Los estudios de esta tesis doctoral muestran la relación estrecha que existe en la Fenomenología del Espíritu entre el concepto hegeliano de experiencia, su concepción del absoluto y el impacto que tiene en ambos el desafío del escepticismo. La tesis general sostenida es que la confrontación de Hegel con el escepticismo es la clave de lectura más importante para la comprensión de la Introducción a la Fenomenología y por lo tanto del programa original de la obra. Más específicamente, se sostiene que la Introducción a la <i>Fenomenología del Espíritu</i> se encuentra filosóficamente constituida en atenta referencia a las objeciones que Gottlob Schulze había dirigido al incipiente idealismo de Jena en sus escritos de 1803 (<i>Aforismos sobre lo Absoluto</i>) y de 1805 (<i>Los momentos principales del modo escéptico de pensar acerca del conocimiento humano</i>). Se afirma aquí que Hegel revalorizó el escepticismo de Schulze, a tal punto que: a) los desafíos de Schulze son la principal provocación para un cambio de rumbo en los planes filosóficos de Hegel, esto es, el de comenzar por el problema del conocimiento antes de presentar su <i>Lógica</i>; b) las objeciones de Schulze constituyen los motivos decisivos que generan la ruptura entre Schelling y Hegel; c) a raíz de tales objeciones, Hegel relativiza en la Fenomenología la distinción tajante que había establecido entre antiguo y nuevo escepticismo en su escrito de 1802 (<i>Relación del escepticismo con la filosofía</i>); d) Hegel no sólo considera las objeciones del escéptico sino que se apropia y reformula algunas de sus ideas.En síntesis: los estudios que se exponen en esta tesis reconstruyen una polémica entre Hegel y Schulze. Esta reconstrucción puede aclarar la teoría de la experiencia que se encuentra en el texto de la Introducción a la <i>Fenomenología</i>. En cuanto al orden de la exposición, este trabajo doctoral comienza con una presentación de la concepción de Kant acerca de la experiencia, del límite del conocimiento humano y del absoluto, tal como aparecen en la <i>Crítica de la Razón Pura</i>, mostrando cómo ya en aquella obra el escepticismo juega un rol determinante (capítulo 1). A continuación, se exponen las ideas y los argumentos fundamentales del escrito hegeliano de 1802 sobre el escepticismo (capítulo 2). En el tercer capítulo se muestra la incertidumbre que tuvieron los lectores académicos, entre ellos Schulze, acerca de la autoría de la <i>Revista Crítica de Filosofía</i>, la cual era editada por Schelling y Hegel sin especificar la autoría de cada artículo, y en la que había sido publicado el escrito de Hegel. A esta situación se debe -según la presente tesis- que Schulze haya dirigido sus críticas a Schelling y no a Hegel. En los capítulos cuarto y quinto se exponen las tesis fundamentales que Schulze sostiene en los escritos mencionados de 1803 y 1805. El capítulo central, el sexto, consiste en un comentario de toda la Introducción a la <i>Fenomenología</i> a la luz del debate velado con Schulze y en atención particular al concepto hegeliano de experiencia. El último capítulo examina a grandes rasgos, a partir de lo demostrado, la concepción de Hegel sobre el escepticismo y sobre el concepto de experiencia en el resto de la <i>Fenomenología del Espíritu</i>. Se distingue un escepticismo estructural, que forma parte de la dinámica de la experiencia, de un escepticismo histórico que constituye una figura puntual del itinerario de la experiencia que hace la conciencia. En el mismo capítulo se considera el destino que tuvo el concepto de experiencia en el resto de la obra de Hegel y se concluye que sigue de cerca el destino de la Fenomenología y se indagan los motivos. También se examina sucintamente el papel del escepticismo en la <i>Ciencia de la Lógica</i> y en las <i>Lecciones de Historia de la Filosofía</i>. En las Conclusiones Finales de este trabajo doctoral se retoman en forma comparada y sintética las concepciones de Kant, de Schulze y de Hegel acerca de la experiencia, el límite, el absoluto y la libertad. / This doctoral work shows the strained relationship existing in Phenomenology of Spirit between the Hegelian concept of experience, his conception of the Absolute and the impact on both of the challenge of Scepticism. The thesis broadly maintains that Hegel's confrontation with Scepticism is the major key to understanding the Introduction to Phenomenology and, for that matter, the original scheme of the work. More specifically, it maintains that the Introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit finds itself philosophically based on specific references to the objections that Gottlob Schulze had directed toward the early idealism of Jena in his work of 1803 (Aphorisms about the Absolute) and