such as „Bildsamkeit“ (the ability and necessity of self-forming) and participation within the process of education. Nevertheless, the rehabilitation of development thinking proves beneficial due to its ability to indicate the complex genealogy of human life and the opportunities as well as limitations of pedagogical actions.

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