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Der Zweite Weltkrieg war von neuer Technik und damit auch von neuen Möglichkeiten in der Propaganda und Psychologischen Kriegsführung geprägt. Speziell in der britisch-deutschen Auseinandersetzung wurden aus den Erfahrungen des Ersten Weltkrieges neue Konzepte entwickelt, mit denen eine Manipulierung feindlicher Soldaten und Zivilisten ermöglicht werden sollte. Die Dissertation setzt sich mit den Mentalitäts- bzw. Charaktereinschätzungen der Deutschen aus Sicht der britischen Akteure auseinander, die für eine effiziente Propaganda und Psychologische Kriegsführung gegen das sogenannte ''Dritte Reich'' sorgen sollten. Die oftmals präzisen Einschätzungen der Propagandisten, teils auch unter Verwendung psychologischer und psychiatrischer Dossiers hatten jedoch nicht immer den gewünschten Effekt. Auch aus diesem Grund wurden neue Strategien im Rahmen der sogenannten ''schwarzen'' Propaganda entwickelt, die den Gegner in den Grundfesten seiner Seele erschüttern sollte (und zu Teilerfolgen führte). Auch wenn die Briten auf beeindruckende Art und Weise die Deutschen hinsichtlich politischer, sozialer, religiöser oder lokaler Zugehörigkeit analysierten und Versuche unternommen wurden, diese Gruppen anhand dieser vermeintlichen Schwächen zu manipulieren, wurde nie das Ziel erreicht, via der Provokation von Differenzen innerhalb der Bevölkerung oder zwischen Bevölkerung und NS-Regime den Krieg zu verkürzen. Dabei ist die britische Effizienz im Einzelnen wiederum schwer messbar, festzustellen ist jedoch eindeutig, dass die britischen Propaganda-Maßnahmen keinen durchschlagenden Erfolg hatten, da die Autorität des NS-Regime zu keinem Zeitpunkt durch Massenaufstände oder Meutereien bzw. Massendesertionen an der Front gefährdet waren. Im Großen und Ganzen war die Entwicklung der mentalitätsorientierten ''geistigen Kriegsführung'' ein beeindruckendes Kapitel der britischen Geschichte, jedoch ohne messbare Auswirkung auf den Kriegsverlauf bzw. seiner Verkürzung. / The beginning of the Second World War imposed a new kind of warfare on the battlefield. The progress of radio and flight techniques permitted measures to manipulate the enemy with a combination of propaganda and psychological warfare. Furthermore, an analysis of his character was needed to spot the weak points in German psychology, to support the enemy population and soldiers in enmity towards their own government and to the war and to induce political uprising, sabotage and desertion. But the economic rebirth of Germany had created a strong connection between the Germans and Hitler, that would not be easy to weaken. British attempts to manipulate the German mind were wholly unsuccessful. Even the best analysis, very often close to the truth, could not jeopardize the efforts of Nazi propaganda, that drummed successfully into the German mind that the intentions of the Allied forces would be to destroy and enslave Germany. Furthermore, efforts to drive a wedge between the Germans and their leaders failed. Even in decline and defeat, the average German remained incapable of drawing his own conclusions and rising up against the Nazis. The history of the British attempts to manipulate the German mind was yet an impressive chapter of the Second World War, even if not entirely successful. The propaganda-organization of those measures and the confirmation of at least some of the estimates proved the efficiency of a well-organized brain-pool. For the totalitarian regime, it was easier in the end to oppress opposition, and for the democratic system too difficult to penetrate the German minds.

