I have outlined some objections to soteriologies that presume that only some are given a chance of eternal life. Such soteriologies can include or exclude those mentally competent but lacking human evangelisation. Fundamental to evaluating soteriologies I have looked at both what sin is (being and doing) and what salvation consists in, as regards divine and human interaction. On the one side I have considered God's goodness - would such a being act unethically regarding man's eternity? On the other hand I have looked at whether, and if so in what way, man is required to respond - in what way or ways is chance (if at all) given. Finally I have considered views about those who die in infancy. Here I have tentatively suggested my own theory which seeks to presume that before death every human being may choose to accept of reject God, a choice integral (I suggest) to salvation. / Department of Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / M. Th. (Systematic Theology)

Christian Spirituality, Church History & Missiology

Device-independent cryptography provides security in various tasks whilst removing an assumption that cryptographers previously thought of as crucial -- complete trust in the machinations of their experimental apparatus. The theory of Bell inequalities as a proof of indeterminism within nature allows for secure device-independent schemes requiring neither trust in the cryptographers' devices nor reliance on the completeness of quantum mechanics. However, the extreme paranoia attributable to the relaxed assumptions within device independence requires an explicit consideration of the previously assumed ability of the experimenters to freely make random choices. This thesis addresses the so-called `free will loophole', presenting Bell tests and associated cryptographic protocols robust against adversarial manipulation of the random number generators with which measurements in a Bell test are selected. We present several quantitative measures for this experimental free will, otherwise known as measurement dependence. We discuss how an eavesdropper maliciously preprogramming the experimenters' untrusted devices can falsely simulate the violation of a Bell inequality. We also bound the amount of Bell violation achievable within a certain degree of measurement dependence. This analysis extends to device-independent randomness expansion, bounding the guessing probability and estimating the amount of privacy amplification required to distil private randomness. The protocol is secure against either arbitrary no-signalling or quantum adversaries. We also consider device-independent key distribution, studying adversarial models that exploit the free will loophole. Finally, we examine a model correlated between the random number generators and Bell devices across multiple runs of a Bell test. This enables an explicit exposition of the optimal cheating strategy and how the correlations manifest themselves within this strategy. We prove that there remain Bell violations for a sufficiently high, yet non-maximal degree of measurement dependence which cannot be simulated by a classical attack, regardless of how many runs of the experiment those choices are correlated over.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the lives of men and women living in London and Bury St. Edmunds in the late fourteenth - early fifteenth centuries. Sources studied include the administrative and legal records of the City of London and of the Abbot and Convent of St. Edmund's abbey; legislation and court records of royal government and the wills and testaments of Londoners and Bury St. Edmunds' inhabitants. Considerable research on a wide range of topics on London, but far less work on Bury St. Edmunds, has already been undertaken; however, this thesis is the first systematic comparative study of these two towns. The introduction discusses the historiography and purpose of the thesis; the methodology used, and the shortcomings of using medieval wills and the probate process. Chapter One discusses the testamentary jurisdiction in both towns; who was involved in the will making process, and the role that clerics played as both executors and scribes and how the church courts operated. Chapter Two focuses on testators' preparations for the afterlife, their choices concerning burial location, funeral arrangements and the provisions made for prayers for their souls. Chapter Three examines in detail their pious and charitable bequests and investigates what ‘good works' testators chose to support apart from ‘forgotten tithes'. The family and household relationships, including servants and apprentices, are examined in Chapter Four, exploring the differences in bequests made depending on the testators' marital status, together with evidence for close friendships and social networks. Chapter Five discusses the ownership and types of books referred to in wills and the inter-relationship between the donors and the recipients. Testators' literacy and the provision for education are also investigated.

