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1	A questão da racionalidade jurídica em Hart e em Dworkin / The question of rationality of law in Hart and Dworkin Colontonio, Carlos Ogawa 28 April 2011 (has links) O objetivo desta pesquisa é apresentar o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Hart e o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Dworkin, assim como a crítica realizada por Dworkin em face do Conceito de Direito oferecido por Hart. O positivista, Herbert Hart, propõe que o direito é formado por um sistema de regras primárias e regras secundárias, sendo que uma regra de reconhecimento é responsável por identificar quais regras estão ou não incluídas em tal sistema. Caso seja apresentado um problema que não é resolvido por uma regra reconhecida pelo critério, deverá o julgador apelar para a discricionariedade. Dworkin, em um primeiro momento, criticará o conceito de Hart, alegando que o seu critério de demarcação entre o que é direito e o que não é direito é insatisfatório, por deixar de reconhecer vários elementos como jurídicos, uma vez que a regra de reconhecimento, sendo um teste de pedigree, não à capaz de captar princípios de direito não legislados e direitos e deveres controversos. Ademais, há um erro na teoria positivista de Hart, ao afirmar que os casos não claramente resolvidos por uma regra serão resolvidos a partir da arbitrariedade da autoridade estatal. Posteriormente, Dworkin oferecerá um modelo de direito que dê conta da realidade jurídica, em seu entendimento. Um modelo em que o jurista, a partir do equilíbrio reflexivo e do axioma da equidade poderá deduzir teorias possíveis para responder problemas do direito, identificando, dentre estas teorias, qual é a melhor resposta, sendo portanto a resposta exigível para a solução da lide concreta. / The objective of this research is to present the rational legal model presented by Hart and rational legal model presented by Dworkin as well as criticism made by Dworkin in the face of the Concept of Law offered by Hart. The positivist, Herbert Hart, proposes that the right is formed by a system of primary rules and secondary rules, and a rule of recognition is responsible for identifying what rules are or are not included in this system. If presented with a problem that is not resolved by a rule recognized by the criterion, the judge should resort to discretion. Dworkin, at first, criticize the concept of Hart, claiming that his criterion of demarcation between what is right and what is not right is unsatisfactory, for failing to recognize various elements such as legal, as a rule of recognition , being a test of pedigree, not able to capture the principles of law and not legislated rights and duties controversial. Furthermore, there is an error in the positivist theory of Hart, asserting that the cases do not clearly resolved by a rule will be resolved from the arbitrariness of state authority. Later, Dworkin offer a model law that embraces the legal reality in his mind. A model in which the lawyer from the reflective equilibrium and the axiom of justice may deduct possible theories to address problems of law, identifying, among these theories, what is the best answer, the answer is therefore required for the solution of the dispute concrete. Conceito de direito Concept of law Critério de demarcação Demarcation criterion Dworkin Dworkin Hart Hart Regra de reconhecimento Rule of recognition
2	A questão da racionalidade jurídica em Hart e em Dworkin / The question of rationality of law in Hart and Dworkin Carlos Ogawa Colontonio 28 April 2011 (has links) O objetivo desta pesquisa é apresentar o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Hart e o modelo racional jurídico elaborado por Dworkin, assim como a crítica realizada por Dworkin em face do Conceito de Direito oferecido por Hart. O positivista, Herbert Hart, propõe que o direito é formado por um sistema de regras primárias e regras secundárias, sendo que uma regra de reconhecimento é responsável por identificar quais regras estão ou não incluídas em tal sistema. Caso seja apresentado um problema que não é resolvido por uma regra reconhecida pelo critério, deverá o julgador apelar para a discricionariedade. Dworkin, em um primeiro momento, criticará o conceito de Hart, alegando que o seu critério de demarcação entre