在民主政治中，所謂「第四權」的大眾傳播媒體，具有監督國家的功能。大眾傳播媒體的自由與獨立的程度，乃是民主化的重要指標之一。本論文旨在探究普丁時期，俄羅斯大眾傳媒體與政權的關係。 俄羅斯大眾傳播媒體的功能與運作模式，隨著蘇聯解體與民主轉型，有著重大的改變。然而，普丁政權藉由「愛國主義」和「管理式民主」，對俄國傳媒進行控制，從新聞自由的角度來看，此舉造成了俄國民主的倒退。 普丁藉由國家控股公司、大眾傳播媒體法，以及限制國外媒體等手段，達成媒體國家化的目標。雖然電視深受俄國人民喜好與信賴，但是多屬國營電視台。作者分析了政治對大眾傳播媒體的影響，尤其是電視台在處理俄國總統大選及對於反恐怖行動的新聞及議題設定上，均可看出克里姆林宮高層所操作的痕跡。 / The mass media, the so-called fourth estate, have a function of oversight over the state in democratic politics. The extent of the mass media’s freedom and independence is one of the important criteria of democratization. The thesis aims to explore the relations between the mass media and regime in Putin’s Russia. The functions and operational mode of Russian mass media have changed significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and during democratic transition. However, the mass media have been under regime’s control through “patriotism” and “managed democracy” in the Putin era, and that has caused Russia’s democratic setbacks from the perspective of press freedom. The Putin regime used state holding companies, laws on the mass media, and limitations on foreign media to achieve the goal of nationalizing the mass media. Television is popular and trusted by Russian people, but most of Russia’s TV stations are under state control. The author analyzes the political effects of the Kremlin-controlled mass media, especially the impact of television broadcast on presidential elections and anti-terrorism campaign.

本文探討俄羅斯的社會福利改革過程。透過說明俄羅斯社會福利制度改革模式的選擇，解釋影響改革的因素，具體描述了蘇聯解體以來的俄羅斯福利制度改革過程，特別是普丁政府的改革策略。討論主題為俄羅斯的福利制度改革模式為何？影響俄羅斯福利制度改革的因素有哪些？何以普丁政府得以克服阻礙推動福利制度改革？ 本文套用Esping-Andersen的分類法來分析俄羅斯的福利模式，發現俄羅斯福利制度轉型採用自由模式作為改革方法。至於普丁政府何以克服困難進行福利制度改革，本文從經濟、政治和國家治理三個角度分析之，發現國家治理能力的改善是普丁政府得以推動福利改革的重要原因。 / This study aims at exploring the process of social welfare reform in Russia. To fulfill this goal, the author describes the pattern and factors of reform during the Post-Soviet era with a specific focus on the Putin government's policy. The main subjects of the study are the pattern of reform, the factors contributing to reform, and the Putin government’s reform strategy. By applying Esping-Anderson’s classification of welfare reform to Russia, the author finds that the Russian government has taken a liberal approach to reform. The thesis analyzes Putin government's reform policy from three perspectives, economy, politics, and state governance, and concludes that the improvement of state governance plays the main role in advancing Russian social welfare reform.

本論文採取改革-反改革循環研究途徑與克里姆林政治研究途徑，闡釋俄羅斯總統普欽重新定位民營化政策的驅動因素。 2000年，普欽當選總統後，以迅雷不及掩耳的霹靂手段，徹底解構金融工業集團，並將業已民營化的大型企業，特別是能源企業，收歸國有；同時，以漸進的方式，逐步推動以中小企業為主的民營化。 本論文認為，普欽重新定位俄羅斯民營化走向的主要目的在於，解構葉里欽勢力集團、拓展國際戰略空間、以及創造經濟改革條件；而這三項努力的終極目標，則在於掃除異己、改善經濟、攏絡民心、提升大國地位、從而鞏固個人政治權位。 / Applying reforms/counter-reforms cycle approach and kremlinological politics approach, the purpose of this study is aimed at exploring driving forces behind Russian president Putin’s efforts to reorient Russia’s privatization policy line. Immediately after his inauguration in 2000, Russian president, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, took quick and decisive steps to thoroughly undermine the financial industrial groups and renationalize those privatized big enterprises, especially, energy enterprises. At the same time, step by step, he pushed forward a new privatization policy line, concentrate on small and medium-sized enterprises. This author argues in this study that main driving forces behind Putin’s efforts to reorient Russia’s privatization policy line are identified as attempts to undermine the pro-Yel’tsin group, to develop international strategic maneuvering room, and, to create favorable conditions for economic reforms. This author contends that the ultimate aim of these efforts is to wipe out political rivals, to improve economic life in order to win support from the populace, to promote Russia’s status as a great power, and, eventually, to consolidate Putin’s personal power. Key wods: Putin, Yel’tsin, Russia’s privatization, financial oligarchs, FIG.

