冷戰後加上後共時期的轉型促使俄羅斯與歐盟的關係日趨緊密，而俄羅斯的領導階層亦將俄歐關係視為戰略伙伴關係。俄羅斯在葉爾辛執政時期，由於決策階層對於俄歐夥伴關係缺乏清晰的認知，導致俄歐戰略夥伴關係之發展並未有重要成果。 俄羅斯對歐盟關係經過長時間的停滯不前後，在普欽執政下，歐盟逐漸成為俄羅斯外交政策的重要目標。俄羅斯與歐盟在政治、經濟、商貿及安全等領域之關係發展對於彼此均非常重要，但是雙方在民主、人權、貿易及能源等方面仍然存有許多分歧，俄羅斯與歐盟唯有透過協商及彼此妥協方能有效解決上述歧見。 / Post-Cold War and post-communist transformations had brought Russia closer to the European Union, the Russian leadership had declared that it had made a European choice and viewed EU-Russian relations as a strategic partnership. But during Yeltsin’s presidency, many Russian policy-makers seemed to lack a clear understanding of what to get from the EU-Russian partnership, the EU-Russia strategic partnership did not produce any serious results. After a decade of uncertainty about Russia’s relations to the EU, the EU has become a constant theme in Russia’s foreign policy discourse of Putin’s presidency. The relationship between Russia and the EU is very important to both parties in political, economic, business, and security terms. But there are many disputes between Russia and EU in democracy, human rights, trade, energy, etc. Russia and the EU can only solve these problems through negotiations and compromises.

本文旨在探討俄羅斯影子經濟現象，而在影子經濟包羅萬象的形式中，又以當前俄羅斯最重要議題之一的貪污為主要分析主題。本文內容主要可以分為三部分：第一部分，首先釐清影子經濟與貪污概念，並闡述影子經濟於蘇聯末期發展情況以了解其背景。第二部分，探討蘇聯解體後俄羅斯向市場經濟轉型時期影子經濟的轉變，以及貪污的主要模式。第三部分，剖析普欽任總統時期俄羅斯影子經濟的發展，自不同面向檢視貪污情形，並闡釋影子經濟與貪污的關係。 本文將影子經濟內涵界定為家戶經濟，非正式經濟活動，與犯罪經濟活動。其中，貪污屬犯罪經濟活動範疇，且又以政府部門的貪污影響最劇。俄羅斯影子經濟自蘇聯末期開始快速發展，向市場經濟轉型時期，由於各類必要制度的缺乏，改革措施導致影子經濟規模擴展，許多影子關係亦於此時期制度化。二十一世紀初期，俄羅斯影子經濟受葉爾欽時期遺續影響，規模仍大。然而，普欽第一任總統任期中，影子經濟與貪污情況皆有所改善。但於第二任期間因政府治理品質惡化，行政體系問題，以及整體民主自由度的下降，導致貪污再次成長。最後本文指出，貪污不僅為影子經濟中主要制度之一，且為促使非法影子經濟發展的主要根源。因此，本文認為，欲抑制削減非法影子經濟應得從打擊貪污著手，並嘗試提出降低貪污規模的辦法。 / The main purpose of this article is to explore the phenomena of shadow economy in Russia. And in the multiform shadow economy, the most topical issue in Russia today – corruption has been chosen as the core of our analysis. Contents of this article can be divided into three parts: first of all, the concepts of the shadow economy and corruption are defined. Meanwhile, the development of the shadow economy in the late Soviet era is introduced as background knowledge. In the second part, the evolution of the shadow economy during Russia’s transition to market economy, as well as specific models of corruption are expounded. The third part presents an analysis of the development of the shadow economy in Putin’s period, examines corruption from different dimensions, and interprets the relations between shadow economy and corruption. In this article the shadow economy includes following three kinds of activities: household economic activities, unofficial economic activities, and illegal economic activities. As one kind of illegal economic activities, corruption of government officials has the most serious impact. The shadow economy in Russia spread quickly in the last years of Soviet Union. Afterward throughout the economic transition, owing to lack of essential institutions, market reforms stimulated expansion of the scale of the shadow economy. Diverse shadow relations and behaviors were also institutionalized in that period. While at the beginning of Putin’s regime, because of the legacy of his predecessor, the scale of the shadow economy remained high, in Putin’s first term the situations of the shadow economy and corruption indeed had been improved. Nevertheless, due to deterioration of the quality of governance, problems in the administrative system, and a decline in the level of democratic freedom, corruption again wildly grew in his second term. Corruption is seen in this article as a primary institution of the shadow economy and the root of illegal shadow economy. Thus it is considered in this article that restraining illegal shadow economy must start from combating corruption, and few possible methods of reducing corruption are purposed.

