L’institution municipale est restée à l’écart des recherches menées en histoire sur le 19e siècle sinon sous l’angle d’une prosopographie des maires et sous celui des élections municipales de la monarchie de Juillet. Les apports des autres sciences sociales – sociologie, anthropologie, ethnologie – ont renouvelé les approches, ainsi que l’histoire sociale fine. Cette recherche propose une analyse sociale et politique de cette institution, inscrite sur la longue durée (1800-1940) et sur un terrain resserré (un arrondissement et plus particulièrement cinq communes). Au moyen de bases de données relationnelles permettant une agrégation des données à différentes échelles de temps et d’espaces, elle vise à identifier les édiles (maires, adjoints, conseillers municipaux) pour eux-mêmes, dans une approche prosopographique, puis relativement pour définir leur représentativité (échelle de l’arrondissement) et pour les inscrire dans les relations qu’ils entretiennent avec les autres acteurs de la vie municipale (échelle communale).Cette analyse permet de mettre au jour une institution municipale que les villageois se sont appropriés au cours du 19e siècle, en reconnaissant une autorité au maire qui s’est construite d’abord dans l’opposition à celle du desservant et qui dépasse le cadre donné par la loi. De fait, les outrages à leur encontre sont peu nombreux et permettent d’appréhender non les limites de l’autorité consentie à la fonction mais le défaut d’exercice de son dépositaire. De même, les élections municipales font l’objetd’une préparation, d’une mobilisation et d’un contrôle – parfois jusqu’à la protestation électorale qui constitue alors un troisième tour – qui donnent la légitimité aux élus.L’identification des édiles a également permis de nuancer le portrait qu’il en est généralement dressé : s’il existe bien des familles éligibles parfois très anciennement implantées dans les communes d’exercice, la part de conseillers municipaux mobiles reste forte pendant tout le 19e siècle avant de se réduire progressivement. La reconstitution des carrières municipales montre aussi que l’accession au conseil municipal n’est pas définitivement acquise du fait d’une compétition électorale réelle.Quoiqu’un cadre légal précis préside la prise de décision au sein de l’institution municipale, la comparaison des modes de gouvernement d’une commune à l’autre fait émerger deux extrêmes, de l’exercice solitaire du maire à une décision prise collégialement par le conseil municipal dont le maire se fait le porteur. Entre ces deux extrêmes, les situations sont nombreuses et, si dans certaines communes, l’un s’impose davantage que l’autre, il existe aussi des mouvements de fluctuation en fonction des rapports de force qui se dessinent.Enfin, ce politique défini comme organisation du pouvoir au sein de la société, n’est pas enfermé dans les limites communales : les conflits au sein des conseils municipaux mettent au jour des réseaux sociaux qui sont également culturels et porteurs de sensibilités politiques ; c’est alors à une échelle intercommunale qu’ils prennent sens, marqués par les scansions nationales. / Historical researches on the nineteenth century have left aside Municipal institutions, except from the point of view of a prosopography of mayors and municipal elections of the July Monarchy. The contributions of other social sciences - sociology, anthropology, ethnology - have renewed the approaches, as well as the one on precise social history. This research puts forward a social and political analysis of this institution, registered on the long term (1800-1940) and on a tightened ground (a district and more particularly five localities).By means of relational databases allowing the aggregation of data at different scales of time and spaces, it aims at identifying the city councilors (mayors, deputies, councilors) for themselves, in a prosopographic approach, then relatively to define their representativeness (district scale) and to register them in the relationships they maintain with the other actors in municipal life (municipal scale).This analysis brings to light a municipal institution that villagers took over during the 19th century, by recognising an authority to the mayor and which was first shaped in opposition to that of the parish priest and which then overtook the given law framework. In fact, the outrages against them are few and allow to understand not the limits of the authority granted to the function but the lack of exercise of its depositary. In the same way, municipal elections deal with preparation, mobilisation and control -sometimes up to the electoral protest which constitutes then a third roundwhich brings legitimacy to the elected ones.The identification of the city councilors has also qualified the portrait that is generally drawn up: if there are many eligible families sometimes anciently established in the municipalities of exercise, the share of the moveable city councilors remains strong throughout the 19th century before gradually decreasing. The reconstitution of the municipal careers also shows that the access to the municipal council is not definitively acquired because of a real electoral competition.

