我國於94年6月22日公布修正後之公司法，正式賦予公司召開股東會時，得採行書面或電子方式供股東行使表決權之法律依據，期能使我國之公司治理與股東權益維護能與國際接軌；惟「股東會電子投票」制度，歷經元大京華證券股份有限公司、台灣總合股務處理股份有限公司及台灣集中保管結算所股份有限公司三個平台之建置，仍然未被各上市、櫃公司廣為採用，即使偶有採用者，其投票總權數占總股份之比例多數未及1%，顯示成效不彰。另2010年10月的亞洲公司治理協會(Asian Corporate Governance Association)年會，提出了最新一份的「CG Watch」報告，在這份報告中，ACGA指出我國推動股權權益的狀況上較前次調查類似，並未有太大改善，比如公司對國外投資人「通訊投票」、「分割投票」權益的行使，相關法規及配套仍不夠完備，而針對「通訊投票」得分，在歷次的評分中，我國都是敬陪末座，可以說，這幾年來此一核心問題並未被重視並獲得具體的改善。 基此本研究將以股東會通訊投票之法令、制度為經，佐以實務之見解為緯，參考外國經驗，藉由分析現行之問題並勾勒未來推動之建議供各界參考。本研究除分析我國股東會之基本概念、表決權行使方式、委託書之使用，並藉由對美、日兩國股東會制度及實務之探討，一窺國際之現況及未來發展之趨勢。另針對我國股東會通訊投票制度與現況進行背景說明，並介紹我國通訊投票下書面投票與電子投票之架構及現況，最後分析我國電子投票採用率偏低之原因。 此外，針對美、日、台三國股東會通訊投票制度分別由法規制度面、股東權益面、公司執行面及電子投票實務面進行比較，最後並提出對相關主事者之建議及對後續研究者未來研究方向之建議，以期經由各界之腦力激盪，共同為我國的資本市場國際化而努力。 / The amendment of Taiwan Company Act in June 22nd, 2005, upon its release, granted each shareholder the legitimate right to cast his/her vote by both written and electronic means in shareholders’ meetings. This amendment is menat to bring Taiwan’s corporate governance and shareholder rights in line with the international practice. However, with the limited use of no more than 1% voting rights of most listing and over-the-counter (OTC) companies on the three voting forums established by Yuanta Core Pacific Securities Co., Ltd., Taiwan Integrated Shareholder Service Company and Taiwan Depository & Clearing Corporation, the attempt has been proven unsuccessful. In addition, the latest “CG Watch” report, submitted during the 2010 Asian Governance Association annual conference held in October, has suggested that, similar to the previous reports, shareholder rights of Taiwan-based companies have not been improved outstandingly. For instance, the exercise of “postal voting” and “vote splitting” upon foreign investors of Taiwan-based companies has been restricted due to the flaws in the domestic voting system and regulations. Also, in the report, a constant low rating in “postal voting” for the Taiwan-based companies simply hints that the core issue has never been properly valued nor concretely improved. Based on the suggestions in the previous paragraph, this research paper provides an overview of the laws and the regulations of the postal voting system. The paper also includes opinions on practical needs and comparison from foreign experiences. By means of analyzing our current issues, the research draws an outline of the propositions for trends of the future development. Apart from analyzing the basic concepts of shareholders’ meetings held by some Taiwan-based companies, exercise of voting rights, and use of proxy forms, the research also peeks into the current situation around the globe and the future trends by consulting the system and the practical needs of shareholders’ meetings in the U.S. and Japan. As for the postal voting system and the current situation in Taiwan, the research provides a background illustration by introducing the structure and the current status of printed ballot voting and electronic voting under our postal voting framework. In conclusion, the paper points out the reasons for limited use of electronic voting in Taiwan. Finally, the research measures postal voting systems in the U.S., Japan and Taiwan from aspects of the laws and regulations, the shareholder rights, the corporate execution and the practical needs. In the end, in order for the effort of internationalization upon domestic capital market, the research eventually proposes the solutions for the related personnel in charge and the follow-up research direction for future researchers.

