A regulação financeira, especialmente a regulação bancária, tem um papel central na organização da vida social. As modernas técnicas regulatórias, altamente sofisticadas, são o resultado de décadas de evolução. Elas exigem técnicos especializados, orçamentos específicos e uma estrutura institucional complexa. Mais que isso: para promover as regulações sistêmica e prudencial, os reguladores necessitam de amplos poderes normativos uma capacidade normativa de conjuntura. A atribuição de tais competências a órgãos que não contam com a legitimidade das urnas é considerada por alguns autores uma espécie de anomalia no direito constitucional. Para outros, ao contrário, ela é um elemento necessário do desenho institucional do Estado Regulador contemporâneo. É nesse ponto que se cruzam os debates sobre o processo de burocratização da vida social e sobre o desenvolvimento dos cânones do direito ocidental, especialmente a doutrina da separação dos poderes. A juridificação das esferas sociais suscita o tema do déficit democrático da formulação de políticas pela burocracia. A presente tese desenvolve, a partir do modelo de democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas, a premissa normativa segundo a qual o controle judicial é necessário para garantir a legitimidade democrática do processo administrativo normativo. Como o cidadão comum não dispõe nem do conhecimento técnico nem dos meios materiais necessários para acompanhar o processo de tomada de decisões, o controle judicial deveria funcionar como um mecanismo de controle democrático da regulação financeira. A tese analisa esse déficit democrático a partir da jurisprudência constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) relativa à separação dos poderes e às disputas doutrinárias sobre delegação legislativa e poder regulamentar. Os estudos de caso, focados no sistema financeiro, buscam investigar se a atuação do STF tem garantido de forma adequada um equilíbrio entre a racionalidade tecnocrática e as exigências normativas de uma democracia deliberativa. / Financial regulation, specially banking regulation, plays a central role in the organization of social life. The current regulatory techniques, highly sophisticated, are the result of decades of evolution. They require well-trained public officials, specific budgets and a complex institutional framework. Moreover, in order to carry on the systemic and prudential regulations, regulators need broad rule-making powers. The assignment of such authority to non-majoritarian bodies is considered by some authors as a sort of anomaly in Constitutional Law. To others, it is seen as a necessary element of the institutional design of the contemporary Regulatory State. This is the stage where the debate about the process of bureaucratization of social life meets the intellectual concern about the current developments of western public law, namely the issue of the separation of powers. The juridification of the social spheres brings the issue of the democratic deficit of bureaucratic policymaking. Since ordinary citizens lack the expertise as well as the material and financial resources which are necessary to monitor the decision-making process, this dissertation develops the normative assumption that judicial review is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process. The dissertation analyses that democratic deficit from the viewpoint of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) regarding separation of powers, the rule-making authority of Brazilian non-majoritarian bodies and the doctrinal disputes about legislative delegation. The case studies show that the judicial review by STF has in practice rejected the Brazilian public law non-delegation doctrine, but has done it in a way that does not strike a balance between technocratic rationality and the normative claims of deliberative democracy.

This dissertation concentrates on the interplay between politics and financial markets using various empirical tools applied on historical financial statistics. The first essay examines the effect of stock transaction taxation on trading activity and asset prices, specifically focusing on the case of early 20th century Sweden. The main finding is that the tax substantially reduced trading as well as the level of asset prices. In the second essay, modern ex post historical writing is contrasted with the ex ante views of contemporaries which are estimated from historical price data. The specific case study is the events around World War II related to the Nordic countries and Germany. The comparisons point out considerable differences between the assessments of historical events in the ex post and ex ante approaches. The third essay is an empirical study of price controls on asset price movements and how these controls affect asset returns. The study finds that the controls have large significant effects which even may influence estimates of the long-run equity premium. Altogether, this raises concerns about the use of century-long series of asset returns without correcting for the impact of institutional variation and market constraints. Finally, the fourth essay examines the growth effects of international financial liberalization and integration using a large country- industry sample from the 1980s. The main result is that industries highly dependent on external financing do not experience higher value added growth in countries with liberalized financial markets. Liberalization does, however, increase the growth rates of both output and firm creation among externally dependent industries. These results are consistent both with increased competition and increased outsourcing. / <p>Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2003</p>

