民國90年代初期，我國參照美、日私募之規定，正式引進私募制度。此後，企業得以選擇公開現金增資，或透過私募發行新股，來募集所需的營運資金。根據統計，民國94年以後，台灣的私募市場日趨成熟，私募逐漸成為企業最重要的籌資管道之一，特別是讓原先不能符合公開募集資格之公司，合法迅速取得資金。雖然私募之平均發行金額仍小於公開現金增資，但近年來私募件數平均都有超越公開現金增資之表現，顯示私募在資本募集市場的重要角色，也肯定其對於企業和經濟發展之正面功效。 過去文獻指出，美國之私募平均以折價發行，且有顯著正的宣告股價效果。針對不同樣本之特性，Wruck（1989）、Hertzel and Smith（1993）和Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan（2007）分別提出監督假說（monitoring hypothesis）、資訊不對稱假說（information asymmetry hypothesis）和自利假說（entrenchment hypothesis）解釋之。雖然我國之私募制度多參照美國而訂定，但法律架構和私募流程仍有相當程度的差異。因此，本研究將以上述三大假說為基礎，藉由樣本敘述統計和線性迴歸分析，探討我國上市上櫃公司私募之定價與宣告股價效果。 我們自公開資訊觀測站收集民國91年至98年7月底之私募股權樣本，扣除變數資料不全者，最後共有398筆，包含上市公司174筆，上櫃公司224筆。研究發現，我國私募多以折價發行。其中，特別股之折價幅度低於普通股，電子科技類普通股之折價幅度又高於普通股之平均。而且，根據迴歸結果，私募金額、私募比率和公司規模三個變數最能解釋我國私募之折溢價幅度，但並沒有傾向支持任一個私募假說。 至於宣告股價效果，我國私募董事會和股東會皆不顯著為正，且宣告股價效果的迴歸解釋力也偏低，只有股價淨值較具顯著性。探究其原因，可能是因為我國私募制度不同所致。依證交法之規定，私募股權需先經由董事會和股東會同意後，始得募集。然而，最後私募成功與否常與市況和發行公司能否找到適當投資人等密切相關。既然兩事件日都不能保證私募可以如期完成，我們也就無法預期投資人會對私募有明確迅速的反應。 / In the beginning of 2000, Taiwan’s Securities Transaction Law was amended to introduce the new way of financing- private placements. Since then public corporations are allowed to issue new securities either by public offerings and private placements. According to statistics, after 2005 private placements have become one of the most important funding sources for corporations, especially for those who are disqualified for public offerings. Although the average proceed of private placements is still relatively small, the number of private placements has already surpassed that of public offerings in recent years. This manifests the important role of private placements in building a sound financial market. Private placements in the U.S., despite selling at discounts, are associated with significant positive abnormal returns on the announcement date. With different sample characteristics, Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2007) suggest monitoring hypothesis, information asymmetry hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis respectively. Our study is based with these three most accepted hypotheses and aims to give an insight in Taiwan’s private placement of equities for public corporations. I search the Market Observation Post System for all private placements from 2002 to July of 2009, and obtain a sample of 398 private equities with complete data. Empirical evidence shows that Taiwan’s private equities are selling at discounts as well and “proceeds of private equity”, “placement fraction” and “corporate size” are the three significant explanatory variables for discounts. However, all the results seem not to fully support any hypothesis as mentioned above. On the other hand, the announcement stock price effects on the board and shareholders’ meeting are insignificantly positive in Taiwan. The regressions on the announcement stock price returns also indicate low explanatory power with only “Tobin’s Q” variable being significant overall. This may be attributed to the legislation differences between U.S. and Taiwan. According to Taiwan’s Securities Transaction Law, private equities should be first approved by the board and shareholders’ meeting, but might not be a successful private equity placement due to market condition, lack of proper investors and others. As a result, we can’t expect investors would instantly, correctly respond to this resolution information on those announcement dates.