美俄關係的發展仍是國際關係重要的一環，雙方均足列大國，但在許多議題上的認知、利益卻經常出現矛盾，即使在冷戰結束近二十年後的今日，美俄關係對國際局勢的影響仍扮演舉足輕重的角色。自蘇聯解體以來，美俄關係呈現起伏不定的態勢，而普欽時期的美俄關係正好經歷和緩與降溫之轉變，實為研究美俄互動的良好時間點。普欽上台後不久便發生911事件，促使美俄關係迅速升溫，然而隨著分歧逐漸浮上檯面，普欽對美認知也出現轉變，雙方關係慢慢走下坡，尤其自2007年起美俄關係更是急轉直下，使得普欽任期最後兩年雙方關係屢創新低。筆者在本篇論文中將討論普欽時期美俄關係之變化，並瞭解造成各階段關係變化之因素，從中觀察美俄交往模式的轉變。另外，筆者將著重討論後普欽時期對美俄關係造成重大影響的兩個議題：北約擴大問題及東歐飛彈防禦系統問題，深入探討構成後普欽時期美俄互動的兩大主軸，分析美俄各自的考量與衝突點，並總結普欽時期俄羅斯對美態度之轉變以及美俄互動模式的改變。

本研究以普丁於2012年後所提出之「傳統價值」──東正教、愛國主義與中央集權為出發，在其談話與文件為基礎上，以文獻分析法分析自2000年以後普丁執政以來之傳統價值意涵。並以歷史研究方法分析，其所提出的傳統價值在俄羅斯歷史上的意義與形成模式，以及在俄羅斯歷史上的作用，並藉此比較傳統價值在普丁執政期間的復甦現象，以及探討其意欲復甦傳統價值的原因、目的與政策執行。 / This study focuses on the emphasis on traditional balues by Vladimir Putin since 2012. Various documents including speeches by Putin since he first took presidency in 2000 are analyzed to decode the true meaning of what the Russian leader considers as the traditional values of Russia. The study explores the evolutions of Orthodoxy, patriotism and government centralization in the history of Russia, compares them with the modern definition of traditional values today, and by analyzing how Putin proactively formulates his policies to resurrect these traditional values, the study attempts to explain the reason and intention of Putin’s such policies.