在法人格獨立之原則下，公司對董事、監察人是否提起訴訟，原則上應由公司之意思機關決定，並由公司之代表人代表公司進行。然而，當公司內部機關失靈，代表人怠於為公司行使權利時，我國公司法在第214條以下訂立少數股東例外情形下可代位公司對不法之董事提起訴訟之代表訴訟制度。但我國現行公司法下之股東代表訴訟制度，存有起訴之門檻過高、起訴股東負擔之訴訟風險與成本過大之重大缺失，導致實務上甚少股東代表訴訟之實際案例。因此，立法者於民國98年增訂證券投資人及期貨交易人保護法(下稱投保法)第10條之1，使財團法人證券及期貨交易人保護中心(下稱投保中心)可以自己名義為公司提起代表訴訟，不受公司法起訴門檻之限制。探究增定投保法第10條之1之背景可能係考量目前環境仍不適合全面免除少數股東提起代表訴訟之起訴門檻，以避免股東濫行起訴而影響公司正常經營。故立法者藉由具有公益性質之投保中心，在主管機關之監理下，於投資人保護法限制之範圍內對公司之不法董事或監察人提起代表訴訟，以追求小股東權益之維護與公司經營利益與董事、監察人負擔責任三者間最大平衡。 然而，立法者於公司法之外，另於投保法制訂股東代表訴訟之制度，將產生投保中心提起之股東代表訴訟在雙軌制度下是否回歸適用公司法規定之爭議。又股東代表訴訟制度於投保法修法後仍存有許多爭議，投保法第10條之1之規定僅解決起訴誘因不足之問題。縱透過投保中心依投保法規定代位公司起訴，投保中心提起之代表訴訟亦存有維護公司利益與維護公益之內涵是否一致之爭議。又投保中心提起之股東代表訴訟常遇到證據偏在造成舉證困難之問題，縱以刑事附帶民事程序方式提起訴訟，仍存有訴訟程序進度緩慢，且刑事判決認定之結果難以解決民事求償程序中具體判斷公司之損害現今是否仍然存在、損害範圍為何及有無重大性之問題。是本文除在第五章介紹投保法現行規範及實務運作之狀況外，另於第六章透過英美法制之比較，針對股東代表訴訟中當事人之範圍、其他股東之程序保障、內部救濟程序先行之效力三大爭議進行我國現行股東代表訴訟制度之檢討，冀希能作為未來股東代表訴訟修法方向之參考。

隨著企業經營規模日趨複雜、專業化，股東因人數眾多、股東意見不一，在面臨公司所有與經營分離所產生的代理成本控制上，實有困難。一般小股東因持股過低，對於公司經營事務只能消極以待，若對公司經營成果不滿意，只能選擇華爾街準則(Wall Street Walk or Vote with Feet)，而賣掉股票，甚難對管理階層進行更進一步的影響。相較之下，機構投資人基於其人力及資源優勢，能深入參與公司治理、監督管理階層，進而提昇公司經營績效，增進股東投資價值，此即為機構投資人積極主義。 本篇論文探討機構投資人行使股東權以促進公司治理發展。首先討論機構投資人積極主義之兩大基礎支柱－其一，良好公司治理確能對公司績效表現有所助益，其二機構投資人促進公司治理乃其善盡受託義務之體現。 由於美國機構投資人主義高度成熟發展，而國內機構投資人積極主義仍屬起步階段，本篇論文即以比較研究法，探討美國機構投資人行使股東權如股東提案、委託書投票、直接與管理階層溝通、發布黑名單、團體訴訟與股東提名董事草案等，及分析說明我國公司治理相關條文與機構投資人行使表決權時所會遭逢之困境。 此外，本論文經由案例研究，深入蒐集資料並訪談兩個在促進公司治理領域夙負盛名的退休基金-美國威斯康辛州投資委員會與加拿大安大略省教師退休計畫，從而細膩地觀察美國及加拿大機構投資人積極主義之發展、瓶頸與挑戰。 最後，本論文提出促進機構投資人提出公司治理及表決權行使政策、鼓勵機構投資人於股東提案權與表決權等議案進行合作及建置對機構投資人餐與公司治理友善之法規環境等建議，期能對於我國機構投資人積極主義之發展有所助益。 / The increase in institutional funds has been extraordinarily rapid. Comparing with the minority shareholders, the institutional shareholders’ size and expertise can minimize the collective choice problem and agency costs. Their resources enable them to investigate and monitor management in corporate governance field. This is the “Institutional Shareholder Activism“. This article discusses the institutional shareholder’s enhancement of corporate governance. It explores from the two backbones of the Institutional Shareholder Activism: Firstly, the correlation between corporate governance and corporate performance, and secondly, fiduciary duties of the Institutional Shareholder. It makes two conclusions: Good corporate governance certainly helps protect shareholder interests, and contributes to superior long-term economic performance, and institutional shareholders can comply with fiduciary duties by enhancing corporate governance. Furthermore, due to America institutional shareholder activism is highly developed, while Taiwan institutional shareholder activism is not developed. This paper compares America institutional shareholder activism with Taiwan’s. It discusses America institutional shareholder activism in many aspects, such as shareholder proposal, proxy solicitation, vote, direct negotiation with the corporate management, focus list, class action, security holder director nominations bill etc. Then, it analyses some of Taiwan’s