本論文以國內1997-2006年之上市櫃集團為研究對象，探討集團企業內相互轉投資所造成的市值高估現象及其對公司價值的影響，並深入各集團分子企業探討不同轉投資標的對公司價值之影響。實證結果顯示集團企業內各分子企業相互轉投資的確造成集團市值高估之現象，而投資人對於該現象，給予集團企業整體負向評價。此外，就集團內各分子企業而言，轉投資於上市櫃公司由於資訊透明度相較於轉投資於非上市櫃公司為佳，故對於公司價值負面影響較不嚴重；而轉投資於集團內其他分子企業相較於投資集團外企業，由於關係企業間之交易揭露仍不透明，操縱可能性較高，故對於公司價值呈負面影響，後兩者實證研究都再次證明資訊透明度與公司價值間之正向關係。 / This study explores the double counting effect and the relationship between that effect and the corporate value resulting from cross-holding among firms in a conglomerate, and also explores the relationship between different type of investing objects and the corporate value by using a sample of companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over the Counter during 1997-2006. Our empirical analysis indicates that cross-holdings among firms in a conglomerate resulted in overvaluation of the group, and investors responded to them negatively. In addition, member companies in the conglomerate investing in companies listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange or Over the Counter did not so negatively influence the corporate value as compared to investing in companies not listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and Over the Counter mainly because of the information transparency. Furthermore, the information among conglomerate trading is still opaque and the possibility of manipulation is higher, so investment within the conglomerate as compared to outside companies has negative impact on corporate value. The above findings both proved a positive relationship between information transparency and corporate value.

隨著競爭的激烈，現今半導體晶圓代工產業面臨研發支出不斷增加以及晶圓製造廠的投資門檻越發提高之環境。然而在這晶圓代工競賽中，金融市場投資者也開始關注到金額龐大的資本資出是否能為公司創造更多的價值，以及其投資決策與融資決策對晶圓代工公司營運績效影響為何。 本研究以經濟附加價值(Economic Value Added; EVA)作為衡量半導體晶圓代工產業的公司價值指標，利用縱橫資料模型(panel data)驗證晶圓代工公司的EVA與市場價值之關連性，並探討影響半導體晶圓代工公司的價值創造的因子。此外，本研究亦針對半導體景氣循環指標及晶圓代工公司價值創造的關係進行研究。最後本研究以個案方式分析半導體晶圓代工公司價值創造之原因。 實證結果發現晶圓代工公司的EVA與市場價值具有高度的關連性與解釋能力，代表EVA確實能反映企業的真實價值。本文亦發現公司投入愈多的資本支出、追求高的營業利潤率、降低資金成本都會為半導體晶圓代工公司創造更多的價值。然而營收增加、營運資金投入的多寡及半導體景氣循環指標等因素對晶圓代工公司價值創造並無明顯之影響。此外，本文個案研究歸納出晶圓代工公司創造公司價值之因素共有下四點：一、擴大對現有的投入資本的報酬率。二、利用低利率環境和低β值，以降低資金成本。三、維持技術領先的競爭優勢，使公司擁有一段較長的時間能產生高於正常報酬率。四、加大資本資出進行新的投資，以賺取超額報酬。 / Advanced semiconductor manufacturing is at an inflection point with escalating R&D intensity and capital expenditure requirements for new fabrication plants of leading process. However, investors are concerned whether tremendous capital expenditure could generate return and create value to the company in this competition. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine the foundry firms’ value by adopting the concept of Economic Value Added (EVA), measuring the excessive return that a company can generate over the cost of capital. At first, this study tests the power of EVA to capture the relationship between a company’s market value and EVA of foundries. As EVA may be affected by numerous financial value drivers, this research examines and ascertains which factors are relevant. Furthermore, this study also monitors the EVA of these firms to determine their relationship with the semiconductor cyclical index. The primary findings of this study are illustrated as below. EVA is systematically linked to market value in foundry industry. In addition, foundries with higher operating profit margin and higher capital expenditure could create more firms’ value while foundries with higher cost of capital and financial flexibility would destroy its value. Moreover, foundries’ EVAs are not been significantly affected by growth of sales, investments in working capital, and semiconductor cycle index. Furthermore, this paper also conducts a case study to analyze why TSMC creates EVA continuously: (1)TSMC increases returns on existing capital while holding WACC and invested capital constant. (2)TSMC reduces the cost of capital by leveraging low interest rate and low beta. (3)TSMC makes new investments that earn returns greater than the WACC. (4)TSMC sustains the competitive advantage of technological leadership which enables the company to generate above-normal returns for a longer period.

