「沒有標準化就沒有現代經濟。」在知識經濟時代，掌握制定規則權力者，就占有主宰市場的領導地位。由於絕大多數標準係由政府或私人組織所制定，因此，研究標準制定組織具有重要意義。此外，觀察當代立法趨勢，政府以採訂私人組織或非政府組織所擬定之產業標準的方式，擴增其管制功能，在此潮流下，採訂私人草撰標準成為法律規範一環，此舉一方面可能形成授權立法之漏洞，另一方面將迫使個人暴露於著作權侵權行為之刑事、民事以及行政制裁大帽。同時，政府將產品標準及認證之工作委由產業協會等私人組織承擔亦成主流，該項¬「公益性」作業即可能成為事實標準制定者用來限制競爭、不當逐利的手段。 本文便以上述爭議問題為出發點，討論標準制定組織所擬定之標準，特別是經過政府機關以法律規範形式採用後，是否仍該當著作權的保護客體？並將研究延伸到網路產業中標準著作權保護的適當性問題，以及針對標準這類事實編輯物的資料庫保護進行分析；其次，本文將針對一國之產業標準制定組織為研究重心，探討例如標準制定與認證中的限制競爭及獨占管制的法律問題，以及隱然成為事實標準的市場領導者涉及智慧財產權的拒絕交易紛爭等課題。然而，針對上述命題的前提要件是對標準的概念與應用有相當之瞭解，以導入標準制定組織之運作、不同層級標準制定過程之影響及其所涉及之智慧財產爭議問題研究。因此，本文將對國家標準以及行業標準制定及運用過程所涉及之著作權及競爭法問題作深入且廣泛之瞭解，以此為基礎，分析各層級標準制定體系的規範內涵，繼而詮釋一國保護行業標準之著作權與競爭法之法律規定；並提出建言作為我國標準化體系之發展、參與國際標準制定活動、標準著作權保護分析架構、事實編輯物（資料庫）保護模式、競爭法對標準與認證活動之適用以及切入拒絕交易案件等之參考。 / In a knowledge-based economy, whoever dominates rules-developing overpowers the market. Most of the standards are set by the government and private organizations; therefore, a study on standard-setting organizations is of essential value. The Government leverages its regulatory function by adopting law standards promulgated and copyrighted by non-governmental actors. Despite governmental ambitions, no one is responsible for evaluating the legitimacy of this approach ex ante and no framework exists to facilitate analysis. On the other hand, standard-developing and conformity assessment increasingly falls on the shoulders of industry associations and lead to impartiality concerns from the antitrust law perspective. Regarding standards that are generated and controlled by private actors exposing citizens to criminal, civil and administrative sanctions, this paper contributes an analytical framework and proposes institutional mechanisms to implement it in terms of copyright. This paper extends by questioning if copyright would be an appropriate form to protect standards in the Internet industry. Then, it explores ways to protect compilation of facts and databases once they are de facto standards. Following the antitrust concerns, this paper focuses on industry standard-setting organizations within a specific territory to explore the antitrust and unfair competition problems confronting the role of the de facto standard-setters or the certification performers and the refusal to deal involving intellectual property issues. As foundations, this paper initiates by a detailed study of concepts and applications surrounding standardization; then, it leads to how a standards is produced, how standard-developing organizations in various levels affect the market, and how the intellectual property problems involves in standardization. In conclusion, based upon in-depth coverage of copyright and antitrust predicaments facing applications of national standards and industry standards, this paper interprets how copyright and antitrust laws work to protect business standards. At the same time, it delivers suggestions for the development of our standardization system, involvement of international standard-setting activities, an analytical framework for standards in copyright, protection for compilation of facts and databases, and how antitrust laws works when it comes to non-governmental standard-setting actors.

本文共分六章，約八至九萬字。全文內容說明如下： 首章為結論，依次說明研究動機及目的、研究方法、研究範圍、本文結構；第二章係 扣除額理論基礎之說明，分為二節，第一節為總論，第二節則依次說明各扣除額之理 論基礎；第三章介紹各國扣除額之制度，各項扣除額獨立為一節，且各節中包含了各 國的制度約定；第四章乃我國扣除額制度之研究，分為二節，第一節說明我國扣除額 制度之研究，分為一節，第一節說明我國扣除額制度之規定沿革，第二節則分析本國 施行扣除額制度後在租稅上的分配及效果。第五章提出對我國列舉及標準扣除額制度 之檢討及改進意見。第六章總結全文，提出結論與建議。

