Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-08-06Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:35:54Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 lancia_jc_me_ia.pdf: 1949570 bytes, checksum: de65c06be1d96f797a0b1521e72e719c (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O minimalismo musical de La Monte Young, Terry, Riley, Steve Reich e Philip Glass foi chamado, entre outros rótulos, de música repetitiva, modular, de pulsação, de processos e estática – e, portanto, não-teleológica – antes que o termo minimalismo prevalecesse. Uma vez que tais termos não são infundados e refletem características percebidas no minimalismo, este trabalho tenta definir as idéias por trás desses rótulos. O trabalho também discute os procedimentos mais típicos adotados por cada um dos quatro compositores mencionados, apontando as mudanças de feições na produção desses compositores entre as décadas de 1960 e 70, período normalmente utilizado como referência para estudos. / The musical minimalism of La Monte Young, Terry, Riley, Steve Reich and Philip Glass had been called, among other labels, repetitive, modular, pulse, process, and static – and as a result, a-teleological – music before the name minimalism finally caught on. Since those labels reflect, at least in part, some of the features commonly found in the style, this study attempts to define the concepts behind such labels. This work also discusses some of the most typical procedures adopted by the four composers aforementioned, pointing their changing style during the 1960s and 70s, period often used as a reference for studies.

Este trabalho apresenta o argumento que Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274) oferece como a quinta das vias para demonstrar a existência de Deus na Suma de Teologia. O foco desta apresentação não é explorar o contexto histórico em que o argumento se originou, nem examinar as fontes gregas, latinas e islâmicas sobre as quais Tomás teria se baseado, mas sim analisar a possibilidade de sustentá-lo de modo atemporal como um argumento plausível a favor da existência de Deus. Minha intenção é oferecer boas razões em seu favor e rebater as objeções mais notórias em contrário, apontando os limites explicativos do argumento e oferecendo sugestões para fortalecê-lo. Inicio distinguindo diferentes tipos de teleologia e de argumentos teleológicos pela existência de Deus, comparando a quinta via com os demais argumentos teleológicos de Tomás e com o argumento de William Paley pelo projeto inteligente (Intelligent Design). Em seguida, passo à análise da própria via, mostrando evidências das inclinações e tendências a fins a que Tomás faz referência e tratando das teses metafísicas que defende a partir da observação destas inclinações. Também ofereço respostas às objeções que pretendem que esta teleologia seja redutível a leis de natureza ou ao acaso. No último capítulo, considero a segunda parte da quinta via, que afirma que tais inclinações em direção a fins dependem em última instância de uma inteligência ordenadora que seria Deus. Analisando, ao fim, em que medida procedem as objeções de que esta conclusão não passa de um antropomorfismo injustificado e de que Tomás vai além do que lhe permite a conclusão ao considerar que esta inteligência é Deus. / This work presents the argument Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) offers as the fifth of his ways to demonstrate the existence of God in the Summa Theologiae. The main point of this presentation is not to explore the historical context in which the argument was written, neither to examine the Greek, Latin and Islamic sources upon which Thomas could have based himself, but rather to analyze the possibility of sustaining it timelessly as a plausible argument in favor of God’s existence. My purpose is to offer good reasons in its favor and to rebut the most notorious objections against it, pointing out the explanatory limits of the argument, and providing suggestions to strengthen it. I start by distinguishing different sorts of teleology and of teleological arguments for the existence of God, then I compare the Fifth Way with others teleological arguments formulated by Thomas and with the argument of William Paley for the “intelligent design” hypothesis . I also analyze the way itself, pointing out evidences for the inclinations and tendencies towards ends that Thomas refers to, also dealing with the metaphysical theses that Thomas defends based on the observation of these inclinations. Moreover, I offer answers to objections that intend to reduce teleology to laws of nature or to chance. In the last chapter, I consider the second part of Fifth Way, which affirms that those inclinations towards ends ultimately depend on an ordering intelligence that would be God. Lastly, I examine to what extent are valid the objections that claim this conclusion is simply an unjustified anthropomorphism and that Thomas goes beyond what his conclusion allows him when he takes this intelligence to be God.

