The question of free will, determinants of free action and responsibility is one of the most thrilling questions of the mankind. Moreover, the free will problem is closely connected to regulation and hindsight judgement of man behaviour so the law is concerned with the problem as well. However, a legal concept of free will is missing in the Czech law or legal theory. The author is therefore concerned with the fact that there is no satisfactory legal definition of free will even though legal responsibility is impliedly based on free action and free will. The Czech law defines just the freedom of action in negative terms, i.e. as an action of will free from circumstances limiting or precluding legal responsibility. The aim of the thesis is to summarize knowledge of social psychology regarding free will and assess whether the Czech law does impose the right standard of freedom of will in comparison to scientific experiments and findings. Furthermore, there are philosophical theories of free will introduced in the thesis and consequently these theories are questioned and examined for the purpose of defining legal concept of free will. At the end of the psychological part of the thesis one comes to the conclusion that the social determinants such as peer pressure, conformity and obedience to authority...

The aim of this thesis is to clarify the concept of the right to life in the legislative in the Czech Republic and in abroad with a comparison with its unnatural end, while abortion and euthanasia. This work is primarily devoted to law regulation of these institutes, but also covers other aspects such as religion, philosophy and science. It is designed so that each and every chapter is in its introductory section devoted to the formulation of the topic, the historical development in the Czech Republic but also abroad, it introduces the possible procedures and attitudes, it mentions for example and briefly compares similar institutes. Other parts of the diploma deal with legislation whether the right to life, abortion or euthanasia, provides comparison of domestic legislation with internationals. In light of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights points the views and attitudes on the subject at the international level. The final section is then evaluated core issues especially from the standpoint of law.