The objective was to examine students’ attitudes versus the concepts of free will and determinism, and to juxtapose these to anxiety and religiosity.An online survey was filled in by 162 Swedish students aged between 18 and 20 in an upper secondary high school. To measure the concepts of free will and determinism the Paulhus & Carey FAD-Plus scale (2011) has been used. Anxiety was measured with two types of the short STAI-index.The factor analysis did not support the idea of an extra division of the original FAD-plus index into the factors ‘free will without moral responsibility’ and the fac-tor ‘moral responsibility’. Some minor sex differences were notices in that females scored higher on fatalistic determinism as well as anxiety. The correlation be-tween free will and scientific determinism were very small negative and not sig-nificant, implying that the two concepts are compatible to at least some respond-ents. The same week correspondence were noticed between scientific determin-ism and moral, showing that the dichotomy between the concepts having low support among students.The traditionally seen opposite concepts of fatalistic and scientific determin-ism were surprisingly positively and significant corresponding.Conclusion of the survey results support the view that the question on free will and determinism is more complex than a simple two way street as shown by Paulhus & Carey (2011) and Nichols & Knobe (2007). Moral responsibility is strongly connected to free will, but is not negatively correlated to determinism showing an interesting paradox in the traditional view of these concepts.

本論文以會計師事務所二一０名在職員工及六十四名已離職員工為研究對象，分析（ １）我國會計師事務所員工之離職意願，其與組織規模、個人基本變項、工作滿足感 、工作壓迫感及人格特質之相關情形暨目前常用之人事作業政策對離職意願之影響。 （２）我國會計師事務所離職員工離職時點之選擇、離職後之工作去向、主要離職原 因、對工作合約之信守情形等，其與個人基本變項、工作滿足感、工作壓迫感、人格 特質及離職意願之相關情形。（３）人格特質、工作滿足感、工作壓迫感、離職意願 及離職行為之因果模式驗證。 本論文共一冊，陸萬餘字、分七章廿四節，第一章緒論，第二章為有關理論文獻之探 討，第三章為本文實證研究方法之說明，第四、五、六章為實證研究結果之分析及討 論，第七章為結論與建議。

由於台灣近年來生育率有逐年下滑的趨勢，形成少子化的現象，少子化代表著未來人口可能逐漸變少，對於社會結構、經濟發展等各方面都產生重大的影響，因此此一課題值得深究。 本研究以文獻分析及深度訪談法來進行，首先利用文獻資料來分析影響生育意願的相關原因，包括人口結構變遷對總體經濟的影響、生育行為的相關理論、現實經濟的因素、婦女勞動參與等，並歸納整理後作為深度訪談的基礎。深度訪問以大台北地區12位已婚婦女為對象，藉由深入訪談來了解箇中原因，歸結出台灣目前超低生育率的原因所在。 本研究結果發現，目前婦女生育意願低落的原因，主要是第一：傳統養兒防老的觀念式微，女性生育自主意識的崛起；第二：受教育延長、晚婚是催化高齡少子的趨勢之一；第三：現實經濟的考量下，加上養兒不易，導致多數家庭因此將生小孩的數量轉往養育的品質；第四：家庭分工的不平均也是降低婦女生育的意願的重要原因之一；最後現階段的托育政策與制度的不完善，加上生育補助有限，誘因不足之下，因而無法提高婦女的生育意願。 依據研究發現本研究建議(一)強化家庭功能，以增加婦女的社會支援；(二)提高育兒補助並視嬰幼兒為未來國家的資產，以減緩少子化的趨勢；(三)政府應以人口優質及避免人口短缺的方向努力；(四)政府應積極擬訂鼓勵男性參與育兒及家務政策，並將養育責任，由兩性來共同承擔，以達到美滿家庭的目標；(五)加強改善婦女的經濟地位，鼓勵並積極輔導婦女就業及強化專業職能的訓練，不致因婚育而影響其勞動參與，以提高其生育意願；(六)政府應正視目前超低生育率的現象，設立專責機構並參考國外(如日本或法國)生育政策及托育制度，以提高國內生育率。 關鍵字：少子化、超低生育率、生育行為、生育意願 / In Taiwan, the rate of fertility has been continually in decline in recently year, which is called ‘the phenomenon of declining birth rate.’ It signifies a less future population and impacts on every aspects of our social structure and economic development. This, it is worthy of probing. This research is conducted with the method of literature review and in-depth interviews.It first analyzes via literature review those factors influencing the will of bearing children, such as the impact of the structural change of population on the macro economy, the theory of fertility behavior, considerations of livelihood, and the women participation in labor, etc. All those factors are inducted and sorted as the basis of in-depth interview. Then, the in-depth interview is conducted on 12 married women, penetrating on the cause of extremely low fertility rate in Taiwan. This research finds the reasons to cause the low rate of fertility are as below: First, the traditional idea is decline currently to have children caring the agedness. Meanwhile, the females are learning the independent consciousness to decide how many children they want in life. The second: high grade education & late marriage is one of the trends of declining birth rate with elder females. The third: taking consideration into the family’s economy as well as hard teaching on child, most families turn to focus on life quality instead of having kid's