在當前競爭態勢下，台灣金融市場的發展，勢必朝向跨業經營的方向前進。我國亦於民國九十年六月二十七日通過金融控股公司法，賦予台灣金融業跨業經營的法源，為國內金融業創造成為金融集團的契機，以達成金融跨業經營現代化、國際化的目標。雖然金融機構業務營運多樣化，但金融機構承擔風險亦隨之增加，金融監理機制在面臨這樣的挑戰下勢必得做一番調整，才能持續扮演健全及穩定國內金融體系的重要角色。 我國主管機關對於金融控股公司要求以合併基礎計算資本適足比率，並訂定了「金融控股公司合併資本適足性管理辦法」，以期能發揮適度的監理功能。然該辦法中僅以簡單的加減乘除運算求得之資本適足率，是否為反映集團資本需求的良好指標實不無疑問。因此，本文除了研究國際監理官組織所發布的相關報告外，並藉由介紹和討論歐盟指令對金融集團的補充監理原則和措施，如：資本適足性、集團內部交易、風險集中等問題，以及美國對於金融控股公司之相關監理規範，加以比較研究後，來探討我國現行規範是否妥當，並提出相關監理制度改善之建議，以期能作為我國建構健全金融市場之參考。 / Under current competitive circumstances, the development of Taiwan’s financial market will be bound to move forward in the direction of cross-sector business. In Taiwan, Legislative Yuan also has passed the “Financial Holding Company Act” in June 2001. With the passage of the act, it not only gives Taiwan’s financial institutions authority to operate cross-sector activities, but also creates a trigger for financial institutions to become financial conglomerates in order to meet the objectives of financial modernization and globalization. Although financial institutions may diversify their business, additional risks may arise. Financial regulatory mechanisms have to adjust their function to ensure the safety and soundness of financial system. Our competent authorities demand financial holding companies calculating their capital adequacy ratio on a consolidated basis, and enact “Regulations Governing the Consolidated Capital Adequacy of A Financial Holding Company.” However, in this regulation, the ratio was calculated in simple aggregated method, and it is doubtful that such ratio is a good index to reflect consolidated capital requirement. Therefore, this thesis not only studies on related publications issued by international supervision organizations, but also introduces EU Financial Conglomerate Directive with regard to some supervisory issues (e.g. capital adequacy, intra-group transactions and risk concentrations etc.) and U.S. framework for financial holding company supervision. After investigating and comparing different models, this study tries to find whether current regulation is appropriate or not, and make some suggestions concerning the supervisory system in order to construct a sound financial market as a reference in our country.

A presente dissertação versa sobre o estudo da regulação financeira sistêmica brasileira e está dividida em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, descreve-se a essência das atividades financeiras e narra-se a trajetória histórica que deu ensejo à criação de Bancos Centrais e o surgimento da regulação bancária no mundo. Em seguida, discorre-se sobre o processo de expansão do sistema financeiro e sua internacionalização face à globalização financeira dos mercados. Após a exposição de razões políticas, comportamentais, econômicas e técnicas consideradas determinantes para a consumação da última crise financeira mundial (caso subprime), demonstra-se que uma regulação financeira sistêmica adequada constitui um processo complexo, dinâmico e contínuo de gestão pública com vistas a evitar ou atenuar os efeitos de crises sistêmicas. Nesse sentido, são expostos os motivos por que o Brasil enfrentou bem tal crise, através da apresentação da evolução dos processos regulatórios domésticos nos últimos anos. No segundo capítulo, utilizado o marco político-filosófico de John Rawls, sustenta-se a ideia de que a estabilidade financeira sustentável ao longo do tempo é uma questão de justiça básica que deve influenciar o desenho político-institucional em sociedades democráticas constitucionais. Nesse sentido, afirma-se a possibilidade de geração de um consenso sobreposto, segundo o ideal de razão pública, quanto à necessidade de estabelecimento de instituições, relativamente descoladas dos ciclos político-eleitorais e dotadas de especialização técnica, responsáveis pelo planejamento e acompanhamento público e transparente da sustentabilidade da execução da política monetária e da regulação financeira sistêmica propriamente dita no longo prazo. Adicionalmente, em razão da globalização financeira dos mercados, discorre-se sobre os limites e possibilidades do ideal de razão pública nos organismos financeiros internacionais (redes globais de governo), instituídos para definir padrões de regulação financeira sistêmica, e são feitos