本文的研究目的，企圖從地緣政治與克里姆林宮政治研究的角度，就俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則的形成因素作一研究與分析。 本論文發現俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則形成的主要動因有二： 一、地緣政治惡化是促使俄羅斯調整軍事準則的根本動因。 由於冷戰結束後全球戰略格局的變遷，俄羅斯在國際地位明顯下降，地緣政治環境日益惡化，傳統勢力範圍受到侵蝕，國力嚴重衰退，為續與美國保持低水準戰略平衡以及抗衡北約東擴，確保其國家利益和國際地位。另面對解決境內及獨立國協宗教、民族衝突所爆發局部戰爭及軍事衝突，在軍事上重新制定了俄羅斯聯邦軍事基本準則由單一注重外部威脅，轉為同時注重國內、外兩種威脅，重點由世界戰爭轉向地區性衝突。這說明了俄羅斯的新軍事準則在相當大程度上受到地緣戰略的影響。 二、俄羅斯軍方的態度及國內政治生態是促使軍事準則調整變化的另一因素。 隨著俄羅斯超級大國地位的喪失、地緣政治環境惡化、軍隊地位和待遇的不斷下降及士氣日益低落，軍隊對國家的安全和強烈不滿。強烈要求重樹大國地位、恢復軍隊實力。俄羅斯軍隊一些將領紛紛公開批評外交政策和軍事政策。同時，由於在1993年10月流血事件中，葉爾欽動用軍隊戰勝議會，增大了政府對軍隊的依賴，使俄羅斯軍隊在國家政治生活中的發言權和影響力日益增大。故葉爾欽在制定安全政策和軍事準則時不得不更多地考慮軍隊的利益和主張：如在制定新軍事準則中明確保障軍人及其家屬福利、增加軍費開支、放慢軍轉民步伐、以及在境外顯示軍事存在等方面，都採取了一系列迎合軍隊主張的措施和行動。而葉爾欽為贏得民心，鞏固地位，即開始了以恢復大國地位為中心的內外政策的大調整。在這種特定的政治氣氛中，新的俄羅斯軍事準則應運而生。可見，俄羅斯軍方的態度是促使俄羅斯軍隊準則調整與轉變的重要因素之一。 在此兩個主因中以俄羅斯國內政治生態互動，特別是葉爾欽與軍隊間關係影響最大，加上冷戰後美中俄戰略三角互動的架構的國際政治格局，在此條件下，形成了俄羅斯聯邦新軍事準則。 / The purpose of the thesis is attempting to analyze the factors that exert great impact on the formation of the Russian Federation's military doctrine from the perspective of geopolitics and Kremlin politics. This thesis is taking the position that Russian Federation's military doctrine has been shaped by two main motives: First, the worsening geopolitical situation demands that Russia adjust its military doctrine. Due to the changes of global strategy after the end of the cold war, the decline of Russia's international prestige, worsening geopolitical situation and the severe threat to Russia's traditional sphere of interest, Russia takes important measures to adjust its military doctrine accordingly. In order to keep minimum strategic balance with the United States, ensure its national interest and international status and settle local wars or military conflicts caused by religion and ethnic conflicts within Russia's own territory and Commonwealth of Independent States, new military thinking has to emphasize both internal and external threats. Second, the attitude of Russian army and domestic political struggle also force Russia to adjust its military doctrine. Owing to the loss of superpower status and the decline of army's status and wellbeing, leading generals of the Russian army became increasingly dissatisfied with government's foreign policy and military thinking. They demanded that Russia restore her great power status and restrengthen its army's forces. In the blooding event of October 1993, Yeltsin used army to defeat the parliament, for this reason Yeltsin had to depend more on army. Russian army has became more influential in politics. Yeltsin had to consider army's interests and opinions in draw up security policy and military doctrine. For example, new military thinking clearly ensures welfare of soldiers and their family, increases military expense, slows down the speed of conversion and other measures to satisfy army. Besides, in order to gain people's support and consolidate political power, Yeltsin started to adopt policy to restore status of great power. Among these two dynamics, domestic political struggle－the relationship between Yeltsin and army－plays more influential role. Russian Federation's military doctrine was thus formulated under Kremlin politics and the interaction of strategic triangle.

雖然俄羅斯民族主義在不同的歷史發展過程中，都起著不同的作用，但是其對西方的敵意卻似乎未曾改變。對於所有的俄羅斯政治家而言，適時的煽動俄羅斯民族主義，是助其掌握國家權力的一大要素。因此俄羅斯的民族主義一直深深影響著俄羅斯對外政策的走向。 自一九九三年之後，以極端民族主義者為主的俄羅斯民族主義，不但成為國內政治的一股新勢力，同時也對俄羅斯的對外政策產生極大的影響。分析從一九九一年到一九九八年的俄羅斯對外關係發展史，我們可以看出在一九九四年之後，俄羅斯明顯的從早期的親西方外交政策，逐漸轉變成為以國家利益為重的大國外交政策。亦即把對外政策的工作重點，從美國轉移到中國和「近鄰國家」地區。 本篇論文希望藉由分析國內政治中的民族主義因素，及其對俄羅斯對外政策的影響，以瞭解俄羅斯對外政策的實際走向。 / Although Russia nationalism has different functions in different historical stages, but its hostility to the west has never changed. To all Russian politicians, to abet Russian nationalism appropriately is one of the most important means to control the power of the state. That's the reason why Russian nationalism has always influenced the direction of Russian foreign policy. After 1993, Russian nationalism led by extreme nationalists is not only a new force in domestic affairs, but also critically influential in Russian foreign policy. Through the analysis of the foreign affair development in Russian history from 1991 to 1998, we can tell that after 1994 Russia has altered the pro-western foreign policy to the great state " velikaya derzhava " foreign policy, which emphasizes on the national interests. That means Russia has transferred their attention from America to China and the region of " near abroad ". The dissertation will analyze Russian nationalism in domestic policy and how it influences Russian foreign policy, we could then understand the real direction of Russian foreign policy.