amount. The fourth: the heavy loading of housework on females is also the reason to reduce the will of bearing children. Finally, not only the current child care policy/system but also the limited subsidization by the government is not perfect to meet the family’s requirements; which are unable to promote the will of bearing children. Based on such research findings, I come up with six policy recommendations as follows to encourage our country’s bearing rate：(一) to enhance family function according to the research, with increment women of social support；(二) look after the kids as the country’s property to promote the subsidization of bearing children to reduce the declining birth rate；(三) government should forward to superior quality population, and to avoid the population runs short；(四) the government should actively draw up some bearing plans to encourage male’s participation (sharing evenly) on child care, housework & teaching responsibility in family; which is aimed to build a sweet home for couples；(五) to improve the female’s economic position. And, to encourage/guide women to work with complete working training for proper job arrangement, which will encourage their will of bearing children when woman gets independent incomes；(六) the government should notice the serious declining birth rate currently – i.e. not only to establish some responsible organizations, but also to refer successful growing policy and child care system from other countries (such as Japan, France) in order to raise the fertility rate in Taiwan..

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de docteur en droit (LL.D.)". Cette thèse a été acceptée à l'unanimité et classée parmi les 10% des thèses de la discipline. / La liberté de tester au Québec a longtemps été qualifiée de « illimitée ». Dans les faits, une telle liberté signifiait que le de cujus pouvait ne rien laisser à son ou sa conjointe ni à ses enfants. Or, depuis l'introduction des dispositions législatives sur la prestation compensatoire et, plus particulièrement, de celles sur le patrimoine familial et sur la survie de l'obligation alimentaire, l'étendue de cette liberté n'est plus la même. Bien que les Québécois soient toujours libres de déterminer par testament à qui ils souhaitent léguer leurs biens, leur liberté est désormais limitée par ces dispositions législatives impératives qui permettent au conjoint survivant et à la famille immédiate du défunt de réclamer certaines sommes à la succession, et ce, quelles que soient les dernières volontés du de cujus. Ainsi, le patrimoine sur lequel s'exerce la liberté du testateur n'est plus forcément celui sur lequel le défunt pouvait exercer sa volonté pendant sa vie et son mariage. Il n'est donc plus possible de parler de liberté « illimitée» de tester des Québécois. Ce constat quant à l'émergence de restrictions à la liberté testamentaire dans le Code civil nous conduit à nous interroger sur les raisons et les fondements de cette transformation de la liberté de tester et, incidemment, sur la question plus générale de la production et de l'évolution du droit de la famille dans la société. Pour répondre à ce questionnement, cette thèse repose sur une approche socio-juridique selon laquelle il faut rechercher les fondements de l'évolution du droit à l'intérieur des représentations sociales valorisées dans une société et une époque données. Partant du postulat que ce sont les changements dans les représentations sociales qui contribuent à expliquer le passage d'une rationalité sociale à une rationalité juridique, cette thèse dégage par quels acteurs, suivant quelles logiques et dans quels buts ces restrictions à la liberté de tester ont été introduites dans le droit québécois. Une telle façon d'aborder l'évolution du droit à partir de l'évolution des représentations sociales contribue ainsi à « éclairer» l'idée communément véhiculée selon laquelle le droit reflète l'évolution des moeurs. Grâce à une étude des représentations sociales inscrites et retracées dans le discours des acteurs sociaux - mémoires déposés à l'Assemblée nationale, Journal