corporate governance related articles such as shareholder proposal and security holder director nominations, and some difficulties which the pension fund and the security investment trust fund face when they vote as shareholders. Moreover, through case study, this paper analyses two prestigious pension funds: State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) and The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP), and investigates their stages of development and current operation and future challenges in the corporate governance field. At last, this paper provides some suggestions and inspirits the institutional shareholder activism in our country.

企業股東基於法律與契約對於所投資之公司，通常享有股利分配權、新股優先認購權、剩餘財產分配權、股東投票權等基本權利，本文以股東權利基礎來重新詮釋Ohlson模式與Easton模式。基於股東權利基礎，Ohlson模式（價格模式）可重新表示為盈餘、帳面價值、投票權價值之線性模式；Easton模式（報酬模式）可重新表示為盈餘水準、盈餘變動、投票權價值變動之線性模式。本文依上述理論基礎發展相關之研究假說，為彌補單用當期盈餘資訊之不足本文於實證模式中將再加入未來盈餘變數，並以臺灣市場之資料來驗證各項假說。首先，本文實證價格模式與報酬模式之各項變數，對於股價及報酬是否具有解釋力。其次，本文實證當經濟環境不同時，上述實證結果是否會受到影響。 價格模式之實證結果指出：（1）各項價格變數對於股價皆具有顯著的正向解釋力。（2）當公司盈餘為負數或者盈餘持續性低時，當期盈餘對於股價的解釋力會降低。（3）當產業前景較差時，當期盈餘、帳面價值等會計資訊較不被注意，故比較不會反應在股價；管理者可由公司獲取的私有利益也會較少，故投票權價值與股價之關聯也會較低。（4）當產業生命週期較短時，當期盈餘資訊較被注意，此與其較易取得與計算有關。（5）當總體經濟情況不同時，各項變數對股價的解釋力並無顯著差異，此現象可能與研究期間內總體經濟情況好壞的差異並不明顯所致。（6）當通貨膨脹率較高時，公司所傳達之會計資訊會有高估的現象，故當期盈餘與股價之關聯會較低。 報酬模式之實證結果指出：（1）各項報酬變數對於報酬皆具有顯著的正向解釋力。（2）當公司盈餘為負數或者盈餘持續性低時，盈餘水準對於報酬的解釋力會降低，盈餘變動對於報酬的解釋力則會提高。（3）當產業前景較差時，由於盈餘水準、未來盈餘價值指標等會計資訊較不被注意，故比較不會反應在股價報酬；管理者可獲取的私有利益也會減少，故其與股價之關聯會降低。（4）當產業生命週期不同時，各項變數對報酬的解釋力並無顯著差異。（5）當總體經濟情況較差時，盈餘變動的資訊性顯著較低，此現象應與總體經濟情況較差時盈餘通常為負數所致，投票權價值指標也有相同的現象。（6）當通貨膨脹率不同時，各項變數對報酬的解釋力並無顯著差異，此現象可能與研究期間內通貨膨脹率高低的差異並不明顯所致。 綜上所述，股東權利基礎評價模式之各項變數確實能解釋股價或報酬，而且在不同的經濟情境下，上述變數對股價或報酬之解釋力確實會有不同，因此未來從事股權價值或股價報酬評估時，研究者應再進行相關的情境分析。 目 錄 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的與方法 5 第三節 論文貢獻 7 第四節 論文架構 9 第二章 文獻探討 10 第一節 股利分配權價值之相關文獻 12 第二節 剩餘財產分配權價值之相關文獻 14 第三節 新股優先認購權價值之相關文獻 19 第四節 股東投票權價值之相關文獻 26 第五節 情境式分析研究法之相關文獻 31 第三章 研究方法 33 第一節 股東權利基礎評價模式之建構 34 第二節 研究假說與實證模式 38 第三節 變數定義 47 第四節 樣本與資料選取 55 第四章 實證結果分析 59 第一節 價格模式之實證結果 60 第二節 報酬模式之實證結果 63 第三節 價格模式之情境分析結果 66 第四節 報酬模式之情境分析結果 80 第五章 結論與建議 94 第一節 研究結論 95 第二節 研究建議 101 第三節 研究限制 102 參考文獻 103 / When investors buy stock, they acquire all common and specific rights granted by the laws and contracts. Shareholders usually have the right to receive dividends, the preemptive right, the right to claim the residuals assets, and the right to vote at shareholders’ meetings. The paper uses the base of shareholders’ rights to re-explain the empirical meanings of Ohlson model and Easton model. According to the base of shareholders’ rights, Ohlson model（price model）can be rewritten as the linear model of earnings, book valve, and voting right premium. In the same way, Easton model（return model）can be rewritten as the linear model of earnings level, earnings change, and voting right premium change. According to the theory base above, this paper develops related research hypotheses. Not only current earnings but also future earnings are included in empirical