公司治理是否完善，不僅影響公司自身發展，亦會衝擊國家整體金融秩序。近年來，國際間在公司治理議題上，有強化股東權之趨勢。保護股東權益、便利股東權之行使，對於健全公司治理尤為重要。中國大陸1993年公司法中所架構的公司治理結構並不完整，其中關於少數股東權益的保障機制亦是寥寥無幾。中國大陸公司法於2005年進行了大幅修正。其中，為避免控制股東濫用多數決原則，破壞公司治理之監控機制，2005年公司法賦予少數股東多項權利。少數股東權之設計，不僅是防止董事會濫權，侵害股東利益的監督機制；也是股東平等原則下，少數股東在股東會採多數決下獲得平等對待的具體展現。 本文圍繞中國大陸2005年公司法中所規定的四項少數股東權展開，介紹少數股東之股東會召集權、提案權、代表訴訟和解散裁判訴請權在中國大陸公司法中的具體規定，整理台灣相關立法規定以供參考比較，并嘗試對中國大陸公司法提出完善建議，期能達到強化少數股東權保障之目的。 / Corporate governance not only influences company, but shocks global economics. In recent years, international tendency has strengthened the shareholders’ rights in corporate governance. It is obviously important for corporate governance to protect the shareholders’ rights and interests, and facilitate the exertion. The corporate governance structure in Mainland China Company Act of 1993 was not complete, which on minority interest protection system was also few. In 2005, Mainland China Company Act was substantially amended. In order to avoid abusing the majority rule, damaging monitoring system of corporate governance, Company Act of 2005 gives a number of minority shareholders' rights. This paper focuses on four minority shareholders’ rights in the Company Act of 2005, introduces their specific regulations, sorts out the relevant legislation in Taiwan for reference comparison, tries to put forward some suggestions on Mainland China Company Act to strengthen the protection of the minority shareholders’ rights.

本研究以關係人交易及其揭露為研究範圍。首先探討關係人之涵義，並說明關係企業 形成原因及型態，藉以瞭解關係人交易何以產生﹖同時就企業管理當局透過關係人非 常規交易，從事損害債權人與股東權益之交易型態，予以介紹。 除了研究關係人交易型態外，另就關係人交易之會計處理及揭露方面，說明關係人交 易入帳之基礎、特殊會計處理、會計揭露之理論基礎及揭露之性質與內容。 本研究於文獻探討中，除介紹國際、美國及我國會計權威機構，對關係人交易及其揭 露之有關規定外，並針對我國會計研究發展基金會財務會計準則委員會所發佈之財務 會計準則公報第六號：關係人交易揭露”，就所規定應行揭露事項，進行實證研究， 藉以瞭解公報之發布，是否能達成企業資訊充分且適切公開之目的。 本研究亦就”關係人交易”所可能衍生之法律問題，扼要說明我國對關係人交易立法 之動向，並簡介美國有關”關係企業”法律問題之案例，最後並加以評述。

資本市場日趨國際化及自由化，國際主要證券市場大多允許外國企業可至當地第一上市，故開放外國企業來台第一上市櫃掛牌是一必然之趨勢。在各界積極建議下，97年3月政府正式開放未在海外上市之外國企業，得以原股來台申請第一上市櫃。 吾人樂見我國政府對於證券市場的規範跨出一大步，然而政策開放初期，證券交易法並未隨之檢討修正，衍生相關適法性疑義。嗣後雖於101年1月增訂外國公司專章，但對於外國企業股東權益保護事項，仍繼續沿用採「外國發行人註冊地股東權益事項檢查表」規範之作法，要求外國企業在不牴觸註冊地國法令之前提下修訂其公司章程，將我國股東權益保護重要事項(參照我國公司法及證交法之部分規定)納入公司章程。 上開要求，對於自97年起迄今來台第一上市櫃之註冊於開曼群島公司而言，執行上並無太大困難。然在101年起每股面額新台幣十元規定開放後，包括日本企業在內之實際營運實體公司，若擬直接來台第一上市櫃，將面臨我國與註冊地國兩地法令之重大差異，甚至部分股東權益保護重要事項無法修訂公司章程之問題。究竟我國股東權益保護重要事項得否定於章程對股東權益之影響為何？倘無法修正公司章程所採配套措施之可行性？亞洲鄰近證券市場如香港、新加坡之作法為何？等，均值得吾人加以關注。如何因應解決此一問題，勢必影響我國未來推動外國企業來台第一上市櫃之具體成效。因此，將再以日本企業來台第一上市櫃為例，進一步深入探討股東權益保護之議題。 本論文係就外國企業來台上市櫃所衍生相關法律適用與衝突問題為出發點，並以最基本之股東權益保護為中心加以探討，以實務運作之觀察對相關問題提出具體建議，期能對釐清問題有些許貢獻，俾有助在於推動優質外國企業來台上市櫃之同時，得以兼顧我國投資人權益。

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本研究主要在探討特別股之性質究偏向股東權益或負債性質，首先介紹特別股之歷史 ，從單純的特別股開始，到今日企業的複雜性增加，而發展出因應不同需求，多種性 質特徵之特別股。既而由財務、法律及會計的觀點來趼究經理人、投資人、債權人及 權威機構對特別股之認定與觀感。 特別股性質研究之分析架構乃以其發行目的及其具有之特徵（參加與否，累積非累積 ，有無剩餘財產分配優先權、有無否決權、贖回權、轉換權等）為主，分別研究該發 行目的或該特徵符合負債定義或股東權益定義，從而決定特別股之適當表達方式。 本研究之實證部分，除介紹國外特別股之發行概況外，並以國內公開發行公司為對象 ，對於已發行之特別股探究其性質，對於未發行特別股者，了解其發行意願與其對特 別股之看法。希望經由已有之特別股與將來欲發行特別股者之觀感來證實特別股在使 用者心目中之性質如何。