o que é direito e o que não é direito é insatisfatório, por deixar de reconhecer vários elementos como jurídicos, uma vez que a regra de reconhecimento, sendo um teste de pedigree, não à capaz de captar princípios de direito não legislados e direitos e deveres controversos. Ademais, há um erro na teoria positivista de Hart, ao afirmar que os casos não claramente resolvidos por uma regra serão resolvidos a partir da arbitrariedade da autoridade estatal. Posteriormente, Dworkin oferecerá um modelo de direito que dê conta da realidade jurídica, em seu entendimento. Um modelo em que o jurista, a partir do equilíbrio reflexivo e do axioma da equidade poderá deduzir teorias possíveis para responder problemas do direito, identificando, dentre estas teorias, qual é a melhor resposta, sendo portanto a resposta exigível para a solução da lide concreta. / The objective of this research is to present the rational legal model presented by Hart and rational legal model presented by Dworkin as well as criticism made by Dworkin in the face of the Concept of Law offered by Hart. The positivist, Herbert Hart, proposes that the right is formed by a system of primary rules and secondary rules, and a rule of recognition is responsible for identifying what rules are or are not included in this system. If presented with a problem that is not resolved by a rule recognized by the criterion, the judge should resort to discretion. Dworkin, at first, criticize the concept of Hart, claiming that his criterion of demarcation between what is right and what is not right is unsatisfactory, for failing to recognize various elements such as legal, as a rule of recognition , being a test of pedigree, not able to capture the principles of law and not legislated rights and duties controversial. Furthermore, there is an error in the positivist theory of Hart, asserting that the cases do not clearly resolved by a rule will be resolved from the arbitrariness of state authority. Later, Dworkin offer a model law that embraces the legal reality in his mind. A model in which the lawyer from the reflective equilibrium and the axiom of justice may deduct possible theories to address problems of law, identifying, among these theories, what is the best answer, the answer is therefore required for the solution of the dispute concrete. Conceito de direito Critério de demarcação Dworkin Hart Regra de reconhecimento Concept of law Demarcation criterion Dworkin Hart Rule of recognition
3	UNDERSTANDING FUNDAMENTAL SECONDARY RULES AND THE INCLUSIVE/EXCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM DEBATE Kuiper, Heather N. January 2012 (has links) <p>Within legal positivism, the theory which holds that there is no necessary connection between legal validity and morality, there is dissensus about whether there can be a contingent connection. Inclusive legal positivists suggest that it is possible for morality to play a role in determining a norm’s legal validity while exclusive legal positivists argue for the opposite. This dissertation examines this debate between inclusive legal positivism and exclusive legal positivism focusing on how paying attention to all of the fundamental secondary rules in a legal system can affect arguments about the coherence of either theory. The fundamental secondary rules being the rules which identify other rules, identify authority and authorize changes. I will be demonstrating that three exclusive legal positivist arguments against inclusive legal positivism are unconvincing because of the role that fundamental secondary rules play in our legal systems. Shapiro and Raz offer arguments against inclusive legal positivism based on different important features that they believe the law possesses. However, given their commitment to a particular type of fundamental secondary rule, specifically a directed power, exclusive legal positivism is unable to better capture these important features. Himma suggests that inclusive legal positivism cannot explain how a court can have final authority to determine constitutional cases involving moral criteria. Again, however, we examine what fundamental rules an inclusive legal positivist could employ to explain the phenomenon, we find that exclusive legal positivism is in no better position. At the end of the dissertation, I will suggest why I think continuing with these types of arguments will continue to be fruitless and briefly examine how similar inclusive and exclusive legal positivism are through investigating how one might determine whether a given legal system had an inclusive rule of recognition or exclusive one.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Rule of Recognition Rules of Change Rules of Adjudication Directed Powers Legal Positivism General Jurisprudence Jurisprudence Jurisprudence