models, and I use Taiwanese data to test the hypotheses. First, the paper tests whether each variable in price model or return model can explain stock price or return. Second, the paper investigates whether the results mentioned above will be affected by different contexts. The empirical evidence of the price model can be summarized as follows. First, each price variable has significantly positive explanatory power with respect to stock price. Second, when earnings is negative or earnings persistence is low, the value-relevance of current earnings will decrease. Third, when industry prospect becomes worse, market pays little attention to current earnings and book value and manager gets less private benefits, thus the association between current earnings, book value, voting right premium and stock price is low. Fourth, when industry life cycle is shorter, more attention is paid to current earnings, which is related to availability of data. Fifth, when macroeconomic circumstance is different, the explanatory power of each variable is not significantly different, this phenomenon may be due to little significant difference among macroeconomic circumstance during research periods. Sixth, when inflation rate is high, accounting information signaled by firm is overstated, which reduces the association between current earnings and stock price. The empirical evidence of the return model can be summarized as follows. First, each return variable has significantly positive explanatory power with respect to stock return. Second, when earnings is negative or earnings persistence is low, the value-relevance of earnings level will decrease, while the value-relevance of earnings change will increase. Third, when industry prospect is not good, market pays little attention to earnings level and future earnings indicator and manager gets less private benefits, thus the association between earnings level, future earnings indicator, voting right premium indicator and stock return is low. Fourth, when industry life cycle is not the same, the explanatory power of each variable is not significantly different. Fifth, when macroeconomic circumstance becomes worse, the informativeness of earnings change is significantly low, this phenomenon may be due to positive correlation between macroeconomic circumstance and earnings. Voting right premium indicator also has the same phenomenon. Sixth, when inflation rate is different, the explanatory power of each variable is not significantly different, this phenomenon is likely due to little significant difference among inflation rate during research periods. In summary, the variables in shareholders’ rights-based valuation models can explain stock price or stock return. In the different contexts, the explanatory power of variables mentioned above with respected to stock price or stock return is significantly different. The results imply the importance of contextual analysis when researchers are engaged in the valuation of stock price or stock return.