of 1805 (The principal moments of the sceptic mode of thinking about human knowledge). This thesis strongly suggests that Hegel, revalued the scepticism of Schulze, to such a point that: a) the challenges of Schulze are the principal motivation for a change of direction in the philosophical stages of Hegel, suggesting that he began with the problem of knowledge before presenting his Logic; b) the objections of Schulze constitute the main reasons generating the rupture between Schelling and Hegel; c) at the root of such objections, Hegel revises in Phenomenology the clear cut distinction that he had established between ancient and new scepticism in his work of 1802 (On the relationship of scepticism to philosophy) ; d) Hegel not only considers the objections to scepticism but also he appropriates and reformulates some of Schulze's ideas. In synthesis: this thesis attempts to reconstruct a polemic between Hegel and Schulze. This reconstruction may clarify the theory of experience found in the Introduction to Phenomenology. This doctoral work is presented in the following order: it begins with an overview of Kant's notion of experience, from the limit of human knowledge and the absolute, which appears in the Critique of Pure Reason, showing how, already present in that work, Scepticism plays a determining role (Chapter One). Following this, the next chapter demonstrates the ideas and fundamental arguments of Hegelian writing from 1802 about Scepticism (Chapter Two). The third chapter discusses the uncertainty that scholars had, among them Schulze, about the authorship of the Critical Journal of Philosophy, which, even though edited by Schelling and Hegel, and containing the latter's writings, had no specific authorship ascribed to its contents. It was owing to this situation - argues this thesis - that Schulze would have directed his criticisms to Schelling and not to Hegel. Chapters Four and Five demonstrate the fundamental theses that Schulze sustained in his aforementioned work of 1803 and 1805. The central Chapter Six consists of a commentary on the Introduction to Phenomenology in the light of this veiled debate with Schulze, paying special attention to the Hegelian concept of experience. The last chapter outlines, from what has been shown, Hegel's ideas about Scepticism and the notion of experience in the rest of Phenomenology of Spirit. A structural scepticism, that forms part of the dynamic of experience, is here distinguished, from an historical scepticism that constitutes an identifiable component of the experience that makes the conscience. The same chapter considers the aim of the concept of experience in the rest of Hegel's works, and concludes that it closely follows the aim in Phenomenology, citing the reasons for this. Also explored, succinctly, is the role of Scepticism in Science of Logic, and Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The Final Conclusions of this doctoral work synthesise and compare the views of Kant, Schulze, and Hegel, on experience, the limit, the Absolute, and freedom.

La tesis analiza dos objeciones corrientes a la interpretación del problema de las reglas por el Wittgenstein de Kripke: el PROBLEMA DE LA OBJETIVIDAD DE LA REGLA, ¿puede un individuo estar acertado en contra de la opinión comunitaria consensuada?; y el PROBLEMA DE LAS RELACIONES INTERNAS entre reglas y casos, presuntamente violentada por el rol de la noción de acuerdo en la misma. La estrategia general de la tesis es examinar las vías de ataque al lenguaje privado (LP) previas a la de Kripke. El contraste con las mismas permite conceptualizar adecuadamente la propuesta de Kripke, para mostrar que las objeciones mencionadas no se le aplican. En el marco de la tesis, comprendemos por LP a cualquier tesis que sostenga que las condiciones de significatividad del lenguaje pueden ser provistas por estados mentales subjetivos, p.e. creencias, de ahí el solapamiento de la tesis del lenguaje privado con el escepticismo epistemológico y con posiciones solipsistas, y la convicción de que la refutación del LP acarrea la ruina del escepticismo epistemológico. Hay dos versiones clásicas del argumento del LP. Las versiones epistemológicas (Malcom, Fogelin son los representantes que examinamos) derivan la imposibilidad del LP de la imposibilidad de establecer la verdad/corrección de un uso en el contexto de privacidad. La crítica a estas versiones (Ayer, thomson) muestra un círculo justificatorio entre oraciones subjetivas y objetivas. Las versiones semánticas (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) intentan evitar el círculo, elucidando las presuposiciones que le subyacen. Esta respuesta no es satisfactoria ya que o bien regenera el círculo en un nuevo nivel, o bien no