4	Normative Political Communities: Foundations for a Hartian Theory of State and Non-State Law Fabra-Zamora, Jorge L. January 2019 (has links) This dissertation outlines a theory of law capable of explaining both the legal systems of domestic states and other types of legal phenomena different from state law that I will call non-state legal phenomena. Central examples of non-state law include indigenous and customary laws, the international legal order, the European Union, and transnational commercial law. This theoretical framework aims to formulate and resolve questions about the common features shared by different types of legality and the distinctive legal character of non-state legal phenomena. It also sets the stage for doctrinal and politico-moral inquiries about these phenomena. My account draws liberally from central themes of HLA Hart’s theory of state law that I deem applicable outside the domestic context. One key idea is the notion of normative order or unified complexes of interrelated rules that regulate specific domains of action. The refined Hartian view that I develop here distinguishes between two kinds of normative orders, sets and systems, which differ in their characteristic features and that allow for different doctrinal and moral inquiries. While these tools can be used to explain both state and non-state normative phenomena, I shall consider as law the normative orders of political communities, i.e. groups whose participants efficaciously employ intense forms of social pressure to secure conformity to norms that regulate pressing politico-moral issues. With these elements in place, the legal domain can be characterized as a constellation of sets and systems that constitute political communities at the state, non-domestic, international, supra-national, and potentially global levels. The argument proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 sets the stage of this inquiry. Chapter 2 explicates the key insights of the Hartian framework. Chapter 3 defends the applicability of this framework to non-state contexts. Chapter 4 illustrates its explanatory virtues by applying it to two regimes of international trade law. The conclusion summarizes the central insights of this view and highlights the avenues for future research. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This dissertation outlines a theory of law capable of explaining both state and non-state legal phenomena. This theoretical framework aims to formulate and resolve questions about the common features shared by different types of legality and the distinctive legal character of non-state legal phenomena, and to help to set the stage for further inquiries about them. My account draws liberally from HLA Hart’s theory of state law. The argument proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 sets the stage of this inquiry. Chapter 2 explicates the key insights of the Hartian framework. Chapter 3 defends the applicability of this framework to non-state contexts. Chapter 4 illustrates its explanatory virtues by applying it to two regimes of international trade law. The conclusion summarizes the central insights of this view and highlights the avenues for future research. legal philosophy HLA Hart non-state law legal pluralism authority international law WTO legal officials normative order rule of recognition
