近年來國內外許多企業層出不窮的發生管理階層舞弊案，使得投資人以及債權人對於企業公開發佈財務資訊之信心大受影響，公司若能開誠佈公告知利害關係人其相關之資訊，不僅能提升公司之資訊透明度，亦能重拾投資人的信心，故公司資訊透明度為廣受重視之議題。分析師擁有專業知識分析公司的財務報表且能提供額外的資訊給投資大眾，並扮演了公司重要的外部監督機制。 本研究旨在探討公司資訊透明度、分析師跟隨與公司績效之關聯性。採用台灣證券暨期貨發展基金會所公布的資訊揭露評鑑系統結果作為資訊透明度的替代變數，來探討當公司資訊透明度揭露程度較低時，分析師跟隨人數愈多是否愈能增加公司之績效。此外，本研究採用標準普爾之評等分數作為穩健性測試，來驗證結果是否相ㄧ致。研究結果顯示：公司資訊透明度較佳的公司相較於揭露程度較差之公司，其績效愈高。公司績效愈好，分析師跟隨人數愈多。資訊透明度揭露程度較差的公司，分析師的跟隨人數會愈少。無論公司資訊透明度好或壞時，分析師跟隨人數愈多，均能增加公司之績效，且資訊透明度揭露程度較差的公司相較於資訊透明度揭露程度較好的公司，分析師跟隨人數愈多，愈能增加公司之績效。穩健性測試之結果亦有相ㄧ致的發現。 / In recent years there were lots of frauds by managers in domestic and international enterprises, causing investors and creditors lose confidence on financial reporting. It is believed that if the company management can frankly and earnestly disclose related information to the stakeholders, the company’s transparency and thus the investors’ trust will be promoted. Corporate information transparency has become an important issue. Analysts have professional skills to analysis financial statements and disclose additional information to investors and also play an important role in supervising corporation’s operating condition. The purpose of this study is to discuss the association among corporate information transparency, analysts following and firms performance. The research uses the evaluated result of The Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System as the disclosure transparency proxy variable to examine whether the companies with lower disclosure level have higher firms performance if more analysts follow these enterprises. In addition, this paper uses Standard and Poor’s rating scores to do robust check. The empirical results indicate follows: 1.The higher information disclosure level companies have higher firms performance than the lower information disclosure level companies. 2.Enterprises with better firm performance have a larger analyst following. 3.Analysts are less likely to follow firms with lower corporate information transparency. 4.Corporate information transparency plays an important role in analysts’ willingness to follow firms and that increased analyst following is associated with higher firm performance, particularly for firms with lower corporate information transparency. 5.The result of robust check reaches a consistent conclusion.

歷經國內外多起知名企業的財務弊案後，各國政府及投資人開始關注公司的資訊透明度，企業也意識到資訊透明度對於企業永續經營的重要性，因此，本研究主要探討資訊透明度對於企業價值之影響。研究貢獻在於以具有專業和分析能力之分析師預測行為作為判斷企業資訊透明度之依據，進而探究其與企業價值之關聯性。本研究以2008年到2013年台灣上市(櫃)公司為樣本，以企業價值(Tobin’s Q)為應變數，資訊透明度相關之變數(分析師追蹤意願、分析師盈餘預測偏誤與分析師盈餘預測離散性)為主要解釋變數，在控制公司成長面、獲利面、風險面與公司規模因素，並固定產業和年份，利用追蹤資料迴歸模型(panel regression)來進行分析。 實證結果分為兩部分，（1）代表資訊透明度之變數－分析師預測意願、分析師預測精準度及分析師預測離散性與企業價值具有顯著正向關係。另利用前述之結果，本研究自行建立一個衡量企業透明度的模型，以整合性資訊探討資訊透明度對於企業價值的影響，實證結果顯示（2）資訊透明度與企業價值間確實具有顯著正向關係，結果支持良好的資訊透明度，有助於公司治理，長期間更能夠提升企業價值與永續經營。此外，本研究以整合資訊衡量企業資訊透明度，相較於單一資訊更為完善，也提供企業利害關係人及一般大眾不同面相去了解企業的資訊透明度，進而保護其權益。 / Since the occurrences of financial scandal, issues surrounding corporate governance and information disclosure have been widely discussed in these few years. Not only have government and investors started paying more attention on information transparency, but more and more firms have noticed that well corporate governance could help its sustainable development. The main purpose of this study is to examine the influences of information transparency on corporate value. Based on the samples of Taiwan listed firms for the period from 2009 to 2013, this study employs panel regression model with Corporate value (Tobin’s Q) as the dependent variable against various combinations of explanatory variables (analysts following, analysts’ earnings forecast bias and analysts’ earnings forecast derivation). The results of this research reveal that (1) the firms with high corporate value significantly have more analysts following, less analyst's earning forecast error and the greater forecast derivation. And by using an integrated model to do further analysis, the evidence shows that (2) higher information transparency could improve the corporate governance, gain more corporate value and benefit sustainable development in the long term. What’s more, instead of unitary source, this research measures corporate information transparency via integrated sources to ensure credibility, and provides various angles for corporate stakeholders and the general public to learn further more about corporate information transparency and be able to protect their rights.