This thesis is an examination of whether the “egalitarian model” for political finance that has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada, other Canadian courts and legal scholars and commentators is actually egalitarian and has been applied consistently (in Chapter 2), and whether Canada’s political finance system measures up to the Court’s model (in Chapters 3 and 4), and how it could be changed to comply with a more egalitarian model that would also be ethical in terms of preventing even the appearance of a conflict of interest (in Chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 1 sets out a general theoretical framework for evaluating the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, and I develop and set out a more egalitarian model in Chapter 5. In the Chapter 8 conclusion, I summarize the findings and propose structural and positive Charter rights court cases as a way forward, given that the platforms federal politicians and political parties from the past few elections, and the reports of parliamentary committees, have not called for the most of the changes I propose are needed to make the system more egalitarian. The thesis addresses political finance broadly defined as money, property, use of property, gifts, services, favours and other benefits and advantages provided to nomination contestants, election candidates and political party leadership contestants, electoral district associations, political parties, politicians and their staff during election campaign periods and also during the time period between elections, including support provided by “third-party” interest groups, lobbyists and other individuals, and by media outlets. In Chapter 3, I examine the rules that apply to each of these political actors in the areas of registration, donations and loans, spending, public subsidies and disclosure (including auditing), including a separate section on the role of media and social media. Given that political systems include providers (whether as contractors or donors) of money, property and the use of property (including gifts and other benefits and advantages), and services (including favours) to politicians, and given that providers could be lobbyists, I also examine in Chapter 4 the rules concerning gifts, favours and other benefits and relations between voters, lobbyists and politicians, and concerning the conflicts of interest that can be caused by these activities. Other than disclosure and auditing, I do not cover enforcement measures or systems in any of the areas. However, I do note at various points in the thesis that, as several studies and history have shown clearly, effective enforcement measures, policies and practices are key to ensure compliance with such rules. The main contentions that I make are: that the key principles of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model have not been consistently upheld by the Court and other Canadian courts, that Canada’ federal political finance system does not fulfill the Court’s egalitarian model, and that several changes are needed to make the model and the system more egalitarian, only a few of which have been addressed by Canadian courts and scholars to date. These contentions counter the claim made in the Court’s rulings, and by many scholars and commentators, that Canada’s political finance system has developed and is based on an egalitarian model. In Chapters 5 through 7, I develop a more egalitarian model and set out specific proposed changes to make Canada’s systems more egalitarian, both in theory and in practice, within the framework of a democratic good government political system (meaning a system with separation of powers, elections, human rights protections, rule of law etc.) and a mixed market economy with both public sector institutions and private sector businesses, unions and other organizations (cooperatives, non-profit, religious organizations etc.). Both the model and many of the specific proposed measures should also be applicable in other jurisdictions with different political systems and economic systems. The framework of 19 standards for a more egalitarian model that I develop in Chapter 5 is based mainly on John Rawls’ theory of justice, but modified and expanded to incorporate critiques of Rawls’ theory, other legal principles and democratic good government theories, international standards, government ethics case law, behavioural psychology studies, and evidence of the public’s expectations. The 201 proposals I make in Chapters 6 and 7 for specific changes to the rules of Canada’s current federal political finance system (again, broadly defined), are based on the model, measures from various jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere, and international standards. I am not claiming that these changes would definitely result in “better” or more “public interest” policy-making decisions, however that would be determined. I am only contending that the framework I develop is more egalitarian than the Supreme Court’s model, and that the rule changes I suggest would make the political finance, gifts, favours, conflict of interest and lobbying systems align with the more egalitarian model I propose. I primarily use the doctrinal research methodology by examining scholarly research and, given I also examine aspects of the laws of Canadian provinces and municipalities, and other countries, I also deploy some aspects of the comparative methodology (most fully when comparing Canada’s federal rules to Quebec’s rules, and somewhat when comparing Canada’s rules to the U.S. and U.K. rules). The research results from these sources inform the conclusions I set out in my thesis. The thesis advances knowledge in the following areas: 1. It is the first complete evaluation of the federal Canadian political finance, gifts-favours-benefits, conflict of interest and lobbying rules and systems in their current state as of May 2023, based on the findings of extensive new research into key parts of these systems; 2. It sets out the first comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model has been applied by the Court and other courts inconsistently, in ways that do not comply with the model; 3. It sets out the first analysis of how Canada’s political finance statutory rules, again defined broadly to include rules that apply to donations, loans, gifts, services, favours and other benefits, lobbying and conflicts of interest, do not comply with the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, based in part on new statistical research set out in 28 charts, and; 4. It sets out a new theoretical framework based on 19 standards, and a comprehensive set of 201 innovative proposals for changes to make Canada’s political finance rules (again defined broadly) more egalitarian, and more ethical in terms of preventing conflicts of interest. Five comprehensive studies of key parts of the political finance, ethics and lobbying systems are also proposed to gather key information needed to inform the design of some of the 201 proposed changes. Eight structural and positive Charter rights cases are also proposed to challenge current rules that do not comply with the egalitarian model.

