近來陸續爆出的舞弊案件已連帶引起了社會大眾對關係人交易行為的注意。本文先探討審計品質與關係人交易之關聯性，而實證結果顯示關係人銷貨、進貨、應收款項與應付款項交易與審計品質皆呈負向關係，足見關係人交易之查核是困難的。因此本文期望透過外部審計人員的專業屬性來降低關係人交易對審計品質產生的不良影響，提升投資人對公司財務報導的信任。過去文獻針對會計師專業屬性部分，指出會計師事務所規模愈大以及產業專精程度愈高者，具備較佳的查核品質。研究結果顯示當關係人銷貨、進貨及應收款項交易係由四大會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所查核時，因大型會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所具備較佳會計師專業屬性，能抑制或減少關係人交易對審計品質之負面影響，而提升財務報表之審計品質。 / Numerous financial reporting frauds over recent years have made related party transactions the center of public attention. We first investigate the association between related party transactions and audit quality (proxied by discretionary accruals), and find that four kinds of related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) all have negative impacts on audit quality. We posit that (1) external auditing is a monitoring mechanism to reduce audit quality decline caused by related party transactions, and (2) auditor attributes including big 4 audit firms and industry specialist audit firms can mitigate the audit quality decline thereof. Empirical results show that companies audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms, whose sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties show significantly smaller negative impacts on audit quality than companies not audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms.

公司因應「企業全球化」趨勢，追求全球資源最佳配置下，交易大多在集團內部進行。透過移轉訂價政策，作為集團企業間關係人交易價格的制定依據。 此趨勢之下，我國集團企業間關係人交易採用移轉訂價政策的情況為何？本研究以我國上市櫃公司之集團企業為研究對象，探討分析移轉訂價查核準則實施對我國集團企業間移轉訂價制定因素之影響，並彙整我國集團企業對移轉訂價查核準則規範內容的意見。 一、我國集團企業移轉訂價政策之運用現況及考量因素： 1、目前僅有五成的集團企業有建立明確移轉訂價政策作為關係人交易訂價的依據：公司規模愈大、對外投資期間愈長、關係人交易總額愈多、而關係企業家數在5家以下的集團企業，採用比例也愈高。 2、以移轉訂價查核準則規範之「可比較未受控價格法」及「成本加價法」之傳統交易基礎法採用為多。整體租稅負擔並非主要考量因素，各國移轉訂價法令規定及我國財務會計準則公報第六號規定為最主要的因素。規模越大、關係企業家數越多、越重視法令規定的企業，採用交易基礎移轉訂價法的機率愈高。惟，綜合集團整體內外經濟因素加以考量時，則偏向利潤基礎法。 二、我國集團企業受移轉訂價查核準則影響及意見： 1、透過組織管理架構的調整，將關係人交易價格的重心轉為事前規劃，進而考量移轉訂價稽查之因應。 2、目前我國集團企業多數認為準則並無不合理且頗具可行性。 / With the trend of globalization, companies use global resources to pursue best interest of the group enterprises as a whole within related party transactions. Through the transfer pricing policy, conglomerates can determine the prices for transactions between related parties. This study uses the conglomerate enterprises of Listed and OTC companies in Taiwan as questionnaire samples. The study analyses the impact of implement action of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations on conglomerate enterprises and the factors of transfer pricing among the conglomerates in Taiwan. The results of the research are as follows: 1.Nowadays, only 50% of the conglomerates in Taiwan establish a stated transfer pricing policy in determining the prices for transactions between related parties. We also focus that the larger size, the longer time of investment and the great investment amount, the higher proportion to adopt the transfer pricing policy. 2.The conglomerates in Taiwan tend to “The Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method” and “The Cost Plus Method” . The groups do not regard world-wide tax burden as an important factor, rather they emphasize more on the other countries’ transfer pricing regulations and financial accounting standards No.6 as the main factors. 3.The larger size, the more related companies, and paying more attention to regulations, the higher probability of transaction-based transfer pricing method. When the comprehensive internal and external economic factors are considered, the conglomerate companies tend to adopt profit-based transfer pricing method. 4.Through the adjustment of the organizational structure, and planning the price for transactions between related parties in advance, the conglomerate enterprises take tax audit into account. 5.Most of conglomerates in Taiwan regard the criteria of Taiwan transfer pricing regulations as rational and feasible at present.