中央銀行政策透明度影響總體經濟的議題在近日漸受重視。以美國為例，2008年房貸嚴重違約，高順位債權受到波及，使多數金融業產生營運危機，讓聯邦準備銀行 (Fed) 政策執行受到關注。晚近貨幣當局的政策透明度漸受重視。貨幣政策應如何選定才能使總體經濟達到較高的社會福利？Cukierman在2002年指出中央銀行的透明度低易造成較高的物價膨脹。本研究以動態一般性均衡模型 (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) ，建構新凱因斯小型開放總體模型。模型內含一定程度的價格僵固，並且擁有前瞻預期 (forward looking) 及後顧預期 (backward looking) 兩種型態的廠商存在其中。再採用貝氏方法估計台灣在該模型所應採用的參數後，並嘗試對體系內多個部門投入衝擊，然後檢視央行的政策透明度對總體經濟的影響，同時驗證是否支持Cukierman的結論。本研究印證Cukierman的結論，發現央行在操作貨幣政策面臨兩難時，不應採取透明度低的政策法則，而應優先針對物價的不穩定做出因應對策。 / Recently, people pay attention to central bank’s policy transparency, and most countries’ central banks have accepted the suggestion made by the Bank for International Settlements to adopt transparent monetary policy. Cukierman (2002) concluded that if the central bank’s policy was not transparency, it would cause higher inflation. The thesis will utilizes dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with New Keynesian concept proposed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) to analyze the effects of transparent monetary policy and to classify the macroeconomic different effects between transparent and hazy monetary policy. The conclusions support that higher monetary policy transparency will reduce social welfare loss, lower the volatility of inflation and output gap.

摘要 一九九七年東亞金融風暴起因之一即為公司治理不佳，其影響所及至數年後仍餘波蕩漾，而根據2000年6月麥肯錫顧問公司所做的全球投資人意見調查發現，有高達80％的美國投資人願意多付18％的價格來買良好公司治理企業的股票；自2001年底以來，美國「恩隆」（Enron）與「世界通訊」（WorldCom）等弊案又陸續爆發，其中所暴露的公司治理問題，讓世人驚覺這已是全球企業刻不容緩的議題，並亟思未來如何防止類似事件之發生。 公司治理經緯萬端，但都與如何確保資金提供者的投資能夠獲得應有的報酬有關。據此，公司治理的重要議題之一即為如何使小股東的權益不受內部人（即大股東與管理者）的侵犯；尤其在當今大企業紛紛進行事業轉投資之際，大股東常身兼轉投資事業之經營者，如何確保外在投資人（小股東與債權人）應得的報酬，並兼顧其他利害關係人的利益，為公司治理中實際且有趣之課題。我國大股東往往基於營運效率、自身利益與控制權的考量，會做出許多便宜行事卻不利公司治理的行為，如轉投資事業與母公司之間的透明度不足、大股東交叉持股或持有間接股權、所有權與經營權不分、母公司與轉投資事業之間可能的利益衝突、乃至於大股東個人風格等，這些大股東在轉投資事業中的角色定位與公司治理間的相互關係是本論文論述之重點。同時，為了加強研究的深度與實證性，作者特別藉由個案公司的實際案例來驗證文獻上的觀點，結論所得與研究相符合，並更能增添對企業經營之變化多端與不易控制之親身體驗。 本文最後並討論世界銀行、OECD及我國所規範之公司治理架構，希望公司治理能實際有助於我國企業之轉投資行為。因為制度的設計與執行若能加強公司治理與監督管理者的行為，當能強化公司競爭力，此乃公司治理積極面的貢獻。 / Abstract One of the reasons for the East Asia 1997 financial crisis is because of the careless corporate governance. The impact of this financial crisis actually has had deep and board affection even afterward. According to one investigation by Mckinsey & Company in June 2000, there are about 80% of global investors who are willing to pay 18% extra money to buy those stocks belong to companies have better corporate governance. On the other hand, starting from the end of year 2001, the successive collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other USA companies has exposed the serious and urgency about corporate governance. It makes people in worldwide enterprises realize how significant the corporate governance is and try to avoid similar events occurred. Although corporate governance has many aspects, it all related to how to secure the deserved return of the capital providers. Accordingly, one of the important topics of corporate governance is to protect the minority shareholder rights from being invaded by the insiders (controlling shareholders and top executives). This topic become even more important especially when controlling shareholders are also top executives of the equity-invested companies. Thus, how to secure the investors’ (minority shareholders and creditors) rights is an interesting and practical issue of corporate governance. Controlling shareholders in Taiwan are used to manage firms based on their own convenience such as the efficiency of operation, interest of themselves, and control rights, instead of considering corporate governance. This attitude, however, will easily result in some negative behaviors such as the lack of transparency between mother company and her equity investment, cross holding or private holding of controlling shareholders, indifferences between ownership and management, the potential interest impact between mother company and equity investment, and even the affection of firms’ performance by the characteristics of controlling shareholders. This thesis emphasize in the above correlation between corporate governance and equity investment. We also examine a real firm’s case to enhance its conviction. This thesis also discusses the corporate governance structure of World Bank, OECD, and Taiwan. It is the author’s hope that corporate governance can be practically useful for a firm’s performance as its aggressive contribution.