講到犯意變更的問題，必須確定兩件重要的事情，一是何謂犯意、一是何謂變更。 如果我們認為所謂的犯意就是犯罪行為的故意，而故意又是對於構成要件的認識和意欲，那麼這種認識和意欲顯然在任何時點都可能存在，重要的是從哪一個時點開始，這種認識和意欲才會成為刑法評價的對象，這當然也就牽涉到行為開始時點的問題，也就是著手的問題。從著手之後一直到行為終了之前，都符合行為時的要求，因此行為終了同樣是必須確定的重要問題。 而所謂的變更如果被認定在部分同一性的要求上，那麼什麼樣的部分同一要求才會是變更的部分同一性？是不同構成要件之間的部分同一？還是相同構成要件之間的部分同一？如果是不同構成要件之間的部分同一，那麼哪一種情況之下的構成要件之間才會被認為具有部分同一的要求？換句話說，變更的部分同一標準必須設定在什麼樣的觀點上？ 本文即由此二觀點出發，處理犯意變更的問題。

摩托羅拉於1987年開始推動六標準差改善計畫，但當時並未受到企業特別的重視，直到奇異公司於1995年重新啟動六標準差品質計畫，才使得這套成效卓著的改善工具受到企業的肯定。早在1991年，國內便有學者著書將六標準差知識體系介紹給國人（林秀雄，1993），到直到1999年以後，才開始有長榮航太、金寶電子、英業達、漢翔航空等國內企業陸續推行六標準差，並從中受益。如今，六標準差已是最高品質的代名詞，它不只是一系列的改善活動，更是企業追求卓越的經營模式。 本研究有鑒於六標準差品質改善手法對於國內企業競爭力助益匪淺，故採取個案研究的方式，將國內某通訊產品業者首次應用六標準差改善流程（DMAIC）執行手機生產線改善的推動歷程，進行深入的報導，研究重點在於個案公司如何運用六標準差改善流程之界定、衡量、分析、改善、控制五個階段，提升生產線之生產力，減少浪費，最終滿足顧客的需求。 個案公司乃運用六標準差改善流程，找出影響生產力之關鍵影響因素，包括瓶頸工站工時、工時變異性程度、生產線平衡率，並結合生產線改善與平衡的手法，發展出具體可行之解決方案，達成專案初期所設定的目標，最終並發展有效的控制方式，使專案效益能夠持續。 另外，本研究試圖以系統化的歸納方式，整理出個案公司的成功經驗與遭遇問題，並說明個案公司所提之解決方案，希冀本論文之付梓對於有志推動六標準供之企業，能夠有借鏡學習之參考作用。

我國對消除土地不勞而獲、實現漲價歸公，係以課征土地增值稅為手段；然買賣雙方當事人即使移轉價格高於當期公告土地現值，亦以當期公告土地現值來申報移轉現值，雖合法減輕土地增值稅負擔，但造成漲價歸公不能完全貫徹實現。其次，以偏低之公告土地現值作為徵收補償及規費計收標準，造成民眾抗爭及政府收入減少，影響建設及都市健全發展。故現行公告土地現值偏低，如何使其接近市價？如何使政府機關所查估之地價更精確、有時效性？如何找出一套以一當十、以簡馭繁之新方法，以改進現行公告土地現值制度，並節省人力和財力？得進一步深入研究。 　　本論文首先探討現行公告土地現值制度之缺失，並根據地價波及現象理論、替代原則、特徵價格理論、地價形成因素之固定性等理論基礎，提出以公告地價區段之指數替代公告地價區段之地價，來改進現行公告土地現值制度。其方法為採每個地價區段之標準宗地地價，來編製地價區段指數。由於受到時問與經費之限制，以新店市中央路至中華路之間之福民段作為個案分析之地區，並只限八十四年三月至八十七年二月福園段之買賣實例。經實證分析後證明：地價區段指數制度是可行的，可據以編製地價指數、掌握全國地價高低層次、計算土地漲價總數額、供學術研究及國土規劃之參考。最後，提出建議：速建立土地估價師制度、提高地價人員素質、改進地價評議會功能、速訂定「查價業務委託民問辦理辦法」、法令配合修改等，並建議後續研究方向：對個別因素評價基準及期日修正研究、對全國作實證研究、對於其他用地影響地價區域因素評價基準表研究、研究查定特殊用地地價之方法。