Submitted by Nilo Almeida (naajrj@gmail.com) on 2018-08-15T16:34:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 The Related Party Transaction in Brazilian Infrastructure PPPs - Final Version.pdf: 1720313 bytes, checksum: 169661514312285f50c2683e8bb457ca (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2018-08-24T14:47:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 The Related Party Transaction in Brazilian Infrastructure PPPs - Final Version.pdf: 1720313 bytes, checksum: 169661514312285f50c2683e8bb457ca (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T14:37:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 The Related Party Transaction in Brazilian Infrastructure PPPs - Final Version.pdf: 1720313 bytes, checksum: 169661514312285f50c2683e8bb457ca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-11 / Transações com parte relacionadas (RPT) é um problema recorrente na maioria das empresas com propriedade compartilhada porque, ao mesmo tempo que pode trazer uma redução significante dos custos de transação, por outro lado apresenta o risco de ser abusada causando perdas para os acionistas minoritários e credores. A Parceria Público Privada (PPP) de infraestrutura, sendo um empreendimento em sociedade, está sujeito a este dilema e, devido à alavancagem proporcionada pelo Project Finance, há inclusive maiores incentivos ao comportamento oportunista. Um exemplo recente, motivando a discussão, é o case da usina hidroelétrica Santo Antônio, que, com um orçamento inicial de R$ 12 bilhões, acabou custando um total de R$ 20 bilhões. O potencial de retorno imediato por expropriação dos custos majoritários, tipo aquisição e construção para o projeto, na maioria das vezes é extremamente superior à exposição do agente oportunista às perdas durante a futura operação da infraestrutura. Neste trabalho é proposto um modelo microeconômico simples para explorar os incentivos subjacentes nos projetos de PPP com o objetivo de encontrar alternativas para mitigar o desalinhamento de incentivos causados por RPT’s nas PPPs. Finalmente, a literatura pesquisada, em conjunto com o modelo proposto, são usados na comparação com dados empíricos mostrando forte evidência de efeitos negativos das RPTs. Em muitas PPPs no Brasil, a presença de grandes construtoras nas holdings dos seus controladores, aliada à pouca experiência dos agentes governamentais e deficiência de recursos na utilização do modelo PPP, criou um ambiente muito desfavorável ao sucesso desses projetos. / The Related Party Transaction (RPT) is a recurring issue in most shared ownership companies because, at the same time, it has the potential to bring significant reduction of transaction costs, on the other hand, presents many pitfalls of being abused to the loss of the minority shareholders and creditors. The infrastructure Public Private Partnership (PPP), being a shared enterprise, is prone to this dilemma and, because project finance is extremely leveraged, there are even stronger incentives for opportunistic behavior. As a recent example to motivate the discussion there is the case of Santo Antonio hydroelectric power generation facility, which had an initial budget of R$ 12 billion and ended up costing a grand total of R$ 20 billion. The potential immediate returns of expropriation from major expenses, such as acquisition and construction for the project, most of the time, far outweighs the opportunist’s exposure to losses in the future operation of the infrastructure. It is proposed a simple microeconomic model for exploring the underlying incentives of PPP projects to help devise options for mitigating the incentive misalignment of RPTs in PPPs. Finally, the literature and the proposed model findings are used to compare with empirical data which has showed strong evidence of negative RPT effects. In many PPPs in Brazil, the presence of big construction firms in the controlling shareholders’ holdings, coupled with the government’s lack of experience and adequate resources to work with the PPP model, created a difficult environment for the financial success of those projects.

Submitted by Renato Vilela (renatovla@yahoo.com.br) on 2012-10-15T15:01:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RENATO VILELA - Dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 2009901 bytes, checksum: c6531673d2170c86cb4edebfc889a91c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2012-10-15T15:12:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RENATO VILELA - Dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 2009901 bytes, checksum: c6531673d2170c86cb4edebfc889a91c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-15T15:24:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RENATO VILELA - Dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 2009901 bytes, checksum: c6531673d2170c86cb4edebfc889a91c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-13 / The work is situated in the large area of corporate law, specifically under the subject of conflicts of interest in the deliberations of listed companies. The assumed objective was to critically explore theoretical interpretation of the legal problem resulting from these conflicts, and then perform an empirical study about a potentially contentious negotiating mode, the related party transactions. After studying the logic from these doctrinal proposals, the thesis maintains the hypothesis that the explanations of the Brazilian legal literature vary the ratio of the open concept of 'best interests of the company', according to articulate the position of the party represented by counsel. Arbitrarily designed as 'formal' or 'substantial', such interpretations cares about the time of infringement of the Company's best interest, respectively, to prohibit or guarantee the exercise of voting from the