在知識經濟時代中，企業的核心競爭價值已由過去以勞力、廠房及資本等有形資產為基礎，轉變至以智慧資本驅動為核心。然而，受限於會計準則對於智慧資本認列及評價規定之缺乏，僅以財務、實體資產衡量企業價值已不足以反映企業的真實價值。因此，本研究以人力、創新、流程及顧客資本等四大構面，選擇攸關價值因子之替代變數，從投入及產出觀點探討這些價值因子及價值因子間之相互效果對於企業價值的創造是否具有正向關係。 本研究根據Ohlson（1995）的評價模型作為理論架構，以2000年至2002年間台灣上市公司為研究對象，選擇以員工相對教育程度、專利權件數、資產週轉率及顧客留存率等作為智慧資本價值因子，並採用複迴歸方式從事當期及遞延一期之實證模型分析。 實證結果顯示，就智慧資本價值因子而言，員工相對教育程度、專利權件數及資產週轉率均與企業當期及遞延一期之市場價值具有顯著正向關係，惟專利權件數的遞延效益並不穩定。就價值因子間之相互作用而言，人力資本與創新、流程及顧客資本間及創新資本與顧客資本間所產生之綜效，與企業價值間具有正向關係，然而僅人力與創新資本間之綜效具有明顯之持續性。此外，創新與流程資本間之綜效，對於企業價值之創造則具有落後現象。 根據實證結果，本研究建議企業從事知識管理活動時，除應瞭解各項智慧資本對企業核心價值之貢獻外，並應重視智慧資本價值因子間之相互效果，俾利結合企業的經營策略，提昇其市場價值。 關鍵字：智慧資本、Ohlson模型、企業價值、相互效果 / In the era of knowledge economy, firm’s core competitiveness has changed from tangible assets which include labor, factory buildings and capital to the intellectual capital value-drivers. However, the lack of accounting standards of recognition and valuation of intellectual capital results in failing to reflect the firm’s intrinsic value. Therefore, this study uses dimensions of human capital, innovation capital, process capital and customer capital to select the alternative variables of relevant value factors and to examine the relationships between intellectual capital value factors, inter-effects in those value factors and firm’s market value from an input-output viewpoint. The framework of this study is based on Ohlson（1995）valuation model, and the samples of this study is the listed public companies in Taiwan during 2000 to 2002. This study uses relative education degree of employees, patents, assets turnover rate and customer retention ratio as the intellectual capital value factors, and adopts multiple regression methods to build the current and lagged one period empirical analysis models. As the intellectual capital value factors, the results show that relative education degree of employees, patents and assets turnover rate have significant positive effect on firm’s market value under current and lagged one period model. But lagged effect of patents is not stable. As the inter-effects of value factors, the results show that there are significant positive relationships between the synergies of human-innovation, human-process, human-customer, innovation-customer capital and the firm’s market value, but only human-innovation capital has a remarkable persistence. Furthermore, the synergy of innovation-process capital has a lagged effect on the firm value creation. According to the result, this study suggests that company should not only understand the contributions of every intellectual capital value factor to its core value, but also pay more attention to their inter-effects for integration of the firm’s operation strategies and increasing market value. Key words：Intellectual capital, Ohlson model, firm value, inter-effects