La problématique traitée dans ce travail consiste à s’interroger sur les aspects « politiques » de la pensée de Nietzsche, et surtout sur sa dimension européenne et ses enjeux. Il n’est pas question ici de cataloguer Nietzsche de philosophe politique, ni sa philosophie de philosophie politique, dans le sens académique du terme. Mais essayer de montrer, à travers sa philosophie du sens et de la valeur, de sa méthode généalogique, les démarches et propositions de ce philosophe au « marteau » pour tenter d’éradiquer le nihilisme dans le but d’œuvrer pour une « grande politique » et favoriser l’avènement d’un « nouveau européen » dans une « nouvelle Europe ». En effet, cette Europe dont parle Nietzsche n’a rien à voir avec ce qu’on conçoit généralement comme l’Occident, et cette Europe ainsi que les européens dont il parle n’ont pas vraiment d’existence réelle, repérable avec des frontières, si on se place sur le plan géographique et géopolitique. Dans ce travail je tiens à souligner la contrainte de la sécularisation, et d’autres aspects du dépassement du nationalisme, qui est aussi un dépassement du nihilisme. Nietzsche était, peut-être, l’un des plus acides contempteurs des illusions européennes en démontrant – espérant par la même occasion éradiquer - cette fiction d’une Europe « non-contradictoire », platement conciliatrice, mais à la fois individualiste et revendicatrice d’une égalité des droits. Comportements dénoncés par le philosophe car ce vent pollué par le nationalisme, la puissance industrielle mercantile au détriment de la création vitale ne peuvent mener qu’à une catastrophe en étouffant, en empêchant le jaillissement, l’apparition de l’individu créateur, artiste. Les valeurs se sont donc déjà instituées dans un sens négatif et malsain, et ce dénigrement de la vie n’est pas politiquement indifférent. Ce n’est pas là un vitalisme simpliste. L’homme moderne occidental est le résultat de cette histoire. L’histoire est le résultat de cette « hominisation » inversée qui se fait par le troupeau, et qui est aussi une forme de déshumanisation programmée. C’est Dionysos qui constitue le remède à cette maladie, ce Dieu grec est le héros qui vaincrait cette européocentrisme et le chauvinisme. Soulignons que ce projet qui consiste à critiquer l’égalitarisme comme « dressage », privilégie le retour au texte et non pas la « construction conceptuelle ». Entre autres travaux pour cela : ceux de Patrick Wotling, Paolo D’Iorio, Giuliano Campioni, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Peter Sloterdijk,…Pour éviter toute confusion, malgré la partie « caractéristiques de la philosophie du sens et de la valeur » qui distinguera la « grande politique », soulignons ces quelques points : d’abord la séparation d’avec le vouloir-vivre de Schopenhauer, ensuite l’évaluation d’une transcendance de l’instinct qui fait que Nietzsche quitte le plan de l’irrationalisme furibond, enfin la forme du refus du darwinisme. Ainsi on peut parler d’une volonté de puissance qui n’est plus ramenée à une catégorie volitionnelle, et dotée d’une motivation (par exemple l’oppression physique et militaire ou l’accumulation du capital).Sa reconquête des valeurs doit être replacée dans un contexte mieux compris, et d’abord repensant le nôtre. Il n’est que de songer aux Règles pour le parc humain de Sloterdijk, en réponse à Heidegger, mais qui n’est que le prolongement de l’opposition dressage / élevage (Zähmung / Züchtung) qu’avait thématisée Nietzsche en faveur de ce que seraient de « bons européens ». Ainsi on comprend que les enjeux « politiques » consistent en réalité aux choix de civilisation (Kultur) qui engagent une conception purement anthropologique de l’homme. Seule une métaphysique de la culture permettra alors de dépasser le nihilisme européen et ses nombreuses versions éco-théologiques. / The main theme of this work is that of the “political” aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, particularly in terms of its European dimension and the issues at stake. The aim here is not to label Nietzsche as a political philosopher or his philosophy as political philosophy in the academic sense of the term. Rather, the aim is to show, through his philosophy of meaning and value, and his genealogical method, the approaches adopted and proposals made by this philosopher and his “hammer”, as a means of eradicating nihilism in order to work towards “greater politics” and thus encourage the arrival of a “new European” in a “new Europe”. This Europe of which Nietzsche spoke had nothing in common with what is generally perceived as being the West. His Europe, and its Europeans, do not really exist, and, from a geographical and geopolitical point of view, have no easily identifiable borders. In this work, we underline the restrictions of secularisation, and other aspects that go beyond nationalism, which is in itself a concept that goes beyond that of nihilism. It may be said that Nietzsche had the most acerbic contempt for European illusions, showing – and hoping to thus eradicate – the fiction of a “non-contradictory” Europe, a Europe that is blandly conciliatory but also both individualistic and demanding of equal rights. Such behaviour was denounced by Nietzsche because this wind of change, polluted by nationalism and mercantile industrial power to the detriment of vital creation, can only end in catastrophe, suffocating and preventing the resurgence or appearance of the individual creator, the artist. Values have thus already been adopted in a negative, unhealthy sense and denigrating life in this way is not indifferent from a political point of view. It is not a question of simplistic vitalism. Modern Western man is the result of this history. And this history is the result of the inverted “hominisation” produced by the herd effect, and which is also a sort of programmed dehumanisation. The cure for this ill is Dionysus, the Greek god who was the hero that conquered European centricity and chauvinism. It should be stressed that this project, which consists in criticising egalitarianism as a form of “domestication”, favours a return to the text, and not “conceptual construction”. This theme has also been studied by other authors, such as Patrick Wotling, Paolo D’Iorio, Giuliano Campioni, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Peter Sloterdijk, to name but a few.To avoid any confusion, and despite the section on the “characteristics of the philosophy of meaning and values” which will identify the “greater politics”, we would like to stress the following points: first of all, the departure from Schopenhauer’s will to live, followed by an evaluation of the transcendence of instinct which shows that Nietzsche moved away from the level of furious irrationalism and, finally, the form taken by the refusal of Darwinism. It is thus possible to speak of a desire for power which is no longer reduced to being a volitional category, but which has become motivated (for example, physical and military oppression, or the accumulation of capital).Nietzsche’s reconquest of values needs to be approached within a context that is better understood, starting with a re-evaluation of our own. This recalls Sloterdijk’s Rules for the Human Zoo, written in response to Heidegger, but which is merely an extension of the domestication/breeding opposition (Zähmung/Züchtung) that Nietzsche conceptualised in favour of what would make “good Europeans”.It is thus that we can understand that the “political” stakes are, in reality, civilisation choices (Kultur), which require a purely anthropological conception of man. Only the metaphysics of culture can thus make it possible to go beyond European nihilism and its many eco-theo-logical versions.