二十世紀末，第三波民主化浪潮席捲全世界，在1974至1990年間全世界約莫有三十個國家由非民主政治體制轉型到民主政治體制。此波民主化浪潮始於南歐國家。次一波則發生於拉丁美洲國家與中美洲國家。再者為東歐國家。最近一波則發生於非洲與前蘇聯國家。最後，亞洲地區亦於1970年代迄今，開展民主轉型進程。於此其中，俄羅斯與台灣皆為第三波民主化浪潮中，自威權政體轉型至民主國家。 戈爾巴秋夫出任蘇聯共產黨中央委員會總書記後，在1985年4月蘇共中央全會上毅然提出了「改造」(Perestroika)的新戰略及其基本原則。起初，戈爾巴秋夫改造之主要目的在克服蘇聯經濟停滯不前的現象，稍後，戈爾巴秋夫發覺，僅在經濟領域內進行改造，很難收到預期效果。因而，戈爾巴秋夫決定同時進行政治改革，此舉開啟俄羅斯進行民主轉型之先河。 在台灣，1986年時，執政的國民黨，面臨國外民主化浪潮與國內黨外運動要求更多政治權力的雙重壓力下，始對國家的政治體制進行改造。時至李登輝主政，順然延續此波政治自由化之態勢，並進而開啟台灣民主化進程。 本文選擇俄羅斯與台灣兩國作為比較與研究之目的，著眼於俄羅斯與台灣的歷史發展軌跡中，從執政黨創立、政黨型態、國家肇建、國家機器之運作以及最終邁向民主化的種種背景、情境與模式皆具備著相當程度上相似，進而，試圖探討民主轉型在俄羅斯與台灣開展之動因、民主化途徑模式、及主政者之策略運用，並分析在戈爾巴秋夫與李登輝主政下，俄羅斯與台灣寧靜革命之肇發。 關鍵詞：第三波民主化、寧靜革命、俄羅斯、台灣、李登輝、戈爾巴秋夫

近年來，伴隨著俄羅斯經濟實力的提升，俄羅斯金融體系持續茁壯，並推動俄羅斯國內對金融安全需求的迅速增長。俄羅斯金融體系受政治影響極深，中央銀行缺乏獨立性。2007 年次貸風暴對俄羅斯經濟傷害甚鉅，2008年7雷曼兄弟宣布倒閉後，總計10個月內盧布貶值幅度高達52.5%，從MSCI股價指數波動率(equity VIX index)觀察美國、俄羅斯、日本及歐洲，顯示俄羅斯股市波動率最高，以2007 年的136.7 及2008 年的432.7 居冠。在金磚四國中，俄羅斯短期資金的流動性較高，股市波動率也較高。俄羅斯金融體系不良貸款比率高，易發生金融傳染危機，不良貸款比率高出其他國家4 到8 倍。 在金磚四國中，俄羅斯短期資金的流動性較高，股市波動率也較高。總體而言俄羅斯金融體系近年愈為穩健，俄羅斯的金融存款機構信任度在2008年~2010年有明顯提高趨勢，但存款機構內不良貸款比率仍偏高，同時俄羅斯金融體系易受國際金融傳染危機影響俄羅斯金融體系不良貸款比率高，易發生金融傳染危機，若能降低目前俄羅斯金融存款機構的壞帳比例及呆帳率，則俄羅斯的金融安全會更加穩固。 / In recent years, along with the upgrading of Russia's economic strength, Russia's financial system continued to thrive, the needs of financial security growth rapidly. Russia's financial system is deeply influenced by political power, and their central bank is lack of independence. Subprime crisis hurt the Russian economy hugely, in July 2008, after Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy; ruble devalued 52.5% in 10 months. MSCI stock index volatility equity VIX index) for U.S., Russia, Japan and Europe, shows Russian stock market volatility rate was 432.7 and also the highest of all. In the BRIC, Russia presented higher short-term liquidity, and the stock market volatility. Overall, Russia's financial system is more robust and stable in recent years, from 2008 to 2010, the depository trust in Russian financial institutions increased significantly, while Russia's financial system is still vulnerable to the contagion of international financial crisis.