5	Implied constitutional principles Zhou, Han-Ru January 2012 (has links) This thesis challenges some of the current limits to the grounds for judicial review of legislation accepted by most Canadian jurists. More specifically, it makes a common law-based argument in favour of the priority over legislation of principles which are implied from the Imperial Constitution Acts 1867-1982 and which originally derive from the English constitution – namely implied constitutional principles. The argument faces two main interrelated legal objections: Parliamentary sovereignty and the Framers’ intentions. The first objection is rebutted by arguing that Parliamentary sovereignty possesses an ability to change in a way that can incorporate substantive legal limitations. The most prevalent common law-based theories of change to Parliamentary sovereignty suggest that the courts can authoritatively determine if implied constitutional principles can check legislation. The second objection is rebutted by reference to the notion of progressive interpretation as conceived under Hartian and Dworkinian theories of law and adjudication. Under these theories, progressive interpretation is an aspect of the courts’ best overall interpretation of the constitution, which includes implied constitutional principles. Such progressive interpretation can result in these principles constraining legislative authority. Justification of the progressive interpretation of implied constitutional principles can be based on the rule of law from which derive a number of these principles. One plausible conception of the Canadian rule of law is that it rejects the view that implied constitutional principles can prevail when in conflict with legislation. However, the better conception is that, as an attempt to adapt implied constitutional principles to relevant changes in society and to protect their underlying values, the judiciary should interpret these principles as capable of checking legislation to the extent that they form part of the core content of the rule of law. Such a conception and an operation of implied constitutional principles can properly be explained by Hartian or Dworkinian common law-based progressive interpretation of these principles and by their relationship with legislative authority. 342
6	法與道德--德沃京對法實證主義分離命題之批判 / Law and morality--Ronald Dworkin's critique of the separation thesis of legal positivism 許家馨, Hsu, Chia-hsin Unknown Date (has links) 本論文總共分為三部分，共八章。第一部份是「分離命題綜論」，包含了第一、二章。在第一章當中，筆者從歷史及分析的路徑，對分離命題做了一個初步的介紹。歷史的部分，筆者選取邊沁與奧斯丁、美國法現實主義、德國自然法復興運動這三個對於英美法理學界來說較為重要的關於分離命題的討論。在分析的部分，筆者簡單地說明分離命題與法概念以及道德概念的關係。當然，筆者也介紹了本文所探討的主角—德沃京的生平、其學說的發展以及其學說與分離命題的關係。第二章則是特別針對德沃京最主要的理論對手哈特的法理論以及他對分離命題的主張。第一章與第二章一起，才算是完成本文的預備工作。第二部分是德沃京前期對分離命題的批判。本文將德沃京前期與後期區分開來，是因為德沃京學說的前期與後期都有很大的影響力，可是他後期的理論所使用的語彙有經過相當的修正，因此不適合放在一起介紹。第二部分包括第三、四章，筆者分別名之為「原則論I」與「原則論II」。這是因為德沃京前期的法理論是以「原則」概念為主軸所發展出來的。第三章主要是對德沃京《認真看待權利》一書中《規則模式I》一章的介紹。第四章則是對《規則模式II》以及疑難案件這兩章的介紹。《規則模式I》是德沃京整個法理論的出發點。它本身構成一個完整的整體，儘管仍是一個有待發展的整體。《規則模式II》是對《規則模式I》的補充。疑難案件則是德沃京法理論的突破性發展，許多他在後期完整發展的觀念都可以在這篇文章中看到雛形。筆者將《規則模式II》及疑難案件中的重點一起放入第四章作為對於第三章的補充。這些一起構成了德沃京前期的完整面貌。當然，筆者用以貫穿其中的軸線，就是德沃京對分離命題的批判。第三部份是德沃京後期對分離命題之批判。這一部份主要焦點是在德沃京集大成的系統著作法律帝國。這一部份包括第五、六、七章。第五章說明了德沃京後期修正過後的概念架構，以及在這個新的概念架構與分離命題的關係是什麼。處理的對象是法律帝國的第一章。第六章則是對德沃京「詮釋」概念的闡釋。「詮釋」概念是德沃京後期理論的核心，因此我們有必要對之清楚地說明。顯得比較突兀的是第六章的第一節。筆者從社會科學方法論的角度分析了哈特與德沃京法理論在方法上的意涵。這是因為，筆者認為分離命題的焦點乃是在於法理論家如何看待法概念，若要深入地評估法理論的意涵，勢必要探討其方法。這個部分處理的對象主要是法律帝國的第二、三章。第七章則介紹德沃京後期法理論的重點，也就是他認為的法概念的「構念」--作為整全性的法律。最後，也就是第八章是結論。這是筆者對全篇論文的回顧，以及筆者對於分離命題這個主題的價值的看法。第一部分離命題綜論第一章緒論第一節分離命題概論I—歷史的路徑第一項邊沁與奧斯丁第二項法現實主義者的挑戰第三項德國自然法復興運動第二節分離命題概論II—分析的路徑第一項法概念第一款規範取向的法概念與非規範取向的法概念第二款法概念的指涉與理論說明第二項道德概念第三節德沃京的法理論與分離命題第一項德沃京生平簡介第二項德沃京的法理論發展及其分期第三項本文問題意識：德沃京法理論與分離命題第四節本論文架構第二章哈特與分離命題第一節從定義到核心要素第一項定義第二項組織性原則與一組核心要素第二節哈特的法概念與分離命題第一項初級規則與次級規則的結合第二項個別法律的效力第三項法體系的存在第四項個案中的法律第三節哈特法理論的性質第一項一般性第二項描述性第三項一般性、描述性與分離命題第二部德沃京前期對法實證主義分離命題之批判第三章原則論 ( I ) 第一節德沃京的論證第一項原則是存在的第二項原則與規則邏輯性質的差異第三項原則也是法規範第四項原則無法被承認規則鑑別出來第一款妥當感第二款制度上的佐證第三款習慣法的問題第五項原則是某種道德第二節原則是什麼？第一項原則的功能第一款原則的五種功能第二款原則之功能的省思第二項原則的來源第三節規則與原則的邏輯性質差異是否成立？第一項如何判斷是規則或原則？第二項規則衝突則失效？第三項規則與原則之區分的理論意涵第四節原則是不是法規範？第五節原則與道德的關係是什麼？第四章原則論（II）第一節對承認規則的批判第一項哈特的社會規則論第二項對社會規則論的批判第一款社會規則與規範規則第二款「自主而合意的道德」與「從眾而成習的道德」第三款疑難情況的出現第三項對作為社會規則之承認規則的批判第二節權利論第一項權利第一款權利與目標第二款幾種權利的分類第二項法律權利第一款規範與價值第二款作為權利執行者的司法部門第三款政治理論第三項權利與道德第三節對裁量論的批判第一項德沃京對司法裁量論的批判第一款弱意義與強意義的裁量第二款法實證主義者的裁量論第二項對司法裁量論之批判的理論意涵第三部德沃京後期對法實證主義分離命題之批判第五章新的起點：新的法概念第一節新的概念架構第一項關於法律的理論爭議第二項法律命題與法律根據第三項新的法概念第二節疑難案件的實例第三節單純事實觀點第四節語意學的刺第一項法的語義學理論第二項法實證主義第三項語義學的刺第五節小結：新的起點第六章詮釋性的法概念第一節社會科學方法論上的批判第一項法理論的自我理解第二項作為受制於規則之活動的法律言說第一款語言遊戲與說話行動第二款哈特的困境第三項一般性與描述性法理論之困難第一款一般性第二款描述性第四項詮釋性的法理論第二節建構詮釋論第一項建構性詮釋第一款一個虛構的例子第二款對話性詮釋、科學性詮釋與創造性詮釋第三款建構性詮釋第二項對社會實踐的建構性詮釋第一款詮釋的三個階段第二款概念、構念與典範第三節詮釋性的法概念第七章整全的法律第一節成規主義與法實用主義第一項成規主義第二項法實用主義第二節整全性第一項整全性符合嗎？第二項整全性有吸引力嗎？