本篇論文主要是探討從一九九一年到一九九六年俄羅斯政治菁英變動的情況。俄羅斯菁英的變動主要是根基於兩個主要的因素，一為戈巴契夫的改革，另一則為九一年的蘇聯解體。本篇文章主要是利用兩個面向去探討俄羅斯菁英變動的情形，一為菁英結構的分化，另一則為菁英政治態度的凝結度。同時我們認為利用職官名錄身份來測量新菁英是否為重製的標準是不妥當的。我們認為職官名錄應視為一政治階層，而非菁英團體。本篇論文研究的結果顯示，現今俄羅斯菁英的組成已經與過去蘇聯時期的菁英有所不同，尤其是新進角色—專業人員的加入更是重要。由此，可以得知俄羅斯菁英已經產生循環的現象。 / In this thesis we want to find out the situation of the change of the Russian political elite from 1991 to 1996. The change of Russian elite is influenced by two causes: one is the Gorbachev’s reform, the other is the collapse of the Sovit Union in 91’. In this thesis we use two dimensions, the differentiation of elite’s structure and the unity of elite’s political attitude, to find out in Russia the circulation of elite happens or not, and meanwhile we also argue the nomenklatura is used to be as a standard to measure the level of reproduction of elite is not appropriate. We think the nomenklatura is a political stratification, not a political elite group. The result of the study shows that the proportion of the Russian elite has been changed, is different from that of the Sovit Union. The character of New Comer, has been joined in the Russian elite group is the evident of the circulation of Russian elite has happened.

台灣出口至俄羅斯的商品，機械類商品為前三大項目之一。本研究試以策略三構面分析，台灣機械產業進入俄羅斯市場的經營策略。另外，採用訪談法的方式，訪問有俄國經商經驗之台灣機械廠商，探析廠商拓展俄國市場之經營情形與發展策略。本文之研究目的有兩點：其一，藉由策略三構面，分析台灣機械產業經營俄羅斯市場的策略；其二，實地訪問台灣廠商，探悉其於俄國市場經營的實際策略。選擇1992至2010年，對俄羅斯市場有往來經驗且生產H.S. Code 84的台灣機械廠商為研究範疇。 研究結果顯示，現階段台灣機械業於俄國，主要以代理商的方式接洽，藉由台灣製造的品牌形象以及研發技術生產水準，在當地市場具有競爭優勢，台俄雙方以互信為基礎，建立良好合作關係。根據訪談調查，實際上，台灣機械廠商對俄國市場的拓商大多非主動接洽，是由俄國廠商尋找買主，與台灣方面合作。另外，受到自身的資源影響，以及本身對俄羅斯市場的熟悉度，會影響廠商在當地的經營發展策略，在不熟悉市場的情況下，廠商多採保守策略，以觀望的態度經營市場。 關鍵字：經營策略、機械產業、俄羅斯市場 / Russia inherits the industrial structure of former Soviet Union. Soviet Union devoted to develop military industry but ignored machinery industries for household use. In order to fulfill domestic demand, Russia imported lots of machineries from Germany, China, Italy and Taiwan and so on. As a result, machinery goods are the top three of total exported goods which Taiwan exported to Russia for the long time. According to the background above, this study attempts to research the business strategies of Taiwan machinery industry to the Russian market by strategic management. The method of study is interviewing Taiwanese machinery firms which trading with Russia for analyzing their strategy used to the Russian Market. The study period is from 1992 to 2010, and participants are Taiwanese machinery firms who produced H.S. Code 84, and traded with Russia. Currently, most of Taiwanese machinery firms choose to use agent as their entry model, selling machinery and make conservative decision to the Russian Market by agent. Due to Russia is an emerging market; Taiwanese machinery firms are not familiar with Russian in the scope of economy, politics, social culture and language. In Russia, Taiwanese machinery industry has core resources like price is reasonable than Europe countries, quality is better than China; they will be very competitive in the Russian market. Thus, in order to keep each other good business connection for a long time, Taiwanese machinery firms should build up honest and friendly relationship with Russian agents and clients aggressively. Keyword: Business Strategy, Machinery Industry, Russian Market