Le débat sur le libre arbitre continue depuis des siècles, réfractaire à toute tentative de solution positive. Cette thèse présente une contribution visant à dissoudre le problème plutôt qu’à le résoudre. L’approche négative et « thérapeutique » du travail est d’inspiration largement wittgensteinienne : son noyau réside dans la thèse selon laquelle les problèmes philosophiques – y compris le problème du libre arbitre – ont pour origine une confusion dans l’usage des mots. Dans les deux premiers chapitres, j’examine le débat analytique sur le libre arbitre et l’approche récente de la philosophie expérimentale. Je montre que la difficulté d’arriver à un niveau d’accord même minimal sur les questions principales du débat rend déraisonnable de vouloir le poursuivre. Dans le troisième chapitre, je présente l’approche négative des problèmes philosophiques défendue par Paul Horwich dans son travail sur Wittgenstein et dans ses échanges avec Timothy Williamson et Richard Rorty. Dans le quatrième chapitre, j’applique la thèse wittgensteinienne de la confusion linguistique à la question du libre arbitre. Au centre du cinquième chapitre se trouve la position défendue par Peter Strawson dans son article « Freedom and Resentment » (1962), dont je présente une lecture pragmatique. Selon cette interprétation inspirée par Rorty, Strawson montre que le scepticisme à l’égard de la responsabilité morale représente une forme de politique culturelle vouée à l’échec. / Philosophical attempts to solve the free will conundrum have proven unsuccessful across the centuries. In this work I aim at dissolving rather than solving the problem. The negative and “therapeutic” approach I adopt is inspired by Wittgenstein, its core being the thesis that such philosophical problems as free will stem from linguistic confusion. In the first and second chapter I examine the contributions on free will provided within analytic philosophy and within the so called experimental philosophy. I argue that it is not reasonable to pursue this debate, insofar as it is by now clear that its main questions admit of no shared solutions. In the third chapter I present the negative approach to philosophical problems defended by Paul Horwich in his work on Wittgenstein and in his exchanges with Timothy Williamson and Richard Rorty. In the fourth chapter I apply to the free will issue an approach focused on Wittgenstein’s thesis concerning linguistic confusion. In the fifth chapter I provide a pragmatic reading of the position defended by Peter Strawson in his « Freedom and Resentment » (1962). According to this interpretation inspired by Rorty, Strawson shows that scepticism about moral responsibility comprises an unfruitful form of cultural politics.

Este trabalho se propõe a investigar os principais aspectos do niilismo no interior da obra de Friedrich Nietzsche; em que medida tal questão ocuparia um lugar fundamental na obra do filósofo, e de modo esta se coloca como uma possibilidade de solução superação - frente aos impasses que este problema significou. / This work intends to investigate the principle aspects of nihilism inside Friedrich Nietzsches work; how this matter has a fundamental task inside the philosophers work, and how it put itself as a solution overcome to the difficulties that nihilism have brought.

