Сегодня развернут процесс масштабной реструктуризации оборонной промышленности. Чтобы выстоять в конкурентной борьбе, предприятия оборонно-промышленного комплекса (далее - ОПК) должны включиться в процесс интенсивного развития, который заключается в широком использовании инновационного потенциала, активизации инновационной деятельности и усилении доминанты конкурентных преимуществ. Именно эти предприятия обладают способностью создавать и воспринимать новшества. Создание интегрированных структур является основным направлением организационно-институционального реформирования ОПК и направлено на повышение эффективности и обеспечение устойчивости деятельности предприятий комплекса. Работа содержит следующие положения научной новизны: - предложена усовершенствованная организационная структура предприятия ОПК с внедренной системой позаказной организацией деятельности, позволяющая сформировать реестр центров финансовой ответственности, адаптированных к отраслевой специфике деятельности предприятий ОПК; - разработана схема формирования сводного бюджета предприятия ОПК с позаказной организацией управления, призванная обеспечить получение более точных прогнозных данных. / Today, the process of large-scale restructuring of the defense industry has been launched. In order to withstand the competition, enterprises of the military-industrial complex (hereinafter referred to as the defense industry complex) must join the process of intensive development, which consists in the wide use of innovative potential, activation of innovation and strengthening the dominant of competitive advantages. It is these businesses that have the ability to create and embrace innovation. The creation of integrated structures is the main direction of the organizational and institutional reform of the defense industry complex and is aimed at increasing the efficiency and ensuring the sustainability of the activities of the enterprises of the complex. The work contains the following provisions of scientific novelty: - an improved organizational structure of a defense-industrial complex enterprise with an implemented system of order-based organization of activities is proposed, which makes it possible to form a register of financial responsibility centers adapted to the industry specifics of the activities of defense enterprises; - a scheme for the formation of a consolidated budget for a defense industry enterprise with a custom-made management organization has been developed, designed to provide more accurate forecast data.

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This thesis explores the role and representation of the natural world in a selection of Canadian dystopian novels: After the Fact (1986) by Hélène Holden, Voices in Time (1986) by Hugh MacLennan, Oryx and Crake (2004) and The Handmaid's Taie (1985) by Margaret Atwood. In order to argue that Canadian dystopian fiction varies from conventional literary dystopias because of its predominant use of nature, this thesis first examines the influence that archetypal images and symbols of nature have on specific dystopian conventions in Holden's and MacLennan's respective novels. Then, this study looks at how Atwood's critique of nature as a victim in Oryx and Crake and The Handmaid's Taie engages with ecocritic and ecofeminist ideas causing a breakdown in the generic conventions of Atwood's dystopian novels. / Cette thèse explore le rôle et la représentation de la nature dans les romans dystopiques canadiens suivants: After the Fact (1986) d'Hélène Holden, Voices in Time (1986) de Hugh MacLennan, Oryx andCrake (2004) et The Handmaid's Taie (1985) de Margaret Atwood. Ayant pour objectif de démontrer que la fiction canadienne dystopique se distingue de la littérature dystopique traditionnelle en fonction de son utilisation dominante de la nature, cette thèse examine l'influence des images, des symboles et des archétypes de la nature sur les conventions dystopiques spécifiques à After the Fact de Holden et Voices in Time de MacLennan. Ensuite, cette étude analyse la représentation de la nature comme victime dans Oryx and Crake et dans The Handmaid's Taie de Atwood qui diffère des conventions traditionnelles du roman dystopique en s'inspirant des idées découlant de l'écoféminisme et de l'écocritique.