logran derrocar al círculo de la justificación. Con Stroud identificamos el fallo común de estas estrategias en el hecho de que en su intento de derrotar al escéptico-privatista, requieren o bien una PREMISA FÁCTICA que indica que conocemos, o bien la especificación del conocimiento como una NOTA DEFINICIONAL de los criterios/condiciones de significatividad que el argumento trascendental elucida en la pregunta del escéptico. Kripke impone un cambio de rumbo en el argumento, al plantear el desafío como una forma de ESCEPTICISMO SEMÁNTICO ONTOLÓGICO, el cual ya no se basa en las limitaciones cognitivas de la privacidad, sino justamente en las presuntas ventajas que presenta. El desafío de Kripke pregunta por las razones que podemos aportar para sostener que no ha ocurrido un cambio en el uso, lo cual equivale a preguntar ¿cómo sabes que tu uso actual CORRESPONDE con tu intención/significado previo? De la imposibilidad de responder a la cuestión clave del realismo clásico (correspondencia) en el caso del significado, Kripke concluye que no puede haber condiciones de verdad para las oraciones semánticas. Esto motiva una paradoja escéptica y una SOLUCIÓN ESCÉPTICA de la paradoja en términos de condiciones de aseverabilidad. Tener en cuenta el abandono de las condiciones de verdad es la clave para responder al problema de la objetividad, mientras que la forma del desafío y el funcionamiento de la concordancia en los juicios como base de atribución, es la clave para la solución del problema de las relaciones internas. / This dissertation analyses two objections currently raised against Kripke's Wittgenstein interpretation of rule-following considerations: The problem of OBJECTIVITY OF THE RULE: Can a single individual be right against communal assent?; and the problem of INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. The general strategy of the thesis is to examine different ways of attacking private language (PL) previous to Kripke's one. through contrast we are able to appreciate clearly the nature of Kripke's proposal, showing that mentioned objections cannot be applied to him. In the framework of this dissertation we understand PL as every theses that claim that conditions of meaning of language can be provided by subjective mental states exclusively, believes for instance, which explains usual association between PL and epistemological scepticism, and conviction that refutation of PL is as well a refutation of epistemological scepticism. There are two main versions of argument against PL. Epistemological versions (Malcolm, Fogelin, are considered) derive impossibility of PL from impossibility to establish corection/truth of a use or application of a given sign. Criticism to this version (Ayer, Thomson) indicates that argument concludes in a justificational circle between subjective and objective sentences. Semantical versions (Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat) try to avoid this circle elucidating its presuppositions, which are conditions of meaning of language allegedly neglected by privatist. This answer is no satisfactory, beacuse it raises the circle in a new, semantical level, or it doesn't work properly against justificational circle. with Stroud we indentify the common mistake of both strategies as consisting in proposals to beat the sceptic/privatist that requires either a FACTUAL PREMISE of to specify knowledge as part of the meaning of criterion conditions of significance elucidated in the questions of the sceptic or the claims of the privatist. Kripke imposes a change of direction in the argument because he poses a challenge with the form of a ONTOLOGICAL SEMANTICAL SCEPTICISM, which is not based on limitations of privacy but, quite on the contrary, is grounded in the supposed advantages it offers. Kripke's Wittgenstein challenge asks for reasons we can have to be sure that we are not now committing a mistake consisting in a change of use. This is equivalent to ask: how do you now that your actual use CORRESPONDS with your previous intention or intention? From impossibility of answering this question concerning the key question of classical realism (correspondence) in the case of meaning (conceived as a special setting: idealised epistemic conditions) Kripke concludes that there cannot be truth conditions for semantical sentences. This motivates as sceptical paradox and a SCEPTICAL SOLUTION to it, in terms of assertability conditions. I largue that in rejection of truth conditions we have the key to solve the problem the objectivity of the rule, while the special from of the challenge and particular functioning of agreement in judgements in sceptical solution, as ground of attribution, is the key to solve the problem of internal relationships.