interested party, through suitable arrangements at the dispute. Due to this impairment of abstract reasoning to the practice of law, it is suggested to approach the subject by another theoretical proposal, linked to a specific notion of Law. Understood as a provider of relevant information to stakeholders of the companies, it acts in the regulation of data required from these corporations and in the information produced by them, individually. Such transparency, along with the rules that bind the market, form the conceptual content of the expression 'corporate governance', developed around the proposal called by 'corporate governance system'. The interpretation of information from the various possible systems must offer the decision maker a chance to meet their powers, prerogatives, incentives, skills, limitations and prohibitions in order to assess whether their choice is a good government practice for the business, according the system in which the company operates. For interested third parties, the system should serve to verify if the decision-making process follows the expectation of the business environment designed by the governance system. On the issue of conflicts of interest, the suggestion to think the problem through this notion of Law intended to support the creation and disclosure of rules conceived by the listed companies, which feed the alluded governance system and serve to guide the decision making oriented by the alignment of dissonant goals involved in the company, without the use of external arbitration. So, the empirical work focuses on studies of these particular rules applicable to related party transactions, such mechanisms were collected in the annual report of the 100 most liquid corporations listed at BM&FBovespa in 2011. The results show that only 6% of companies have procedures to identify conflicting relationships arising from related party transactions and 29% to address the problem. The figures relating to companies that establish rules for managing conflicts of interest in the deliberations of the general assembly and board of directors are also low, respectively, 7% and 13% present identification mechanisms, 4% and 11% for treatment. The low frequency showed by the results lighted with the built theoretical proposal identifies an opportunity, namely, to think of mitigating the problem using this private and extrajudicial route. / O trabalho está inserido na grande área do direito societário, especificamente sob a temática dos conflitos de interesses nas deliberações de S.A.´s listadas em Bolsa de Valores. O objetivo assumido foi o de percorrer criticamente as propostas teóricas empregadas na interpretação do problema jurídico resultante destes conflitos, para depois realizar um estudo empírico sobre uma modalidade negocial potencialmente conflitiva, as transações entre partes relacionadas. Após o estudo da lógica norteadora das propostas doutrinárias, sustenta-se a hipótese de que as explicações da literatura jurídica brasileira variam na razão do conceito aberto de 'interesse da companhia', articulado de acordo com a posição da parte representada pelo advogado. Arbitrariamente concebidas como formais ou substancias, tais interpretações cuidam do momento de violação do interesse da companhia, respectivamente, visando proibir ou garantir o exercício de voto do interessado por meio de entendimentos convenientes ao tempo do litígio. Diante deste comprometimento do raciocínio abstrato com a prática da advocacia, sugere-se a abordagem do tema por outra proposta teórica, vinculada a uma noção específica do Direito. Compreendido como um provedor de informações relevantes aos interessados nas operações das empresas, ele atua na regulação dos dados exigidos destas sociedades e na confecção das informações produzidas individualmente por elas. Tal transparência, junto das regras que vinculam o mercado, forma o conteúdo conceitual da expressão governança corporativa, desenvolvido em torno da proposta chamada de 'sistema de governança corporativa'. A interpretação das informações dos diversos possíveis sistemas deve oferecer ao tomador de decisão a chance de conhecer os seus poderes, prerrogativas, incentivos, competências, limitações e proibições, de modo a avaliar se a sua escolha é uma boa prática de governo da empresa, segundo o sistema no qual ela opera. Aos terceiros interessados, deve servir para verificar se o processo decisório segue o esperado pelo ambiente negocial que o sistema de governança delineia. No tema do conflito de interesses, a sugestão de pensar o problema por esta noção do Direito visa respaldar a criação e divulgação de regras próprias pelas empresas listadas, as quais alimentem o aludido sistema de governança e sirvam à tomada de decisões que orientem o alinhamento dos objetivos dissonantes envolvidos na companhia, sem que haja a necessidade de recorrer ao arbitramento externo. O trabalho empírico se debruça então nos estudos destas regras particulares aplicáveis às transações entre partes relacionadas, tais mecanismos são colhidos nos formulários de referência das 100 companhias mais líquidas da BM&FBovespa no ano de 2011. Os resultados mostram que apenas 6% das empresas possuem procedimentos para identificar as relações conflituosas decorrentes da modalidade negocial estudada e 29% para tratar o problema. Os números relativos às sociedades que estabelecem regras para a administração dos conflitos de interesses nas deliberações de assembleia geral e conselho de administração também são baixos, respectivamente, 7% e 13% apresentam mecanismos de identificação, 4% e 11% para o seu tratamento. A baixa frequência mostrada pelos resultados à luz da proposta teórica construída identifica uma oportunidade, qual seja, a de pensar a mitigação do problema por esta via particular e extrajudicial.