從事國際行銷時，需要認識當地的總體環境與產業環境，及研究當地消費者的需求。俄羅斯近幾年經濟迅速發展，且市場尚未飽和。許多企業看重這新興市場，紛紛前往此地開展。俄國國土面積世界第一，人口也為數不少。然而，俄國人口集中於歐俄地區，貧富差距大且購買能力差距懸殊。當地律法、稅制繁複不清，金融體系不甚透明，貪腐官僚問題嚴重，治安仍有待加強。俄國市場具有高度潛能，但也存有較高的政治風險。 　　資訊相關產品在俄的滲透率深具發展空間，近幾年政府與企業的電腦化促使市場快速成長。俄羅斯人民逐漸重視電腦技能的培養，對於電子產品的需求也越發強盛。俄國消費者選購電子產品時，越來越重視品牌，而降低對價格因素的考量。俄羅斯網路建設不足，經過開發後將創造更多商機。網站也快速發展，人民生活與資訊科技的關係越來越緊密。俄羅斯更是擁有豐沛的數理人才，在軟體研發領域頗具實力。 　　台灣資訊科技公司多透過俄國配銷商進入俄國市場，藉由他們分攤風險與了解市場。早期進入俄國市場的業者，如宏碁，積極尋找合適的俄國夥伴。如此為後進入市場的業者減輕審查與教育成本，卻也建立較高的品牌知名度。業者重視品牌形象的提昇與推廣，將行銷重點集中在人口密集與消費力強的莫斯科及聖彼得堡。面對廣大的俄國市場，企業更需當地夥伴的協助，確保經營流程的順暢。近年來越來越多台灣企業在俄設立辦事處，為求貼近市場以快速反應市場需求。 / Engaging in international marketing, companies have to know the countries’ overall situation and the relevant industry there. Russia’s economy is growing rapidly, and there are a lot of chances in this country. Many enterprises regard this emerging market as important, and go to Russia to do business. Russia is the largest country in the world, and there are many people there. However, much more residents are gathered in the Europe part of Russia, and the poverty gap is very big. In Russia laws and taxes are heavy and complicated. The government’s corruption and bureaucrat as well as public security are serious problems. There are both high potential and risks in Russian market. 　　The penetrative rate of relevant computer products in Russia is still low. Computerization of the government and enterprises makes Russian computer market grow rapidly. Russians are more and more attaching importance to computer skills, and there is more demand for IT products. Instead of emphasizing prices, Russians pay more attention to the brand while they choose electronic products. Russia’s network infrastructure is insufficient, but it will make more chances in the future. Russia is a large source of scientific, mathematical and programming talent, and she’s emerging and aggressive as a R&D center. 　　Lots of Taiwanese IT companies enter Russian market by local distributors. These distributors can help Taiwanese enterprises to more understand the market and reduce risks. Companies which entered Russian market earlier just like Acer had to pay more cost to find appropriate local partners, but they have won higher brand value. Enterprises take brand value seriously, and they focus more attention on Moscow and St. Petersburg. Because Russia is too big, Taiwanese companies need local partners’ assistance very much. More and more Taiwanese enterprises establish offices in Russia, so that they can respond to consumers’ requirements faster.