L’étonnement a une place privilégiée dans la vie des idées, considéré comme l’émotion à l’origine de toutes formes de spéculations philosophiques, il est l’objet d’étude le plus adéquat pour analyser les problèmes communs du cinéma et de la philosophie : le mouvement (Thalès, Héraclite, Zénon d’Élée), la remise en question du réel (Descartes), l’accès au savoir par les sens (Platon). Par l’incarnation de « personnages conceptuels » (l’idiot, le sceptique, le jeune philosophe), le cinéma offre la possibilité d’accéder à des raisonnements philosophiques de manière empirique. Le cinéma sera ainsi considéré comme un outil pouvant mettre en scène le doute cartésien grâce à une déconstruction progressive du réel. Chaque film étudié matérialisera une étape de cette déconstruction : Three Days of the Condor de Sydney Pollack : la remise en question du réel ; Aguirre, la colère de Dieu de Werner Herzog et Bullitt de Peter Yates : le déni du réel, la filmographie de Buster Keaton (courts et longs-métrages) : la trahison des apparences, les œuvres abstraites de Stan Brakhage : la réduction du réel à un entrelacement de formes et de sensations. Cette thèse proposera une redéfinition des causes et des conditions du surgissement de l’étonnement. En effet, étant principalement lié au nouveau dans les différents traités sur l’émotion étudiés (Descartes, Darwin, Charles Le Brun, William James), le rapport entre étonnement et mémoire nécessitera un développement. Ainsi par l’intermédiaire d’une revalorisation de la mémoire affective dans la perception d’un objet étonnant, cette émotion pourra enfin être prise en compte en fonction du passé du sujet. Les différents types de reconnaissance engagés dans la vision d’un film seront analysés pour comprendre à quel moment ce phénomène passe d’un événement mineur à un événement majeur. Le cinéma pourra de cette manière être employé comme un laboratoire mémoriel. Grâce à une approche anthropologique de la première cause de l'étonnement au cinéma : "les feuilles qui bougent" c’est-à-dire le mouvement, le mythe des images vivantes sera étudié du point de vue de sa persistance à différents moments de l’histoire du cinéma du Napoléon d’Abel Gance à Young Sherlock Holmes de Barry Levinson. Ce premier principe étonnant du dispositif cinématographique donnera lieu à une inversion, 4 l’étonnement suscité par une autre vie des images cette fois insufflée par la suspension ou l’arrêt sur image. Enfin « le phénomène saturé » défini par Jean-Luc Marion comme un étonnement surplombant le champ de vision du spectateur sera divisé en une typologie des différents types de saturation au cinéma (le réel surpris, le montage cubiste, la plénitude du cadre etc.), dans le but de trouver un équivalent visuel de l'évidence (première obsession cartésienne). Le dessein de cette typologie inspirée par Descartes sera de réhabiliser les sens dans la construction du savoir / Astonishment has a privileged place in the history of philosophy, considered as the emotion behind all forms of philosophical speculation; it is the most appropriate object of study to analyze the common problems of cinema and Philosophy: movement (Thales, Heraclitus, Zeno of Elea), questioning reality (Descartes), access to knowledge through the senses (Plato). Cinema will thus be considered as a tool able to portray Cartesian doubt through a progressive deconstruction of reality. Each film studied materializes a stage of this deconstruction: Three Days of the Condor by Sydney Pollack: questioning reality Aguirre, the Wrath of God by Werner Herzog and Bullitt by Peter Yates: the denial of reality the filmography of Buster Keaton (short and feature films); the betrayal of appearances the abstract works of Stan Brakhage: the reduction of reality to an interweaving of forms and sensations. Thus, by the incarnation of « conceptual characters » (the idiot, the skeptic, the young philosopher), cinema allows us to empirically access to philosophical reasoning. This development will also involve the redefinition of the causes and conditions of astonishment. Indeed, the relationship between astonishment and memory will necessitate a further investigation into, since it is mainly linked to the new and the extraordinary in the different treatises on emotion studied (Descartes, Darwin, Charles Le Brun, William James). Thus, by means of a revaluation of the affective memory in the perception of an astonishing object, this emotion can finally be considered according to the past of the subject. The different types of recognition involved in filmic vision will be analyzed to understand when this phenomenon moves from being a minor event to a major event. In this way, cinema can be used as a memorial laboratory. Thanks to an anthropological approach to the primary cause of astonishment in the cinema: « the moving leaves » (i.e. movement), the myth of living images, will be studied through its persistence at different moments of cinema history from Abel Gance’s Napoleon to Young Sherlock Holmes by Barry Levinson. The first principle of cinematic astonishment leads us to consider its inversion, the astonishment aroused by another aspect of life of images, one dominated by the suspension or the halting of the image. Finally, the « Saturated Phenomena » (defined by Jean-Luc Marion as an astonishment overlooking the spectator's field of vision) will be divided into a typology of the different 6 types of saturation in the cinema (cubist montage, crowded frames, etc.) in order to find a visual equivalent of the evidence (the first Cartesian obsession) and to reassert the value of the senses in the construction of knowledge