des débats, commissions parlementaires, jurisprudence, doctrine, textes de loi - cette thèse montre que les changements qui ont conduit à restreindre la liberté de tester au Québec ne dépendent pas que des perceptions relatives à la famille et au patrimoine, tel qu'on le rapporte généralement. L'introduction de restrictions à la liberté de tester dans le Code civil semble plutôt résulter d'un compromis entre l'évolution des représentations sociales sur les rapports familiaux et l'évolution des représentations sociales sur le droit, plus précisément quant aux fonctions du droit dans la société et aux conditions de sa cohérence. L'analyse de cette évolution permet enfin d'observer que si le droit des successions a longtemps été une « composante » du droit des biens, il constitue désormais, surtout, une « composante» du droit de la famille. / Formerly the freedom of wiIling in Quebec was considered to be "unlimited", which meant that its scope was such that the deceased could refrain from bequeathing any property at aIl to his or her spouse or children. Following the introduction of legal measures on compensatory allowance and, more particularly, provisions concerning the family patrimony and the survival of the obligation of support, the scope of this freedom is no longer as alI-inclusive as it once was. Although Quebeckers remain free to determine via their last wiIls and testaments to whom they wish to bequeath their property, henceforth their margin of freedom is limited by the preceding legislative changes which entitle the surviving spouse and immediate family of the deceased to claim to certain amounts from the succession, whatever the last will of the deceased may have been. As such, the patrimony upon which the testator now exercises freedom has ceased necessarily to be that which the deceased had control over during his or her life and marriage. It is thus no longer possible to refer to Quebeckers' "unlimited freedom" of wiIling. The emergence of limitations in testamentary freedom in the Civil Code invites us to question the reasons and foundations for this shift in the freedom of willing and, incidentaIly, the more general issue of the reform and evolution offamily law in society. To address these issues, this thesis is founded upon a socio-Iegal approach according to which it is essential to seek out the basis of the evolution of law from within the social representations valued in a society at a given time in its history. Beginning from the postulate that it is the changes in social representations that help to explain the transition from a social rationality to a legal rationality, this thesis illustrates by what actors, foIlowing which lines of logic and to what end these limitations in the freedom of wiIling were introduced into Quebec law. Such an approach to the evolution of the law on the basis of social representations thereby helps "to enlighten" the commonly expressed idea whereby law is a mirror image of mores. Based upon an analysis of social representations recorded and retrieved in the discourse of different social actors, including briefs tabled before the National Assembly and proceedings in the Journal of Debates, parliamentary committees, as weIl as decided cases, doctrine and statutory texts, this thesis seeks to demonstrate how the changes which led to the restriction in testamentary freedom in Quebec extend far beyond perceptions evoking family and patrimony as is generaIly claimed. The introduction of limitations in the freedom of willing in the Civil Code seems rather to result from a compromise between the evolution in social representations regarding family relationships and the evolution in social representations regarding law, more specifically with regard to the functions of law in society and the conditions underlying the law's systemic coherence. Lastly the analysis of this evolution makes it possible to observe that while the law governing successions was for a long time a "component" of property law, henceforth it has specifically gravitated to being a "component" of family law.