財政透明度為建立一個良好政府治理的基礎。近年來隨著中國大陸高速的經濟發展，中央政府相關單位亦注意到財政公開的重要性。然而，目前中國財政資訊仍處於不透明的狀態。另一方面，中國大陸貪腐現象無所不在，內部腐敗行為更是日益猖獗，因此如何打擊貪腐、提升中國地方政府的財政透明度，就成為迫在眉睫的問題。 因此，本文的研究目的主要探討中國貪腐程度對地方政府財政透明度的影響：第一，瞭解當今社會對於財政透明度的提倡與國際規範；第二，考量貪汙與財政透明度之間可能存在非線性關係，建構一個追蹤平滑轉換迴歸模型（Panel Smooth Transition Regression Model，PSTR），瞭解中國大陸財政資訊的公開情形是否因各地區貪腐程度的不同而有所差異；最後，對於中國大陸嚴重的貪腐與財政透明度的關聯做深入探討，以期能為中國大陸財政不透明與不重視情況提出政策建議。

本研究主要是探討公司治理結構與資訊透明度之間的關聯性，並進一步檢視公司治理結構與資訊透明度對於權益資金成本及分析師盈餘預測之影響。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現企業的資訊透明度確實會受到公司治理結構因素的影響。在股權結構方面，當控制股東所持有的現金流量權比率增加時，由於外部股東的持股相對減少，在監督成本大於效益的情況下，對於公司資訊的需求會降低，因此，管理當局會降低資訊的揭露水準，導致資訊透明度下降。在董事會組成方面，本研究的發現支持財富侵佔假說的論點，當控制股東所掌握的董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會提高控制股東剝奪外部股東財富的動機，使得控制股東傾向利用控制力以影響被投資公司的資訊揭露政策，造成被投資公司的資訊透明度下降。除此之外，研究結果也支持監督假說的預期，即獨立董監事的設置，能有效發揮監督管理當局與制衡控制股東的功能，有助於提昇公司的資訊透明度。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳確實會影響外部投資人對於企業風險的評價，進而影響投資人所要求的必要報酬率(即企業的權益資金成本)。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東的持股比率增加時，其與外部股東的目標會趨於一致，發生代理問題的風險會降低，投資人承擔較低的代理風險。因此，控制股東持股比率增加所傳達予投資人是一項有利的訊息，以致於投資人願意降低必要的投資報酬率，使得公司的權益資金成本降低。董監事持股質押的行為對於投資人而言，可能是一項風險的訊號，理性的投資人預期未來可能被董監事剝奪財富的風險，以致於要求的投資報酬率會提高，企業的權益資金成本會增加。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於分析師預測的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳會影響企業資訊環境的品質，進而影響分析師預測誤差與離散性。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東所掌握之投票權比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題，降低財務報導的可靠性，因而導致分析師對於公司未來績效與前景的瞭解程度相對較低，分析師之間對於公司未來的盈餘並無一致的看法，即預測的離散性會增加，但是並不影響預測的誤差；當控制股東所掌握之董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的利益不一致，使得控制股東有誘因剝奪外部股東的權益，操縱公司的會計資訊，使得會計資訊的可靠性降低，以致於分析師預測未來盈餘所面臨的不確定性會愈大，預測誤差與離散性也會愈高。 關鍵詞：公司治理結構；資訊透明度；權益資金成本；分析師預測；控制股東；獨立董監事 / This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, which in turn examines the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on the cost of equity capital and the analyst’s earnings forecasts including forecast error and forecast dispersion. On the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the transparency is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the transparency is lower with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Finally, the transparency is higher with higher percentage of independent directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on cost of equity capital, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity capital is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the cost of equity capital is higher with higher percentage of cash flow rights pledged by directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on analyst’s forecasts, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the forecast dispersion is higher with higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Second, the forecast error and dispersion are higher with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Keywords: Corporate governance structure；Transparency；Cost of equity capital；Analyst’s forecasts；Controlled stockholder；Independent directors and supervisors.