L’objectif de cette thèse est de montrer que le mouvement constitue le principe fondateur de la démarche intellectuelle et poétique d’Emily Dickinson (1830-1886). Mis au service d’une pensée qui ne cessa de se remettre en question et de combattre les certitudes et les schémas (culturels, religieux…) établis, le mouvement se révèle être une arme de déstabilisation et de déconstruction critique visant à discréditer tous les systèmes de pensée et de croyances jugés autoritaires et « dogmatiques », au sens fort où l’entendaient les sceptiques anciens, avec lesquels Dickinson présente d’évidentes affinités. Mais le mouvement apparaît également comme un principe vital et un agent de construction dans les poèmes : il permet d’élaborer, par voie de réécritures subversives et de détournements subtils, une approche du monde, de la connaissance et de la foi, qui vise aussi bien à légitimer la puissance de la pensée et de l’expérience individuelles qu’à rendre compte de ce que l’incertitude, l’instabilité et le changement sont l’essence même de la pensée et de la vie. Située au croisement de la poétique, de l’épistémologie et de l’approche dite « culturelle », cette thèse se propose d’examiner les formes du mouvement présentes dans l’œuvre de Dickinson en les mettant en regard d’une scène nationale elle-même mouvementée, placée sous le signe de la rupture, de la crise et du doute, mais également portée par un élan de libération et de renouveau qui vit l’émergence de nouvelles forces (politiques, économiques, sociales, culturelles) qui entendaient valoriser et défendre la liberté et l’épanouissement individuels. / The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the fundamental poetic and intellectual principle in the work of Emily Dickinson (1830-1886) is movement. In the service of an intellect that constantly questioned and challenged the established religious and cultural frameworks, movement firstly reveals itself to be a weapon of destabilisation and critical deconstruction : indeed, it aims to discredit and overturn systems of thought and beliefs deemed authoritarian and dogmatic, the latter in the strong sense as understood by the ancient sceptics, with whom Dickinson had obvious affinities. Movement however also appears as a vital principle and a constructive agent within her work : through subversive rewritings and subtle deviations, it enables the elaboration of an approach to the world, knowledge and faith, which seeks as much to legitimise the power of individual experience and reflection, as to acknowledge that uncertainty, instability and change are the very essence of thought and of life. At the intersection of poetics, epistemology and cultural studies, this thesis thus examines the forms of movement present in Dickinson’s work, by considering them alongside a turbulent national context, itself characterized by rupture, crisis and doubt, but equally impelled by a momentum towards liberation and renewal, which saw the emergence of new forces (political, economic, social, cultural) valorising and defending the freedom and flourishing of the individual.

In recent decades in Newfoundland, a sustained interest in Christian symbols, stories, and values has been paired with increasing criticism of Christian religious institutions and agents. Newfoundlands burgeoning tradition of professional humour has reflected this changing set of relationships to Christianity. This robust young humour tradition richly reflects the ongoing pluralization and secularization of Newfoundland culture, and abundantly exemplifies humours distinctive potential as a means of addressing potentially contentious or vexing issues. Yet, surprisingly, literary criticism has almost entirely avoided the prominent stream of Newfoundland humour that addresses the islands religious legacy.<p>This project aims to begin to correct this substantial critical omission, examining points of continuity among a number of works produced over the past four decades. It focuses on the works embrace of political and/or epistemological pluralism, typically married to religious skepticism and to misgivings about conventional arrangements of religious power. Chapter One provides an historical and critical context for the project, introduces subsequent chapters, and speculates on ramifications of the pluralistic current that runs through the works in the study. Chapter Two examines religious jokes in Newfoundland joke books. It emphasizes the jokes overall tendency toward (an often ambiguous) religious conservatism, as well as the books latent pluralism regarding interdenominational relations. Chapter Three focuses on journalist and playwright Ray Guys often fierce satire of Christian religious agents and institutions. It argues that Guys satire utterly rejects the legitimacy of religious authority in the civic realm, largely on the grounds that transcendent truthfulness is often invoked as a means of justifying otherwise objectionable power. Chapter Four explores the ecumenical religious humour of columnist and memoirist Ed Smith. It focuses on Smiths playful efforts to harmonize Christian faith and practice with a measure of religious uncertainty presented as a necessary foundation for humane coexistence. Chapter Five examines Ed Kavanaghs novel The Confessions of Nipper Mooney. Primarily, it explicates and examines the novels liberal favouring of the individual moral conscience, and the symbolic association of its religiously dissident and/or marginalized protagonists with elements of the Catholic tradition. Chapter Six discusses Berni Stapletons comic play The Pope and Princess Di. The chapter emphasizes the plays presentation of symbols constant subjection to alteration and hybridization, and its cautious regard for valuable symbols (religious or otherwise) that nonetheless become destructive when viewed as sacrosanct.<p>Chapter Seven concludes the study by considering the works participation in political, philosophical, and literary/dramatic movements that problematize long-established religious modes and support a secular-pluralist outlook. It reflects on the role of humour in movements for change and on didacticism and popular humour as features of publicly engaged literature; it discusses other works of Newfoundland humour that approach religious matters from similarly secular, though less overtly political, angles; and it speculates on some social implications of the ascendancy of liberal, pluralistic values, considering these Newfoundland works in a more general Canadian cultural context.