本研究旨在探討企業研發活動對股東權益報酬率(ＲＯＥ)的影響，企圖了解研發能量強的高科技公司，是否真的有較好的財務績效表現？ 為探討此研究問題，本研究採杜邦恆等式之概念，以修正後ROE作為衡量財務績效的主體，並將其組成要素--營業利益率、資產週轉率及權益乘數作為財務績效指標的影響因子。另外，高科技公司的定義上，可採用研發密集度、核准專利數量、是否位於科學園區做為企業研發活動的評估指標。選定前述指標後，即可進一步分析研發費用率、核准專利數量及是否位於科學園區是如何影響營業利益率、資產週轉率及權益乘數，進而影響企業的修正後ROE。 本研究採一般多元迴歸及Tobit迴歸進行實證研究，並針對台灣2007年所有上市、上櫃之公司進行研究，在篩選不符合研究目的之資料後，共得到1409家樣本公司，用以探討研發創新活動與財務績效的關聯性，其實證結果發現： 一、 研發密集度越高的公司，可透過提高營業利益率(不顯著)，增加未來修正後ROE，然而研發密集度對資產週轉率、權益乘數(不顯著)皆為負向影響。 二、 2006年及2007年度核准專利數量多寡，不影響修正後ROE，然而可提高營業利益率(不顯著)及資產週轉率，但卻降低權益乘數。 三、 位於科學園區的公司，當期修正後ROE較差。由杜邦恆等式的分析中可看出，其資產週轉率及權益乘數(不顯著)皆提高，而營業利益率(不顯著)卻降低。 本研究亦評估此三種研發活動指標的適切性，發現採研發密集度做為指標時，應避免以含有營業收入淨額的財務比率做為績效連結，以免彼此間的連動關係降低解釋能力。當採研發產出與財務績效做連結，較不會受連動性影響，解釋能力更好。而採是否位於科學園區做為指標，除了可避免像研發密集度與財務績效間產生的相關性，還可納入政府在篩選高科技事業時考量的條件，讓變數包含更多資訊。

摘要 一九九七年東亞金融風暴起因之一即為公司治理不佳，其影響所及至數年後仍餘波蕩漾，而根據2000年6月麥肯錫顧問公司所做的全球投資人意見調查發現，有高達80％的美國投資人願意多付18％的價格來買良好公司治理企業的股票；自2001年底以來，美國「恩隆」（Enron）與「世界通訊」（WorldCom）等弊案又陸續爆發，其中所暴露的公司治理問題，讓世人驚覺這已是全球企業刻不容緩的議題，並亟思未來如何防止類似事件之發生。 公司治理經緯萬端，但都與如何確保資金提供者的投資能夠獲得應有的報酬有關。據此，公司治理的重要議題之一即為如何使小股東的權益不受內部人（即大股東與管理者）的侵犯；尤其在當今大企業紛紛進行事業轉投資之際，大股東常身兼轉投資事業之經營者，如何確保外在投資人（小股東與債權人）應得的報酬，並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益，為公司治理中實際且有趣之課題。我國大股東往往基於營運效率、自身利益與控制權的考量，會做出許多便宜行事卻不利公司治理的行為，如轉投資事業與母公司之間的透明度不足、大股東交叉持股或持有間接股權、所有權與經營權不分、母公司與轉投資事業之間可能的利益衝突、乃至於大股東個人風格等，這些大股東在轉投資事業中的角色定位與公司治理間的相互關係是本論文論述之重點。同時，為了加強研究的深度與實證性，作者特別藉由個案公司的實際案例來驗證文獻上的觀點，結論所得與研究相符合，並更能增添對企業經營之變化多端與不易控制之親身體驗。 本文最後並討論世界銀行、OECD及我國所規範之公司治理架構，希望公司治理能實際有助於我國企業之轉投資行為。因為制度的設計與執行若能加強公司治理與監督管理者的行為，當能強化公司競爭力，此乃公司治理積極面的貢獻。 / Abstract One of the reasons for the East Asia 1997 financial crisis is because of the careless corporate governance. The impact of this financial crisis actually has had deep and board affection even afterward. According to one investigation by Mckinsey & Company in June 2000, there are about 80% of global investors who are willing to pay 18% extra money to buy those stocks belong to companies have better corporate governance. On the other hand, starting from the end of year 2001, the successive collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other USA companies has exposed the serious and urgency about corporate governance. It makes people in worldwide enterprises realize how significant the corporate governance is and try to avoid similar events occurred. Although corporate governance has many aspects, it all related to how to secure the deserved return of the capital providers. Accordingly, one of the important topics of corporate governance is to protect the minority shareholder rights from being invaded by the insiders (controlling shareholders and top executives). This topic become even more important especially when controlling shareholders are also top executives of the equity-invested companies. Thus, how to secure the investors’ (minority shareholders and creditors) rights is an interesting and practical issue of corporate governance. Controlling shareholders in Taiwan are used to manage firms based on their own convenience such as the efficiency of operation, interest of themselves, and control rights, instead of considering corporate governance. This attitude, however, will easily result in some negative behaviors such as the lack of transparency between mother company and her equity investment, cross holding or private holding of controlling shareholders, indifferences between ownership