Ce mémoire portera sur le problème de la signification, dans la pensée de Heidegger, de la métaphysique moderne, à partir de la conception de l’histoire de l’être qu’il développe dans les années 1930. Plus précisément, nous nous baserons sur l’écrit Die Zeit des Weltbildes, que l’on retrouve dans le recueil nommé Holzwege, mais également, dans une moindre mesure, sur l’écrit Niezsches Wort « Gott ist tot » du même recueil. Nous commencerons par introduire le lecteur à l’idée qu’il se fait de la métaphysique en général dans son rapport à l’homme, et du nihilisme que constitue son histoire, lequel s’accentue à l’époque moderne. Nous rentournerons alors brièvement aux premiers commencements de la métaphysique, chez Parménide et Platon principalement, dans le but de dégager les aspects de la métaphysique moderne qui y ont trouvé leur source. C’est alors que nous entrerons dans le vif du sujet, en expliquant en quoi consiste l’inauguration de la métaphysique moderne chez Descartes qui, face à l’obligation religieuse, pose la confirmation autonome de la vérité qui trouve son lieu propre dans la conscience de soi. Il sera dès lors question de montrer précisément comment se fait cette confirmation par soi-même du vrai, au travers de certaines notions centrales de l’analyse heideggerienne : la pro-position, la présentation et la représentation, l’instauration, la production, l’obtention, la préhension et la compréhension, notamment. Nous analyserons ensuite le mouvement de la volonté du sujet qui sous-tend cette confirmation autonome du savoir jusqu’à son aboutissement chez des penseurs tels que Schopenhauer. Nous mettrons par le fait même en évidence le rapport fondamental, souligné par Heidegger, entre le sujet et son objet, l’homme moderne se soulèvant et se donnant lui-même le statut éminent de centre de référence de toute chose, rapportant à lui-même tout chose. Ce mémoire se terminera par l’analyse que fait Heidegger d’un phénomène propre à la modernité, et donc émanent de la métaphysique qui aura été examinée au préalable, soit la science moderne. Celle-ci constitue la voie privilégiée où l’homme moderne, après avoir sciemment pris position au centre du monde, peut « procéder » dans le monde comme dans son royaume, un monde qui se révèle alors comme étant essentiellement à sa disposition. La science, émanant selon Heidegger de la conception moderne de la vérité et de l’étant, se révèle alors non seulement comme une réalisation de la métaphysique qui aura été analysée dans les chapitres précédents, mais peut-être même comme le phénomène duquel Heidegger semble s’être inspiré pour développer son idée de la métaphysique moderne. / The present thesis explores the nature of the Heideggerian critique of Modern Times and of the metaphysics that constitutes their foundation, a critique that is based on the notion of the history of Being as conceived by Heidegger in the1930s. We will do so through a close reading of Die Zeit des Weltbildes, as well as of Nietzsches Wort « Gott ist tot », two essential writings found in the collection of texts called Holzwege. First, we will have a look at his idea of metaphysics in general, and of nihilism as the principle behind it’s history, of which we will then examine the first phases, leading to the emergence of Modern Times. At that point, we will explain of the nature of the inauguration of this era in Descartes’ philosophy, where he opposes the self-confirmation of truth by the human subject to religious obligation, a confirmation happening in self-consciousness. The modalities of this modern principle of knowledge will be examined, through key notions of Heidegger’s analysis: proposition, presentation, representation, production, objet, prehension, comprenhension, etc. After which a look at the human will as the main motor of this autonomous confirmation of truth, all through modern history up to philosophies such as that of Schopenhauer, is necessary to understand how Heidegger interprets this determination of truth in the light of the relation between man and his world. In his eyes, the Modern Times see man standing up to consciously assert himself as the center of reference of the whole world, bringing everything back to himself, therefore reducing ontology to anthropology. This paper will then, at the end of it’s path, take a close look at the way Heidegger interprets one of Modern Time’s main phenomena, originating according to him in modern metaphysics, that is to say modern science. It will reveal itself to be the privileged way by which man, after his positioning at the center of the world, proceeds through the world as his kingdom, all beings essentially being at his disposal. Modern science, this accomplishment of modern thought, almost seems to be the main inspiration from which he derives his theory concerning the essence of this thought.