Notre thèse se donne pour objectif d’examiner la projection culturelle de la présence militaire américaine en France entre 1944 et 1967. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, alors que le monde bascule dans la Guerre froide, nul ne sait déterminer l’issue de la confrontation politique et idéologique qui se déroule entre les États-Unis et l’Union Soviétique. En 1949, la France fait partie des pays fondateurs de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN). Sa participation à l’organisation internationale entraîne le « grand retour » des soldats américains, les GI, sur le territoire français. Celui-ci s’accompagne d’une politique culturelle inédite, qui se traduit par de nombreuses actions menées tant au niveau institutionnel que sur le terrain des bases militaires. Comment et pourquoi les autorités diplomatiques et militaires s’appliquent-elles à développer une stratégie de promotion de la présence militaire américaine en France ? Quelles formes prennent les campagnes de publicité organisées par les services d’information américains en France (USIS-France), pour développer les rapports entre civiles et militaires ? Quelle image les Français et les Américains se font-ils de cette présence militaire en territoire étranger ? À la lumière d’études journalistiques, archivistiques et de terrain, nous montrons que Washington s’emploie à conduire une politique culturelle « parabelliciste » très maîtrisée. Cette notion, adaptée de la pensée de l’intellectuel français Jacques Ayencourt en 1946, caractérise avec à-propos la politique culturelle américaine conduite de l’arrivée des premiers GI en 1944 jusqu’au départ des derniers bataillons en 1967. / Our thesis aims to examine the promotion of the American military presence in France from 1944 to 1967. After World War II, as the world was slowly drifting into the Cold War, the outcome of the political and ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was still uncertain. In 1949, France took part in the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its participation in NATO led to the return of US soldiers, the GIs, to French territory. Their return was accompanied by an unprecedented cultural policy, implemented both at the institutional level and in the day-to-day lives of French citizens. How and why did the diplomatic circles and the military establishment feel the need to develop a strategy to promote the US military presence in France? How were the advertisement campaigns conceived by the US information services in France (USIS-France) in order to develop a relationship between civilians and the military? What image did the French and the Americans have of this military presence on French soil? Based on journalistic, archival and field studies, our work shows that Washington’s cultural policy was “parabellicist,” aiming deliberately to keep both the French and the Americans on a war footing. This notion, derived from Jacques Ayencourt’s work in 1946, appropriately characterizes American cultural policy conduct from the arrival of the first GIs in 1944 until the last battalions departed in 1967.

Le 22 juin 1994, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU vote la résolution 929 autorisantle déploiement d’une force multinationale humanitaire, neutre et impartiale au Rwandaayant pour mission de mettre fin aux massacres. Concrètement, c’est la France, àl’initiative de ce projet, qui va assurer le commandement de la mission dénomméeOpération Turquoise. Celle-ci se heurte à l’opposition des rebelles tutsis du FrontPatriotique Rwandais, aux réserves des organisations humanitaires mais elle reçoit lesoutien appuyé du gouvernement intérimaire rwandais hutu. L’Opération Turquoisesuscite surtout une vague d’accusations dans la presse française, le président FrançoisMitterrand et les militaires français étant accusés de « complicité de génocide », voire de« participation au génocide ». Ces accusations perdurent et reviennent régulièrementdepuis plus de vingt ans, relayées par des journalistes qui disent avoir découvert puisrévélé « l’inavouable » rôle de la France au Rwanda.Cette étude analyse les enquêtes journalistiques menées de 1994 à 2014 et lesconfronte aux documents confidentiels et secret-défense issus des archives américaines,françaises, rwandaises et onusiennes, ainsi qu’à la stratégie militaire mise en oeuvredurant l’Opération Turquoise. Elle permet ainsi d’identifier les sources sur lesquellesreposent ces accusations et d’en évaluer le bien-fondé. Ce faisant, elle met en évidence lafaçon dont la recherche s’est concentrée sur le génocide au détriment de la lutte arméeinitiée par le FPR de 1990 à juillet 1994, laissant de côté des aspects essentiels à lacompréhension de la tragédie rwandaise. / On the 22nd June 1994, the UN Security Council passes the resolution 929authorising the deployment of a multinational humanitarian, neutral and impartial force toRwanda having as its mission to put an end to the massacres. In concrete terms, it isFrance, on initiative of this project, who goes to carry out the command of the missionnamed Operation Turquoise. This comes up against the opposition of the Tutsis rebels ofthe Rwandan Patriotic Front, to the reservations of the humanitarian organisations but itreceives the backup support of the acting Rwandan Hutu government. OperationTurquoise incites above all a wave of accusations in the French press, with the PresidentFrançois Mitterand and the French military soldiers being accused of 'complicity ingenocide', even of taking part in the genocide. These accusations have endured and havebeen regularly coming back for more than twenty years, relayed by journalists who claimto have discovered then revealed the shameful role of France in RwandaThis study analyses the journalistic inquiries led from 1994 to 2014 and comparesthem with confidential secret defence documents stemming from American, French,Rwandan and UN records, as well as the military strategy put in place during OperationTurquoise. It also allows identification of the sources on which these accusations lie andevaluation of their validity. In so doing, it brings to the fore the way in which the researchhas focused on the genocide to the detriment of the armed struggle initiated by the RPFfrom 1990 to July 1994, leaving aside essential aspects in the comprehension of theRwandan tragedy.