本論文試圖檢驗中國在技術標準化中推動自主標準的政治思維，並以全球治理概念中多元主體的研究途徑作為論文的基本分析架構。本論文試圖探尋以下三個問題的解答：其一，檢驗全球治理理論在分析技術標準議題的適用性；其二，描繪出中國的政府角色在全球治理中為重要的「看不見的手」；其三，歸納出中國推行自主技術標準的舉動為闡述中國在「和諧世界」政策下中國式全球治理思維的經典案例。 　　本論文首先回顧了不同派別的全球治理理論。和既存理論最大的差異為，作者認為全球治理是一種動態的調整過程。中國藉由政府主導的模式，協助尚未成熟的第二、第三部門(企業及公民社會)參與全球治理，這種強調政府角色在全球治理中重要性的傾向，使得中國被歸類於「國家中心維持現狀派」。中國的學者將此種現象稱為「中國特色的全球治理」或是「中國模式」，然而本論文歸納出所謂中國模式的特色是以西方的價值為政策架構，本質上以政府的力量增進傳統國際關係理論中的核心國家利益項目。換言之，中國特色的全球治理為尚未成熟的全球治理。本論文的案例－中國的技術標準制定政策，闡述了中國參與全球治理的學習歷程，因此，將此稱為「過渡中的全球治理」，以彰顯中國參與全球技術標準化競爭的特殊狀態。 於知識的權力結構體系中，擁有技術標準制定的權力日趨重要，中國的技術標準戰略因而規劃於 2020 年前成為領導創新的國家之一。然而在中國 WAPI (WLAN authentication and privacy infrastructure) 技術標準制定的經驗中，隱約可見中國在全球治理中自我調整的動態過程，這種觀察為現有主流的全球治理理論無法充分解釋的。 / The thesis tries to examine Chinese initiative in indigenization of technical standardization for the global market. The basic analytical framework is based on the theoretical concept of Global Governance with a multi-actor approach. The following chapters try to touch upon three inquiries. First, it examines the applicability of global governance on standards setting issues. Second, it depicts the ”invisible hand” of Chinese government in global governance. Finally, it concludes that Chinese initiative in indigenizing technical standardization can be a good case in point to demonstrate a Chinese version of global governance under the guidance of “harmonious world.” This thesis reviews different schools of global governance. Unlike any of the existing literature, the author considers global governance itself a dynamic adjusting process. China partakes in global governance by emphasizing guidance from the government to boost the second and third sectors which are relatively underdeveloped. Namely, China inclines to be characterized into “state-centric status quo” school, which affirms that government is the most determining actor of global governance, thus not willing to give up “controls of the government.”Chinese scholars dub this phenomenon “Chinese version of global governance” or “China model.” This paper concludes that the so called “China Model” of global governance was conducted in western culture’s framework with a realist’s state-led approach in essence. In other words, Chinese version of global governance can not be regarded as a full-fledged one. The case study standard setting policy of China has illustrated a better picture of China’s learning process of global governance. Accordingly, “global governance in process” was coined into the title of this thesis to identify the current status of China’s involvement in global competition of technical standardization. Given the growing stake of “technical standards setting” in a knowledge-based power structure, Chinese initiative of technical standardization strategy has paved the way for pursuing leading innovative state in 2020. The lesson China learned from WAPI (WLAN authentication and privacy infrastructure) standard setting has provided us a clues about the self-adjusting role of the state in global governance as a dynamic process which could not be fully explained by conventional version of global governance prevailing nowadays.

The concern over test consequence has inspired research into the wider impact of language tests and testing policies, but few studies have examined this subject in the context of Taiwan. With the goal of enhancing Taiwan’s global competitiveness by upgrading manpower quality, the central government implemented a 2002 policy to develop the English proficiency of civil servants by recognizing passing marks on approved English language proficiency tests as a promotion criterion. This thesis reports on a research study that adopted a multi-method approach to assess the testing policy’s impact on test-takers and analyze the rationale and consequences of revisions to the policy that were implemented between 2002 and the 2011. A survey of 282 civil servants working in the banking, economics, and finance sectors yielded data about the participants’ self-assessment of their English proficiency and workplace need for the language, English study and test-taking experience, impressions of English proficiency tests, and assessment of the effectiveness of the testing policy. Statistical analysis of the test impression and policy effectiveness data revealed significant correlation between positive assessments of the policy’s impact and the perceived fairness of the testing policy, the policy’s influence on motivation to study English, and the participants’ intrinsic interest in improving their English. Interviews with officials involved in formulating and implementing the testing policy and a review of government documents related to the policy provided data that were incorporated into the Geelhoed-Schouwstra policy analysis framework and facilitated the identification of factors that influenced the outcomes of the testing policy. The results of this study of an English language testing policy help to clarify who the test-takers and test users are, how and why tests are being used, and what the consequences of test use are.