At the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, most banks in the Czech Republic got into trouble. Some banks overcome this problems, but others have to cease their activities and lost their banking license. Difficulties of banks varied from case to case, but there were some common attributes. The first objective of this work is to find these common attributes. The second objective of this work is to identify "culprits" who were most involved in the difficulties of banks in the Czech Republic in the years 1993-2003. Method of incomplete induction will be used in this work. First of all, from all banks, which had difficulties in the years 1993-2003, I selected a sample of ten banks. Then for each bank I will detect the main causes of its problems. Subsequently, through a comparative method, I will determine the most frequent causes of the problems of banks in the years 1993-2003. To each cause I will assign a group of persons or institutions that contributed to its emergence. Finally, according to frequency of institutions and groups, I will identify the main "culprits", who were most involved in the difficulties of banks in the years 1993-2003. This work will be based primarily on the sources available in the library of University of Economics, the Library of the Czech National Bank and specialized literature, which deals with this issue.

近年來我國屢次爆發掏空公司資產之弊案，而細究其掏空之方式，多係藉由公司之交易行為，將公司資產不法輸送予特定人士。我們不難發現這些特定人士時常某程度與公司之董事或控制股東，具有一定之利害關係，甚至這些特定人士即為董事或控制股東本身。正因如此，關係人交易在我國公司治理議題上逐漸受到重視，並引起廣泛之討論，尤其針對具有董事或控制股東身分之人。由於此兩類身分之人同時具有掌握公司資訊及影響公司經營決策之權力，更易藉此方式自公司謀取私利。 我國對於關係人交易下董事之義務，雖已有規範，然而自比較法之觀點，美國法對此部分顯然較我國完備，不僅對於關係人交易設有事前之董事行為標準，並且對於符合行為標準之關係人交易，給予董事安全港之保護。同時，配合司法實務上所發展之司法審查標準，採取寬嚴不一的審查模式，使董事得於關係人交易中合理預測訴訟風險。一方面可降低關係人交易中非常規交易發生之可能性，另一方面亦不至於全然扼殺關係人交易在現代經濟社會中產生之正面價值。我國法之董事義務既是繼受英美法上受任人義務之概念，因此本文嘗試分析美國法中關於關係人交易之相關規定，希冀做為我國修法之參考以求法制之完備。 又我國現行公司法在控制股東義務方面，似存在重大之法律漏洞。尤其在關係人交易下，有心人士為規避擔任董事可能帶來之相關義務，轉而選擇置身於幕後，成為不具董事身分卻實際掌握公司經營決策權之控制股東。此無疑對於欲利用關係人交易不法掏空公司之人，開啟方便之大門。事實上，在英國及美國法上對於控制股東在特定情況下課予如同公司董事一般之受任人義務，而本文則將其焦點限縮在關係人交易下控制股東之義務，經由整理分析英美兩國法制上之條文、學說及重要判決，以期建構出我國規範關係人交易下控制股東義務之依據。

金融機構所經營之業務涵蓋種類繁多、型式各異並各有其相關之法令，而金融機構透過直接或間接投資方式，一般而言將構成金融集團間之關係人及其交易，本論文之目的在於分析各種金融集團關係人交易相關法令之缺漏，並進而提出建議。 本文首先從現行金融機構經營及投資規範及金融機構關係人交易法律規範，歸納整理出相關法規機制，並探討現行該等關係人及交易之法律規範之「過」與「不足」之處。 此外，本文也參考美國法及跨國性金融監理機構之相關規範，藉此與我國相關規範比較，以作為我國相關立法之參考方向。 接著，本文再以金融機構關係人之實際相關案例，深入分析本國實務上常見之問題，以探討實務上對關係人的認定標準，並釐清現行金融監理對關係人間非常規交易之管理缺漏。 最後本文以上述之分析結果，提出對現行金融機構關係人相關法規之建議，以提供未來修法之參考。 / Due to deregulation and globalization in banking system, financial institutions are increasingly burring traditional differences between banking, insurance, and other institutions. As results, intra-group transactions cause more concern about the conflicts of interests. From a legal point of view, different legal relationships will confer different rights and impose different duties on financial parties. Therefore, it is sensible to analyze the legal nature of the relationships of different participants and their roles in financial institutions’ related party transactions. This study presents an analysis of regulations of related party transactions within Financial Conglomerates, and proposes reforms to deal with conflicts of interest: Firstly, discusses the regulations about the business scope of financial holding company, bank, securities and insurance company. Then further analyzes the regulations of related party transactions within each above financial parties. Secondly, depicts the American regulatory scheme and the frames guidelines and principles of international financial supervisory institutions. The former focuses on the background of banking regulations and the latest issue about The Dodd-Frank Act. The later includes the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) and the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates. A comparative analysis of regulations of the above and Taiwan was made. Thirdly, further analyzes the controversial issues of intra-group transactions based on several judicial cases, and then discusses the operational deficiencies of financial institutions and flaws of law and regulations. Finally, summarizes the said issues and propositions about related party transactions of financial institutions.