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The main purpose of this master thesis is to examine the concept of populism in the post- Gutenberg era. The research stems from a premise that the evolution of the political milieu and change of the media landscape implies a need for a different approach to analyzing populism. The decline of traditional political parties, the disappearance of political cleavages, and the personalization of politics precipitate the need to re-evaluate the debate about the right definition of populism. Based on a comparative case study of two leaders - Andrej Babiš and Donald Trump, this thesis examines how various theories of populism explain their behavior and tries to determine the most suitable option. Three definitions of populism are studied - populism as an ideology, populism as a discourse, and populism as a political style. While comparing political programs, discourse, and marketing strategies of both candidates, this thesis offers a complex insight into political campaigning on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time, this research discusses the relationship between the concept of populism and personalized politics. These two concepts form a personalized leadership where the combination of populism and personality traits of the leader might influence the political programs, discourse, and marketing...

Following thesis investigates the intertwined relationship between the rise of gang-violenceand right-wing populist parties, more specifically the True Finns and the Sweden Democrats. The purpose of this essay being, how the True Finns and the Sweden Democrats usegang-violence to legitimize xenophobia. Analysis are done by using a CDA-approach, the threedimensional model by Norman Fairclough. Materials used in this discourse analysis are material from the parliament, material from the parties websites and public media prior to the general elections in 2022 and 2023. The theoretical tools for analyses in this thesis rely oncombined theories from previous studies in Trygghet as issue ownership and discourses used by the Swedish Democrats and True Finns to legitimize their ideological standpoints. Through combining the theoretical framework and Fairclough’s threedimensional analysis,the empirical findings were analyzed to find which discourses are used when referring to gang violence to legitimize xenophobia. Main results of the analysis found that the parties use similar discourses when talking about gang violence, related to safety, a promised fullness to come and a feared doomsday to legitimize xenophobia. However there were also some culturally bound differences in how the parties legitimized xenophobia when discussing gangviolence. The main conclusion of the study was that some of the findings matched the theoretical framework, while some did not.

In recent studies of Scandinavian Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties, a convergence of their socioeconomic and sociocultural politics have been emphasized. This evidence points towards them having tempered their more radical agenda as they have moved towards the mainstream. But the description of the Sweden Democrats, the Progress Party and the Danish People’s Party as a homogenous entity doesn’t fit their own perception. Across different channels, like printed media and debates, the Scandinavian parties have made clear statements about how they should not be equated with one another. Through comparative method this study wants to shed light on the Scandinavian PRR-parties dividing and uniting ideological features to discuss if they should be described as homogenous - or can we find divergence? Drawing on Cas Muddes theory of populism as a thin ideology, together with Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism as an ‘imagined community’, this study demonstrates how we can cover the full range of ideas that PRR-parties represent, and thereby present a more nuanced description of them.

Much has been written in the past few decades about populism that most scholars approaching the subject feel obliged to begin by justifying their writing of yet another text. In this paper, the situation is somewhat different: whilst our analytical gaze is cast upon populism (and fascism, as a precursor or closely related social phenomenon), this is only indirectly the case. Our primary focus is, instead, on the relationship that populism has with religion and secularity. Or, more precisely, the relationships of diverse populisms with different religiosities and various secularities. While the religious and the secular are mentioned in numerous studies about populism, these topics have rarely been adequately elaborated. Even when they are discussed, they are treated only in a marginal way. The purpose of this work is, therefore, to highlight the complex and multi-faceted way that populisms in Europe and Latin America have related to religion and religiosity. A second, parallel objective of this work is to reflect on the particular relationships populism establishes with different understandings of the secular, specifically within the political sphere, i.e. ‘political secularity.’ Following the differentiation paradigm, another term one might see used for this is ‘laicity’ (laïcité in French, laicidad in Spanish). I understand this to refer specifically to the secularisation of the state and the areas of society which come under its control.

The government in Poland led by the Law and Justice party (PiS) and characterized by its anti-genderism and right-wing populist politics, is framing its opposition to the Istanbul Convention in human rights language. This leads to a puzzling occurrence of the women’s rights Convention being opposed with rights rhetoric. This puzzle was addressed in the thesis by investigating how the PiS-led government is mimicking human rights rhetoric in their opposition to the Convention. That was done in accordance with the ‘Rights as Weapons’ theory, developed by Bob Clifford. Findings revealed that the PiS-led government in their right rhetoric denies the necessity, effectiveness, and apoliticality of the Convention, invokes fears, presents Polish society as victims of 'gender ideology,' and puts forward opposing rights to those enshrined in the Convention. Moreover, their rights rhetoric heavily relies on fear, misinformation, and misinterpretation of the Convention.