本研究探討我國於2004年發佈之第35號財務會計準則公報，有關『資產減損之會計處理準則』。35號公報要求企業必須評估公司資產之價值，以避免資產價值之虛列，增加資產價值資訊之透明度。本研究就公開資訊之揭露與資訊透明度的觀點，探討與資產減損有關的三項議題：(1)資產減損之股價反應幅度與公司特質及減損資產類別的關聯性；(2)資產減損對分析師盈餘預測特性之影響；(3)資產減損對本益比之影響。本文之研究結果顯示：(1)對於提前於2004年年報適用的樣本與準時於2005年第一季季報適用的樣本，公司特質變數與股價反應幅度的關聯性有不同；而減損資產類別變數與股價反應幅度則未有顯著之關係；(2)相較於同產業且資產總額接近之未宣告認列資產減損的控制組公司，宣告認列資產減損之公司，其分析師盈餘預測之離散性與預測誤差降低；並且公司揭露認列的減損比率愈大，其分析師間盈餘預測的離散性及預測誤差愈小；(3)在與同產業且資產總額接近之未宣告認列資產減損之控制組公司相較下，宣告認列資產減損之公司，其減損認列後的本益比較減損認列前的期間為高，且認列減損之比率愈大者，其認列減損之後的本益比愈高。這些結果顯示35號公報之公布實施，強制規定公司全面檢視資產或重大投資之潛在未實現損失，將有助於增加資產及盈餘資訊之透明度與穩健性，並提高了分析師對公司盈餘預測能力及市場對公司盈餘資訊之評價。 / This paper studies the effects of the implementation of Statement on Financial Accounting Standards (hereafter, SFAS No. 35) in 2004 on “Accounting for Asset Impairments”. SFAS No. 35 requires that the company has to assess its assets to reflect the potential unrealized losses of assets and improve the transparency of the value of assets in financial statements. From the viewpoints of the disclosure on public information and the transparency of financial statements, this study examines the following three issues related to the asset write-offs: (a) how is the association between the magnitude of market reaction to write-off announcements, firms’ characteristic, and the categories of the asset written-off? (b) what is the impact of asset write-offs on analysts’ forecast dispersion and errors? (c) what is the impact of asset write-offs on price/earnings ratios? The results show that the magnitudes of market reaction in the early adoption samples in 2004 financial statements are different from that in the timely adoption samples in first quarter of 2005’s financial statement. However, The magnitudes of market reactions to the write-off are not significantly associated with categories of asset written-off. Furthermore, compared to control sample of non-adopting firms in the same industry and with similar total assets, the adopting firms have less analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion and errors. And, the larger the asset write-offs, the smaller the analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion and errors. Finally, the adopting firms have larger price/earnings ratios after the asset write-offs than control sample. The larger proportions of asset write-offs to total assets, the larger the price/earnings ratios after the firm the asset write-offs. Accordingly, the above evidence indicates that the reports implementations of SFAS No. 35 improves the transparency and conservatism of assets and earnings information, and to increase the valuations of earnings in the stock market in that the adopting firms are required to evaluate the potential unrealized losses on their long-lived assets and investments.