Une nouvelle tentative pour faire face au défi sceptique est menée depuis une quarantaine d’années. Cette tentative repose sur une théorie de la connaissance centrée sur la notion d’alternatives pertinentes. La thèse se propose de montrer les faiblesses de cette théorie, même lorsqu’elle s’appuie sur l’appareillage des mondes possibles, et suggère que le scepticisme demeure la meilleure position épistémologique. Dans le premier chapitre on passe en revue une série de difficultés liées au sujet des alternatives pertinentes et l'on essaye d'argumenter en faveur de l'idée qu'il n'y a peut-être pas, finalement, de moyens en quelque sorte objectifs pour établir quelles sont les alternatives pertinentes relativement à une situation quelconque. À partir du deuxième chapitre, il est procédé à une analyse critique des tentatives de certains auteurs qui se sont servis, pour élaborer leurs propres conceptions bien précises, du langage des mondes possibles. Dans le deuxième chapitre, l'on se concentre surtout sur la question du degré de proximité qu'un monde possible donné doit exhiber pour être considéré comme suffisamment proche du monde actuel et l'on essaye de montrer qu'il n’est probablement pas possible de tracer d'une manière non arbitraire une ligne de démarcation entre ces mondes possibles qu’on peut ignorer et ceux qu’on ne peut ignorer dans nos attributions de connaissance. Dans le troisième chapitre, l'on se concentre surtout sur la question des critères qui devraient guider nos évaluations de proximité et l'on essaye de montrer le caractère discutable de n'importe quelle règle visant à établir quels seraient ces critères-là. / Over the last forty years, a new attempt to answer to the skeptic challenge has been proposed. This attempt is based on a theory of knowledge, which is grounded on the notion of relevant alternative. My dissertation aims to show the problems of such a theory, even when formulated in terms of possible worlds, and suggests that in the end skepticism remains the best epistemological option. In the first chapter, I will offer a discussion of the issue of relevant alternatives, and I will argue in favor of the idea that perhaps there are no objective criteria to establish which are the relevant alternatives with respect to a certain given situation. In the second chapter, I will propose a critical analysis of the attempts of some philosophers to formulate their own proposals in the language of possible worlds. In particular, I will focus on the issue of the proximity degree that a certain possible world must have in order to be considered as sufficiently closed to the real world, and I will try to show that perhaps it is not possible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between those possible worlds that we can ignore and those that we must take into account in our attribution of knowledge. In the third chapter, I will critically discuss the criteria that should guide our evaluations about proximity, and I will show the problematic aspects of any rule aimed to establish which these criteria in effect should be.

This thesis is an exploration of the general public's use and reflections on electronic identification (e-ID) tokens, in Sweden. Based on the researcher’s own experiences, the aim was to understand how the current e-ID scheme was enabling or obstructing the interaction with public agencies, etcetera. The thesis has a qualitative research design and is situated within the interpretivist paradigm. The data was collected through semi-structured interviews and the analysis of three documents, published by three different public agencies in Sweden. The data was analyzed through the vehicle of thematic analysis, which engendered four themes. These were 1. e-ID definitions, 2. the personal identity number as enabler and obstruction, 3. banks as the major e-ID issuer in Sweden and 4. security, skepticism and trust. The findings indicated that the e-ID was associated with convenience and security risks, which were brought up by the interviewees as well as the analyzed public reports. Furthermore, one of the public reports argued that the e-ID should be separated from the notion of having authority, through re- baptizing the Swedish term for e-ID, in Swedish 'e-legitimation' to electronic identity document ('elektronisk identitetshandling' in Swedish).

Submitted by Cyntia Uehara (cyntia_uehara@hotmail.com) on 2017-08-18T12:49:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 20170817DissertacaoMestrado_CyntiaUehara.pdf: 1589421 bytes, checksum: a022fcd5fcac3b989f39359bfd1f9b1c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-08-18T12:55:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 20170817DissertacaoMestrado_CyntiaUehara.pdf: 1589421 bytes, checksum: a022fcd5fcac3b989f39359bfd1f9b1c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-18T14:19:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 20170817DissertacaoMestrado_CyntiaUehara.pdf: 1589421 bytes, checksum: a022fcd5fcac3b989f39359bfd1f9b1c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-20 / Brands that promote actions focused on social issues hope to convey to consumers their position on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in order to improve their evaluation with this public. However, the use of these actions may