在現今知識經濟的世紀中，智慧資本已成為企業獲取競爭優勢的關鍵要素。 隨著智慧資本愈來愈重要，許多企業也逐漸在年報或其他公開資訊的管道中，揭 露更多有關智慧資本的資訊。透過更多智慧資本資訊的揭露，為企業本身及投資 人、債權人間建立起彼此溝通的橋樑。 綜上所述，智慧資本的報導和揭露顯得日趨重要。相關智慧資本資訊的揭露 能使投資人及相關利害關係人更了解公司發展的潛力及價值。而過去的文獻指出 公司資訊揭露的程度會降低資金成本、提高公司股價、降低分析師盈餘預測誤差 等效益。資訊的揭露可以使投資人修正對公司價值的評價，有提高股票流動率等 效益。因此智慧資本揭露及報導能提昇財務報導的價值攸關性，適當地反應公司 真正的價值。因此，對公司而言應多揭露相關智慧資本資訊，以期為公司帶來相 關的效益。但是，哪些公司特性因素會影響智慧資本揭露程度及其是否會影響智 慧資本揭露程度和其效益間的關聯性亦是值得我們進一步探討。 若能透過一系列的分析，找出公司智慧資本揭露政策不足之處，相信能給公 司適當的建議，以符合市場上的需求，適當地揭露智慧資本，以期反應公司真正 的價值並提高公司價值。 本研究係以我國資訊電子業之上市公司為研究對象，蒐集相關資料以統計分 析方法進行，發現之結果如下： 一、公司智慧資本揭露程度和公司價值呈顯著正相關。 二、「公司規模」、「舉債程度」、「公司年齡」會顯著影響公司智慧資本揭露程度。 三、「公司規模」、「獲利能力」、「公司年齡」、「智慧資本降加價值係數(VAICTM )」 會顯著影響智慧資本揭露程度及公司價值間的關聯性。 / In this knowledge-based economy, intellectual capital is the key factor to help firms get its competitive advantage. As intellectual capital is more and more important, many enterprises gradually disclose IC-related information in annual reports or other ways. With more IC-related information disclosures, it could build a bridge to communicate between enterprises, investors, and creditors. To sum up the above-mentioned, intellectual capital disclosure and report is more and more significant with time. IC-related information discourses can make investors and stakeholders understand the value and potential of the company much more. Prior research indicates disclosing information could reduce the average cost of capital and increase company’s stock value and reduce analyst forecast errors. Information disclosure can make investors revise upward valuations of the company’s stocks and increase stock liquidity. Therefore, for companies, they should disclose IC-related information in order to bring effects. But, which kind of company would affect IC-related information and affect the relation between IC-related information and its effects is also worth to investigate further. If we can find out deficiency of company’s IC-related information with above analysis, it will be believed to give some appropriate suggestions in order to match market’s needs. Disclosing IC-related information is aimed to react the company’s real value. In this study, collecting data and statistics analysis are used. The public firms in the electronic industry are the objects of the thesis. We fund that: 1. There is a positive and significant correlation between IC disclosure and market capitalization. 2. Company size, leverage, and age will affect IC-related information disclosure significantly. 3. Company size, profitability, age, and VAIC TM will affect the relation between IC-related information disclosure and its effects (market capitalization) significantly.

