Officially, Sweden has a very low level of corruption and in 2008 topped Transparency International’s list in terms of the perception of a lack of corruption. However, on closer examination it would appear that the Swedish public sector is not as clean as the Transparency International list suggests. What appears to be relatively common and quite widely accepted in Sweden, especially in local government, are conflict of interest situations in which public officials use their position to obtain advantages for themselves, their friends and their colleagues, in particular with respect to public procurement.   According to the Swedish constitution, the public administration shall be governed by the principles on legality and objectivity. Grave violations of these principles are deemed illegal and contrary to the penal code provisions relating to bribery, public misconduct and breach of confidentiality. This, however, is where the problem arises. The provisions of the law regarding public misconduct only cover those areas involving the exercise of public authority. Although the handling of public matters when a conflict of interest exists is prohibited, there are no sanctions in the penal code for occasions where these provisions are violated. As public procurement is considered to be a contractual matter rather than one that falls within the scope of public authority, there are technically no means, from a criminal law point of view, to address conflict of interest situations, unless the actions taken amount to for example bribery, fraud or a criminal breach of trust.   The aim of this paper is to answer the following questions:   Where does the improper influencing of public decisions due to a conflict of interest fit within the concept of corruption? How can improper influence and conflict of interest be tackled from a criminal law point of view under the current Swedish legislation; What changes, if any, would be required to permit that improper influence due to a conflict of interest can be properly addressed from a criminal law point of view?   My research established that a situation in which public officials improperly influence the official decision-making process because of private interests falls within most international definitions of corruption, i.e. “the abuse of public office for private gain”. It was also established that this type of behaviour in the Swedish public service is often impossible to deal with through criminal prosecution, although it violates the legal provisions on public conflict of interest. This paper therefore concludes that the improper use of influence due to a conflict of interest should be regarded as corrupt activities and be criminalised, thus safeguarding the constitutional principles of the public administration.

This study aims to map the opinions and attitudes of lokal elected officials regarding corruption and corruption preventing measures. The study also attempt to determine weather opinions differ based on the interviewed party political affiliations. The study material of the thesis is therefore largely based on interviews with elected representatives from the municipalities; Älmhult, Lessebo and Tingsryd.

<p>The first aim of the thesis is to analyse the problems of trust, according to game theory, in the Russian market for private pensions insurance. The second aim is to find suitable strategies to solve the problems. Problems of trust have arisen because, (i) buyers of insurance have had negative experiences when dealing with insurance companies and corruption has decreased trust for all players in the market, (ii) incomplete information makes it difficult to separate honest actors from dishonest, and (iii) dishonest insurance companies do not get punished because of corruption and weaknesses in the law. Mutual risk-sharing is a potential solution as necessary conditions already exist in the Russian society. There are groups who (i) share the same type of risks, (ii) are aware of moral hazards, and (iii) are able to control each other. Mutual risk-sharing gives people in distant areas the possibility to get insurance. Strategies of trust are a possible solution in the long run because of the presence of corruption in the Russian society. The strategies can be implemented by the insurance companies and are thought to lessen the gap of information between them and the insurance buyer. We believe that corruption is the largest threat towards the success of the strategies of trust.</p>

Sättet på vilket individer interagerar på marknader det vill säga hur utbyte går till möjliggör för typ av ekonomisk utveckling. Hög förtroendegrad mellan människor underlättar för samarbete och beror dels på hur människor upplever den samhälleliga kontexten. Kontexten består av institutioner, varför denna uppsats undersöker hur förtroendegrad och typer av policys i form av hur staten och marknaden organiseras samverkar med ekonomisk utveckling. Österrikisk ekonomisk teori beskriver hur värderingar ligger till grund för vilka typer av institutioner som formas i ett samhälle. Olika typer av samhällsorganisering, som öppna fria marknader, eller reglerade och stängda, får effekt för hur människor upplever sin omgivning och handlar därefter. Fritt samarbete gör människor benägna att bete sig på ett relationsmässigt bra sätt vilket skapar förtroende, då relationsnätverk blir centralt för individer på marknader. Utan fri handel hindras förtroende att spridas då detta representerar värderingar om att alla inte är fria att välja, att det inte är relationsmässigt bra beteende som ligger till grund för handlingar på marknaden, eller att förtroende inte finns för vissa typer av människor. Detta ger normer om relationsmässigt dåligt beteende som korruption och räntesökande vilket inte är förenligt med ekonomisk utveckling. Genom att använda sekundärdata konstrueras en empirisk analys där möjliga faktorer som påverkar olika länders HDI-index undersöks. Variabler som inkluderas är förtroende, korruption, statliga utgifter, statliga bidrag och transfereringar, statliga företag och investeringar, rättssäkerhet och stabil äganderätt, stabilt penningvärde, frihet att handla internationellt samt reglering av marknad. Det empiriska resultatet visar i enhet med tidigare forskning att förtroende har en signifikant effekt på ekonomisk utveckling där länder som samtidigt har högt förtroendeklimat, fria marknader och stora statliga välfärdssystem tycks vara ekonomiskt utvecklade. Detta resultat tyder på att förtroendeklimat kommer utifrån individers upplevda möjligheter till att uppnå egna individuella syften.