In recent decades in Newfoundland, a sustained interest in Christian symbols, stories, and values has been paired with increasing criticism of Christian religious institutions and agents. Newfoundlands burgeoning tradition of professional humour has reflected this changing set of relationships to Christianity. This robust young humour tradition richly reflects the ongoing pluralization and secularization of Newfoundland culture, and abundantly exemplifies humours distinctive potential as a means of addressing potentially contentious or vexing issues. Yet, surprisingly, literary criticism has almost entirely avoided the prominent stream of Newfoundland humour that addresses the islands religious legacy.<p>This project aims to begin to correct this substantial critical omission, examining points of continuity among a number of works produced over the past four decades. It focuses on the works embrace of political and/or epistemological pluralism, typically married to religious skepticism and to misgivings about conventional arrangements of religious power. Chapter One provides an historical and critical context for the project, introduces subsequent chapters, and speculates on ramifications of the pluralistic current that runs through the works in the study. Chapter Two examines religious jokes in Newfoundland joke books. It emphasizes the jokes overall tendency toward (an often ambiguous) religious conservatism, as well as the books latent pluralism regarding interdenominational relations. Chapter Three focuses on journalist and playwright Ray Guys often fierce satire of Christian religious agents and institutions. It argues that Guys satire utterly rejects the legitimacy of religious authority in the civic realm, largely on the grounds that transcendent truthfulness is often invoked as a means of justifying otherwise objectionable power. Chapter Four explores the ecumenical religious humour of columnist and memoirist Ed Smith. It focuses on Smiths playful efforts to harmonize Christian faith and practice with a measure of religious uncertainty presented as a necessary foundation for humane coexistence. Chapter Five examines Ed Kavanaghs novel The Confessions of Nipper Mooney. Primarily, it explicates and examines the novels liberal favouring of the individual moral conscience, and the symbolic association of its religiously dissident and/or marginalized protagonists with elements of the Catholic tradition. Chapter Six discusses Berni Stapletons comic play The Pope and Princess Di. The chapter emphasizes the plays presentation of symbols constant subjection to alteration and hybridization, and its cautious regard for valuable symbols (religious or otherwise) that nonetheless become destructive when viewed as sacrosanct.<p>Chapter Seven concludes the study by considering the works participation in political, philosophical, and literary/dramatic movements that problematize long-established religious modes and support a secular-pluralist outlook. It reflects on the role of humour in movements for change and on didacticism and popular humour as features of publicly engaged literature; it discusses other works of Newfoundland humour that approach religious matters from similarly secular, though less overtly political, angles; and it speculates on some social implications of the ascendancy of liberal, pluralistic values, considering these Newfoundland works in a more general Canadian cultural context.

Many of us have grown up hearing or using words meant as insults or negative adjectives that were in fact names for social groups. Most of them have gone unquestioned in the mainstream consciousness, but the term Gay in the generally negative meaning has in the past years been given attention as offensive and homophobic, with debates emerging in response over whether or not this is true, particularly on the internet. It is the articles and forum threads from these debates that make out the empirical material for a qualitative study as I ask what these people’s thoughts are about this term and how it is perceived. After a qualitative coding and analysis of these texts, and interpretation of the results based on Erving Goffman’s theory of Phantom acceptance and stigma terms, Judith Butler’s theory of performativity, Ferdinand de Sassure’s theory of signifier and signified and how it connects to the community and Baudrillards theory of simulacra, this is the principal conclusion that I have drawn: For some of the people in this debate, the term Gay and its use is about homophobia and heterosexism, though mostly it’s not overt but a subconscious part of the continued dehumanization and stigmatization of homo- and bisexual people. This is a position I call The socially focused skepticism. Others distance themselves from this idea, talking about language development, the lack of inherent meaning of words and freedom of expression. Using Baudrillard for guidance, I interpret this as having a different, more abstract view of language than those who connect the term to heterosexism, and with this focus on language I name this position The language centered defense. Yet another group frame their reasoning about the term in compromise, preferring to limit their use of it to certain contexts rather than disposing the habit entirely or risk causing offense. To these people, whether or not the word is homophobic is less relevant to the discussion than showing respect for how it can be perceived, which gives their position the name The compromising position.

