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Liability Rules: An Economic Taxonomy / Reglas de responsabilidad: Una taxonomía económicaDari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Parisi, Francesco 12 April 2018 (has links)
The analysis of tort law is one of the most well-developed applications of economic methodology in the study of law. in this essay, we provide an overview of the economic approach to tort law, analyzing the effects of liability rules on care incentives. We catalogue a variety of possible tort regimes, systematically breaking down possible assignments of liability in terms of primary and secondary rules, and describe how their permutations distribute the costs of accidents (and the concomitant incentives to exercise precautionary care). We further consider what factual circumstances may render one tort regime preferable to another from the perspective of policymakers. / El análisis de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual ha sido unade las aplicaciones más y mejor desarrolladas aplicaciones de la metodología económica en el estudio del Derecho. e n el presente ensayo, ofrecemos un vistazo general de la aproximación económica a la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, analizando los efectos de las reglas de responsabilidad en los incentivos de precaución. Catalogamos una variedad de regímenes de responsabilidad, desglosando sistemáticamente las posibles asignaciones de responsabilidad en términos de reglas primarias y secundarias; asi como describimos como sus transformaciones distribuyen los costos de los accidentes (y los incentivos concomitantes para tomar las medidas precautorias). Consideramos luego que circunstancias empíricas o facticas pueden determinar que un régimen de responsabilidad extracontractual sea preferido sobre otro desde la perspectiva del legislador.
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L’Union européenne et la Suisse : recherches sur l’institutionnalisation d’une relation entre l’UE et un État tiers / Switzerland and the European Union : research on the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third countryMazille, Clémentine 05 December 2014 (has links)
La relation entre l’Union européenne et la Suisse est celle d’une ambivalenceentre l’intériorité et l’extériorité de la Suisse par rapport à l’Union européenne, tension querend prégnant l’effet de l’écoulement du temps. Une analyse de l’interaction entre lesubjectivisme et l’objectivisme caractérisant cette relation permet d’expliquer juridiquementcette tension, et de qualifier le développement de la relation Suisse-UE. Il existe entrel’Union européenne et la Suisse un phénomène d’objectivisation du droit, profondément liéà l’utilisation du droit de l’Union européenne pour fonder les règles applicables. Cephénomène se prolonge au niveau institutionnel : les négociations en cours visent àrenforcer l’homogénéité du droit de la relation Suisse-UE sur le droit de l’UE. Pourtant, cephénomène d’objectivisation se heurte à certaines limites : l’ensemble formé entre l’Unioneuropéenne et la Suisse ne peut prétendre qu’à un développement intrinsèquement limité,parce qu’il ne bénéficie pas d’une « idée d’oeuvre » propre, mais emprunte celle del’Union européenne. La tension résultant entre le maintien dans le temps d’un phénomèned’objectivisation et les limites inhérentes de l’objectivité possible, semble alors être lamanifestation de la liberté politique, qui se pose dans un ensemble qui se construit, sanspouvoir se déployer dans la mesure du commun. / The relationship between Switzerland and the European Union can bedescribed as a tension between the interiority and the exteriority of the former to the latter.This ambivalence is emphasised by the effect of the passage of time. The interactionbetween objectivism and subjectivism can explain both the legal analysis of this tension asthe evolution of the relationship. One can point to the existence of a legal objectivizationphenomenon linked to the use of European Union law in order to determine the applicablelaw between the two parties. This phenomenon extends to the institutional part of therelationship as well: the ongoing negotiations are to strengthen the homogeneity of the lawapplied in the EU-Switzerland relationship by aligning it on European Union law. However,the evolution of this objectivization phenomenon is limited. The evolution of thegroup/ensemble formed by the European Union and Switzerland has an innate boundaryas it is lacking its own “idée d’oeuvre”, thus following that of the European Union. Thetension between the ongoing objectivization phenomenon and its innate limits seems toreflect the issue of political liberty. As the group/ensemble is still evolving and raisespolitically related issues, political liberty cannot unfold.
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La codification du droit de la responsabilité des organisations internationales : étude des travaux de la Commission du droit international relatifs au projet d’articles sur la responsabilité des organisations internationales / Codification of the law of responsibility of international organizations : study of the work of the International Law Commission on the draft articles on responsibility of international organizationsAlata, Ayham 08 December 2014 (has links)
Enfin, le droit international dispose d’un ensemble de règles relatives à la responsabilité des organisations internationales pour fait internationalement illicite. Après 10 ans de travail, la Commission du droit international est parvenue, en 2011, à élaborer un projet d'articles codifiant les règles en la matière. La tâche était pourtant délicate : assujettir ces entités dont la nature et le fonctionnement sont différents des Etats, à un ensemble de règles unique dans le domaine de la responsabilité internationale. L’objet de cette étude porte sur l’œuvre de codification effectuée par la Commission dans le projet d’articles. Il s’agit plus précisément d’analyser les techniques de codification utilisées par la Commission dans l’élaboration des règles applicables : s’agit-il d’une codification stricto sensu de la pratique ou bien de l’élaboration de nouvelles règles relevant du « développement progressif » du droit international ? La réponse apportée à cette question suppose préalablement de définir les sources de la codification en ce qui concerne chacune des dispositions du projet d’articles, en se demandant si elle concrétise une pratique bien établie des organisations internationales, ou au contraire une transposition des règles du projet d’articles sur la responsabilité de l’Etat, adaptées aux particularités des organisations internationales. L’autorité du projet d’articles ne semble pas, à l’heure actuelle, faire l’unanimité, et dans ce contexte, la présente étude portant sur le rapport entre codification et développement progressif dans l’œuvre de codification de la CDI permet d’apprécier l’autorité substantielle propre à chacune des dispositions du projet d’articles. D’autant qu’on ne sait absolument pas si une convention de codification sera adoptée, qui pourra ériger les dispositions du projet d’articles en normes juridiquement obligatoires. / The international law has finally a set of rules on the responsibility of the international organizations for internationally wrongful acts. After 10 years of work, the International Law Commission was able in 2011 to elaborate a draft articles codifying the rules on the matter. However the task was difficult: subject these entities, whose nature and functioning is different from States to a single set of rules in the field of international responsibility. The purpose of this study focuses on the work of codification made by the Commission in the draft articles. This is specifically to analyze the techniques of codification used by the Commission in the elaboration of the applicable rules: is it a codification sticto sensu of the practice or a creation of new rules under the "progressive development" of the international law? The answer to this question presupposes to define the sources of codification in each of the provisions of the draft articles concerned, wondering if it embodies a well-established practice of international organizations, or rather a transposition of the rules of the draft articles on States responsibility, adapted to the features of international organizations. At present the authority of the draft articles does not seem to have unanimity, and in this context, the present study on the relation between codification and progressive development in the codification work of ILC can appreciate the substantial own authority of each provisions of the draft articles. Especially that no one knows if a codification convention will be adopted, which will set the provisions of the draft articles up as legally binding norms.
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A Pragmatic Standard of Legal ValidityTyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links)
American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law.
These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism.
In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method.
This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.
The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent.
The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.
Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.
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