La Porta 等人以提高內部人持股可使內、外部股東利益一致，進而降低代理問題的觀點出發，在2002 年發表的實證研究中指出，提高內部人持股有助於提升公司的價值，特別是在對外部投資人保護較差的國家；他們也發現，對投資人保護程度愈好的國家，該國企業的價值也較高。本研究則從提高內部人持股可能產生的代理問題著手，在利弊同時存在之下，以涵蓋範圍更廣、時間更長的樣本，探討在不同的投資人保護環境下，提高內部人持股對公司價值的影響，以及投資人保護程度對於內部人持股集中與分散的公司價值是否也有不同的影響。 本研究發現，在投資人保護較佳的國家，提高內部人持股會傷害公司價值，但在投資人保護較差的國家，提高內部人持股可增加公司價值。另外，公司價值與內部人持股率之間呈現曲線關係，當內部人持股率相對較低時，提高內部人持股對公司價值是弊多於利；當內部人持股水準相對較高時，提高內部人持股則是利多於弊。而投資人保護程度對於內部人持股較分散的公司而言，顯得較為重要。因此，法律層面對投資人的保護程度和內部人持股集中度對於公司價值的影響有顯著的替代效果。 / This paper uses a sample of companies from 34 countries around the world to shed light on the relationships among legal protection of shareholders, ownership structure, and firm value. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate a positive relationship between cash flow, ownership, and firm value, especially in countries with poor investor protection. Besides, they also find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders. However, they don’t consider the effect of higher ownership on the cost of stealing, which may cause the controlling shareholders to expropriate more from minority shareholders. Also, their study covers only large firms with a controlling shareholder by one year data. Their results can be restricted to large firms and a particular year. Therefore, we use more comprehensive time series and cross section data to probe into the subject. Using various specifications of the valuation regressions of Fama and French (1998), we find that higher ownership improves valuation in poor protection countries while higher ownership deteriorates valuation in good protection countries. In addition, stronger legal protection improves firm value, especially the firms with low ownership concentration. That is, there is a substitute effect of legal protection and ownership concentration on firm valuation. Finally, we also testify that dividends are valued more in poor protection countries and firms with low ownership concentration.

本研究共包含三篇論文，首先修正von Hagen and Hepp(2000)所建立模型分析政府的財源轉移之風險分散與重分配動態效果。整體而言，補助與協助收入或統籌分配款所產生的所得與稅收風險分散或重分配效果相當有限，且各分區(北、中、南與全區)的結論差異甚大，顯示財源轉移發揮的效率不足。統籌分配款對於改善稅收的風險分散與重分配上，效果優於補助與協助收入。各縣市取得的補助與協助收入或統籌分配款高於長期所得與稅收風險分散與重分配所應對應的額度，造成資源浪費。就全區而言，前幾期稅收(所得)風險分散變化，可作為短期調整補助與協助收入(統籌分配款)的依據；統籌分配款與稅收的風險分散、補助與協助收入或統籌分配款與稅收重分配均存在雙向因果關係。 其次，在分析勞動者的休閒時間選擇時，本文修正跨期選擇模型，考慮勞動者持有投資組合與採取避險措施，並面對租稅問題下，以導出休閒時間方程式。實證上採用混合估計法針對12種樣本產業及兩種不同休閒時間衡量方式進行估計，結果顯示不同休閒時間衡量方式，影響估計結果甚鉅；金融市場的變化與波動攸關休閒時間變動：國內外利率、匯率與遠期匯率等與投資組合報酬相關的變數，在多數情況下顯著地影響休閒時間變動，且各變數對於休閒時間的影響程度，在工業中的次級產業大於服務業中的次產業。此外，採行周休二日制度確實改變制度採行前後的休閒時間，惟在三個工業次產業上則不明顯。 最後，修正Bo and Sterken (2002) 所建立的最適動態模型，分析公司價值不確定與租稅措施對海運廠商投資的影響，經由最大化公司價值導出影響台灣海運公司投資的三種不確定來源與避險措施，並進行實證估計。實證結果顯示，不確定的衡量方式攸關投資函數的估計結果，以指數加權移動平均標準差衡量不確定時，其估計結果優於以GARCH(1,1)衡量不確定，隱含廠商較在乎可預期波動對投資的影響。一般而言，廠商利率與原油價格的波動增加，均不利於公司投資，其中以原油價格不確定對於投資的影響最大，其效果約略與廠商利率相當。其次，影響海運公司投資最重要的三項因素均分別為BDI、負債與廠商利率，顯示價格與債務規模的重要性更甚於利率。此外，三種公司價值不確定來源對投資的影響，在多數個別公司之間並無顯著的差異，有助於採行總體財金政策以刺激投資。 / This dissertation contains three articles. First I revise the models set up by von Hagen and Hepp (2000) to analyze the dynamic effects of the Aid and Assistance and central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund on income (or tax) risk sharing and redistribution. For all the counties in Taiwan area the effects are tiny, but those are diverse among the counties in each Taiwan sub-area. The Aid and Assistance and central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund actually obtained by each county are larger than the amounts required to maintain long-term risk sharing and redistribution effects. These all imply that fiscal transfer is inefficiency. The effects of the central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund on risk sharing and redistribution are larger than those of Aid and Assistance. The central government can adjust the Aid and Assistance based on the change of earlier-period ax (income) risk sharing effect. Moreover, the existence of significant short-run interaction between the central government’s Tax Redistribution Fund and tax risk sharing, the Aid and Assistance and tax redistribution. Secondly, I revise intertemporal choice model by considering portfolio selection, hedging and taxation problems to derive economic agent’s leisure time equation. In empirical study, we focus on twelve sample industries and two different leisure time measurements, then adopt pooled estimation to estimate leisure time equation. Empirical results show that different measurement of leisure time influences estimation outcomes tremendously. Furthermore, the financial variables affecting portfolio return, including