not cause the desired effect, either by the consumer's distrust of such activities or by the individual's lack of sensitivity to the subject. The effect of these actions may suffer interference from other aspects related to consumer profile and knowledge about products and brands, for example. In this way, this study investigated by a factorial experiment between subjects the effect of the Cause Related Marketing (CRM) the reaction of the consumers regarding the perceived image of the brand, the attitude towards the brand and the intention to purchase the brand that adopts CRM. Were tested brands already on the market of products considered harmful to health (soft drinks) by the World Health Organization and products considered as beneficial to health (mineral water) supporting the cause ‘nutritional re-education’. Familiarity with the brands, high and low, was also evaluated in the study. An experiment was conducted with 480 Brazilian consumers of both sexes, who had income above 1 minimum wage, aged between 18 and 60 years and who had attended at least high school, in order to reflect the actual buying behavior. This study also verified the relationship between consumer skepticism as well as the congruence of the social cause with the brand and the attitude, image and intention to buy. The choice of brands was based on the knowledge and frequency of use that the consumer has with these product types, which makes possible the external validity of the experiment. The data were analyzed by means of averages test and also by linear regression. The results of the experiment point out that the CRM shows greater adherence to brands with low familiarity and beneficial health products. Highly familiar brands did not show significant changes in consumer assessment and the health products of low familiar brands achieved an improvement in attitude, image and purchase intent when tied to an CRM campaign. A positive and significant relationship was also identified between skepticism and congruence in the consumer's attitude and the intention to buy the brand, however, a significant influence on the brand image was not perceived. / Marcas que promovem ações voltadas às questões sociais esperam transmitir aos consumidores seu posicionamento em relação à responsabilidade social corporativa (RSC) visando melhorar sua avaliação junto a este público. Todavia, o uso dessas ações podem não causar o efeito desejado, tanto pela desconfiança que o consumidor nutre em relação a essas atividades, quanto pela falta de sensibilidade do indivíduo a esse tema. O efeito destas ações pode sofrer interferência de outros aspectos relacionados ao perfil do consumidor e conhecimento sobre produtos e marcas, por exemplo. Desta forma, este estudo investigou por meio de um experimento fatorial entre sujeitos o efeito do Marketing Relacionado à Causa Social (MRC) na reação dos consumidores quanto à imagem percebida da marca, à atitude em relação à marca e à intenção de compra da marca que adota MRC. Foram testadas marcas já existentes no mercado de produtos considerados prejudiciais à saúde (refrigerantes) pela Organização Mundial da Saúde e de produtos tidos como benéficos à saúde (água mineral) apoiando a causa ‘reeducação alimentar’. A familiaridade com as marcas, alta e baixa, também foi avaliada no estudo. Foi conduzido experimento com 480 consumidores brasileiros de ambos os sexos, que possuíam renda acima de 1 salário mínimo, idade entre 18 e 60 anos e que tivessem cursado pelo menos o ensino médio, com o intuito de refletir o real comportamento de compra. Esse estudo verificou também a relação entre o ceticismo do consumidor bem como a congruência da causa social com a marca e a atitude, a imagem e a intenção de compra. A escolha das marcas tomou como base o conhecimento e a frequência de uso que o consumidor tem com esses tipos produtos, o que possibilita maior validade externa do experimento. Os dados foram analisados por meio de teste de médias e também por regressão linear. Os resultados do experimento apontam que o MRC apresenta maior aderência para marcas de baixa familiaridade e para produtos benéficos à saúde. Marcas de alta familiaridade não apresentaram mudanças significativas na avaliação do consumidor e os produtos prejudiciais à saúde de marcas de baixa familiaridade obtiveram uma melhora na atitude, na imagem e na intenção de compra ao ser atrelada a uma campanha de MRC. Foi identificada também uma relação positiva e significativa entre o ceticismo e a congruência na atitude do consumidor e na intenção de comprar a marca, todavia, não se percebeu uma influência significativa sobre a imagem da marca.