La responsabilité publique évolue et de nombreux régimes d’indemnisation ne trouvent pas leur place dans la grille de lecture habituelle de cette matière. Pour remédier à ce problème, la thèse propose de créer une nouvelle catégorie juridique : la responsabilité sans fait. Celle-ci regroupe les régimes de responsabilité publique dans lesquels la victime est dispensée d’apporter la preuve d’un fait générateur imputable au responsable. Vingt régimes très divers y sont actuellement classés. Leur analyse permet de comprendre l’évolution historique de la responsabilité sans fait. La création de la responsabilité sans fait produit trois types de conséquences qu’il faut étudier. D’abord, elle joue un rôle particulier dans l’indemnisation des victimes. Ensuite, elle exerce une influence sur les catégories actuelles de la responsabilité publique que sont la responsabilité pour faute et la responsabilité sans faute. Enfin, elle est le point de départ d’une recomposition de l’architecture de la responsabilité publique. En effet, cette matière peut être présentée grâce à la distinction responsabilité pour fait / responsabilité sans fait. / Public liability evolves and a lot of systems of compensation cannot be filed in the usual classification of this field. To remedy this problem, the thesis suggests creating a new legal category: liability without act. This one contains systems of public liability within which the victim is exempt from proving an act imputable to the person responsible. Twenty very different systems are presently filed there. Their analysis makes understanding of historical evolution of liability without act possible. The creation of liability without act produces three types of consequences which must be considered. First, it plays a particular part in compensation for victims. Second, it affects present categories of public liability which are fault-based liability and liability without fault. Finally, it is the beginning of a reconstruction of the structure of public liability. In fact, this field can be presented thanks to the distinction fact-based liability / liability without act.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silvia Roberta Chiarelli.pdf: 1008898 bytes, checksum: 9b31c82b3ec32fa43edbc9e042a2c0be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-18 / The aim of the present academic work is to present the procedures of the tax assessment changeability, foreseen in the interpolated propositions of article 145 of the Internal revenue code, also, it covers the ability on performing such activity and the substantial causes for the changeability, as foreseen in the interpolated propositions of article 149 of the same statute, covering the pictures of the vices of the legal fact tributary occurred by the insertion of deficient individual and concrete rules of law, contaminated of errors in fact and right. Leading in consideration that the tax assessment - conceived as the administrative activity of which the Treasury department constitutes the tributary liability and consequentely, the tributary credit, and notifies the passive citizen to pay it it can eventually contain irregularities (vices) and that the Public Administration can and must review its own acts when contaminated of nullities. Our Internal Tax Code, in observance to the Federal Constitution that imposes limits or restrictions to legal disciplines of revision of the tax assessment, preventing itself the confront of the basic rights of the contributor, establishes two limits criteria for its revision, which are the temporal limits and the objective limits. The temporal limits rely on to the legal stated period of which the revision could be initiated; therefore, it is associated to the decay of the right to review the tax assessment. And the objective limits are related to the justifying fundamentals of the revision, which are the error in fact, the error of law and the change of legal criteria / O presente trabalho versa sobre o procedimento da alterabilidade do lançamento tributário previsto nos incisos do artigo 145 do Código Tributário Nacional, bem como nas formas de competência para o exercício dessa alteração e mais, nas causas substanciais da sua revisibilidade previstas nos incisos do artigo 149 do mesmo diploma legal, percorrendo-se os quadros dos vícios do fato jurídico tributário ocorridos pela inserção de normas jurídicas individuais e concretas deficientes, eivadas de erros de fato e de direito. Levando em consideração que o lançamento concebido como a atividade administrativa pela qual o Fisco constitui a obrigação tributária e conseqüentemente, o crédito tributário e notifica o sujeito passivo para pagá-lo pode eventualmente conter irregularidades (vícios) e que a Administração Pública pode e deve rever seus atos quando eivados de nulidades. Nosso Código Tributário Nacional, em observância à Constituição Federal impõe limites ou restrições à disciplina legal de revisão do lançamento tributário evitando-se dessa forma afronta aos direitos fundamentais do contribuinte, estabelece dois critérios limitadores à revisão do lançamento: os temporais e os objetivos. Os limites temporais dizem respeito ao prazo legal dentro do qual poderá a revisão ser iniciada, portanto, diz respeito à decadência do direito de rever o lançamento tributário, e os objetivos estão relacionados aos fundamentos justificadores da revisão, quais sejam, o erro de fato, erro de direito e mudança de critérios jurídicos