[pt] O período brasileiro 1946-1964 foi tradicionalmente denominado pela literatura brasileira como um período populista, com versões que desqualificam a primeira experiência democrática do país e que foram fortemente internalizadas na sociedade. Nesta pesquisa, o objetivo foi analisar a hipótese formulada no sentido de que a crítica da ideia de populismo é uma condição para se pensar a primeira experiência democrática brasileira, apresentando uma reflexão crítica da literatura sobre o que se chamou de populismo no Brasil. A metodologia adotada foi a pesquisa bibliográfica, por meio da revisão de literatura. Realizou-se um mapeamento da trajetória social e acadêmica do conceito de populismo, apresentando as formulações de alguns historiadores que participaram da problematização do uso desse conceito nesse período histórico do país. O resultado encontrado foi que o paradigma do populismo está empenhado em uma literatura negativa do período, pois, abandonando-se a chave negativa do populismo, foram encontrados elementos caracterizadores de um processo democrático, como exemplo, sujeitos sociais que foram capazes de tomar iniciativas próprias; houve criação de partidos com ampla consistência social, além da incorporação inédita da população no processo político. Concluiu-se que no período analisado ocorreu a vigência de um processo democrático com os seus limites e contradições. A democracia estava sendo construída, mas foi, prematuramente, interrompida pelo golpe militar. / [en] The Brazilian period 1946-1964 was traditionally called by Brazilian literature as a populist period, with versions that discredit the country s first democratic experience and that were strongly internalized in society. In this research, the objective was to analyze the hypothesis formulated in the sense that the critique of the idea of populism is a condition for thinking about the first Brazilian democratic experience, presenting a critical reflection of the literature on what was called populism in Brazil. The methodology adopted was bibliographic research, through literature review. A mapping of the social and academic trajectory of the concept of populism was carried out, presenting the formulations of some historians who participated in the problematization of the use of this concept in this historical period of the country. The result found was that the paradigm of populism is committed to a negative literature of the period, because, abandoning the negative key of populism, characterizing elements of a democratic process were found, as an example, social subjects who were able to take their own initiatives; there was the creation of parties with broad social consistency, in addition to the unprecedented incorporation of the population into the political process. It was concluded that in the analyzed period there was a democratic process with its limits and contradictions. Democracy was being built, but it was prematurely interrupted by the military coup.

[pt] O trabalho busca investigar a dimensão emocional do negacionismo científico através do caso do movimento terraplanista – grupo de pessoas que acredita na teoria de que o planeta Terra na verdade é um disco plano, e o modelo heliocêntrico é uma conspiração de organizações científicas e governamentais – e as imbricações deste com o populismo de direita estadunidense. Utilizando-se de uma abordagem afetiva inspirada pelos trabalhos de Sara Ahmed e Ty Solomon, o trabalho pretende observar como a crença em conspirações como a da Terra Plana possui uma dimensão emocional, que opera em linhas cruzadas aos afetos que circulam ao redor do populismo de direita contemporâneo, especialmente aquele liderado por Donald Trump nos Estados Unidos. Assim, o trabalho observa as imbricações entre o negacionismo científico e o populismo de direita, e as relações discursivas e emocionais entre ambos os grupos, de forma a levantar um debate sobre o caráter inerentemente político da ciência, sobre as formas pelas quais a verdade é manipulada no cenário político atual, e sobre como as emoções são cruciais para entender a aderência de sujeitos a qualquer movimento ou discurso político. / [en] This work seeks to investigate the emotional dimension of science denial through the case of the Flat Earth movement – a group of people who believe in a theory where the planet Earth is actually a flat disk, and the heliocentric model is a conspiracy orchestrated by scientific and governmental organizations – and the imbrications of this movement with American right-wing populism. By taking an affective approach inspired by the works of Sara Ahmed and Ty Solomon, the dissertation seeks to observe how the belief in conspiracies like Flat Earth has an emotional dimension to it, which crosses the same emotional paths as those of the affects that circulate around contemporary right-wing populism, especially the branch of it spearheaded by Donald Trump in the United States. Therefore, the work observes the interweaving between science denial and right-wing populism, and the discursive and emotional relations that these groups share, as to raise questions and discussions about the inherently political character of science, about the ways in which truth is manipulated in our current political spaces, and about how emotions are crucial to understand subjects adherence to any political movement or discourse.