A presente dissertação tem como propósito estudar o que denominamos herói anti-existencialista do romance Angústia, de Graciliano Ramos, ao analisar sua dificuldade de auto-afirmação diante do mundo de que faz parte, a qual o conduzirá à ação central do livro, o assassinato de Julião Tavares. Escamoteando essa causa subjetiva dos afetos aparentes, os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, o protagonista irá atribuí-los ao exterior, à sua existência citadina, ao convívio com o outro, ao rival, Julião Tavares. A dificuldade de auto-afirmação causa de ordem subjetiva desses afetos aparentes , com origem no passado da infância, na não superada rivalidade edipiana, ameaça trazer a tona dois afetos latentes, que se revelam por meio da narrativa digressiva, enquanto forma de auto-análise, a saber: o medo da castração simbólica, e a culpa pelo desejo da morte do pai na infância. Daí a necessidade de escamoteá-la, atribuindo-se ao exterior, a uma causa de ordem objetiva, portanto, os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, o que engendrará a idéia de vingança, motivo aparente do assassinato. No ato de vingança estaria implicado um valor anacrônico, com origem na sociedade patriarcal, na qual vivera o menino Luís da silva, a saber: a prática da violência naturalizada, enquanto expressão do sentido arcaico da liberdade, a liberdade ilimitada. Nesse sentido, o caráter anti-existencialista do herói o levará para a livre escolha do assassinato, como forma imprópria de tentar superar os sentimentos de opressão e inferioridade, cuja conseqüência será o aniquilamento do seu ser, descaminho da sua liberdade. / This dissertation aims at studying the anti-existentialist hero in Angústia, a novel by Graciliano Ramos. In doing so, one analyzes the character´s difficulty of self-affirmation to the world in which he lives, and which will occasionally take him to the central action of the story, that is, the murder of Julião Tavares. As to hide the underlying causes of the apparent affections i.e., feelings of oppression and inferiority , the protagonist will tie them to exterior elements, such as the fact that he lives in town or to the fact that he lives with his enemy, Julião Tavares. The difficulty of self-affirmation is the cause for the underlying apparent affections and has its origins on his childhood, instead of being based on the surpassed oedipal rivalry. It risks bringing up two underlying affections shown up in the story by means of digressions in moments of self analysis done by the character. There are the fear of symbolic castration, end the guilty for wishing for his father´s death when he was a child. This is why he feels the need of hiding them and ties their existence to exterior reasons, to something objective, and this is why he feels inferior and oppressed. Ultimately, there are reasons that will make him wish for revenge and will also constitute the reasons for murder. There is an anachronistic value implied on such revenge, whose origin goes back to the patriarchal society in which the boy Luís da Silva lived: the common naturalized violence as an expression of the archaic sense of freedom an unlimited freedom. In this sense, the anti-existentialist trace of the hero will take him to the free will of murdering as an improper way trying to overcome the feeling of oppression and inferiority, whose consequence will be his own annihilation, a misleading of his freedom.

[pt] A dissertação tem o intuito de percorrer algumas trilhas deixadas por Nietzsche em seus escritos filosóficos. Para tanto, iniciamos o trabalho investigando como o filósofo estudou as manifestações da vontade na Grécia antiga, relacionando, posteriormente, esta vontade com a razão socrática. Este é um gancho para iniciar o debate sobre a questão da razão e da vontade na filosofia do autor. Proposta que ocupa todo o restante do primeiro capítulo, culminando com o estudo sobre o livrearbítrio e a moral de senhor e de escravo. O segundo capítulo busca propriamente os desdobramentos políticos da filosofia apresentada na primeira parte. Analisando a gênese das regras sociais e também o Estado moderno. Culminando com o ensinamento de Zaratustra sobre o eterno retorno. / [en] The dissertation intent to pass through some trills leaved by Nietzsche in his philosophical writings. For that, we started the work by investigating how the philosopher has study the manifestations of the will in the old Greece, doing the relation between this will and the Socratic reason. This is a hook to initiate the debate about the question of the reason and the will in the philosophy of the author. Propose witch occupy all the rest of the first chapter, finishing with the study about the free will and the master and slave morality. The second chapter ride the political consequences of the philosophy presented in the first part. Analyzing the geneses of the social rules and, also, the modern state, culminating with the Zaratustra s teaching about the eternal return.

Die Willensfreiheit ist ein zentraler Bestandteil des alltäglichen menschlichen Denkens und bildet eine wichtige Grundlage für Mechanismen unserer Gesellschaft. Trotz dieser zentralen Stellung herrscht unter Philosophen und Psychologen Uneinigkeit darüber, was Willensfreiheit eigentlich bedeutet. Dies wird besonders bei Experimenten zur Untersuchung der Willensfreiheit wie das Libet-Experiment deutlich. In dieser Arbeit wird in drei Surveys empirisch untersucht, ob der Freiheitsbegriff, mit dem die Libet-Experimente operieren, von den Freiheitsintuitionen der Laien gestützt wird, oder ob Laien eher den konträren Freiheitsintuitionen der Philosophen zuneigen. Die Ergebnisse der vorgestellten Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Laien eine von den philosophischen Vorstellungen abweichende Vorstellung von Freiheit haben. / Free will is one of the most crucial concepts in our daily life. It represents one of the most important aspects of daily human behaviour and has crucial importance in societal mechanism. However, despite its importance and long tradition philosophers still disagree on a definition. At the heart of the problem lie diverging intuitions about what is important for the concept of freedom. This is particular obvious in neuroscientific experiment, like the famous Libet-Experiment. Here I investigate in three empirical surveys whether the lay intuitions about freedom match freedom intuitions on which the Libet-experiment are based or rather the classical philosophical intuitions about freedom. For this purpose I adopt the empirical approach of experimental philosophy. The results demonstrate that lay people’s intuitions are pretty much in line with assumption that are made by the Libet-Experiment and contradict common philosophical intuitions about free will.