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Henrique Araujo Costa.pdf: 715750 bytes, checksum: 377b208f9e659711143cb5230b4a9423 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-05-26 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The subject addressed by the present text is the evidence reexame in an appeal to the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice. The topic under epistemological and dogmatic points of view retakes the concepts of fact and norm to critically analyze the court decisions in the application of its seventh abridgement that states: "The pretension of simple evidence reexame does not try the appeal to the Superior Court of Justice". Therefore, is applied an epistemological and procedural retrospect, from Roman Law to nowadays Instrumentalism, questioning the current landmark of analysis. Under a dogmatic boarding it is cogitated the possibility of setting distinctive criterias of fact and norm concepts, concluding for its impossibility, especially if anchored in the subsumetive paradigm. The present text, based on the Knijnik´s Tricotomic Theory and its concept of mixed questions, attempts to overcome the subsumetive paradigm. However, it concludes that the Tricotomic Theory tackles in an artificial division of concepts. As contribution for a new dogmatic, the present text offers a linguistic and discursive approach of the subject. In support to this approach, axiology and semiotics are binded towards a rhetorical reconstruction, that reread after-modern fashion offers a chance of reflection under more current argumentative and systematic prisms to the procedural thought. After these retaken cases are analyzed it is possible to isolate and criticize emblematic examples of the incompatibility involving the theory of the common sense of the procedure (subsumitive and binary) in contrast with the court decisions (rhetorical and complex). / O reexame de prova em recurso especial é o tema abordado pelo presente texto, que sob o ponto de vista epistemológico e dogmático retoma os conceitos de fato e direito no propósito de analisar criticamente a jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça no que concerne à aplicação da sua Súmula 7, segundo a qual: A pretensão de simples reexame de prova não enseja recurso especial . Nesse intuito, parte-se em retrospectiva epistemológica e processual, desde o direito romano à instrumentalidade, questionando-se acerca da atualidade desse marco de análise para objetivo proposto. Ao mesmo tempo, cogita-se, sob um ponto de vista mais dogmático, da possibilidade de fixação de critérios distintivos dos conceitos de fato e direito, concluindo-se pela sua impossibilidade, especialmente se ancorada a discussão no paradigma subsuntivo. A partir desse ponto, o texto aborda tentativas de superação desse paradigma, inclinando-se à Teoria Tricotômia de Knijnik e seu conceito de questão mista. No entanto, conclui que mesmo a Teoria Tricotômica está comprometida em demasia com uma divisão artificial dos conceitos, pelo que se propõe uma abordagem lingüística e discursiva do tema como contribuição para uma nova dogmática. Em amparo a essa abordagem, são cotejadas axiologia e semiologia rumo a uma reconstrução retórica, que relida à moda pós-moderna oferece ao pensamento processual oportunidade de reflexão sob os prismas argumentativos e sistemáticos mais atuais. Somente após essa retomada é analisada a jurisprudência do STJ, fazendo-se possível isolar e criticar casos emblemáticos da incompatibilidade entre a teoria embasadora do senso comum do processualista (subsuntiva e binária) em contraste com a prática judiciária (retórica e complexa).

This thesis is an investigation into the phenomenon which Shozo Ohmori (1921-1997) considered “a peculiar manner of awareness”, and to which he attributed the term ‘fancy’. The objective is to achieve an approximate understanding of Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’, as it relates to awareness of entities in three-dimensional space, and the extensions mentioned in his only publication in English: “Beyond Hume’s Fancy” (1974). This objective will be realized by asking three questions. The first question is how we are to understand the demarcation of the different phenomena of awareness which Ohmori identifies. The second question that this thesis asks is what applications that the phenomenon ‘fancy’ mentioned in Ohmori’s account have, as Ohmori saw it. Having answered these questions, I will then make an assessment of another salient consideration: how does Ohmori’s employment of the term ‘fancy’ relate to Hume’s employment of the same term (seeing as the name of Ohmori’s article makes such a reference). As we shall see, Ohmori is attempting to identify a more specific phenomenon than the widely discussed issue of thinking about something that is not currently perceivable in our perceptual field. The third and final question that this thesis asks is whether there are any salient issues with Ohmori’s theory of ‘fancy’ and, if so, whether those issues can be resolved. When we are aware of entities in three-dimensional space, we are subject to various mental processes. Our awareness, seemingly, uses different modes of interpretation and orientation. In other words, our ‘point of view’ (which is something that not only pertains to the use of our visual sensory organs) determines both our place and relation towards other entities. One salient issue when considering the notion of awareness is how and by which order awareness emerges. Impressions, as David Hume would call them, seemingly precede our ideas. Sense-data, as Shozo Ohmori phrased it, is unquestionably inseparable from conceptions. Our conceptions, in turn, seem to inform our perceptions with expectations and predictions of how things are. When we perceive an entity, we are ready to make judgements about its being at this moment. When we see the front of a desk, we are ready to claim awareness of said desk-front as part of a desk (which entails the ontology of a desk, namely, being a three-dimensional construction of a particular variety). In everyday situations we simply speak of such an awareness as ‘perception’ when in actuality, all we see (which constitutes the sense-data or content of a perception) is the front of a desk. It seems we cannot regard our awareness of a desk (a three-dimensional entity) as a perception simpliciter. Of course, by having a notion of what a desk is, our awareness is pregnant with a ‘conception’ in the form of an idea that is informing our awareness of said desk. But our conceptual understanding of the notion of something being a desk is not enough to explain what our awareness of a desk-at-this-moment is. At least, that is what Ohmori thought.