comentários acerca da existência de um Direito Administrativo Global. No terceiro capítulo, defende-se a ideia de razão prática regulatória como a diretriz adequada de atuação sustentável do Estado na economia com foco em resultados, a fim de estimular o progresso nos processos regulatórios, mediante o uso do better regulation como paradigma de análise de custos e benefícios. Após, expõe-se a noção de juridicidade administrativa como a mais compatível com a Constituição, além de defender-se a legitimidade democrática e o poder normativo das agências reguladoras financeiras. Por fim, com fundamento nas características do desenho institucional da estrutura regulatória brasileira, são formuladas propostas de aprimoramento institucional. No último capítulo, são feitos comentários sobre as vantagens, limites e riscos de judicialização dos processos regulatórios financeiros em democracias constitucionais, o que motiva a construção de parâmetros institucionais e materiais de atuação judicial, posteriormente analisados em precedentes importantes julgados no Brasil nos últimos anos. / This dissertation deals with the study of systemic financial regulation in Brazil and is divided into four chapters. The first chapter describes the essence of the financial activities and narrates the historical trajectory that gave rise to the creation of Central Banks and the emergence of banking regulation in the world. Afterwards, it exposes the expansion process of the financial system and its internationalization due to globalization of financial markets. Then, it presents political, behavioral, economic and technical reasons considered crucial to the consummation of the last global financial crisis (subprime case) and concludes that an adequate systemic financial regulation is a complex, dynamic and continuous public management process in order to prevent or mitigate the effects of systemic crises. In this sense, it shows why Brazil faced the last crisis well, through the exposure of the evolution of the domestic regulatory processes in recent years. In the second chapter, based on the John Rawlss political liberalism framework, it holds up the idea that sustainable financial stability over time is a matter of basic fairness that should influence the design of political institutions in democratic constitutional societies. In this sense, it states the possibility of generating overlapping consensus, according to the ideal of public reason, on the need to establish institutions, relatively detached from electoral cycles and endowed with technical expertise, responsible for planning and monitoring the long run sustainability implementation of accountable monetary policy and systemic financial regulation as well. Additionally, due to the globalization, it discusses the limits and possibilities of the ideal of public reason in the international financial organizations (global networks of government), established to set systemic financial regulatory standards, as well as comments are made about a Global Administrative Law. In the third chapter, it argues the idea of regulatory practice reason as the appropriate guideline for sustainable state performance in the economy with a focus on results, in order to stimulate progress in regulatory processes through the use of better regulation as a paradigm of cost-benefit analysis. After, it exposes the notion of constitutional legality and it defends the democratic legitimacy and the normative power of the financial regulatory agencies. Finally, based on the characteristics of the institutional design of the regulatory framework in Brazil, proposals for institutional improvement are formulated. In the last chapter, it comments the advantages, limitations and risks involved in judicialization of financial regulatory processes in constitutional democracies, which motivates the construction of institutional and material parameters of judicial action, subsequently analyzed in important cases judged in Brazilian courts.

A presente dissertação versa sobre o estudo da regulação financeira sistêmica brasileira e está dividida em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, descreve-se a essência das atividades financeiras e narra-se a trajetória histórica que deu ensejo à criação de Bancos Centrais e o surgimento da regulação bancária no mundo. Em seguida, discorre-se sobre o processo de expansão do sistema financeiro e sua internacionalização face à globalização financeira dos mercados. Após a exposição de razões políticas, comportamentais, econômicas e técnicas consideradas determinantes para a consumação da última crise financeira mundial (caso subprime), demonstra-se que uma regulação financeira sistêmica adequada constitui um processo complexo, dinâmico e contínuo de gestão pública com vistas a evitar ou atenuar os efeitos de crises sistêmicas. Nesse sentido, são expostos os motivos por que o Brasil enfrentou bem tal crise, através da apresentação da evolução dos processos regulatórios domésticos nos últimos anos. No