Die Krise der Philosophie, die Nietzsche diagnostiziert hat, ist eine Krise der Abstraktheit der Philosophie, einer Philosophie, die nicht mehr als existenziale Luft des Lebens und als existenziale Atmung des Menschen funktioniert. Für Nietzsche ist die Konkretheit als Begriff im Verhältnis mit der wirklichen Lebenswelt des Menschen nicht bloß die Diagnose der Krise des Lebens, sondern eine Philosophie der Heilung, die der Handlung eines Arztes entspricht. In Nietzsches Philosophie als Gesundheitsphilosophie wird die Krankheit als eine Chance bestimmt, wieder gesund werden zu können. Das heißt, die Krankheit ist ein wichtiger Grund für die Hoffnung auf Gesundheit und die Gesundheit ist eine wichtige Antwort auf den Sinn der Krankheit. / The Crisis of Philosophy that Nietzsche has diagnosed, is a Crisis of the Abstractness of Philosophy, a Philosophy that no longer functions as the existential air of Life and existential Breath of Humans. For Nietzsche the Concreteness as understood as a Conceptual unit is in Proportion with the real Life and World of Humans not only the diagnosis of the Crisis of Life, but a Philosophy of Healing, which corresponds to the Cure of a Doctor. In Nietzsche''s Philosophy as a Philosophy of Health the disease is determined as a chance to be Healthy once more. Disease is an important reason for the Hope of Health and Health is an important Response to the sense of the disease.

Diese Arbeit untersucht und expliziert ein Verständnis von Autonomie, das seine Wurzeln (1) in der antiken politischen Autonomiekonzeption, (2) in Kants Theorie von Autonomie als Eigenschaft von Personen und (3) in Frankfurts individualistischem Verständnis von Autonomie hat. Autonomie wird systematisch aufgefasst als eine natürliche und graduelle Eigenschaft von Personen, die nicht an spezifische Normen gebunden ist und sich vom freien Willen abgrenzen lässt. Für Autonomie ist es wesentlich, dass die Person ihren eigenen, authentischen Standpunkt ausdrückt und dazu fähig und disponiert ist, Hindernisse zu überwinden und sich in Konflikten zu behaupten. Die zeitgenössische Autonomiedebatte hat diesem Aspekt von Autonomie zu wenig Beachtung geschenkt und sich nahezu ausschließlich auf Selbstgerichtetheit konzentriert. Ich argumentiere, dass Selbstgerichtetheit eine wesentliche, aber nicht hinreichende Dimension von Autonomie ist. Eine vollständige Konzeption von Autonomie muss die zweite Dimension von Autonomie, nämlich Entschlossenheit, mitberücksichtigen. Die persönliche Stärke, die Entschlossenheit auszeichnet, ist ein wesentliches Merkmal autonomer Akteure. / I explore and explicate a notion of personal autonomy which has its sources (1) in the political concept of autonomy as it was developed in ancient Greece, (2) in Kant’s theory of autonomy as a property of person, and (3) in Frankfurt’s individualistic approach towards autonomy. From a systematic point of view I conceptualize autonomy as a natural and gradual property of persons, which is not tied to norms, and which differs from free will. Autonomy deals with an agent’s authentic expression of her standpoint and her aptitude in prevailing in conflicts or difficult situations. The central insight of this study is that resolute agency is an essential aspect of autonomy. Dispositional autonomy is constituted by an agent’s dispositions and abilities to overcome obstacles. The autonomy debate underemphasized this aspect of autonomy by solely focusing on self-directed agency. But as important as self-directedness is for autonomous agency, without resoluteness, an agent falls short of being autonomous. The personal strength that resoluteness consists in is a hallmark of autonomous agents.