第一款真正的社群第二款政治社群第三節整全的法律第一項連環小說第二項海克力斯法官第三項法律與道德第四節懷疑論的挑戰第八章結論參考文獻 / Abstract This master dissertation elaborates the leading anti-positivist Ronald Dworkin’s standing on critique of the separation thesis, the positivist doctrine that law and morality are separate, or ‘what law is’ is different from ‘what law ought to be’. The author firstly argues that although the dispute over the separation thesis in the old context, which mainly concerns with the relationship between legal validity and morality, no longer stands in the central spotlight, the recent heating concern with the role morality plays in legal reasoning is actually a continuance of the old-time concern. The overarching rationale behind these developments is a battle about where and how to base the objectivity of law in the modern world. Therefore, despite that Dworkin’s legal theory has focused on the part morality plays in legal reasoing, it could still be elaborated as a critique of separation thesis in a broader sense. This dissertation distinguishes ‘early Dworkin’ and ‘later Dworkin’s’ critique of the separation thesis. ‘Early Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Taking Right Seriously. ‘:Later Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Law’s Empire. While the author thinks the essence of Dworkin’s legal theory remained basically the same throughout his early and later thoughts, it is necessary to introduce his theory in two parts because the concepts he used were greatly changed and improved, and the arguments shifted. Dworkin’s early critique of separation thesis is organized around the concept of ‘principle’. The author argues that the most important argument Dworkin should be making is not that principles exist, but that principles are ‘law’ and that principles cannot be identified by the rule of recognition. And these two arguments are not to be cleared up only until Dworkin’s later argument using the concept of ‘interpretation’. The author also criticizes Hart’s claim that the nature of legal theory could fruitfully remain general and descriptive. By surveying the development of the methodology of social science, the author argues that Hart’s standing on the nature of legal theory reveals his ultimate philosophical foundation of empiricism and positivism. The author therefore argues that a fruitful gain a legal theory is to get, it has to be particular and ‘interpretive’, as Dworkin has claimed. 法實證主義自然法論規則與原則承認規則德沃京哈特詮釋性法理論法與道德 legal positivism natural law rule and principle rule of recognition Ronald Dworkin H. L. A. Hart interpretive theory of law law and morality
7	Identidad del orden jurídico y régimen político Vilajosana Rubio, Josep M. (Josep Maria) 20 December 1993 (has links) A la primera part, l'autor tracta de demostrar que certs criteris formals d'identitat d'un ordre jurídic (com els defensats per Austin, Kelsen y Hart) no resulten satisfactoris, perquè ignoren la repercussió que sobre aquesta qüestió té la connexió entre el dret i la política. La solució passa, aleshores, per trobar un criteri material d'identitat dels ordres jurídics. A la segona part es proposa que aquesta identitat es defineixi en termes d'identitat dels règims polítics. Això permet emprar l'instrumental analític de la teoria política (des de Easton a Morlino). La conclusió: dins d'un cert ordre estatal, un ordre jurídic manté la seva identitat fins que el règim polític segueixi sent el mateix. Al seu torn, un règim polític manté la seva identitat fins que els seus elements són modificats de tal manera que ens porten a haver de incloure'l en una categoria diferent, dins d'una determinada classificació. / En la primera parte, el autor pretende demostrar que ciertos criterios formales de identidad de un orden jurídico (como los defendidos por Austin, Kelsen y Hart) no resultan satisfactorios, dado que ignoran la repercusión que sobre esta cuestión tiene la conexión entre el derecho y la política. La solución pasa por delinear un criterio material de identidad de los órdenes jurídicos en términos de identidad de los regímenes políticos, como se hace en la segunda parte. Ello permite usar el instrumental analítico de la teoría política (desde Easton hasta Morlino). La conclusión: dentro de cierto orden estatal, un orden jurídico mantiene su identidad hasta que el régimen político sigue siendo el mismo. A su vez, un régimen político mantiene su identidad