and management, the potential interest impact between mother company and equity investment, and even the affection of firms’ performance by the characteristics of controlling shareholders. This thesis emphasize in the above correlation between corporate governance and equity investment. We also examine a real firm’s case to enhance its conviction. This thesis also discusses the corporate governance structure of World Bank, OECD, and Taiwan. It is the author’s hope that corporate governance can be practically useful for a firm’s performance as its aggressive contribution.

自2001年以來，美國爆發安隆、世界通訊等一連串的弊案後，國際性投資機構法人不斷對財務會計報表是否能真實、允當的表達一家公司經營的面貌產生未有的質疑，其中包括國內實施多年的員工分紅配股制度，在此期間，國內主管機關、產業界及學術界針對此制度所衍伸的問題有相當多的討論與交換意見。 本研究觀察2004~2006年國內員工分紅配股現況；探討員工分紅配股屬盈餘分配情況下，在目前會計處理所衍伸的公司治理及會計原則適用問題；並參考馬秀如教授於會計研究月刊所舉的例子，加以延伸，加入更多參數及假設條件，探討員工分紅配股依面額或依市價計算、股價高或股價低、盈餘是否全數轉增資、除權後是否填權情況下，對股東權益產生何種不同程度的影響；再針對目前產業界，針對員工分紅費用化後，員工產生的實質所得減少，所回應的因應配套措施，探討其各項配套措施對員工權益、股東權益甚至產業界長久以往的影響。 經本研究觀察及探討，有以下發現，提供主管機關、投資人、企業及員工做為參考： 一、2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益仍極嚴重，且2004年至2006年員工分紅配股稀釋股東權益情況並無往改善方向進行。 二、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理，無法真實反應公司盈餘、有違公司治理精神且無法與國際會計準則接軌。 三、在相關的簡化假設條件下，員工分紅配股對股東權益造成下列之影響： 1. 高股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 2. 低股價、員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘全數轉增資情況下，填權與否仍不影響期末股權稀釋比率。 3.員工分紅配股依面額計算、盈餘不全數轉增資情況下，不論股價高低、填權與否，均可使期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 4. 高股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率大幅降低。 5. 低股價、員工分紅配股依市價計算、盈餘全數轉增資、填權情況下，期末股權稀釋比率較高股價高。 四、現行員工紅利屬盈餘分配的會計處理下，大多數的公司選擇員工分紅配股的員工激勵制度。 五、員工分紅費用化後，使股東權益稀釋程度鎖住一固定比率、盈餘真實性提高、公司間可在同一基礎上相互比較、財務透明度提高並與國際接軌。 六、員工分紅費用化後，企業因應的員工激勵制度配套措施將呈現多樣化。 七、員工分紅費用化，對員工實質所得有相當大的影響；對股東為鎖住一固定比率的稀釋程度；對公司而言，可用的員工激勵措施資源減少；對產業，將形成好公司更好，壞公司更壞的循環。 / Following the outbreak of a series of scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, in the U.S. as from 2001, international institutional investors have been suspicious about whether financial statements can truly and adequately represent a company’s operating status, including the employee stock bonus system that had been carried out domestically for many years. As a matter or fact, while applying the system, local competent authorities, industries and academic circles have had a lot of concerns about the resulting problems, which triggers plenty of discussions and opinion exchanges. By observing the domestic employee stock bonus distribution for 2004 through 2006, this study aimed to investigate the issues of corporate governance and accounting principle applicability derived from current accounting process under the circumstance where employee stock bonuses fall in retained earnings. Also, by referring to examples given by Professor Sheree S. Ma in Accounting Research Monthly, the study added more parameters and hypothetic assumptions to explore the degree of the influence of employee stock bonus calculation (according to the face value or market price), the stock price (high or low), earnings recapitalization and price recovery status subsequent to the ex-right date on shareholders’ equity, followed by investigating the