現行《企業併購法》藉由獨立專家制度為少數股東之權益把關，但此制度存有一定問題，諸如會計師、律師、證券承銷商是否對相關產業有足夠了解或具備財務專業性、獨立性並未明文規範、由經營階層聘僱，可能無法獨立客觀為少數股東權益把關、未明定追究責任規範，股東無法直接以委任關係追究債務不履行責任、專家之功能角色僅在提供建議意見，欠缺其他相關權限。因為以上眾多之問題，此次《修正草案》參考美國判例及香港法規範，引進特別委員會制度。 　　特別委員會為美國公司治理法制下發展出來之產物，通常由獨立董事組成，故本文比較各國引進美國公司治理模式之規範與運作，藉由比較法上之適用點出我國引進獨立董事及功能性委員會後所存在之相關問題。各國引進特別委員會與獨立董事制度後之運作，牽涉到原先美國法下一元制模式、各國原先之公司治理模式及引進時法規所作之相應調整。惟我國《證券交易法》於引進美國獨立董事與審計委員會制度時，並未因地制宜規範，亦未一併引進幾種重要的功能性委員會或調整董事會之定位，導致配合二元並列制適用時產生諸多問題及監督權與經營權間之權限矛盾，而這些問題某程度上也牽涉到特別委員會制度之運作。 　　本文透過研究特別委員會於美國法及其他比較法上之角色與運作，再與我國法加以比較分析，但我國《修正草案》規範之特別委員會制度實際上與美國判例法發展出來之制度有極大落差。於美國實務運作之下，特別委員會並非強制之機關，其適用之功能，僅於董事具有利益衝突之情況下，藉由具有足夠談判權限之特別委員會代表公司與相對人交易，以降低事後追究責任之司法審查標準，藉以使董事及控制股東通過受任人義務之審查。而我國藉《修正草案》強制設置特別委員會，但漏未規範未設置之法律效果，未表明設置特別委員會對司法審查標準之影響，亦未將相關權限授予委員會。 　　進而，本文分析特別委員會於引進我國後之規範目的、角色定位與功能、權限規範、設置架構及相關問題。《修正草案》係以特別委員會作為一「中立客觀之機關」之角色以控管企業併購對價與程序之公平合理性，但法規僅使特別委員會審議獨立專家意見再提報董事會及股東會，並未賦予特別委員會對外積極談判併購條件、拒絕交易或積極尋覓其他可提供更好條件之併購對象之權，亦未明文規範未設置或設置卻存有瑕疵之法律效果，而無法給予公司經營階層足夠動機依法設置特別委員會。《修正草案》將特別委員會制度依公司是否設置審計委員會而劃分兩種不同之架構，因此依據原先審計委員會之規範，會使兩種架構之委員會具備不同之權限與效果。而《修正草案》與原先獨立專家制度之差異在於以「雙層架構」之方式藉由特別委員會聘任獨立專家，取代原本由董事會聘僱之專家意見，似是認為具利益衝突之董事會所聘僱之專家無法完全公平為全體股東考量，須由獨立董事或不具利害關係人組成之特別委員會聘任獨立專家，才會排除利益衝突之問題而為公司整體利益進行審酌。總之，本文欲藉由比較分析，探究目前《修正草案》之規範是否較原先獨立專家制度更佳而更能達成保障少數股東之效。 / According to the "Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the Act)", in order to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders, the corporations are under an obligation to appoint the independent experts, to ensure the reasonableness and equity of mergers and acquisitions. However, there are some problems in this system as follows. First, the independent experts do not be required to have sufficient experiences of the relevant industry or financial expertise. Second, the Act does not specifically regulate the important condition of independence. Third, independent experts are appointed by the management, so they may not be independent and objective enough. Fourth, the shareholders cannot directly sue the independent experts for their dereliction of duty. Finally, the experts are limited to provide non-compulsory advices, but are lack of other relevant authrity. Because of those problems, the "Amended Draft of the Business Mergers and Acquisitions Act (the Amended Draft)", referring to the Common Law of United states and the regulations of Hong Kong, introduces the Special Committee system. 　　The Special Committees system is originated from the corporate governance legal system of the United States. They are usually composed of Independent Directors. By means of comparing the introduction and operation of American corporate governance model in other countries, this essay tries to point out some native problems relating to Independent Directors and Functional Committees in our country, which are introduced from the United States as well. Other countries adjusted the regulations and operation of Independent Directors and Functional Committees to tie in the original corporate governance system. On the contrary, our country merely amended the "Securities and Exchange Act" introducing Independent Directors and Audit Committee system, not re-orientated the Board of Directors nor introduced other important Functional Committees. It results in many conflictions and dilemmas between management power and supervisory authority. And those problems also influence the operation of the Special Committees. 　　By means of researching the operation of the Special Committee in the United States and other countries as well as comparing them with our country, this essay considers there is an enormous diversity between the Special Committee in the Amended Draft and the common law of the United States. In case of practical operation in the United States, the Special Committee is not an essential institution. When directors have conflict of interests, the Board of Directors can determine to organize the Special Committee and sufficiently entitle it to transact with the counterpart on behalf of the corporation. By doing so, the court would lower the standards of judicial review, the directors and controlling shareholders could get through the review of fiduciary duties. On the other hand, the Special Committee in the Amended Draft is an essential institution as soon as mergers and requisitions start going. However, the Amended Draft does not regulate the legal effect of violation. It does not show what the influence of setting up the Special Committee on the standards of judicial review is. It does not even authorize the Special Committee to handle relevant affairs. 　　Furthermore, this essay analyzes the purpose, function and role, authority, organization and related issues of the Special Committee in the Amended Draft. The Special Committee acts as a "neutral and objective institution" to make sure the reasonableness and equity of mergers and acquisitions. However, it is unable to negotiate the conditions of transaction with the counterpart, refuse the deal or look for another better counterpart. It is only entitled to make a report to the Board of Directors and shareholders after investigating the opinions from the Independent Experts. And because the Amended Draft has no binding effects of violation, the Board of Directors is less motivated to set up the Special Committee. According to the Amended Draft, the authority and effect of the Special Committee are separated into two kinds by whether there is an Audit Committee inside the corporation or not. In terms of the appointment of the Independent Experts, the difference between the Amended Draft and the Act is the double-layer structure. This design allows the Special Committee to appoint the Independent Experts in place of the Board of Directors. It seems that only when Independent Experts are appointed by the Special Committee consisting of Independent Directors or non-stakeholders could they eliminate the conflict of interests in the business transactions and guarantee the whole corporative interests. In conclusion, by means of comparison and analysis, this essay tries to figure out whether the Amended Draft is better and more efficient in protecting minority shareholders than the Act.