hasta que sus elementos se modifican de tal manera que nos llevan a clasificarlo en otra categoría en el seno de una clasificación dada. / In the first part, the author attempts to demonstrate that certain formal criteria of identity of a legal order (the Austin's, Kelsen's and Hart's criteria) are not satisfactory, because they ignore the repercussions of the link between law and politics. The solution can only be found in trying to delineate a material criterion for the identity of legal orders. In the second part, the author defines the identity of legal orders in terms of the identity of political regimes. In this way, he can make use of the analytical tools devised of political theory (from Easton to Morlino). The conclusion: within a certain State order, a legal order maintains its identity as long as the political regime stays the same. The political regime, in turn, maintains its identity until its elements are modified in a way that forces us to attribute it to another category, within a given classification. validity change of laws political regimes law and politics rule of recognition grundnorm legal system validez identity of a legal order punto de vista interno cambio de normas regímenes políticos derecho y política regla de reconocimiento norma básica sistema jurídico identidad del orden jurídico punt de vista intern validesa canvi de normes Morlino Easton règims polítics dret i política Raz Kelsen Hart Austin regla de reconeixement norma bàsica sistema jurídic identitat del ordre jurídic internal point of view 340
8	A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity Tyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links) American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. natural law theory legal positivism HLA Hart William Blackstone John Locke Jeremy Bentham John Austin Galileo Socrates Trotsky Athens Soviet law Stuart dynasty John Dewey Dewey Commission Sidney Hook Congregation of the Holy Office Galileo Affair trial of Socrates Moscow Trials trial of Galileo heresy trial of Trotsky reason autonomy consent philosophy of law pragmatism Kant Inquisition ostracism Anaxagoras Protagoras Alcibiades Arginusae Pericles Peloponnesian War Solon Ephialtes Apology Plato Herodotus Xenophon Plutarch Roscoe Pound common law Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Common Law The Path of the Law Learned Hand Christopher Columbus Langdell Ronald Dworkin Lon Fuller Lenin Stalin King Rex Sergei Kirov Permanent Revolution Socialism in One Country Great Terror Dekulakization Holomodor Terror Famine Italian positivist school Harold J. Berman Gustav Radbruch Ramon Mercader Trotsky assassination Marteman Ryutin Old Bolsheviks Genrikh Yagoda Pope Urban VIII Walter Duranty Harold Denny New York Times Joseph E. Davies Mission to Moscow New Republic John F. Finerty Lev Sedov Military Collegium Vasili Ulrikh Gaspare Borgia Cardinal Robert Bellarmine Pericles Father Commissary Michelangelo Segizzi Cardinal Francesco Barberini Cardinal Maffeo Barberini Siderius Nuncius Starry Messenger Accademia dei Lincei Letters on Sunspots Friar Tommaso Caccini Niccolo Lorini Commentaries on the Laws of England Second Treatise on Civil Government Henry de Bracton Sir Edward Coke Sir John Fortescue Matthew Hale Ranulf de Glanvil James I Charles I James II Charles II ship money forest fines distraint of knighthood impositions dispensing power royal prerogative Duke of Buckingham Oliver Cromwell Bishops Wars William Prynne Great Migration Declaration of Indulgence Settlement Act Test Act Protectorate Clarendon Code Quaker Act William and Mary English Civil War Puritan Revolution Glorious Revolution Thirty Years' War Earl of Shaftesbuty William Laud Historiomatrix Long Parliament Rump Parliament Barebones Parliament sociological jurisprudence Red Terror war communism New Economic Policy 1926 Criminal Code Kirov Amendments judicial discretion semantic sting The Concept of Law Fragments on Government The Province of Jurisprudence Determined A Fragment on Government Anarchical Fallacies primary rules secondary rules rule of recognition legal validity internal point of view external point of view law as prediction the bad man perspective on law life of the law page of history Basilikon Doron Trew Law of Free Monarchies

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