influence of the countermeasures taken in the industry to cope with the reduction of employee’s real income caused by treating employee stock bonuses as expenses on shareholders’ equity, employees’ real income, and even the industry for a long run. The following findings of the study hope to serve as a reference for competent authorities, investors, enterprises and employees: 1. Given that the dilution status of shareholders’ equity from 2004 to 2006 had not improved, the distribution of employee stock bonuses in 2006 was still severely diluting shareholders’ equity. 2. The current accounting process of combing employee stock bonuses in retained earnings cannot truly reflect a company’s earnings, which is not only against the spirit of corporate governance, but has also deviated from international accounting standards. 3. Under simplified hypothetical assumptions, the employee stock bonus distribution has generated the following influences on shareholders’ equity: (1). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (2.) Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, the status of price recovery subsequent to the ex-right date will not dilute the final equity ratio. (3). Under circumstance where employee stock bonuses are calculated according to the face value, and earnings are not all recapitalized as increased capital, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced no matter how high or low of the stock price, or if the stock price can be recovered subsequent to the ex-right date. (4). Under circumstance where the stock price is high, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are partially recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be substantially reduced. (5). Under circumstance where the stock price is low, employee bonuses are calculated according to the face value, earnings are all recapitalized as increased capital, and the stock price is recovered subsequent to the ex-right date, final equity dilution ratio will be higher than that with high stock price. 4. Before 2008, the existing employee stock bonuses are processed as retained earnings distribution in accounting, a majority of companies choose employee stock ownership as an incentive to motivate their employees. 5. After employee stock bonuses are being treated as expenses, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity is locked at a fixed ratio. As a result, the veracity of company earnings is higher, so different companies may compare with each other on a same basis, financial transparency can be strengthened, and in the end, these companies operating performance can link up with the world. 6. With employee stock bonuses being treated as expenses, the countermeasures taken by enterprises to motivate their employees show versatility. 7. By treating employee stock bonuses as expenses, employee’s real income will be considerably affected, the dilution degree of shareholders’ equity will be locked at a fixed rate, company’s available resources for motivating its employees will be reduced, and the whole industry will fall prey to the cycle that good companies get better while bad companies get worse.