segundo capítulo, utilizado o marco político-filosófico de John Rawls, sustenta-se a ideia de que a estabilidade financeira sustentável ao longo do tempo é uma questão de justiça básica que deve influenciar o desenho político-institucional em sociedades democráticas constitucionais. Nesse sentido, afirma-se a possibilidade de geração de um consenso sobreposto, segundo o ideal de razão pública, quanto à necessidade de estabelecimento de instituições, relativamente descoladas dos ciclos político-eleitorais e dotadas de especialização técnica, responsáveis pelo planejamento e acompanhamento público e transparente da sustentabilidade da execução da política monetária e da regulação financeira sistêmica propriamente dita no longo prazo. Adicionalmente, em razão da globalização financeira dos mercados, discorre-se sobre os limites e possibilidades do ideal de razão pública nos organismos financeiros internacionais (redes globais de governo), instituídos para definir padrões de regulação financeira sistêmica, e são feitos comentários acerca da existência de um Direito Administrativo Global. No terceiro capítulo, defende-se a ideia de razão prática regulatória como a diretriz adequada de atuação sustentável do Estado na economia com foco em resultados, a fim de estimular o progresso nos processos regulatórios, mediante o uso do better regulation como paradigma de análise de custos e benefícios. Após, expõe-se a noção de juridicidade administrativa como a mais compatível com a Constituição, além de defender-se a legitimidade democrática e o poder normativo das agências reguladoras financeiras. Por fim, com fundamento nas características do desenho institucional da estrutura regulatória brasileira, são formuladas propostas de aprimoramento institucional. No último capítulo, são feitos comentários sobre as vantagens, limites e riscos de judicialização dos processos regulatórios financeiros em democracias constitucionais, o que motiva a construção de parâmetros institucionais e materiais de atuação judicial, posteriormente analisados em precedentes importantes julgados no Brasil nos últimos anos. / This dissertation deals with the study of systemic financial regulation in Brazil and is divided into four chapters. The first chapter describes the essence of the financial activities and narrates the historical trajectory that gave rise to the creation of Central Banks and the emergence of banking regulation in the world. Afterwards, it exposes the expansion process of the financial system and its internationalization due to globalization of financial markets. Then, it presents political, behavioral, economic and technical reasons considered crucial to the consummation of the last global financial crisis (subprime case) and concludes that an adequate systemic financial regulation is a complex, dynamic and continuous public management process in order to prevent or mitigate the effects of systemic crises. In this sense, it shows why Brazil faced the last crisis well, through the exposure of the evolution of the domestic regulatory processes in recent years. In the second chapter, based on the John Rawlss political liberalism framework, it holds up the idea that sustainable financial stability over time is a matter of basic fairness that should influence the design of political institutions in democratic constitutional societies. In this sense, it states the possibility of generating overlapping consensus, according to the ideal of public reason, on the need to establish institutions, relatively detached from electoral cycles and endowed with technical expertise, responsible for planning and monitoring the long run sustainability implementation of accountable monetary policy and systemic financial regulation as well. Additionally, due to the globalization, it discusses the limits and possibilities of the ideal of public reason in the international financial organizations (global networks of government), established to set systemic financial regulatory standards, as well as comments are made about a Global Administrative Law. In the third chapter, it argues the idea of regulatory practice reason as the appropriate guideline for sustainable state performance in the economy with a focus on results, in order to stimulate progress in regulatory processes through the use of better regulation as a paradigm of cost-benefit analysis. After, it exposes the notion of constitutional legality and it defends the democratic legitimacy and the normative power of the financial regulatory agencies. Finally, based on the characteristics of the institutional design of the regulatory framework in Brazil, proposals for institutional improvement are formulated. In the last chapter, it comments the advantages, limitations and risks involved in judicialization of financial regulatory processes in constitutional democracies, which motivates the construction of institutional and material parameters of judicial action, subsequently analyzed in important cases judged in Brazilian courts.