This study explores the foundations of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine in order to better understand the main historical influences on that policy and doctrine and how those influences have informed the current US approach to counterinsurgency. The results of this study indicate the US experience in counterinsurgency during the Greek Civil War and the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines had a significant influence on the development of US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following World War II through the Kennedy presidency. In addition, despite a major diversion from the lessons of Greece and the Philippines during the Vietnam War, the lessons were re-institutionalized in US counterinsurgency policy and doctrine following the war and continue to have significant influence today, though in a highly sanitized and, therefore, misleading form. As a result, a major disconnect has developed between the “rhetoric and reality” of US counterinsurgency policy. This disconnect has resulted from the fact that many references that provide a more complete and accurate picture of the actual policies and actions taken to successfully defeat the insurgencies have remained out of the reach of non-government researchers and the general public. Accordingly, many subsequent studies of counterinsurgency overlook, or only provide a cursory treatment of, aspects that may have had a critical impact on the success of past US counterinsurgency operations. One such aspect is the role of US direct intervention in the internal affairs of a supported country. Another is the role of covert action operations in support of counterinsurgency operations. As a result, the counterinsurgency policies and doctrines that have been developed over the years are largely based on false assumptions, a flawed understanding of the facts, and a misunderstanding of the contexts concerning the cases because of misleading, or at least seriously incomplete, portrayals of the counterinsurgency operations.

Aiming to make an intervention in both emerging Slow Cinema and classical Trauma Cinema scholarship, this thesis demonstrates the ways in which the post-trauma cinema of Filipino filmmaker Lav Diaz merges aesthetics of cinematic slowness with narratives of post-trauma in his films Melancholia (2008), Death in the Land of Encantos (2007) and Florentina Hubaldo, CTE (2012). Diaz has been repeatedly considered as representative of what Jonathan Romney termed in 2004 “Slow Cinema”. The director uses cinematic slowness for an alternative approach to an on-screen representation of post-trauma. Contrary to popular trauma cinema, Diaz’s portrait of individual and collective trauma focuses not on the instantenaeity but on the duration of trauma. In considering trauma as a condition and not as an event, Diaz challenges the standard aesthetical techniques used in contemporary Trauma Cinema, as highlighted by Janet Walker (2001, 2005), Susannah Radstone (2001), Roger Luckhurst (2008) and others. Diaz’s films focus instead on trauma’s latency period, the depletion of a survivor’s resources, and a character’s slow psychological breakdown. Slow Cinema scholarship has so far focused largely on the films’ aesthetics and their alleged opposition to mainstream cinema. Little work has been done in connecting the films’ form to their content. Furthermore, Trauma Cinema scholarship, as trauma films themselves, has been based on the immediate and most radical signs of post-trauma, which are characterised by instantaneity; flashbacks, sudden fears of death and sensorial overstimulation. Following Lutz Koepnick’s argument that slowness offers “intriguing perspectives” (Koepnick, 2014: 191) on how trauma can be represented in art, this thesis seeks to consider the equally important aspects of trauma duration, trauma’s latency period and the slow development of characteristic symptoms. With the present work, I expand on current notions of Trauma Cinema, which places emphasis on speed and the unpredictability of intrusive memories. Furthermore, I aim to broaden the area of Slow Cinema studies, which has so far been largely focused on the films’ respective aesthetics, by bridging form and content of the films under investigation. Rather than seeing Diaz’s slow films in isolation as a phenomenon of Slow Cinema, I seek to connect them to the existing scholarship of Trauma Cinema studies, thereby opening up a reading of his films.