本研究以2000年至2006年中國大陸上市公司之財務資料及股價資料，探討中國上市公司是否因租稅優惠而負擔隱含稅，及其負擔之隱含稅與有效稅率、股東權益稅前報酬率、市場結構及產業別之關係。實證結果顯示，中國大陸上市公司有效稅率之平均值遠低於其稅法上之名目稅率，顯示上市公司整體而言因稅法而享有租稅優惠，其中以農林漁牧業與信息技術業之有效稅率最低，反映中國扶植農業以及獎勵高科技產業之租稅政策。上市公司隱含稅率之平均值約為17.91%，顯示在中國大陸經濟成長率高之市場下，其上市公司仍須負擔隱含稅，且實證結果發現中國上市公司之有效稅率與隱含稅率呈顯著正向關係，即當有效稅率下降時，隱含稅率將會相對提高，呈現如Scholes and Wolfson(1992)所提出之隱含稅理論。 本研究實證結果亦發現，中國上市公司之股東權益稅前報酬率與隱含稅負間呈現顯著負向關係，即享受租稅優惠較多的公司，因負擔隱含稅成本，故整體報酬率未必高於享有較少租稅優惠的公司。非製造業公司之市場結構變數與隱含稅率間具有顯著關係性，即市場集中度越高時，廠商的市場支配力越大，也就越接近壟斷市場，造成該產業租稅優惠隱含稅負之負擔者多為消費者，而公司負擔之隱含稅則相對較低。 / This study uses financial and stock price data of the listed companies in China from 2000 to 2006, to examine if the listed companies have to bear implicit taxes because of tax preferential treatments, and to examine the relationship between implicit taxes and effective tax rates. The empirical results indicate that the average of ETRs of listed companies in China is lower than the statutory tax rate, indicating that overall listed Chinese companies have enjoyed substantial preferential tax treatments. The ETRs of the companies of agriculture and information technological industries are the lowest ones of all industries, reflecting China's tax policy aimed at developing agriculture and hi-tech industries. The average of implicit tax rates of listed companies in China is about 17.91%, indicating that listed companies in a high economics growth market, such as China, still have to bear implicit taxes. The empirical results show that implicit taxes are negatively related to ETRs, and the results support the implicit tax theory by Scholes and Wolfson(1992).The empirical results indicate the relationship between implicit tax and PEROEs is negatively, meaning the returns of tax-favored companies are less than tax-disfavored ones. The variables of market structures are significantly related to implicit tax, meaning the more market power the companies have, the less implicit tax they will bear. The empirical results of this study have implications for the government to further use tax incentives as a vehicle to stimulate economic development.

我國公司法在94年6月22 日通過增訂修正條文，新增通訊投票制度，並賦予股東提案權及董事、監察人提名制度。行政院金融監督管理委員會配合公司法新增通訊投票相關規定，於94年12 月15 日發布修正公開發行股票公司股務處理準則，以使公開發行公司採行書面或電子方式行使表決權時之股務作業有所依循，使我國上市上櫃公司正式跨入股東會通訊投票時代。不過法令修正後逾三年除台灣期貨交易所股東會採用通訊投票外，並無其他上市上櫃公司採行，使通訊投票制度徒託空言。 97年6月13日共計有637家上市櫃公司選在同一天召開，過度集中化的結果，不僅股東分身乏術無法參與公司一年一度股東會，也嚴重影響小股東參與監督、瞭解公司經營等權益。 股東會是小股東實踐股東權益及落實股東行動主義最佳的場合，也是公司實行公司治理具體表現。但近幾年股東會撞期情況始終未獲改善，為有效解決此一問題金管會證期局積極宣導通訊投票制度的優點，希望上市上櫃公司採行通訊投票制度，讓股東在親自出席和委託出席之外，多增加一項參與股東會方式。 股東會通訊投票制度亦新增股東會提案權和董監事提名董監事制度，讓少數股東權益能擴大參與公司決策與經營。我國通訊投票制度雖然已有法源和運作平台，但企業普遍對此制度仍不熟悉，未來要擴大推行，有賴主管機關政策輔導和提出獎勵措施，初期如果能鼓勵大型企業或法人持股比重較高公司帶頭做起，則我國通訊投票制度則可望步上正軌。 通訊投票制度最早由美國開始，目前英國、日本、澳洲、香港等國皆已實施多年，我國起步並不算晚，實施股東會通訊投票不僅與國際接軌對我國企業推動公司治理和股東行動主義亦有正面評價。