La présente thèse expose, analyse et critique les positions classiques et modernes à l’égard de la nature et des causes de la faiblesse de volonté. L’identification du problème par Platon et Aristote a donné lieu à l’explicitation de principes et propositions portant sur la rationalité pratique en général et la motivation en particulier. Une discussion de ces principes et propositions est faite dans la mesure où ils ont conservé une certaine pertinence pour les théories modernes. Ce qui est devenu la conception standard de la stricte akrasie ainsi que son caractère prétendument paradoxal sont mis de l’avant. Nous argumentons qu’une position sceptique à l’égard de la stricte akrasie ne peut pas reposer sur une version ou une autre de la théorie des préférences révélées et montrons qu’une description du processus décisionnel est nécessaire pour attribuer une préférence synthétique ou un meilleur jugement. Nous abordons le débat philosophique qui oppose une conception internaliste du lien entre le meilleur jugement et la décision à une conception externaliste, et soutenons, sur la base de résultats expérimentaux en psychologie cognitive et en neuroscience, que cette dernière conception est plus robuste, bien qu’imparfaite. Ces résultats ne vont pas toutefois à l’encontre de l’hypothèse que les agents sont des maximisateurs dans la satisfaction de leur préférence, laquelle hypothèse continue de justifier une forme de scepticisme à l’égard de la stricte akrasie. Nous exposons, par contre, des arguments solides à l’encontre de cette hypothèse et montrons pourquoi la maximisation n’est pas nécessairement requise pour le choix rationnel et que nous devons, par conséquent, réviser la conception standard de la stricte akrasie. Nous discutons de l’influente théorie de Richard Holton sur la faiblesse de volonté non strictement akratique. Bien que compatible avec une conception non maximisante, sa théorie réduit trop les épisodes de faiblesse de volonté à des cas d’irrésolution. Nous exposons finalement la théorie du choix intertemporel. Cette théorie est plus puissante parce qu’elle décrit et explique, à partir d’un même schème conceptuel, autant la stricte akrasie que l’akrasie tout court. Ce schème concerne les propriétés des distributions temporelles des conséquences des décisions akratiques et les attitudes prospectives qui motivent les agents à les prendre. La structure de ces distributions, couplée à la dévaluation à l’égard du futur, permet également d’expliquer de manière simple et élégante pourquoi la faiblesse de volonté est irrationnelle. Nous discutons de l’hypothèse qu’une préférence temporelle pure est à la source d’une telle dévaluation et mentionnons quelques éléments critiques et hypothèses concurrentes plus conformes à une approche cognitiviste du problème. / This thesis explains, analyses and examines the classical and modern positions on the nature and causes of the weakness of will. Since Plato and Aristotle’s identification of the problem, many principles and propositions on the subject of practical rationality in general and motivation in particular have been examined in details. These principles and propositions are being discussed on the basis that they are still somewhat relevant to modern theories. An emphasis is made on what is now known as the standard conception of strict akrasia and its supposedly paradoxical nature. We argue that a skeptical position toward strict akrasia cannot be based on one version or another of the preference-revealed theory and we demonstrate that a description of the decision process is necessary to assign an overall preference or a better judgment. We discuss the philosophical debate on internalist and externalist conceptions of the connection between better judgment and decision. We then argue that, based on experimental results in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, the externalist conception, although imperfect, is stronger. But these experimental results are not incompatible with the hypothesis that agents are maximizers when it comes to the satisfaction of their preference. This hypothesis continues to justify a form of skepticism toward strict akrasia. However, we strongly argue against this hypothesis and we demonstrate why maximization is not absolutely necessary to rational choice; therefore, we have to revise the standard conception of strict akrasia. We then discuss Richard Holton’s influential theory on non-strictly akratic weakness of will. Although compatible with a non-maximizing conception, Holton’s theory tends to reduce episodes of weakness of will to irresolution cases. Lastly, we introduce the theory of intertemporal choice, a more potent theory that describes and explains, with the same conceptual schema, both strict and non-strict akrasia. This schema concerns the properties of temporal distribution of akratic decision’s consequences and the prospective attitudes that motivate agents to make those decisions. Also, the structure of these distributions, along with the devaluation of the future, allows us to explain, clearly and simply, why weakness of will is irrational. We discuss the hypothesis that this devaluation of the future is due to a pure temporal preference and we mention a number of critical elements and rival hypothesis more in keeping with a cognitive approach to the problem.