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-15T07:16:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Martin_LuizFernandoBarrere_D.pdf: 1287336 bytes, checksum: 3ebead21d8c89e099eda7dc86e5477f6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: Trata-se, inicialmente, de neste trabalho analisar a leitura hegeliana da filosofia cética, especificamente, o ceticismo pirrônico. Dessa maneira, será possível começar a avaliar em que medida o ceticismo é importante para a filosofia de Hegel em geral e, em particular, para a constituição de seu método dialético especulativo. Percorreremos textos, de várias fases da filosofia de Hegel, no qual o ceticismo ou é tema central ou aparece dentro de um contexto que também nos interessa, a saber, a discussão acerca do método. No que respeita a este último, objeto da segunda parte da tese, examinaremos na Ciência da Lógica os momentos onde podemos observar de modo privilegiado a constituição do método dialético hegeliano, a saber, a seção dedicada na Doutrina da Essência às determinações de reflexão e a seção intitulada Idéia Absoluta, último capítulo do livro. A partir desse estudo da Ciência da Lógica, poderemos então julgar com maior exatidão no que o método filosófico hegeliano é devedor da filosofia cética, isto é, como esse método é formulado de modo que o ceticismo seja integrado a ele. A idéia central é mostrar que não há, da parte de Hegel, uma simples refutação do ceticismo, mas antes, que o ceticismo é a filosofia, incontornável, da qual se deve partir para que a filosofia não caia vítima das aporias céticas. Essa é a via que Hegel encontra para não se tornar cético pirrônico e, ao mesmo tempo, não ser alvo da crítica cética / Abstract: First it means to analyse Hegel's reading of the skeptical philosophy, specifically pyrrhonian skepticism. Thus it will be possible to assess to what extent the skepticism is important to Hegel's philosophy in general and, in particular, for the formation of his speculative dialectical method. We will cover texts from many phases of Hegel's philosophy, in which skepticism is focus or appears within a context that also interests us, namely the discussion of the method. Regarding this last one, subject of the second part of the thesis, we examine in Science of Logic the moments where we can observe in a special way the formation of hegelian dialectical method: the section in Doctrine of Essence that is dedicated to the determinations of reflection and the section entitled Absolute Idea, the last chapter of the book. From this study of Science of Logic we can judge more accurately what the Hegelian philosophical method is liable to the skeptical philosophy, which means, how this method is formulated in a way that skepticism is a part of it. The main idea is to show that Hegel does not try a simple refutation of skepticism, more than this he shows that skepticism is the philosophy, unavoiable, which preserves the philosophy from fall victim of skepticals aporias. This is the way that Hegel finds to not become skeptical pyrrhonian and also the subject of skeptical criticism / Doutorado / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: Silvio Seno Chibeni / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T18:05:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sousa_ClaudineyJosede_D.pdf: 2248193 bytes, checksum: 2086e31340227c88d3d49873a49aee2f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Resumo: A adoção do modelo da ciência da natureza física, por parte de Hume, para a elaboração de seu projeto de uma ciência da natureza humana, permite ao autor construir um novo sistema de conhecimento, erigido sobre um fundamento inteiramente novo e seguro, mas exige, por outro lado, uma quase completa redefinição de velhos conceitos epistemológicos e uma revisão de teorias e concepções tradicionalmente aceitas em filosofia. Neste trabalho procuraremos avaliar esse audacioso empreendimento a partir do estudo da teoria humeana das crenças (mais particularmente, das crenças causais e da crença na existência dos corpos), destacando duas grandes concepções sobre a atitude do autor, a cética e a naturalista, quase sempre vistas como radicalmente diferentes e incompatíveis: i) por um lado os que tendem a enfatizar o lado negativo de sua filosofia, por entender que ele teria restringido o espaço tradicionalmente conferido à razão, como conceito normativo em filosofia, e exaltado conceitos desautorizados dessa tarefa, como hábito e imaginação (nesse grupo de autores estão, por exemplo, Thomas Reid, Thomas Hill Green e Bertrand Russell); ii) e por outro, os que realçam aspectos positivos e a subordinação da razão aos sentimentos para destacar o caráter irresistível e inevitável de nossas crenças naturais como critério para distinção e escolha entre crenças (a figura central deste segundo grupo de autores é Norman Kemp Smith). Veremos que no século XX o debate sobre a epistemologia humeana continua estimulador: John Wright, Galen Strawson e Edward Craig, são exemplos de uma tendência a conciliar as duas interpretações para uma melhor compreensão de sua epistemologia, mostrando que as duas posturas podem ser complementares ao invés de excludentes. Tendo examinado algumas das principais contribuições desse debate, posicionamos-nos em defesa da concepção segundo a qual o projeto de Hume pode ser visto como um trabalho precursor daquilo que hoje conhecemos como naturalismo epistemológico, embora, de uma forma geral, alguns autores que exploram essa perspectiva contemporânea, notadamente Quine, não reconheçam as contribuições de Hume. Acreditamos, porém, que o filósofo moderno teria fornecido, de forma pioneira, os parâmetros para uma visão científica e experimental sobre os processos e produtos cognitivos, de um modo inteiramente diferente daquele elaborado pela especulação filosófica apriorista. Sem ter que restringir a filosofia à mera extensão do fazer científico, defendemos que Hume se preocupa em preservar o caráter