研發創新活動中，產業標準的設定一直都被視為一種研發的限制條件，本文考慮產業標準的設定是廠商在研發賽局裡的一種策略，使產業標準的設定為研發賽局可以使用的策略，進而討論在哪些情形下，研發賽局的產業標準設定會與當標準化設定作為一種限制條件，研發活動將會相同。 本文利用產業標準對研發賽局報酬有贏家的報酬上升以及輸家的報酬縮減，將產業標準視為賽局成果面的策略選擇，發現若廠商為齊質，產業標準在固定設置成本時，並且贏家報酬必須超過一定大小，產業標準會在研發賽局之始設定，與作為賽局限制條件的結果相同。在有產業標準為策略下的研發賽局，其均衡的參與賽局廠商數目，與報酬因產業標準變化的大小關係較大，而設置 標準的固定成本對廠商數目的影響較小。

本研究係在估計信用損失分配之尾端機率，即發生重大損失的機率；在模型中，信用損失受到系統性風險因子和非系統性風險因子的影響，Glasserman (2004)考慮系統性風險因子和非系統性風險因子皆服從常態分配，然此假設並不符合現實，可能會低估發生極端事件的機率，所以本研究假設系統性風險因子服從常態分配，而非系統性風險因子則是服從標準化的學生-t分配。根據Glasserman (2004)所提之同質法與鞍點法修正出在標準化的學生-t分配之假設的近似機率，以四種不同的投資組合，計算其損失分配之尾端機率，再利用蒙地卡羅法模擬出真實機率以做比較。以計算時間來看，鞍點法較同質法費時許多，以鞍點法之計算點數為倍數；若以準確性來看，鞍點法則表現優良，尤其在損失程度較大時，其尾端機率近似得更精準。