A regulação financeira, especialmente a regulação bancária, tem um papel central na organização da vida social. As modernas técnicas regulatórias, altamente sofisticadas, são o resultado de décadas de evolução. Elas exigem técnicos especializados, orçamentos específicos e uma estrutura institucional complexa. Mais que isso: para promover as regulações sistêmica e prudencial, os reguladores necessitam de amplos poderes normativos uma capacidade normativa de conjuntura. A atribuição de tais competências a órgãos que não contam com a legitimidade das urnas é considerada por alguns autores uma espécie de anomalia no direito constitucional. Para outros, ao contrário, ela é um elemento necessário do desenho institucional do Estado Regulador contemporâneo. É nesse ponto que se cruzam os debates sobre o processo de burocratização da vida social e sobre o desenvolvimento dos cânones do direito ocidental, especialmente a doutrina da separação dos poderes. A juridificação das esferas sociais suscita o tema do déficit democrático da formulação de políticas pela burocracia. A presente tese desenvolve, a partir do modelo de democracia deliberativa de Jürgen Habermas, a premissa normativa segundo a qual o controle judicial é necessário para garantir a legitimidade democrática do processo administrativo normativo. Como o cidadão comum não dispõe nem do conhecimento técnico nem dos meios materiais necessários para acompanhar o processo de tomada de decisões, o controle judicial deveria funcionar como um mecanismo de controle democrático da regulação financeira. A tese analisa esse déficit democrático a partir da jurisprudência constitucional do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) relativa à separação dos poderes e às disputas doutrinárias sobre delegação legislativa e poder regulamentar. Os estudos de caso, focados no sistema financeiro, buscam investigar se a atuação do STF tem garantido de forma adequada um equilíbrio entre a racionalidade tecnocrática e as exigências normativas de uma democracia deliberativa. / Financial regulation, specially banking regulation, plays a central role in the organization of social life. The current regulatory techniques, highly sophisticated, are the result of decades of evolution. They require well-trained public officials, specific budgets and a complex institutional framework. Moreover, in order to carry on the systemic and prudential regulations, regulators need broad rule-making powers. The assignment of such authority to non-majoritarian bodies is considered by some authors as a sort of anomaly in Constitutional Law. To others, it is seen as a necessary element of the institutional design of the contemporary Regulatory State. This is the stage where the debate about the process of bureaucratization of social life meets the intellectual concern about the current developments of western public law, namely the issue of the separation of powers. The juridification of the social spheres brings the issue of the democratic deficit of bureaucratic policymaking. Since ordinary citizens lack the expertise as well as the material and financial resources which are necessary to monitor the decision-making process, this dissertation develops the normative assumption that judicial review is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the administrative process. The dissertation analyses that democratic deficit from the viewpoint of the constitutional jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal STF) regarding separation of powers, the rule-making authority of Brazilian non-majoritarian bodies and the doctrinal disputes about legislative delegation. The case studies show that the judicial review by STF has in practice rejected the Brazilian public law non-delegation doctrine, but has done it in a way that does not strike a balance between technocratic rationality and the normative claims of deliberative democracy.

Diese Arbeit umfasst drei unabhängige Aufsätze, welche die Auswirkungen verschiedener regulatorischer Maßnahmen auf das Bankenrisiko und/oder die Finanzstabilität untersuchen. Zunächst wird der Einfluss von Eigenkapitalanforderungen auf den Zusammenhang zwischen Bankgröße und Volatilität analysiert. Unsere Panel-Datenanalyse zeigt, dass strengere Eigenkapitalanforderungen den Nexus zwischen Größe und Volatilität schwächt. Große Banken haben, ceteris paribus, einen weniger volatilen Kreditbestand, wenn sie strengerer Kapitalregulierung ausgesetzt sind. Gemäß dem Granularitätskonzept kann dies ebenfalls die makroökonomische Stabilität erhöhen. Als Nächstes untersuche ich, ob MiFID II die frühzeitige Informationsweitergabe über Änderungen von Analystenempfehlungen an einzelne Anleger, genannt Tipping, reduziert hat. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die absoluten Renditen und Handelsvolumina einen Tag vor Veröffentlichung einer Hoch- oder Herabstufung vor und nach Inkrafttreten von MiFID II signifikant ansteigen. Da die Aktienkurse am Veröffentlichungstag weiter steigen bzw. fallen, profitieren ausgewählte Anleger trotz der regulatorischen Änderung weiterhin von einem Informationsvorteil. Dies hat vermutlich negative Auswirkungen auf den Finanzmarkt insgesamt. Zuletzt untersuche ich wie sich die Ausgabe von Contingent Convertible (CoCo) Anleihen, die als regulatorisches zusätzliches Kernkapital (AT1) geltend gemacht werden können, auf das Bankenrisiko auswirkt. Meine Analyse zeigt, dass AT1-CoCo-Anleihen ein bis drei Jahre nach Ausgabe zu einem signifikant höheren Bankenrisiko führen. Übereinstimmend mit theoretischen Studien deutet dies darauf hin, dass CoCo-Anleihen ihr Potenzial zur Stärkung der Eigenkapitalbasis der Banken durch die regulatorischen Anforderungen genommen wurde. / This thesis comprises three independent essays evaluating the impact of different regulatory policies on bank risk and/or financial stability. First, we examine the effects of capital regulation on the link between bank size and volatility. Our panel data analysis reveals that more stringent capital regulation weakens the size-volatility nexus. Hence, large banks show, ceteris paribus, lower loan portfolio volatility when facing more stringent capital regulation. According to the granularity concept, that can increase macroeconomic stability. Next, I evaluate if MiFID II reduced the early information disclosure on analyst recommendation changes to selected investors - so-called tipping. I find absolute returns and turnover rise significantly on the day preceding the up- or downgrade release before and after MiFID II became law. Given that stock prices move further in the revision direction on publication day, selected investors continue to profit from an informational advantage, notwithstanding the regulatory change. That is likely harmful to the financial market overall. Lastly, I examine the impact of issuing contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds that qualify as regulatory additional tier 1 (AT1) capital on bank risk. My treatment effects analysis reveals that issuing AT1 CoCo bonds results in significantly higher risk-taking one to three years after the issuance. That is in line with previous theoretical studies suggesting that regulators have stripped CoCo bonds of their potential to strengthen the banks’ capital bases.