normativo desse empreendimento, como propuseram Kemp Smith, Louis Loeb, Michael Costa, entre outros. A base para a defesa dessa concepção estaria em sua reavaliação do estatuto epistemológico do conceito de crença que, embora seja um complemento essencial do conhecimento, contrapõe-se diretamente a este (conforme sugere Locke em seu Essay). Sendo assim, o tema central de nosso trabalho será a maneira como Hume procede a essa difícil tarefa de conciliar naturalismo e normatividade em sua teoria da crença, antecipando propostas muito conhecidas no século XX como o confiabilismo de Alvin Goldman, que analisaremos com o intuito de estabelecer pontos de contato entre o naturalismo pioneiro de Hume e a epistemologia contemporânea / Abstract: The adoption of natural science as a model for the project for a science of human nature led Hume to build a new system of knowledge, built, as he hoped, on an entirely new and secure foundation. But the implementation of this project would require an almost complete redefinition of old philosophical concepts, and a reappraisal of traditionally accepted philosophical theories. In the present work we attempt to evaluate this bold intellectual enterprise, taking as focal point Hume's theory of belief (and, more particularly, causal beliefs and belief in the existence of bodies), analyzing two major interpretative trends, the naturalistic and the skeptical, often seen as radically different and incompatible: i) To the latter belong those authors who tend to emphasize the negative side of Hume's philosophy by holding that he would have restricted the space traditionally accorded to reason as normative concept in philosophy, and that his theory of belief does not in fact have epistemological import, to the extent in which it is based on concepts such as habit and imagination (to this group belong, for instance, Thomas Reid, Thomas Hill Green and Bertrand Russell); ii) In the other, more recent interpretative trend, are those who seek to bring out the positive aspects of his theory, taking Hume's proposed subordination of reason to the sentiments as a way to highlight the inevitable and irresistible character of our natural beliefs, an not their epistemic devaluation. Norman Kemp Smith is the leading proponent of this position, taken up more recently by authors such as John Wright, Galen Strawson and Edward Craig. In fact, these authors seek to reconcile the two interpretations, by showing that the two positions can be complementary rather than exclusive. Having examined some of the major contributions of this debate, we argue that Hume's project can be seen as a pioneering work containing some central elements of the position now know as epistemological naturalism, although many of the philosophers who explore this contemporary perspective do not to acknowledge Hume's contributions. We believe, however, that in Hume we find guidelines for a scientific and experimental study of the cognitive processes and products which still retain much interest nowadays. Without reducing philosophy to a mere brach of natural science (as Quine famously proposed), Hume was, we argue, concerned to preserve the normative character of epistemology. The basis for the defense of this position is the reassessment of the epistemological status of the concept of belief. Thus, we try to show that the way in which Hume seeks to combine naturalism and normativity in his theory of belief bears resemblance to proposals such Alvin Goldman's reliabilism / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Submitted by Cristiano Amaral (cristiano.ab.castro@gmail.com) on 2013-03-29T12:07:34Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Versão Final Revisada Pós Banca.pdf: 5123662 bytes, checksum: 8f45db0b7df686fbca7c29913288d95c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2013-04-01T13:25:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Versão Final Revisada Pós Banca.pdf: 5123662 bytes, checksum: 8f45db0b7df686fbca7c29913288d95c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-04-01T13:29:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Versão Final Revisada Pós Banca.pdf: 5123662 bytes, checksum: 8f45db0b7df686fbca7c29913288d95c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-01 / The Cue Utilization Theory establishes that all products are made of multiples cues that may be seen as surrogates for the intangible attributes that make up any given product. However, the results of many years of research have yet yielded little consensus as to the impact generated by the use of such cues. This research aims to contribute to the discussion about the importance of intrinsic cues by investigating the effects that the use of product cues that confirm the product claim may have on Claim Credibility (measured through Ad Credibility), and also on consumers’ Purchase Intention and Perceived Risk toward the product. An experiment was designed to test such effects and the results suggest the effects of the use of Claim Confirming Product Cues depend on consumer’s level of awareness about such cue, and that when consumers are aware of it, Ad Credibility and Purchase Intention increase, as Perceived Risk decreases. Such results may have implications to academicians and practitioners, as well as may provide insights for future research.