知訊者與非知訊者資訊不對稱之議題在學術殿堂一直廣為學者所研究討論，且各國證管機關為了維持證券市場公平性、保護非知訊者權益並且維持股票市場的穩定運作，適度的資訊揭露以維持證券市場的公平性一直都是各國證券交易所重視的政策目標。 是故，本研究利用代理人基人工股票市場來探討資訊揭露對於金融市場之影響。在此架構下之交易者皆已有限理性方式來呈現。他們是以遺傳規劃(genetic programming)之方式來學習並修正他們對於未來之金融市場之預期。在透過即時的模擬價格之資訊揭露，我們嘗試探討此資訊揭露之金融政策措施對於市場之波動性、市場之流動性之影響。 / The topic of asymmetric information between the informed traders and uninformed traders has been widely discussed by researchers in academics. To maintain the fairness of securities market, an appropriate information disclosure is quite important for authorities of securities regulation to protect the rights and interests of uninformed traders, and to maintain the operations of securities market stable. Based on these reasons, we construct an agent-based artificial stock market to investigate how information disclosure affects a financial market. In this framework of artificial stock market, all traders are characterized by bounded rationality. The traders are able to learn and adjust their predictions of financial market by means of a genetic programming algorithm. We try to understand how market transparency affects the volatility and the liquidity of a securities market.

為改善資訊揭露環境，並增進上市公司的資訊透明度，上海證券交易所在2004年起對所有上市公司強制實施XBRL財務報導格式，本研究檢驗強制實施XBRL財務報導格式對於公司經營績效之影響，以上海證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，研究期間為2003年至2010年，並考慮中國國有企業的特色，將樣本公司分為國有企業與民營企業，分別檢視強制實施XBRL財務報導格式對其經營績效之影響。基於中國國有企業之組織特性，本研究假設僅有民營企業可獲益於強制實施XBRL財務報導格式，並因此提升經營績效。實證結果顯示，確實僅有民營企業獲得XBRL財務報導的效益，在強制實施XBRL財務報導格式後經營績效提升，但由於組織特性的關係，強制實施XBRL財務報導格式的預期效益並未顯現在國有企業，對中國國有企業來說，資訊透明度與外部監督的提升不足以解決其經營上之代理問題。

建構一套健全的公司治理評等機制，為落實公司治理相關議題的核心工作。本研究以經濟暨合作發展組織之公司治理原則、世界銀行之公司治理架構與國內外公司治理相關實證文獻作為理論基礎，透過分析量化之公司層級衡量指標，嘗試建構一套可行且適合衡量台灣企業之公司治理評等指標，以作為投資人制定投資決策與授信機構評估企業債信風險時之參考。 本研究以2002年國內523家非金融業上市公司為樣本，利用LISREL方法 (線性結構關係模式統計方法)建構台灣公司治理評等指標。分析結果共得出：股權結構構面 (盈餘股份比、專業機構投資者持股率)；董事會職責構面 (盈餘席次比、外部董事席次比率、外部監察人席次數與外部董監持股率)；財務透明度構面 (盈餘管理幅度、損益平穩化程度與財報重編率)等3個構面、9項衡量指標。 透過與企業當期及次期經營績效、公司價值與投資人投資風險間之關聯性實證測試，本研究發現，前項公司治理評等指標與企業之經營績效、公司價值呈顯著正相關，而與投資人投資風險呈顯著負相關。此項實證結果一方面顯示，前項公司治理評等指標愈佳，企業當期與次期之經營績效與公司價值愈高，投資人之投資風險愈低；另方面亦表示本研究所建構之公司治理評等指標對於企業之經營績效、公司價值與投資人投資風險，具有一定程度之關聯性與預測能力。 / A well-developed corporate governance ranking system is essential to implantation of corporate governance. Base on principles proposed by OECD, a framework provided by the World-Bank and empirical literature on corporate governance, this research attempts to develop a workable TCGI (herein Taiwan Corporate Governance Index or TCGI) ranking system. The purpose of provision of TCGI is to help investors and creditors to make better decisions. Using data for 523 non-banking corporations publicly traded at Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2002, and LISREL as the analytical tool, this research constructs a three-aspect (including ownership structure, responsibility of the board and financial transparency) TCGI ranking system with 9 corresponding indicators in total. The empirical results of association tests show that TCGI indicators are significantly and positively (negatively) related to operation performance and market value (the occurrence of firms encountering financial difficulties). The findings thus imply that the TCGI ranking system developed in this research may be useful in investors and creditors decision-making.