A presente pesquisa tem o objetivo de estudar os princípios de investigação dos seres vivos tendo como parâmetro a concepção hilemórfica dos entes naturais em Aristóteles. Para tanto, em primeiro lugar, analisaremos o hilemorfismo tal como exposto no Livro II da Física, a fim de investigarmos a doutrina da matéria e forma, no contexto em que ela desempenha um papel fundamental para a elaboração de uma concepção que é capaz de mostrar os modos pelos quais os entes se constituem na natureza. Em segundo lugar, examinaremos os princípios de investigação dos seres vivos no Livro I das Partes dos Animais, de modo a identificar os fundamentos conceituais nos quais ele se sustenta. Assim, veremos em que medida a doutrina da matéria e forma desempenha uma função determinante na análise relativa aos organismos vivos. / The present research aims to study the principles of investigation of living beings, from hylemorphic conception as a parameter of explanation of natural beings in Aristotle. To do so, first, well analyze the hylemorphism as set out in Book II of Physics in order to investigate the doctrine of matter and form, in which it plays a key role in the development of a conception that is able to show the ways in which beings are formed in nature. Second, well examine the principles of living beings in Book I of the Part of Animals, in order to identify the conceptual foundations on which it holds. So we\'ll see how far the doctrine of matter and form plays a decisive role in the analysis relating to living organisms.

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The thesis is that contrary to the received popular wisdom, the combination of David Hume's sceptical enquiry and Charles Darwin's provision of an alternative theoretical framework to the then current paradigm of natural theology did not succeed in defeating the design argument. I argue that William Paley's work best represented the status quo in the philosophy of biology circa 1800 and that with the logical mechanisms provided us by William Dembski in his seminal work on probability, there is a strong argument for thr work of Michael Behe to stand in a similar position today to that of Paley two centuries ago. The argument runs as follows: In Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 1 I introduce the issues. In Section 3 I argue that William Paley's exposition of the design argument was archetypical of the natural theology school and that given Hume's already published criticism of the argument, Paley for one did not feel the design argument to be done for. I further argue in Section 4 that Hume in fact did no such thing and that neither did he see himself as having done so, but that the design argument was weak rather than fallacious. In Section 5 I outline the demise of natural theology as the dominant school of thought in the philosophy of biology, ascribing this to the rise of Darwinism and subsequently neo-Darwinism. I argue that design arguments were again not defeated but went into abeyance with the rise of a new paradigm associated with Darwinism, namely methodological naturalism. In Chapter 2 I advance the project by a discussion of William Dembski's formulation of design inferences, demonstrating their value in both everyday and technical usage. This is stated in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 I discuss Dembski's treatment of probability, whilst in Section 4 I examine Dembski's tying of different levels of probability to different mechanisms of explanation used in explicating the world. Section 5 is my analysis of the logic of the formal statement of the design argument according to Dembski. In Section 6 I encapsulate objections to Dembski. I conclude the chapter (with Section 7) by claiming that Dembski forwards a coherent model of design inferences that can be used in demonstrating that there is little difference between the way that Paley came to his conclusions two centuries ago and how modem philosophers of biology (such as I take Michael Behe to be, albeit that by profession he is a scientist) come to theirs when offering design explanations. Inference to the best explanation is demonstrated as lying at the crux of design arguments. In Chapter 3 I draw together the work of Michael Behe and Paley, showing through the mechanism of Dembski's work that they are closely related in many respects and that neither position is to be lightly dismissed. Section 1 introduces this. In Section 2 I introduce Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in the light of (functional) explanation. Section 3 is a detailed analysis of irreducible complexity. Section 4 raises and covers objections to Behe with the general theme being that (neo-) Darwinians beg the question against him. In Section 4 I apply the Dembskian mechanic directly to Behe's work. I argue that Behe does not quite meet the Dembskian criteria he needs to in order for his argument to stand as anything other than defeasible. However, in Section 5 I conclude by arguing that this is exactly what we are to expect from Behe's and similar theories, even within competing paradigms, in the philosophy of biology, given that inference to the best explanation is the logical lever therein at work. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

The contemporary flâneur is confronted with a radically different world in comparison to the Parisian arcades of the nineteenth century during which the idea of the flâneur was conceptualised. The current urban milieu of the flâneur is dominated by consumerism, computer systems and surveillance, and the research posed here explores the flâneur within this environment. The flâneur was originally visualised on the streets and arcades of the city; however, cities do not only exist as buildings and streets and have become global entities that are constituted from the physical and the virtual. Throughout this study reference is primarily made to the work of Francis Alÿs to elucidate theoretical concepts. This study proposes that there is an absence of the teleological goal in the journey of the flâneur and as such, the flâneur wanders the streets without aim; however, in the process creates narratives and leaves traces of his journey. The ubiquity of surveillance in the contemporary metropolis complicates the flâneur's relationship with the latter. Consequently the impact of surveillance on the flâneur and the flâneur's daily wanderings are examined to ascertain its influence on the flâneur in a hyperreal society. In contemporary thinking, the traditional idea of the male flâneur requires reassessment and this research investigates the possibility of the female flâneur and women's presence in the public spaces of the city and the virtual realm of cyberspace. Furthermore, women are intricately linked to consumerism and their experience and position in the city are influenced by being seen as objects of the gaze. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Visual Arts / unrestricted