domestic and foreign interest rates, exchange rate and forward rate almost have remarkable effect on leisure time. Finally, the effect of each explanatory variable on leisure time is larger in industry than in service industry. Finally, I revise the optimal intertemporal model, constructed by Bo and Sterken (2002), by maximizing corporate value to derive three uncertainty sources and hedging influencing shipping-firm investment. Empirical evidences show that it is relevant for the estimation results to adopt which methods to measure the uncertainty. The outcomes derived from taking the Exponential Weighted Moving Average model to measure uncertainty are better than those from adopting the GARCH(1,1) model. Generally, as the volatilities in firm’s interest rate and crude oil price increase, firm investment decreases and the effect of crude oil price uncertainty on investment, the largest among the four effects, is nearly equal to that of firm interest rate on investment. Furthermore, BDI, debt and firm interest rate are the most important variables influencing firm investment. Finally, the effects of three uncertainty sources on investment are almost indifferent among the ten shipping-firms.

This dissertation discusses three issues. First, we provide a thorough survey of political connections in the essay “A Survey of Political Connection Literature.” Then two empirical studies on political connections are presented in the following two essays, “Do Political Preferences Affect Investor Trading Behavior and Market Reaction?” and “The Relationship between Ownership Structure and the Value of Political Connections: Evidence from the Taiwanese Presidential Election and Global Financial Crisis of 2008,” respectively. Last, we present the conclusions in the final chapter. From the survey in the first essay, the impacts of political connections on firm value and corporate finance issues are discussed. A number of recent studies have found that political connections create value for firms when these connections are considered beneficial. Thus, in the second essay, we are motivated to investigate what kind of stock market investors would take such advantages that increase the value of their portfolio. We are also motivated by the argument in the literature that the officials’ rent-seeking behavior to establish political connections may bear some costs for the firms. Then, in the third essay, we address the question whether the value of political connections is associated with the firms’ managerial ownership structure. We organize our three essays into Chapters 2 to 4, respectively, and we briefly describe these issues below. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical and empirical background of this dissertation. We survey extant research on political connections, with special attention to its importance on corporate finance. First we discuss whether and how political connections affect firm value. Then we turn to the channel through which political connections affect firm value. For instance, political connections help firms obtain more external funds with lower costs, which results in a decline in the required rate of return and an increase in the market value. Studies that discuss the characteristics of politically connected firms are also surveyed in this essay. In Chapter 3, the essay discusses whether or not political preferences bring value to a firm. We approach the issue by checking the share trading and stock returns of politically connected firms during the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential Election. In particular, we classify investors into sophisticated and non-sophisticated investors. The political preference hypothesis is proposed to explore whether the trading behavior of the two types of investors shifts when their favorite political party loses or wins during a Presidential Election. First, a sophisticated investor holds more shares in the firm connected with the winning political party, but has fewer shares in the losing party. However, this may not hold for non-sophisticated investors. Second, firms connected with the winning party exhibit positive stock returns, whereas firms connected with the losing party do not experience the same success. Finally, the increment shares of sophisticated investors in firms connected with the winning party are positively correlated with the stock returns around the time of the election. Specifically, sophisticated investors invest more on firms connected with the winning party, thus obtaining more abnormal returns. However, the