有鑒於全球半導體產業已趨成熟，全球半導體通路商之間的競爭也越來越白熱化，越來越多家半導體通路商藉由企業併購，進行所代理產品線的互補、技術整合與併購後的企業資源整合，進而產生併購綜效(Synergy)，以達半導體通路商的經濟規模，才足以持續保有競爭力。 本研究藉由大聯大控股公司的併購策略，持續保持競爭力，以及併購後所產生綜效作為研究對象，針對未來半導體通路商產業的全球佈局之策略參考，在面對全球景氣循環不佳環境下，半導體通路商毛利率越來越低情況下，如何思考通路商的營運策略、通路商的價值與市場定位，尋求全球戰略佈局，發揮企業的核心價值與核心競爭力。在其併購前之充分準備、規劃與決定併購方式，併購後如何持續做好經營管理，組織設計與調整組織..等做完整分析，從中找出『半導體通路商之核心能力、併購戰略與整合佈局』等交互關係。 研究說明併購前應有的考慮事項如：環境評估、競爭策略方向、白地策略、價值鏈加值、併購後之系統整合、資源整合、組織的設計創新、經營管理制度創新..等因素，供相關企業於併購前後可採取之策略參考，圓滿達成併購績效目標，並達到預期併購綜效，符合股東期望。 本案例研究結果歸納出下列重點： 1.併購前首重交易前之準備階段(即評估併購目標公司和制定整併計畫)。 2.挑選併購對象時，相關併購所創造的價值比無相關併購要來得高。 3.周詳的整合計畫與管理機制，是實現併購綜效的主要關鍵。 4.留住關鍵人才是確保企業併購成功的重要基石。 5.併購後，如何消彌兩家企業間文化差異，是合併後經營成敗的關鍵因素。 6.併購後保留雙方的優良企業文化，再循序漸進轉化成新的企業願景、文化。 7.藉由不斷的溝通協調，建立共識，設定目標，資源整合等，才可以提升綜效。 8.設計新組織架構、新的營運與管理模式，讓併購綜效延續，持續保有競爭力。 9.階段性組織調整與經營策略調整，並配合上游供應商策略，是半導體通路商重要成功關鍵因素。 10.依併購對象規模條件決定，小公司由子集團併購，大公司由控股公司併購。 / In view of the mature global semiconductor industry, more and more intense competition between the global semiconductor distributor, a growing number of semiconductor distributors through mergers and acquisitions, product line agent complementary, technology integration, mergers and acquisitions, enterprise resource integration, and thus produce a net synergistic effect (synergy), to achieve the economies of scale of the semiconductor distributor, enough to sustain their competitiveness. By WPG Holdings company's acquisition strategy, the study continued to remain competitive and generate synergies after the acquisition as an object of study for future semiconductor distributors industry's and global distribution strategy reference, the poor in the face of the global business cycle environment, getting lower and lower gross profit margin in the semiconductor distributors, how to think about the operating strategy of the distributor, distributor’s value and market positioning, seeking global strategic layout, play to the company's core values and core competitiveness. Fully prepared in the pre-merger planning and decision mergers and acquisitions, post-merger continued good business management, organizational design and adjust the organization. Do a complete analysis, to find out the core competencies of the semiconductor distributors, M & A strategy and integration layout and other interactive relationship. Study shows that pre-merger due considerations such as: environmental assessment, direction of competitive strategy, Seizing the white space strategy, value chain, value-added, M & A system integration, integration of resources, organization design innovation, management system innovation. And other factors, for related enterprises can be taken before and after the M & A strategy reference, the successful completion of the merger and acquisition performance objectives, and achieve the expected synergistic gains, in line with the expectations of shareholders. This case study results are summarized to the following priorities: 1. Preparation phase before the first heavy trading in the pre-merger (ie, assessment of the M & A target company and the development of the whole and plans). 2. Selection of acquisition targets, the value of mergers and acquisitions are creating related to mergers and acquisitions to come. 3. Comprehensive integration planning and management mechanism, which is the key to achieve synergistic gains. 4. Retain key personnel to ensure that the cornerstone of success of mergers and acquisitions. 5. After the merger, and how to eliminate a key factor in business success of the cultural differences between the two companies merged. 6. After the merger, to retain both excellent corporate culture, and then step-by-step into the new corporate vision, culture. 7. By continuous communication and coordination, consensus-building, goal setting, resource integration, can enhance the synergy. 8. The design of the new organizational structure, the new operation and management mode, make a merger synergy continuation, continued to stay competitive. 9. Phased organizational restructuring and business strategy adjustment, and in line with the strategy of vendor suppliers are the semiconductor distributor important critical success factors. 10. Conditions in accordance with the scale of acquisition targets decided, a small company by the sub-group mergers and acquisitions, and large companies by the holding company mergers and acquisitions.