No description available.

The aim of this research is to show the effects of financial liberalisation on emerging market economies, how these economies removed restrictions on financial institutions so that they can be globally integrated, and to show the flow of international finance in and out of a country. This research also illustrates how the financial system in these economies moved from being government-led to being market-led. The main finding of this research is that many countries failed to reap the benefits of liberalisation because of weaknesses in the regulatory structure, undercapitalised banks, volatile markets and contagion effects. The research concludes that the long-term gains of liberalisation certainly supersede short-term instability of liberalisation. Thus, for financial liberalisation to have predominantly positive effects, attention should be drawn to the importance of a more prudent regulatory and supervisory environment. Furthermore, financial liberalisation must be accompanied by a sound institutional infrastructure, proper conduct of monetary and fiscal policies, a reduction in corruption, and an increase in transparency. In addition, liberalisation should be a gradual process whereby the right measures are taken in the right sequence. / Economics / M. Comm. (Economics)

近年來，國內金融問題層出不窮，陸續發生多起的金融弊案，皆有引發金融危機之可能。因此如何強化金融監理效能，建立金融市場之安定與秩序，實為金融革新的重要議題。 世界上多數國家的金融監理架構有單一監理機關與多數監理機關，甚至折衷於二者之方式。我國目前金融市場中因金融商品之區隔性降低、金融購併與金融集團之出現、效率監理原則、及因應WTO的加入考量，究竟如何調整金融監理架構以強化金融監理效能，實為當務之急。因此，政府希冀成立金融監督管理委員會，以有效整合金融發展政策及監理事權，全面加速金融現代化工程，因應未來國際金融競爭趨勢。 而本文，以「論金融統合監理之架構」為題，試圖先對我國現行金融監理架構做一剖析；其次針對單一監理架構—以英國金融服務管理局（Financial Service Authority）、澳洲金融監理總署（Australian Prudential Regulation Authority）、韓國金融監理局（Financial Service Supervision）為介紹；在其次亦就多數監理架構為論述—以美國的金融監理架構為題；繼而對於我國未來金融監理架構—以現行的行政院金融監督管理委員會組織法草案為介紹；最後做一評析與建議。 / In the last decade, Taiwan has experienced several financial institutions scandals and a local financial crisis has almost emerged. Under such a circumstance, it is essential for the Government to undertake regulatory reform in order to enhance the regulatory efficiency and reinstate the social confidence toward the financial markets. To cope with the entrance into WTO, the trend of financial liberalization, the emergence of financial conglomerates, it seems crucial for Taiwan to reconstruct the regulatory framework to promote the regulatory effectiveness and efficiency. Under such a scenario, the Government intends to establish a new regulatory agency, i.e. the Financial Regulatory Committee, to regulate financial institutions in a consolidated approach. The main theme of this paper focuses on the issue of the consolidation in financial regulatory structure. In the first place, the current financial regulatory mechanism in Taiwan is addressed and the potential inefficiency is identified. Secondly, some models of the single-regulator approach are examined, including the Financial Services Authority of UK, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Services Supervision of South Korea. On the other hand, the US model, the most significant one in the multiple-regulator approach, is also envisaged in the third place. Fourthly, the draft of Financial Regulatory Committee Bill of Taiwan is examined and the potential failures therein are explored. As possible contribution to the financial regulatory reform in Taiwan, some conclusive remarks and suggestions are submitted in the final place.