results may not hold for non-sophisticated investors. Consequently, foreign investors are found to be sophisticated investors and political preference brings market value to this kind of investors. In Chapter 4, the essay examines the relationship between ownership structure and the value of political connections. We address this issue with the data of Taiwanese publicly-traded firms during the 2008 Taiwanese Presidential Election and the 2008 global financial crisis. First, following the literature, the value of political connections is examined through the positive abnormal stock returns of the winning-party-connected firms during the election. Then we find a negative relationship between the value of political connections and the deviation of management group’s control rights from cash flow rights. Second, using the collapse of Lehman Brothers as an exogenous shock to control for the overall decline in investment opportunity, we find that politically connected firms with managers possessing more excess control rights underperformed in stock returns than firms without such potentially entrenched managers. Thus, studies that do not consider the inverse impacts of potential expropriation tend to present an incomplete picture of the value of political connections.

We employ S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2013 to investigate how female directors affect firm value. We explore two possible channels, the monitoring effect and the risk management effect, through which female directors can have material effect on firms. While the prior research shows a negative relation between female directors and firm value, we find that such a relation diminishes in the post-SOX period (2004 to 2007). More importantly, female directors enhance firm value in the crisis period (2008 to 2013). Our findings suggest that the way female directors affect firm value changes depending on the external environment. Female directors benefit firms mainly by monitoring in the post-SOX period but by risk management in the crisis period.

本文以Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007)所使用的模型為基礎，研究公司治理對公司價值、現金持有價值以及股利的影響。以市值對淨資產比、資產報酬率(以同產業的平均ROA調整後)為衡量公司價值的變數。而以內部人的行為和公司監督機制2項指標來衡量公司治理。其中，公司內部人行為指標包括：董監質押比、盈餘股份比、關係人融資比。公司監督治理機制指標包括：法人持股比、大股東持股比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比、外部持股比。 以民國85-95年上市櫃公司為研究對象，以panel data之fix effect方式進行分析，實證結果顯示(一)對公司價值影響方面：盈餘股份比和法人持股比與公司價值呈現顯著正向關係；而董監質押比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比與公司價值呈負向關係。(二)在現金持有價值影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對現金持有價值影響為顯著負向，並無發現監督機制對現金持有價值有正向影響。(三)在股利影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對股利的影響為顯著正向，並無發現監督機制對股利有負向影響。整體來看，公司治理對公司價值確有影響，但對現金持有價值和股利的影響方面，並沒有發現如Pinkowitz et al. (2006)之實證結果。 / Based on Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007) valuation models, I investigate how the corporate governance affects the contribution of cash holdings and dividends to firm value. Firm value was measured by market value to book value ratio and the adjusted return on assets. We use two major categories of corporate governance measures including the degree of insider acting and the presence of shareholder monitoring. The degree of insider acting includes the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged (dsip) , the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp). The shareholder monitoring includes institutional holding(ihp), large shareholder holding(mhp), the ratio of independent directors and supervisors(idsp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors(ocp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors holding(ohp). Firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC during 1995-2006 are selected as the sample. The empirical results indicate that the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and institutional holding(ihp) are significantly and positively related to market value and return on assets. Second, the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly and negatively related to the value of cash holding. We didn’t find the shareholder monitoring significantly increase the cash holding value. Finally, only the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip) and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly related to dividends value. The conclusion is that although corporate government affects firm value, corporate government doesn’t significantly determines the value of cash holding and dividends. That empirical result is not consistent with the one of Pinkowitz et al. (2006).