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Ce mémoire examine le thème des causes finales dans l’Éthique (1677) de Spinoza. À l’aide d’une classification quadripartite des types de discours sur les causes finales, il identifie d’abord en le finalisme théologico-métaphysique la cible philosophique visée par la critique de l’Appendice de la première partie de cet opus magnum. Radicalisant le postulat épistémologique cartésien voulant que la volonté divine ne puisse servir de principe explicatif aux phénomènes naturels, Spinoza rejette complètement l’idée selon laquelle le rapport entre Dieu et sa création puisse être conçu sous le mode de la cause finale et élabore, à l’ombre de cette critique, une conception de la causalité divine selon laquelle la production du monde est le résultat nécessaire de l’essence de Dieu. Ensuite, notre mémoire se penche sur le concept de conatus qui se situe à l’intersection de la philosophie naturelle et de l’ontologie. Nous explorons, selon trois hypothèses convoquées tour à tour pour comprendre son fonctionnement, la possibilité de dynamiques téléologiques dans la nature malgré la critique de l’Appendice. Finalement, la dernière partie de notre mémoire tente de faire la lumière sur l’articulation entre, d’une part, la philosophie naturelle et l’ontologie de Spinoza et, d’autre part, sa philosophie pratique. Nous démontrons ainsi l’utilité de faire appel aux causes finales pour expliquer sa conception de la psychologie humaine et pour rendre compte de la dernière station de son éthique, à savoir la beatitudo. De cette façon, nous entendons reconstruire le rapport qu’entretiennent les différents volets de la philosophie spinoziste avec la question des causes finales. / This paper examines the theme of the final causes in Spinoza’s Ethics (1677). Using a quadripartite classification of the types of discourse on the final causes, we define theological-metaphysical finalism as the main philosophical target of Spinoza’s critics. Radicalizing the epistemological Cartesian postulate according to which the divine will cannot serve as an explanatory principle for natural phenomena, Spinoza completely rejects the idea that the relationship between God and his creation can be conceived under the mode of the final cause and elaborates, in the shadow of this criticism, a conception of divine causality that presents the production of the world as a necessary result of God’s essence. Then, we briefly look at the concept of conatus, which is at the intersection of natural philosophy and ontology. We explore, according to three hypotheses, the possibility of teleological dynamics in nature. Finaly, the last part of our thesis tries to shed light on the articulation between, on the one hand, Spinoza’s natural philosophy and ontology and, on the other hand, his practical philosophy. We thus demonstrate the usefulness of using the final causes to explain human psychology and to account for the last station of the spinozist ethics, the beatitudo.

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Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Intelligent Design (ID) Bewegung auf Basis der Luhmannschen Systemtheorie. Innerhalb dieser theoretischen Rahmung werden eine Einordnung und Positionsbestimmung der Bewegung, die ihrer Selbstbeschreibung nach wissenschaftlich operiert, vorgenommen. Die Wurzeln der Bewegung finden sich in der historischen Ausgangslage protestantischer Konfessionen. Aufgrund ihres Glaubens verfolgt, emigrierten viele Christen aus Europa in die 'neue Welt'. Die evolutionstheoretischen Erkenntnisse des 19. Jahrhunderts, insbesondere von Charles Darwin, hatten auch für das theologische Selbstverständnis dieser christlichen Gruppierungen weitreichende Folgen. Diesen wird entlang der Positionierung zum Kreationismus bis hin zum modernen politischen Aktivismus der Evangelikalen nachgegangen. Der systemtheoretische Ansatz leitet die Betrachtung der komplexen Kopplungen der ID-Bewegung zwischen verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Teilsystemen an. Insbesondere wird die Beziehung zur Wissenschaft behandelt, mit Fokus auf das organisationale Zentrum der Bewegung, das Discovery Institute. Neben der politischen Arbeit wird der nach US-Recht „steuerrechtlich gemeinnützigen“ Stellung der Organisation besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Politisches Agieren und wirtschaftliche Aspekte lenken den Blick schließlich auf die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der ID-Bewegung und deren massenmedialen Auftritt. Die vorgebliche Wissenschaftlichkeit der Bewegung endet im Versuch das gegenwärtige System der Wissenschaft durch religiös-normative Setzungen zu regulieren. Das Ziel wird dabei mit der Gegenrepräsentation in der Gesellschaft, als soziale Bewegung, verfolgt.