This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method. / En este trabajo se constata un desajuste entre una demanda real y acuciante de un análisis filosófico que permita dar cuenta de la irrupción de nuevos fenómenos en el panorama del derecho y la limitada oferta de herramientas teóricas con que satisfacer esta demanda que aporta el modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho. Tras el diagnóstico inicial de desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda, se destaca como un problema medular del modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho su resistencia a asumir una racionalidad de tipo práctico y se defiende la viabilidad de esta forma de pensamiento. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta para la reinvención de la filosofía del derecho del siglo XXI, redefiniendo sus objetivos y replanteando su método.

[pt] Sexto Empírico não fala de dúvida, e não faz uso deste conceito em sua clássica descrição do cético pirrônico. No entanto, desde a sua redescoberta na década de 1430 no contexto do humanismo florentino e até os dias atuais, o ceticismo é interpretado através da dúvida. Na presente tese, primeiramente mostramos que não há uma conexão direta entre o ceticismo pirrônico e o conceito de dúvida. Em seguida, analisamos alguns dos modos pelos quais a dúvida é introduzida no ceticismo, particularmente no período que vai do início do século XV ao final do século XVI, conhecido como ceticismo renascentista. Sexto Empírico não fala de dúvida, e não faz uso deste conceito em sua clássica descrição do cético pirrônico. No entanto, desde a sua redescoberta na década de 1430 no contexto do humanismo florentino e até os dias atuais, o ceticismo é interpretado através da dúvida. Na presente tese, primeiramente mostramos que não há uma conexão direta entre o ceticismo pirrônico e o conceito de dúvida. Em seguida, analisamos alguns dos modos pelos quais a dúvida é introduzida no ceticismo, particularmente no período que vai do início do século XV ao final do século XVI, conhecido como ceticismo renascentista. / [en] Sextus Empiricus does not speak of doubt, nor does he use this concept in his exposition of Pyrrhonian skepticism. However, since its rediscovery in the 1430s to the present day, skepticism has been interpreted through the concept of doubt. In the present thesis, we showed first that there is no explicit connection between Pyrrhonian skepticism and doubt. Then, we analyzed some ways through which the concept of doubt was introduced into skepticism, especially in the period from the beginning of the 15th to the end of the 16th century, known as Renaissance skepticism.

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo mostrar que o ceticismo resultante do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana não pode ser fundado na suposta descoberta, por parte de Hume, de uma oposição entre os princípios que considera fundamentais para a natureza humana. Isso porque a factualidade dessa oposição seria defectiva para a filosofia humeana, uma vez que solapa a distinção entre princípios universais e princípios variáveis, essencial para a distinção entre princípios que devem ser aceitos e que devem ser rejeitados; porque um ceticismo dessa natureza é próprio do fideísmo corrente na Renascença e na Modernidade; e porque a impossibilidade do conhecimento resultante dessa oposição acarretaria na eliminação do estímulo à filosofia. Para negar tal oposição, é preciso afirmar que Hume nega a distinção ontológica entre as qualidades primárias e secundárias, que é a sua raiz. Isso pode ser feito a partir da apreciação da Parte 2 do Livro I do Tratado da Natureza Humana. É também preciso mostrar a possibilidade da existência dos corpos, o que é feito a partir da análise de trechos da Parte 4 do Livro I. Isso feito, uma nova perspectiva sobre a filosofia humeana se apresenta concernindo à natureza do seu ceticismo – um que se constitui pela insegurança – e à relação entre a razão e os instintos naturais – uma relação harmônica, antes que conflituosa. / This work aims to show that the resulting skepticism of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature cannot be founded on the alleged discovery, by Hume, of an opposition between the principles which he considers fundamentals to human nature. This because the factuality of this opposition would be defective for the Humean philosophy as it undermines the distinction between universal principles and changeable principles, essential to distinguish between those principles which must be accepted and those which must be rejected; because a skepticism of this nature is proper of the current Fideism in the Renaissance and Modernity; and because the impossibility of knowledge that is consequence of this opposition would lead to the removing of the stimulus to philosophy. To deny such opposition, we must affirm that Hume denies the ontological distinction between primary and secondary qualities, that is its root. This can be done from the consideration of Part 2 of Book I of the Treatise of Human Nature. It is also necessary to show the possibility of the existence of bodies, what is done by the analysis of excerpts of Part 4 of Book I. That done, a new perspective on the Humean philosophy about the nature of its skepticism – one that is constituted by insecurity – and about the relation between reason and natural instincts – a harmonic relation, rather than confrontational – is presented.