Les révolutions de l’Est ont induit la fragmentation des Etats qui s’est accompagnée, sur le plan interne par une renaissance des partis ethniques ; ce qui ne va pas sans poser de problèmes à la démocratie politique. Les transitions et a fortiori les consolidations démocratiques font émerger un double phénomène d’interaction entre les acteurs et le système, dans la recherche d’un nouvel équilibre. Les partis ethniques se politisent alors que le système s’ouvre à l’acteur ethnique. On assiste donc à un réajustement évolutif du système devant la nouvelle donne. Le système s’ouvre aux nouvelles demandes à caractère ethnique de différentes façons et à différents degrés : entre la légalisation et la tolérance. Côté acteurs, les partis ethniques rentrent progressivement dans le jeu politique ; de différentes façons et à différents degrés. Dans notre champ problématique les relations interactives se déploient entre acteurs multi-niveaux (partis-Etats) et dans les divers champs (politique, sociétal et juridique). Leurs connexions sont croisées entre l’espace étatique et internationale, public et civil, politique et sociétal ; avec les Etats d’accueil ou d’origine, mais aussi, les Etats-tiers. Ils sont à velléités indépendantistes ou simplement des lobbies politiques. Nous avons essayé de mettre en lumière les principaux aspects de la complexité de la question ethnique dans les jeunes démocraties politiques ‘‘en consolidation’’. La problématique ethnique des PECO peut-elle nous aider à compléter en actualisant certaines visions généralistes des sciences politiques ? Les acteurs impliqués sont ainsi invités à éviter les pièges des nationalismes perçus comme ‘‘mesquins’’, voire ‘‘chaotiques’’ tout en servant la cause d’une plus souple intégration politique alias la ‘‘paix démocratique’’. / The revolutions of Eastern induced fragmentation of States were accompanied internally by a revival of ethnic parties, which is not without its problems in political democracy. Transitions and even more democratic consolidation are emerging a double phenomenon of interaction between actors and the system in search of a new equilibrium. Ethnic parties then politicize the system opens the ethnic actor. We are witnessing an evolutionary adjustment of the system to the new situation. The system opens to the new demands ethnic ways and to different degrees: between legalization and tolerance. Side actors, are gradually returning ethnic parties in the political game, in different ways and to different degrees. In our problem the field deploy interactive relationships between multi-level actors (parties-States) and in the various fields (political, societal and legal). Their connections are crossed between the State and international space, public and civil, political and social, with host countries or origin, but also the third States. They are separatist ambitions or simply political lobbies. We tried to highlight the main aspects of the complexity of the ethnic issue in young democracies political '' in consolidation ''. The ethnic problem of CEEC can help us to complete updating some general visions of political science? The actors involved are invited to avoid the pitfalls of nationalism perceived as '' petty '' or '' chaotic '' while serving the cause of a more flexible policy integration to the ‘‘democratic peace’’.