The purpose of this study is to explore the current practices in corporate sustainability/CSR communications and how this trend contributes to corporate value creation. More specifically, this study looks at this subject from the angle of how companies can use corporate sustainability/CSR communications in marketing activities to attain corporate marketing objectives. To achieve the aim of this study, an examination of the current practices in corporate sustainability /CSR communications was performed through a pertinent empirical and theoretical literature review as well as a quantitative and qualitative empirical method using a survey questionnaire. The author attempted, in the same way, to illustrate how corporate sustainability/CSR communications can strengthen corporate reputation and directly enhance financial performance. For theory, two bodies of literature (corporate communications and corporate sustainability) were selected for review in terms of the degree of synergy and integration between them and their implications for this thesis. The key findings from literature review and empirical study showed that the practices of corporate social responsibility communications occurs through CSR, Triple Bottom Line (PPP) or corporate sustainability reporting, stakeholder dialogue on sustainability issues and social and environmental communication programs. Also, the auditing and assurance of CSR reporting is carried out through different measures including internal (i.e. human resources management, CSR and/or PR department) and external (i.e. business partner, consulting or risk management firm) or both measures. It was also found that sustainability has been a part of corporate culture and strategy development for a number of organizations pursuing the sustainability path for decades. Moreover, public relations activity is ranked the most effective in communicating sustainability at corporate level and has the potential to reach a wide spectrum of stakeholder audiences. However, a level of skepticism was noticed among stakeholders towards corporate sustainability/CSR communications. Nonetheless, knowing how stakeholders perceive corporate image and what they expect in return for their support is fundamental in designing effective corporate and marketing communications strategies. Stakeholders’ relations management is the bottom line for success and sustainability of the business and lies at the core of CSR practice and its reporting. Further, the growth of corporate sustainability/CSR communications has reflected the keen interest from all stakeholders; hence, it has become a topic of major importance and also, as it was found, a key factor that experts and planners in the field should capitalize on and watch in competitive marketplaces. Furthermore, having a pro-social and environmental agenda means having a sound corporate and marketing communications strategies that can build a company’s reputational standing and create sustainable competitive advantages. The trend towards injecting sustainability into corporate decisions making and strategy development has come about through what organizations have achieved in terms of value creation pertaining to reputation and financial performance enhancement. The author’s review of the literature makes an advance on extant reviews of the literature by highlighting the importance of corporate sustainability/CSR communications in marketing with respect to corporate value maximization. Overall, this thesis endeavours to present contributions, avenues and departure of journeying for further empirical research and development. / +46704352135

Cette thèse de doctorat aspire à percevoir jusqu’à quel point la dynamique agonale du XVIe siècle déclenchée par la Réforme protestante provoqua des différences irréconciliables parmi les humanistes français. L’analyse prend comme point de départ la querelle sotériologique entre Érasme et Luther de 1524, considérée comme l’exemple le plus paradigmatique de l’impossibilité de trouver une compatibilité bien entendue entre les diverses manifestations de l’enthousiasme philologique, stylistique, éthique, religieux et épistémologique des humanistes. Ses oppositions fondamentales en ce qui concerne la liberté du chrétien démontrèrent que les humanistes étaient contraints d’envisager l’élan de réforme avec prudence afin d’éviter de mettre en danger leurs propres fondements épistémologiques. Par ailleurs, l’affrontement entre ces deux hommes tellement représentatifs de la Renaissance tardive peut bien inaugurer l’étude du cas français à cause de l’influence d’Érasme sur les humanistes vassaux du Roi Très-Chrétien, mais aussi à cause de l’échec de la collatio érasmienne. Le centre de gravité historique est l’événement le plus révoltant de la France du XVIe siècle, i.e., le massacre de la Saint-Barthélemy. Le choc provoqué par la tuerie fut si définitif qu’on peut, faisant attention aux participations directes des humanistes dans la polémique confessionnelle avant et après août 1572, reconstruire le socle commun de discours dont beaucoup d’eux partageaient. Nonobstant, ces dénominateurs communs encouragèrent paradoxalement des dynamiques agonales autant qu’ils permirent la survivance d’une courante irénique marquée par la tradition sceptique qui finira par être une des marques d’identification historiographique du discours humaniste. / This Ph.D. dissertation tries to measure how the violent dynamic of the 16th century, encouraged by the Reformation provoked dissention in between French Humanists. The analysis takes the debate between Erasmus and Luther of 1524 as a point of departure, considered as the paradigmatic example of the impossibility of finding some compatibility between the different versions of the philological, stylistic, ethic, religious and epistemological enthusiasm of the Humanists. Their fundamental oppositions concerning the free will showed that the Humanists were forced to take the will of reformation with caution to avoid the harm of their own epistemological fundaments. On the other hand, the clash between these men had a very large impact in France because Erasmus was one of the main influences of the French Humanism but also because of the failure of his collatio. The center of gravity of the research is the Saint-Bartholomew Night’s Massacre because it left an impression over the humanists’ consciences that the analysis of the discourses before and after the killing may allow to recover the common basis of their discourses. This common basis encouraged violent dynamics but let paradoxically survive an irenic trend marked by the skeptic tradition, which would be one of the most characteristic signs of the historiographical readings of the humanist discourse.