當併購行為未經目標公司之經營階層同意時，目標公司之經營階層，是否得採取對抗敵意併購之防禦措施?由於經營階層在採取防禦措施並成功排除敵意併購下，將產生確保自身經營權之效果。從而，防禦措施之採取恐有涉及其自身之利害關係，是否得以任意採取防禦措施即生疑義。再者，防禦措施之採用，涉及該項措施相關領域之基礎規範，包括法律及行政命令之範疇，此等規範之內容，亦有釐清之必要。此外，縱使符合防禦措施所涉及各該相關法律領域之基礎規範，針對於防禦措施之適用本身，是否可能發展出不同於基礎規範之內容，包括防禦措施所應有之適當程序與規制內容。本文試圖對此作等問題，整理相關學說及實務見解，並提出個人之淺見。 本文共分為七章，分別闡述題目所涉及之若干議題。第一章為「緒論」，說明研究之基本理念與架構。第二章為敵意併購之概說，首先本文先對敵意併購之意義作一界定與說明，其次介紹敵意併購之類型，包括所謂有害企業價值之相關敵意併購類型。再者說明敵意併購與防禦措施之關聯，董事會於敵意併購發生時，是否應具有中立之義務，亦或得基於保護全體股東之利益而積極採取防禦措施，值得加以說明。此外，本文將一一介紹常見防禦措施之內容，其類型包括預防性之防禦措施與臨時性之防禦措施，並分析此二類防禦措施區分之實益。 第三章為防禦措施之妥當性問題。敵意併購關於不同當事人間之利益狀態，包括經營者與股東間、收購者與目標公司股東間，以及目標公司股東與利害關係人間之利害狀態等，實影響法律對於防禦措施規範之立場，宜先予分析。其次，分別介紹英國、歐盟、美國、日本，以及我國法制上對防禦措施規範之處理態度。 最後，整理我國學者在立法論上之意見及提出本文之淺見。 第四章為防禦措施於我國法下之可行性。本文將一一分析，於第二章所介紹外國所常出現之防禦措施，於我國法制下適用之可行性，包括黃金股、多數表決權特別股、黃金降落傘、銀降落傘、錫降落傘、白馬侍從、期限利益或授權之喪失、改變公司資本結構、鯊魚驅逐、員工持股計畫、白馬騎士、小精靈防衛戰、支付綠色郵件之贖金、目標公司買回股份，以及阻止或延緩股東會之召開等防禦措施。此外，我國實務於經營權爭奪上常見之定暫時狀態假處分，其意義與法制規範之內容，本文亦作一介紹，並分析其適用於公司經營權爭奪之運作情況。 第五章為日本法上毒藥丸之適用。日本過去因其特殊之交叉持股結構，及股東對公司之忠誠度遠高於歐美之故，敵意併購之發展未如美國，然而近年來日本亦開始出現敵意併購，同時發展出日式毒藥丸之運用，實值得作為我國之參考。首先，本文介紹日本法上關於新股預約權之意義及其相關之規範。其次，日本近年來所發生之三件對抗敵意併購之案件，包括日本放送事件、ニレコ(NIRECO)事件以及ブルドックソース(BULL-DOG SAUCE)事件，本文亦將一一介紹其事實之經過，並分析日本法院之見解。 第六章為毒藥丸於我國防禦措施之適用。毒藥丸為防禦措施中，最為傳統且典型之防禦措施，毒藥丸於我國法下適用之可行性，值得詳加琢磨。首先本文介紹認股權所呈現之各種型態，包括員工認股權憑證、認股權憑證、附認股權特別股、附認股權公司債、可轉換公司債等，並說明其於我國法下之規範內容。其次再進一步分析此等認股權型態之內容於我國作為防禦措施之可行性。 第七章為本文之結論。本文試圖提出防禦措施之妥當規範所應有之適當程序與內容，並分析於我國法下之運用，以作為本文之結論。