街童是指大部分時間在街上生活的兒童。大多數的街童已經和家裡斷絕往來，依靠街童團體在現實世界生活下去。俄羅斯聯邦存在許多的街童。在俄羅斯轉型時期，國家將注意放在政治和經濟上，並且削減大幅度的社會福利，因此，創造出一波街童潮。 俄羅斯街童的生活方式不僅促使他們早夭，還惡化社會問題。本文從蘇聯制度遺緒、社會環境變遷，和家庭系統失衡來探討這一批街童的成因。最後，討論俄羅斯官方與非政府組織的因應街童措施，發現俄羅斯政府的態度與應對街童的措施是杜絕街童問題的關鍵。 / Street children are groups of children who spend most of their time living on the streets. Most of them have already cut their relationships with their families, and they depend on members of their street children group to survive in real world. There are many street children in the Russian Federation. When Russia was in transition, the government put the attention on politics and economy, besides that, the government reduced the scope of social welfare, therefore creating a wave of street children. The way of life of Russian street children does not only cause them to die young, but also is a factor for the deteriorating social problems. This study discusses cause factors of this group of street children from the soviet institution, the change of society, and the imbalance of the family system. Finally, this thesis discusses Russian official and NGO’s measures those responding to street children, and concludes that the attitude of the Russian government and how it reacts to the street children is a key factor in putting an end to the problem of street children.

本研究旨在衡量俄羅斯銀行業競爭程度的變化，探討2003至2010年間，其銀行行為、政府政策和國際情勢對俄羅斯銀行業競爭程度的影響。本研究以非結構法的Panzer-Rosse模型為研究主軸，並輔以結構性指標來衡量俄羅斯銀行業的競爭程度，發現俄羅斯銀行業在2003至2009年俄羅斯的銀行市場大多處於獨占性競爭。但是2010年以資產標準化的總收入為被解釋變數時卻無法拒絕市場存在獨占力或銀行間存在聯合勾結的寡占之需無假設，可能與俄羅斯政府因應全球金融危機所作的政策調整有關。 為使結果更具可靠性，本研究排除可能影響檢定結果知極端值進行敏感性檢定，將可能對市場具有獨占力的俄羅斯最大的國有銀行Sberbank排除在樣本之外，結果2010年的俄羅斯銀行市場仍然存在獨占力。另外，考慮不同地區銀行密集度的不同，將研究樣本分成中央聯邦區與非中央聯邦區，結果發現在銀行密集度較高的中央聯邦區在2005至2009年為完全競爭，但是該地區2010年的銀行市場依然存在獨占力，而非中央聯邦區的競爭程度變化較小。相較於過去的文獻，本文發現俄羅斯銀行業在考慮利息收入與非利息收入之競爭程度有所不同，尤其在2008至2010年間的差異更為明顯，而俄羅斯銀行業的競爭程度在金融危機期間也確實因為採用的被解釋變數不同，致使兩者的H統計量與市場檢定結果呈現不一致的趨勢。 / This paper examines the degree of market competition in Russian banking industry by analyzing the impact of bank activity, government policy and international situation over the period of 2003-2010.We use the P-R model as well as concentration ratio and Herfindall-Hirschman Index to measure the competition in order to distinguish competitive behavior on market. Evidence is found that during the period of 2003-2009 the Russian banking industry is characterized as monopolistic competition. But in 2010, the market becomes monopolistic due to the change of government policy by global financial crisis. To do our sensitivity analysis, we exclude the outlier that might influence the results such as Sberbank, the biggest state bank of Russia. But our results remain the same. Furthermore, this paper separates the region into Central Federal District and non- Central Federal District, and we find that market is perfect competition in Central Federal District in period 2005-2009, but monopoly still exists in 2010. Compared with the previous literature, this paper finds that some differences exist between the results when dependent variable is interest revenue and the result of total revenue, especially in period of 2008-2010.