La distinction du fait et du droit est une problématique centrale dansl’organisation des voies de droit. Elle exerce en effet, au-delà d’une variété de formes et designifications, une influence décisive sur l’office du juge ainsi que sur la fonction desautorités soumises à son contrôle. Pour appréhender pleinement la portée qu’elle revêt dansl’équilibre des pouvoirs établi par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, il est nécessairede se défaire de toute préconception de la distinction du fait et du droit (notamment auregard des pratiques observées en droit interne), afin de comprendre comment le juge del’Union européenne exerce un pouvoir de détermination à son égard, que ce soit dans lecontrôle de validité des actes juridiques ou dans les voies de recours dirigées contre desactes juridictionnels. Dans cette opération, elle reste toutefois soucieuse d’assurerl’acceptabilité de ses décisions, et prend donc en considération certaines contraintesjuridiques qui se présentent à elle dans son office. Autorité normatrice et ordonnatrice, laCour de justice en tant qu’interprète authentique utilise en réalité la distinction du fait et dudroit comme un instrument de répartition des compétences entre les différents acteursconcernés par la réalisation du droit de l’Union européenne. Elle définit ainsi, à travers ladétermination de la distinction du fait et du droit dans chacune de ses manifestations,l’habilitation que leur confère le système juridique. En ce sens, elle apparaît comme lajuridiction suprême de cet espace normatif. / The distinction between fact and law is central to the organization of remedies.It exerts, through its variety of forms and meanings, a decisive influence on the Court and onthe function of the authorities that the former reviews. In order to fully grasp its significance inthe balance of power that the European Court of Justice has established, one has to discardany preconception related to the distinction between fact and law (especially those present inmunicipal law). This in turn leads to the understanding of the manner in which the EuropeanCourt specifies the distinction, should it concern the review against legal acts or the ways ofchallenging case law. Whilst doing this, the European Court remains wary of the acceptabilityof its decisions, thus taking into account several legal constraints. As a normative authorityand as the authentic interpreter, the European Court of Justice uses the distinction betweenfact and law as a way to divide the competences of the actors concerned with theimplementation of EU law. By performing this specification, it defines the way the legalsystem entitles these actors. In this way, the European Court of Justice emerges as theSupreme Court of this normative space.

This thesis examines how the Supreme Court of Canada, across legal contexts, has tended to conceptualize sexuality. It focuses primarily on areas of public law including sexual assault law, equality for sexual minorities, sexual harassment and obscenity and indecency laws. There were a number of trends revealed upon reviewing the jurisprudence in this area. First, the Court’s decisions across legal contexts reveal a tendency to conceptualize sexuality as innate, as a pre-social naturally occurring phenomenon and as an essential element of who we are as individuals. This is true whether one is speaking of the approach to gay and lesbian rights, the occurrence of sexual harassment, or the sexual abuse of children. However, there is an exception to this trend. The exception relates to the Court’s conceptual approach towards sexual violence against adults. The research revealed, likely as a result of feminist activism both in the legislative and judicial arenas, that there has been a shift in the way that the Court understands sexuality in the context of sexual violence. It is a shift away from understanding it as pre-social and naturally occurring towards understanding it as a product of society, as a function of social context. This change in the Court’s conceptual approach towards sexual violence has engendered a shift in the law’s moral focus as well – a shift away from a moral focus on specific sexual acts and sexual propriety and towards a moral focus on sexual actors and sexual integrity. The thesis weaves together the analytical observations about the jurisprudence just described with a theoretical argument that is both grounded in the case law and which draws upon a number of different theorists. The argument developed suggests that the Court, regardless of the legal issue involved, ought to conceptualize sexuality as socially constructed/ contextually contingent, that it ought to orient itself towards protecting sexual integrity, and that it ought to understand this sexual integrity as a common interest.