In this study, my intention has been to examine how the ambiguous concept of corruption is constructed by the press. Emphasizing the media’s representations of the socially constructed and context-specific concept, this work adopts a critical perspective on discourse, together with an approach of conceptual history. Finland has for many years been appointed as one of the least corrupt countries in the world, signing several international conventions against corruption since the 1990s, which in turn has led to an increase in discussion regarding the phenomenon. By conducting a multi-method study, my aim has been to analyse the possible changes in the definition of ”corruption” in the Finnish newspaper Hufvudstadsbladet during the period 2000-2013. Using the theoretical framework of Fairclough’s media discourse and Koselleck’s conceptual history, the concept has been analysed in light of Finnish legislation regarding corruption during this period. The analysis yielded several results. The concept of corruption is defined as a both moral and legal problem, resulting in shifting meanings. A change in the representation of levels of corruption in Finland, from optimistic to pessimistic is illustrated, which is upheld in the press by results from international corruption surveys and statements made by those in power. Overall, while discourse on corruption is both constructed and transformed by journalists, it has ideological effects when what is presented as facts are in reality based on statements made by experts and political actors.  Finally the analysis shows that “corruption” and “trust”, being asymmetrical concepts, constitute an inseparable pair of concepts. In a democratic country these concepts depend on each other, making corruption a matter of the entire society. I propose that further research examine the possible changes in the concept of corruption over a longer period of time.

There is unanimity within the arbitration community that corruption is disrupting international trade and that arbitrators must not let arbitration be a safe forum for enforcement of contracts tainted by such illicit acts. Due to the hidden nature of corruption, often hiding behind an agency agreement, the most challenging question facing arbitrators has shown to be how to handle the rules of evidence. Awards show that there is an inconsistency in the treatment of the burden and standard of proof as well as the significance given to circumstantial evidence. Two trends can be spotted where the first approach is to argue that the seriousness of the accusations calls for a heightened standard of proof. The second trend is to argue that the seriousness to the contrary calls for a pragmatic approach to the rules of evidence, allowing a less rigid view on the standard of proof and use of circumstantial evidence or even a shift in the burden of proof. The focus of the thesis is on evidentiary aspects of corruption cases and how arbitrators have dealt with these challenges. The overall question is how arbitrators should handle the rules of evidence in corruption cases from a lege ferenda perspective. It is argued that the inconsistency in the handling of proof is sometimes misguided and that there are reasons to agree on a common starting point for applying the rules of evidence to corruption cases. Arbitrators should realise the frightening fact that it is their weighing of the evidence which is usually decisive for the outcome and accordingly there is a responsibility to conduct this operation carefully. The tools and procedural flexibility to reveal corruption exist even if there is no perfect solution on how to do it.

Universiẗat, Diss.-2008--Bielefeld, 2007.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, 2008.

Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 1998/99.

Corruption is a challenge to aid organizations and donor countries such as the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. Corruption within a country’s ruling power or public sector is an obstacle to development resulting in bribery and embezzlement of aid funds. In this paper I am going to analyze if the regulation and formation of aid change due to corruption in recipient countries looking into the work of Sida in the three east African countries Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Using theories from Rothstein, Cremer and Rose-Ackerman I explain the effects of corruption on aid as well as the ongoing debate of how to defeat corruption. Studying the three countries and Sida the result shows that corruption alters both the regulation and formation of aid. The regulation and control tend to increase while the formation become more project based and oriented towards anti-corruption efforts.