本文旨在研究俄羅斯銀行監管體系的建構與發展，並藉由巴塞爾銀行監管的框架概念，檢視俄羅斯自轉型以來的銀行監管政策的形成與演進，主要研究目的有三。首先，研究俄羅斯經歷過經濟轉型後，銀行監管體系的發展與建構情形；其二，透過巴塞爾銀行監管協議的核心原則，檢視俄國銀行監管的發展現況；最後，進一步探討俄國與國際上的銀行監管通則－巴塞爾銀行監管協議，兩者之間的差距。研究發現，隨著俄羅斯的經濟持續成長，與銀行監管的發展，俄羅斯的金融市場與銀行監管政策已經建立一套制度，有了大幅進步，然而仍然與國際標準有所差距，原因主要出在，俄羅斯政府法規給予該國央行，實質上的監管權限不夠，無法對國家銀行業的各種問題進行有效的整頓。

台俄雙方展開經貿交流已經有十多年的歷史了，但這十幾年來台灣與俄羅斯之間的經貿關係 不論於貿易額上或雙邊各種對於投資者法規的簽定上沒有較突破性的進展，台商在俄羅斯市場 面臨重重的困境，台灣企業到俄羅斯投資時究竟遇到哪些障礙？本論文將運用模糊理論的概念，以「模糊德菲法」與「模糊層級分析法」作為研究分析方法，藉此篩選出台商赴俄羅斯所面臨投資障礙的重要性程度，以了解台商赴俄羅斯所面臨眾多投資障礙中哪些對台商影響最為嚴 重。本論文的問卷發放將分為兩階段：第一階段先發放模糊德菲法專家問卷期望透過產官學三方面決策群體的意見確立架構與各項評估因子，第二階段再進行模糊層級分析法以求算各進入 障礙的權重關係。依據本研究的結果我們可以歸納出： 1. 在經過專家訪談以及文獻回顧所歸納出的五大構面台商赴俄投資障礙，立法、社會、經濟、金融、政治中、立法以及政治方面的問題是對赴俄羅斯投資的台商受影響最大的。 2. 立法問題上投資法令不透明，中央地方法令的規定不一是影響台商最大的。 3. 經濟金融方面高度的通貨膨脹以及高關稅重複課稅銀行體系不健全為台商赴俄投 資所面臨經濟金融方面的障礙。 4. 社會方面當地緊密的關係網絡對於台商在俄羅斯的阻礙相當大，由於俄羅斯社會 上對於關係仍相當重視無法打入當地的生活圈阻礙了台商於俄羅斯當地的投資。

本文研究以總統權力、國會政黨體系與府會關係，來分析俄羅斯的總統權力及其政府體制類型。藉由評量俄羅斯總統權力與他國總統權力比較的方式，瞭解俄羅斯總統權力的範圍，及其所產生的影響。 本文重新檢視俄羅斯政府體制是否符合半總統制的定義，探討在俄羅斯政治發展過程中，總統權力的範圍會是否受到府會一致與否（府會一致或不一致）、國會內政黨分佈型態（聯盟或單一政黨組成）與國會多數的席次多寡（過半或三分之二過半）的影響。 本文研究發現，俄羅斯現行的政府體制實際運作模式為總統制，但俄羅斯政府體制仍有向半總統制傾斜的可能性，而這種可能必須具備兩個要件：一、憲法修改；二、慣例的建立，總統尊重國會多數，放棄組閣的權力。

俄羅斯於1992年獨立後開始向市場經濟轉型，為了擺脫經濟危機並發展國家經濟，俄羅斯全力開發市場、健全制度，並積極吸引外國直接投資，以彌補其國內資金之不足等問題。外國直接投資不僅為俄羅斯注入國際資金，也帶入新的技術、管理，使俄羅斯整體環境與國際接軌。本文將探討外國直接投資進入俄羅斯的狀況，以及影響外國直接投資進入俄羅斯之因素及其進入俄羅斯所面臨之問題，包括俄羅斯政府的態度與其所制定的政策法規，並分析外國直接投資與俄羅斯經濟之互動。本文使用Dunning的折衷理論，分析外國直接投資俄羅斯所擁有的所有權優勢、區位優勢與內部化優勢；其次加入分析俄羅斯經濟轉型與法規變動過程，得以了解外國直接投資俄羅斯所面臨的問題。研究發現，獨立後的俄羅斯極力吸引外國直接投資，期盼可以為俄羅斯帶入大量資金與技術。然經濟轉型的挫敗導致俄國投資環境惡化，外資望之卻步。所幸俄羅斯不斷對政策與法律作修改，期許能為外國直接投資提供良好的投資環境。經過十五年的努力，俄羅斯的外國直接投資出現亮眼的發展，這將為俄羅斯經濟帶來更多的希望。